JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. This criminal appeal under Section 374 (2) Cr.P.C. is preferred by the accused-appellant to assail the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2006 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Hanumangarh (for short 'the learned Trial Court') in Sessions Case No. 07/2005 whereby the appellant is convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC and handed down sentence of life term imprisonment on 08.12.2006. 2. The facts apposite for the purpose of this appeal are that PW- 7 Gyan Singh resident of ward No. 15 submitted a written report (Ex.P/6) at Police Station, Hanumangarh Town alleging therein that appellant is his neighbour besides Baldev alias Deva. It is also stated in the written report that there was serious acrimony between Baldev and the appellant and the cause of annoyance of the accused-appellant was illicit relation of his wife with Baldev. As per the written report, on 21.11.2004 at about 9:45 p.m. when the informant PW-7 Gyan Singh was standing on street, he heard some noise and alarm from the house of appellant Satish Kumar where his wife was shouting to save Baldev and thereupon he went to appellant's house and saw that Baldev was lying on the bed and appellant was inflicting blow on his head by a laundry bat (wooden 'Ghota'). The injuries caused by wooden 'Ghota' oozed out blood from the head of Baldev and thereafter Baldev was taken to hospital by him. Pursuant to the written report, FIR (Ex.P/8) was registered against the appellant for the offence under Sections 307 & 223 IPC. The injuries suffered by Baldev proved fatal and after ten days, he succumbed to injuries and consequently, the police added offence under Section 302 IPC and after completing investigation submitted charge-sheet against the accused-appellant before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate while resorting to Section 209 Cr.P.C. committed the case to the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court framed charge against the accused-appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC and charge was denied by the accused-appellant. Later on, the learned Trial Court proceeded for trial of the case. The prosecution in order to bring home guilt for the offence under Section 302 IPC against the appellant, examined 12 witnesses and some documents were also exhibited for substantiating the charge. Later on, the learned Trial Court proceeded for trial of the case. The prosecution in order to bring home guilt for the offence under Section 302 IPC against the appellant, examined 12 witnesses and some documents were also exhibited for substantiating the charge. On completion of prosecution evidence, statements of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded wherein accused-appellant has pleaded that he has been falsely implicated and also craved before the learned Trial Court for producing his defence. In his defence, the appellant examined two witnesses. Upon conclusion of the trial, arguments were heard and the learned Trial Court by the impugned judgment indicted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC and handed down the sentence referred to supra. 4. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant Mr. M.K. Garg at the outset while admitting the occurrence of incident submits that taking into account facts and circumstances of the instant case, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is not sustainable. Mr. Garg would contend that upon harmonious construction of the entire prosecution evidence, it is abundantly clear that there is no iota of evidence to show that the act of the appellant was with intention of causing such bodily injuries to the deceased which is likely to cause death. Learned counsel further submits that there is no semblance of proof that appellant has acted with premeditated mind to cause death and it was clear case of sudden provocation depriving the appellant of the power and self-control and, therefore, learned Trial Court ought to have examined this aspect objectively so as to record conviction of appellant under Section 304 Part-I IPC instead of Section 302 IPC. Mr. Garg while elaborating his submission in this behalf has also urged that even the alleged weapon of offence, a laundry bat ('Ghota') was a domestic article useful for washing cloths is indicative of the fact that the appellant has acted in spur of moment to give blow on the head of the victim, sufficient to mitigate the offence. Mr. Garg while elaborating his submission in this behalf has also urged that even the alleged weapon of offence, a laundry bat ('Ghota') was a domestic article useful for washing cloths is indicative of the fact that the appellant has acted in spur of moment to give blow on the head of the victim, sufficient to mitigate the offence. Lastly, learned counsel has urged that infidelity of appellant's wife and presence of the victim in his bed obviously resulted in grave and sudden provocation, prompting the accused to become violent for giving thrashing to the victim was a very vital fact which has not been taken note of by the learned Trial Court, is sufficient to vitiate the finding and alter the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 304 Part-I IPC i.e. culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 5. E converso, learned Public Prosecutor has vehemently argued that entire prosecution evidence duly supported by medical evidence has rightly persuaded the learned Trial Court for recording conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and, therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment is warranted. Learned Public Prosecutor would contend that learned Trial Court on appreciation of evidence has recorded a definite finding that repeated below was given on the head of the deceased by the appellant with intention to cause death and, therefore, impugned judgment is not liable to be tinkered with for altering the conviction under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I IPC. