ORDER : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. CMP No.7039 of 2016. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioners claiming therein the following reliefs:- “a. Quash the notification dated 16th May, 2016, Annexure P-11 in so far it relates to the opening of the Government Degree College, Jandaur, District Kangra, H.P. b. Prohibit the respondents from opening or starting Government Degree College Jandaur, District Kangra, H.P. from the Academic Sessions 2016-2017 and constructing building and creating infrastructure for the Degree College at Jandaur.” 2. The respondents in the year 2012 decided to open eight colleges including the one at Kotla Behr. On 02.03.2013, the college at Kotla Behr was de-notified and the said decision was challenged by one Harbans Lal Kalia by medium of CWP No.1526 of 2013. This petition was decided alongwith bunch of petitions which pertained to the other colleges as de-notified vide notification dated 02.03.2013. This Court upheld the decision of the respondents, as would be clear from para-43 of the judgment which reads thus:- “43. We may now turn to writ petition No.1526 of 2013 in respect of Government Degree College at Kotla Behar in Kangra District. The original record produced before us contains a communication, purported to be dated 15th June, 2012, sent from the office of the then Chief Minister addressed to the Principal Secretary (Education), mentioning that during the tour to Dehra, District Kangra, on 9th June, 2012, the (then) Chief Minister made announcement to start a Government Degree College at Kotla Behar, Tehsil Jaswan, District Kangra, from current academic session i.e. 2012-13. The communication calls upon the Principal Secretary (Education), Government of Himachal Pradesh, to take immediate action to comply with the said announcement made by the (then) Chief Minister and send compliance report within 15 days. It is in this backdrop, the Department moved into action and after completing the necessary paper work, issued notification on 23rd June, 2012 within the prescribed time. Notably, the decision to start new College is sought to be justified on some report prepared in the year 2003. However, no attempt was made by the dispensation to examine other relevant factors before taking the final decision. The Government Senior Secondary School was, obviously, compelled to set apart three rooms from its building to accommodate the College. That inevitably compromised the quality education imparted to its students. However, no attempt was made by the dispensation to examine other relevant factors before taking the final decision. The Government Senior Secondary School was, obviously, compelled to set apart three rooms from its building to accommodate the College. That inevitably compromised the quality education imparted to its students. Besides, only 16 students were finally admitted in this College for the academic year 2012-13. In other words, the three reasons recorded for closing this College cannot be discarded nor can be said to be mala fide or unreasonable. The fact that the local Gram Panchayats were supportive of setting up the said College cannot be the basis to ignore the opinion recorded in the impugned decision, which is taken in public interest. Accordingly, even this petition ought to fail for the same reasons.” 3. It would be evident from the aforesaid decision that the considerations which primarily weighed with the Court to uphold the decision of the Government was that the opening of college at Kotla Behr would have inevitably compromised the quality education to be imparted to the students and, therefore, the reasons given by the respondents for closing the college could not be discarded nor said to be tainted with malafide or unreasonable. It was also observed that merely because the Gram Panchayats had been supporting the setting up of the colleges could not be the basis to ignore the opinion recorded in the decision of the Government which had been taken in public interest. 4. It was pursuant to the decision rendered in CWP No.1526 of 2013 alongwith other batch of petitions that the respondents formulated the guidelines for setting up the colleges vide notification dated 02.01.2014. Later, vide notifications dated 15.01.2014 and 24.02.2014, the Government took decision to open various new colleges, but college of Kotla Behr was not included in the aforesaid notifications. However, strangely enough, the petitioners filed a writ petition therein again assailing the notification dated 02.03.2013 whereby the respondents had already de-notified the college at Kotla Behr. This petition came to be allowed and the decision dated 02.03.2013 which as stated above had already been upheld in CWP No.1526 of 2013 came to be quashed and set aside vide judgment dated 20.07.2015. 5. This petition came to be allowed and the decision dated 02.03.2013 which as stated above had already been upheld in CWP No.1526 of 2013 came to be quashed and set aside vide judgment dated 20.07.2015. 5. The matter is now sub-judice before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition C.C. No.21698 of 2015 and the judgment and order passed by this Court on 20.07.2015 has been ordered to be stayed vide order dated 29.02.2016. 6. On 16.05.2016, the Government issued yet another notification for opening Government Degree College at Jandaur, District Kangra, which decision is the subject matter of the instant petition. The petitioners have assailed the notification on the ground that the same was arbitrary and irrational and taken with a view to frustrate the decision rendered by this Court on 20.07.2015 and that the respondents have not been guided by sound policies and doctrine of good governance in the State. 7. Alongwith the writ petition, the petitioners filed an application for interim directions and vide orders passed by this Court on 27.05.2016 the notification dated 16.05.2016 was ordered to be stayed. 