JUDGMENT : Alok Verma, J. This writ appeal which is filed under section 2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Adhiniyam' 2005 for the sake of brevity), against the order passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 4935/2008(S). 2. The facts giving rise to this application are that the present appellant was an employee of Indore Municipal Corporation. He was reported absent from his duty w.e.f. 20.4.2003. Due to his absence from duty, a departmental enquiry was initiated against him on 25.8.2005 and after initiation of departmental enquiry, while the departmental enquiry was still pending, he submitted an application for joining duty on 1.10.2005 which was not allowed on the ground that the departmental enquiry was pending against him and he could be allowed to join the duties only subject to final outcome of the enquiry When the departmental enquiry was completed, the charges were found proved by order dated 12.7.2006. Period from 20.4.2003 to 27.8.2006 was treated as wilful absent from duty and therefore the appellant was not paid any salary of the aforesaid period on the principle of 'No Work No Pay'. 3. The present appellant had filed a writ petition bearing No. 4935/2008(S) challenging the order dated 12.7.2006 passed by the respondents on the ground that on 1.10.2005 he submitted his application for joining duties and he was willing to perform his duties and therefore, the period between 1.10.2005 to 27.8.2006 should not be treated as the period of absence and he should be paid full salary of the aforesaid period. 4. Learned Single Judge after hearing both the parties and also considering the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, AIR 2007 SC 3100 : 2007 (115) FLR 16 (Sum.) held that in this case the petitioner himself is a trouble-shooter because he remained absent from his duty w.e.f. 20.4.2003 but after initiation of the departmental enquiry on 25.8.2005, expecting harsh action against him, he marked his presence and expressed his willingness to join his duties on 1.10.2005. Learned Single Judge had observed that since it was wilful absent on the part of the present appellant his case could not be viewed liberally is in the case above and the learned Single Judge further observed that he was already treated by the department leniently and a leave without pay was sanctioned for the aforesaid period of absence. In this view of this matter, the learned Single Judge had observed that the principles laid in the case of C. Muddaiah (supra) did not apply on the present case and the writ petition was dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge, present writ appeal was filed on the grounds inter alia that the appellant was claiming the salary of the period from 1.10.2005 to 27.8.20091 when he presented himself and expressed his willingness to join his duties and he was arbitrarily not allowed to join duty and to do the work. According to him, the principles laid down in the case C. Muddaiah (supra) squarely apply on this case and therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge should be set-aside and writ appear filed by him should be allowed and the respondents should be directed to pay full salary to him for period of 1.10.2005 to 27.8.2009. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-Indore Municipal Corporation while supporting the order passed by the learned Single Judge submits that in this case a lenient view had already been taken by the Department and the period of absence was not treated as 'dies-non'. Only period of absence was regularised by sanctioning leave without pay and therefore, there as no arbitrariness in the decision taken in this case because the present appellant was himself responsible for his wilful absence from his duties and therefore no relief should be granted to him. 7. To resolve the controversy involved in this case, we may consider the facts and principle laid down in the case of C. Muddaiah (supra). 8. The facts of this case were that the writ-petitioner before the Hon'ble Apex Court was appointed as a Second Division Assistant and he was promoted as First Division Assistant subsequently in the year 1972. 7. To resolve the controversy involved in this case, we may consider the facts and principle laid down in the case of C. Muddaiah (supra). 8. The facts of this case were that the writ-petitioner before the Hon'ble Apex Court was appointed as a Second Division Assistant and he was promoted as First Division Assistant subsequently in the year 1972. The seniority list of the First Division Assistant was published and the said seniority list was challenged by the writ petitioner by filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Karnataka which was registered as Writ Petition No. 1848/1992. The petition was allowed and the High Court directed the Karnataka Housing Board to reassign seniority of the writ petitioner by placing him above the respondent Nos. 2 to 34 and also to grant other consequential benefits. A writ appeal was filed against the order passed by the earned Single Judge in writ petition which was dismissed on 30th March, 1998. Even the Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5487/1098 which was filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court was also dismissed and hence the order passed by the earned Single Judge became final. 9. The Board complied the order by reassigning seniority to the writ-petitioner, however, consequential benefits were not paid to him and for this purpose two Contempt Petitions were filed by the writ petitioner which were duly dismissed. Thereafter he filed a Ijresh Writ Petition No. 10722/2000 after Gaining age of superannuation on 28th February, 1998. This writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by taking a view that as two Contempt Petitions were already dismissed against the directions issued by earlier writ petitions, this fresh substantive writ petition did not lie as a compliment to order passed by the learned Single Judge. The writ petitioner went for writ appeal before the Division Bench and the Division Bench had allowed the appeal and directed the Board to pay consequential benefits to the petitioner. The Board challenged the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing the appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court where it was not disputed that no consequential benefits were paid to the writ petitioner by the Board. 10. The Board challenged the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing the appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court where it was not disputed that no consequential benefits were paid to the writ petitioner by the Board. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the Board had placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16 . In that case, however the legislature passed an Act with a view to nullifying the effect of order passed by the Court which attained the finality. The vires of the relevant section 11 of the Act was challenged and it was argued that the legislature had no competence to pass such Act, merely to nullify the effect of order passed by the Court of law and it was also argued that if such an Act would be passed, it would be against the principle of rule of law. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court had upheld the contentions of the writ-petitioner and while declaring certain provisions of the Act, so far as it related to the petitioner, as null and void, the petition in that case was allowed. 12. After discussing the case of S.R. Bhagwat (supra) in detail, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C. Muddaiah (supra) held as under:- "We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the Country (as has been done in the present case)". 13. 13. Applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned two cases i.e. C. Muddaiah (supra) and S.R. Bhagwat (supra), we find that in the facts and circumstances, of the present case, the appellant presented himself and expressed his willingness to join the duties which he was not allowed to do and at that point of time there was no finding in the departmental enquiry initiated against him and even if it is assumed that the charges were framed against him in which he was prima-facie found guilty of wilful absence from duty, even then, the charges were of not such nature that he was not competent to perform the duties further. This view was vindicated by the fact that ultimately when the departmental enquiry was over and he was found guilty of wilful absent from the duty, he was allowed to join duty and work, only punishment granted was that the period of his absence including the period from 1.10.2005 to 27.8.2006, was regularised by granting him leave without pay on the principle of no work no pay. 14. Therefore, applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C. Muddaiah (supra) that Court may, in a given case, when the person was willing to work but was not allowed to do so illegally and unlawfully and in such cases, the consequential benefits should be allowed to be given to such an employee. In the present case, there was no reason to refuse permission to the present appellant who was willing and ready to perform and join duties on 1.10.2005 and in this view of the matter, we find that the appellant was entitled for pay and allowances at the rate at which he was entitled to such pay and allowances between 1.10.2005 to 27.8.2006. 15. Accordingly, this writ appeal is allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court is set-aside. It is directed that the present appellant is entitled for all the consequential benefits such as his salary and allowances which were due to him between the period 1.10.2005 to 27.8.2006. The respondents are directed to pay the amount to the present appellant within three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 16. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ appeal stands disposed off. The respondents are directed to pay the amount to the present appellant within three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 16. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ appeal stands disposed off. Certified copy, as per rules.