8. The respondents have filed their reply wherein they have raised preliminary objections regarding the very maintainability of the petition on the ground that it is more than settled law that Court should be chary from interfering in policy matters and infusing or imposing its assessment of the policy, especially, when the same does not suffer from any malice or arbitrariness. On merits, it is averred that the decision of the Government to establish college at Jandaur was taken as the same would benefit the general public of the area as it would cater to the areas of Sanasrpur terrace Suelkhad, Nari Ghati, Ghati Bilwan, Jandaur, Katola, Bathu, Tippari, Ghamroor, Gangret, Dharmshala Mahantan, Gindpur Malon, Bari and such other backward adjoining areas. It is further averred that the area in question is semi-hill area and only one major district road passes through the same. Moreover, as the mode of transport is very limited and the students, particularly girl students cannot conveniently travel long distances and, therefore, after taking into consideration the judgment rendered by this Court on 18.06.2013 in CWP No.1468 of 2013 and after keeping in view the guidelines issued on 02.01.2014, the respondents have decided to open a college at Jandaur. 9. Moreover, as the mode of transport is very limited and the students, particularly girl students cannot conveniently travel long distances and, therefore, after taking into consideration the judgment rendered by this Court on 18.06.2013 in CWP No.1468 of 2013 and after keeping in view the guidelines issued on 02.01.2014, the respondents have decided to open a college at Jandaur. 9. At this stage, the learned Advocate General has prayed for vacation of the interim orders dated 27.05.2016 on the ground that these orders virtually amount to sitting over the judgment rendered by this Court in CWP No.1468/2013 and that apart this Court ought not to interfere with the policy matters, particularly, when the decision of the respondents is not tainted with malafide and is not even otherwise arbitrary and illegal. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 10. Shri K.D.Sood, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the decision taken by the respondents for not restarting the Government Degree College at Kotla Behr and issuing notification to open the same at Jandaur which is 3 kilometres away from Kotla Behr is arbitrary, irrational and has been brought about with a view to frustrate the decision rendered by this Court on 20.07.2015. He further argued that the decision has been taken without taking into consideration the local conditions ignoring the comparative advantages of Kotla Behr vis-à-vis Jandaur like Kotla Behr was having no institution of higher studies, but was having sufficient feeder institution as there were 11 Government Senior Secondary Schools in the vicinity with a strength of more than 1000 students. The decision was taken by the respondents in haste and amounted to discrimination to the people of the area and the decision had been taken only when there was change of guard in the State. 11. On the other hand, Shri Shrawan Dogra, learned Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3, would vehemently argue that the decision by the respondents had been taken in the larger public interest that too strictly in accordance with the guidelines dated 02.01.2014. It is further argued that the policy cannot be vitiated only on the ground of change of Government as the Government has discretion to adopt a different policy or alter or change its policy calculated to serve public interest and make it more effective. It is further argued that the policy cannot be vitiated only on the ground of change of Government as the Government has discretion to adopt a different policy or alter or change its policy calculated to serve public interest and make it more effective. The choice in the balancing of pros and cons relevant to the change in policy lies with the authority and until and unless proved to be in conflict with Wednesbury’s reasonableness or arbitrary, irrational, bias or malafide should not normally be interfered with. 12. It cannot be disputed that when the Government forms a policy, it is based upon number of circumstances on facts, law including constraints based on its resources. It is also based upon expert opinion. It would be dangerous if Court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavit. The Court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive (Refer: State of Punjab and others versus Ram Lubhaya Bagga etc. etc. AIR 1998 SC 1703 ). 13. It is well settled that the Court cannot strike down a policy on decision taken by the Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been fairer and more scientific or logical or wiser. The wisdom and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional provision or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power. (See: Ram Singh Vijay Pal Singh and others versus State of U.P. and others (2007) 6 SCC 44 , Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam versus Union of India and others (2009) 7 SCC 561 , State of Kerala and another versus Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Kerala State Unit and others (2009) 8 SCC 46 . 14. Thus, what emerges to be a settled legal proposition is that the Government has the power and competence to change the policy on the basis of the ground realities. A public policy cannot be challenged through PIL when the State Government is competent to frame a policy and there is no need to anyone to raise any grievance if any policy is changed. A public policy cannot be challenged through PIL when the State Government is competent to frame a policy and there is no need to anyone to raise any grievance if any policy is changed. The public policy can only be challenged where it offends some constitutional or statutory provisions (Refer: State of Madhya Pradesh versus Narmada Bachao Andolan and another (2011) 7 SCC 639 ). 15. It is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. 16. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the state, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heart beat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness. (See: Union of India & Anr. versus International Trading Co. and Another (2003) 5 SCC 437 . 17. It is equally settled that the Government policy can be changed with the changing circumstances and only on the ground of change, such policy will not be vitiated. (See: Union of India & Anr. versus International Trading Co. and Another (2003) 5 SCC 437 . 17. It is equally settled that the Government policy can be changed with the changing circumstances and only on the ground of change, such policy will not be vitiated. The Government has discretion to adopt a different policy or alter or change its policy calculated to solve the public interest and make it more effective. The choice in the balancing of pros and cons relevant to the change in policy lies with the authority. 18. What would be the extent of the powers vested with the Court to review policy decision was the subject-matter of recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Essar Steel Ltd. versus Union of India and others AIR 2016 SC 1980 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “30. Before we can examine the validity of the impugned policy decision dated 06.03.2007, it is crucial to understand the extent of the power vested with this Court to review policy decisions. In the case of Delhi Development Authority ( AIR 2008 SC 1343 ) (supra) on issue of judicial review of policy decisions, the power of the court is examined and observed as under: “An executive order termed as a policy decision is not beyond the pale of judicial review. Whereas the superior courts may not interfere with the natty grittiest of the policy, or substitute one by the other but it will not be correct to contend that the court shall like its judicial hands off, when a plea is raised that the impugned decision is a policy decision. Interference therewith on the part of the superior court would not be without jurisdiction as it is subject to judicial review. Broadly, a policy decision is subject to judicial review on the following grounds: (a) if it is unconstitutional; (b) if it is de’hors the provisions of the Act and the Regulations; (c) if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation; (d) if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or a larger policy.” 31. Thus, we will test the impugned policy on the above grounds to determine whether it warrants our interference under Article 136 or not. Thus, we will test the impugned policy on the above grounds to determine whether it warrants our interference under Article 136 or not. Further, this Court neither has the jurisdiction nor the competence to judge the viability of such policy decisions of the Government in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India (2013) 7 SCC 1 , this Court has further held as under: “This Court sitting in the jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment over the commercial or business decision taken by parties to the agreement, after evaluating and Assessing its monetary and financial implications, unless the decision is in clear violation of any statutory provisions or perverse or for ex traneous considerations or improper motives. States and its instrumentalities can enter into various contracts which may involve complex economical factors. State or the State undertaking being a party to a contract, have to make various decisions which they deem just and proper. There is always an element of risk in such decisions, ultimately it may turn out to be a correct decision or a wrong one. But if the decision is taken bona fide and in public interest, the mere fact that decision has ultimately proved to be a wrong, that itself is not a ground to hold that the decision was mala fide or done with ulterior motives.” (emphasis laid by this Court) In the case of Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India (2009) 7 SCC 561 , it was held as under: “It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a Petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the Government has, while taking a decision, right to "trial and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the Government has, while taking a decision, right to "trial and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts.” (emphasis laid by this Court) A Three Judge bench of this Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 664 cautioned against Courts sitting in appeal against policy decisions. It was held as under: “234.In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the Courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in Public Interest to require the Court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the Court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more options or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the Court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.” (emphasis laid by this Court) A similar sentiment was echoed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India (1992) 2 SCC 343 , wherein it was observed as under: “Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India (1992) 2 SCC 343 , wherein it was observed as under: “Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the Courts to sit in Judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts.” A perusal of the above mentioned judgments of this Court would show that this Court should exercise great caution and restraint when confronted with matters related to the policy regarding commercial matters of the country. Executive policies are usually enacted after much deliberation by the Government. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for this Court to question the wisdom of the same, unless it is demonstrated by the aggrieved persons that the said policy has been enacted in an arbitrary, unreasonable or malafide manner, or that it offends the provisions of the Constitution of India.” 19. It would, thus, be clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that broadly a policy decision is subject to judicial review on the following grounds:- (i) if the policy fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it shall be unconstitutional; (ii) the change in policy must be made fairly and should not give impression that it was so done arbitrarily of any ulterior intention; (iii) the policy can be faulted on the ground of malafide unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc.; (iv) if the policy is found against any statue or Constitution or runs counter to the philosophy behind these provisions; (v) it is dehors the provisions of the Act or Legislations; (vi) if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation. 20. It cannot be disputed that it is within the complete domain of the State to select a site for construction of college which decision obviously would be taken after taking into consideration various factors in mind. The Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with such policy matters. 21. 20. It cannot be disputed that it is within the complete domain of the State to select a site for construction of college which decision obviously would be taken after taking into consideration various factors in mind. The Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with such policy matters. 21. Direct authority on the subject is judgment rendered by an Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others versus Lok Shikshan Sanstha and others AIR 1973 SC 588 wherein while dealing with the State Policy in the matter of giving permission to start educational institutions, it was held that the High Court should not interfere so long as fundamental rights and principles of natural justice are not violated and it would be apt to reproduce para -9 of the judgment which reads thus:- “9. Before we deal with the above contentions advanced before us on behalf of both sides, it is necessary to state that the High Court in the judgment under attack has made certain observations regarding what according to it should be the policy adopted by the educational authorities in the matter of permitting the starting of a new school or of an additional school in a particular locality or area. It is enough to state that the High Court has thoroughly misunderstood the nature of the jurisdiction that was exercised by it when dealing with the claims of the two writ petitioners that their applications had been wrongly rejected by the educational authorities. So long as there is no violation of any fundamental rights and if the principles of natural justice are not offended, it was not for the High Court to lay down the policy that should be adopted by the educational authorities in the matter of granting permission for starting schools. The question of policy is essentially for the State and such policy will depend upon an overall assessment and summary of the requirements of residents of a particular locality and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for education. If the overall assessment is arrived at after a proper classification on a reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with the policy leading up to such assessment.” 22. If the overall assessment is arrived at after a proper classification on a reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with the policy leading up to such assessment.” 22. A similar issue with regard to shifting of school from one place to another came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Shikshan Prasarak Mandal versus State of Maharashtra and others (2001) 10 SCC 75 and it was held that the High Court should not interfere with the Government order granting permission to shift the school in absence of it being malicious, arbitrary or whimsical and it is apt to reproduce para -3 of the judgment which reads thus:- “3……..The shifting of the school from one place to the other or having an ashram school at one place is not governed by any statutory rules and it is in fact a policy decision of the Government. So long as the government decision is not actuated with any malice or is not the outcome of an arbitrary and whimsical act, the same should not be interfered with by a court of law under Article 226 of the Constitution of India……” 23. Similar reiterations of law can be found in CWP No.621 of 2014 titled as Nand Lal and another versus State of H.P. & others, CWP No.7115 of 2013 titled as Sher Singh versus State of H.P. & others, CWP No.4625 of 2012 titled as Gurbachan versus State of H.P. & others, CWP No.3862 of 2014 titled as Surinder Kumar versus State of H.P. and others, CWP No.2927 of 2015 titled as Rikhi Ram and another versus State of H.P. and others, CWP No.359 of 2016 titled as Ranjan Singh and others versus State of H.P. and others, CWP No.1764 of 2012 titled as Meena Kumari versus Union of India and others and CWP No.1307 of 2016 titled as Mohan Dutt and another versus Union India and others. 24. As we are only dealing with the prayer of vacation of stay, we need not to delve in detail in merits of the case. Suffice it to say that prima facie we do not find the action of the respondents in opening the college at Jandaur to be either malicious, arbitrary or whimsical. 24. As we are only dealing with the prayer of vacation of stay, we need not to delve in detail in merits of the case. Suffice it to say that prima facie we do not find the action of the respondents in opening the college at Jandaur to be either malicious, arbitrary or whimsical. That apart, the decision taken by the respondents cannot be termed to be unconstitutional or dehors the provisions of any Act or Regulation or even notification dated 02.0 1.2014. The decision is not even contrary to the statutory provision and larger public policy, but appears to have been taken after due care and consideration. 25. In addition to the aforesaid, it appears that the petitioners at the time of passing of interim orders had not even brought to the notice of this Court the fact that the decisions qua de-notifying the Degree College at Kotla Behr dated 02.03.2013 had already been upheld by this Court in CWP No.1526 of 2013 titled Harbans Lal Kalia versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another. 26. Moreover, no reliance, at this stage, can be placed on the judgment rendered by this Court in CWP No.1526 of 2013 (supra) as the same has been stayed and the matter is now sub-judice before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. That apart, the petitioners during the course of hearing of this petition had repeatedly sought adjournments, firstly, on the ground that they wanted to move a transfer petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition C.C.No.21698 of 2015 as mentioned in para-5 (supra) and thereafter after having preferred a Transfer Petition (Civil) No.1173 of 2016 sought adjournment on the ground that the application is likely to take up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, the facts remains that the application though stands filed, yet no orders till date have been passed thereupon. 28. As observed earlier, the decision to open a college at Jandaur, prima facie, appears to have been taken in the larger public interest and, therefore, the said decision cannot be stayed indefinitely. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the interim order passed by this Court on 27.05.2016 whereby the notification dated 16.05.2016 (Annexure P-11) to the extent it pertains to the opening of Degree College at Janduar has been stayed deserves to be vacated. Ordered accordingly. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the interim order passed by this Court on 27.05.2016 whereby the notification dated 16.05.2016 (Annexure P-11) to the extent it pertains to the opening of Degree College at Janduar has been stayed deserves to be vacated. Ordered accordingly. However, it is made clear that in case the respondents open the college at Jandaur, the same shall be subject to the final outcome of this petition. The application is accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid terms.