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned Public Prosecutor, perused the impugned judgment and thoroughly scanned the entire record of the case. 7. The pivotal question which has emerged for consideration in this appeal lies in narrow compass inasmuch as on behalf of the appellant, occurrence of incident is admitted and arguments are essentially canvassed for altering his conviction under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I IPC. In that background, our endeavour is to re-apprise the entire prosecution evidence in conjunction with available material for ascertaining as to whether the act/omission of the accused-appellant amounts to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder for recording his conviction under Section 304 Part-I IPC. That apart, we are also required to see the findings in this behalf recorded by the learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment. That apart, we are also required to see the findings in this behalf recorded by the learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment. For thrashing the matter on this crucial issue, it has become imperative for us to scrutinise the entire evidence with forensic approach. The prosecution in order to bring home guilt against the accused-appellant has examined three ocular witnesses PW-1 Parmanand, PW-2 Smt. Urmila and PW-3 Kala Makkad, besides first informant PW-7 Gyan Singh. 8. PW-1 Parmanand in his examination-in-chief has fully supported the prosecution story attributing a definite role of the accused-appellant in commission of offence. The witness has also stated that appellant was giving blow of laundry bat on the head of the victim when he along with his son Kala and PW-7 Gyan Singh reached to the appellant's house. PW-1 has also stated that why the appellant has attacked the victim is not known to him but simultaneously he has also asserted that appellant had suspicion about the character of Baldev, his wife and sister-in-law. The relevant excerpts of statement of PW-1 recorded during his examination-in-chief reads as under:- " lrh'k us ;s ekjihV D;ksa dh irk ughaA lrh'k fcanw dk HkkbZ cuk gqvk Fkk vkSj og mlds ?kj ij jgrk FkkA lrh'k fngkM+h oxSjk djrk Fkk lrh'k dks cynso ij 'kd FkkA mldh ?kjokyh fcUnw ;k mldh lkyh xyr /kU/kk djrh FkhA " 9. During his cross-examination, the witness has clearly stated that on the same day at about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. police reached at the spot in his presence but no investigation was conducted. He has further stated that on the next day morning, he was not present at the site. The relevant portion of his statement in this behalf during cross-examination reads as under:- " lrh'k dks mlh le; jkr dks iqfyl okys idM+ dj ys x;s Fks fcUnw vkSj fdj.k mlh le; Qjkj gks x;sA iqfyl jkr dks gh lk<+s ukS&nl cts djhc ?kVukLFky ij vk x;h FkhA jkr dks iqfyl us esjs lkeus dksbZ dkxth dk;Zokgh ?kVuk LFky ij ugha dhA lqcg dk;Z dk;Zokgh ekSds ij dh ;k ugha dh eSa ?kVuk LFky ij lqcg ekStwn ugha FkkA " 10. In the later part of his cross-examination, he has contradicted his statement recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The relevant excerpts showing contradiction in the statement of witness from his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D/1) reads as under:- " Fkkus okyksa dks eSaus ?kVuk dh lwpuk tkdj nh ysfdu Fkkus okyksa us esjh dksbZ fjiksVZ ugha fy[khA izn'kZ Mh&1 dk fgLlk , ls ch cynso dk ----- pksVsa ekjh] izn'kZ Mh&1 dk fgLlk lh ls Mh brus esa--- lrh'k ds ?kj esa x;s] izn'kZ Mh&1 dk fgLlk bZ ls ,Q geus ns[kk-----dejs esa iM+k Fkk eSaus ugha fy[kk;sA " 11. The contradictory version of the witness from his statement (Ex.D/1) from A to B, C to D and E to F reads as under:- " cynso dk lrh'k dh iRuh ds lkFk uktk;t laca/k gksus dh jaft'k dks ysdj gh lrh'k us cynso ij tkuysok pksVsa ekjh gSA brus esa oDr ikSus nl cts lh fcUnw tksj ls fpYykrh gqbZ vius ?kj ls fudyh o dgk cynso dks lrh'k dqekj ekj jgk gSA mls cpk yks rks eSa o esjk yM+dk dkyk o Kku flag Hkkxdj lrh'k ds ?kj esa x;sA geus ns[kk fd lrh'k ds gkFk esa ?kksVuk ydM+h dk Fkk ;k o cynso cSM ij dejs esa iM+k FkkA " 12. The other prosecution witness PW-2 Smt. Urmila has also corroborated the version of PW-1 in her examination-in-chief. Quite interestingly, she has shown her presence at the time of commission of offence by the appellant which PW-1 Parmanand, her husband has not admitted in his deposition. There is yet another aspect of the matter that PW-1 in his statement while asserting arrest of the accused-appellant at the site has testified that wife of appellant-accused Bindu and Kiran, sister-in-law eloped from the scene of occurrence. However, PW-2 Smt. Urmila has not corroborated this version of her husband PW-1. There is yet another aspect of the matter that PW-1 in his statement while asserting arrest of the accused-appellant at the site has testified that wife of appellant-accused Bindu and Kiran, sister-in-law eloped from the scene of occurrence. However, PW-2 Smt. Urmila has not corroborated this version of her husband PW-1. PW-2 has also stated that her statements were not recorded by the police but when she was confronted with her police statement (Ex.D/2) she has shown her ignorance in non-mentioning of some of the incriminating part of her statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The relevant excerpts of her statement during cross-examination reads as under:- " iqfyl c;ku izn'kZ Mh&2 esa fNUnziky oksVksa esa [kM+k gqvk Fkk vkSj mldks yM~Mqvksa ls rksy jgs Fks ;g ckr eSaus izn'kZ Mh&2 esa fy[kk nh Fkh blesa dSls ugha fy[kh gS irk ugha gSA izn'kZ Mh&2 esa ;g fy[kk fn;k Fkk fd lrh'k dk nl lky ds yM+ds dk esjs ikl vkuk vkSj mldk ;g crkuk fd esjs eEeh] ikik] ekek] ekSlh >xM+ jgs gSa eSaus rks fy[kk fn;k Fkk blesa dSls ugha fy[kk gS irk ugha gSaA lrh'k] nsok] eEeh >xM+ jgs gSa ;g ckr izn'kZ Mh&2 esa dSls ugha fy[kh gS irk ughaA izn'kZ Mh&2 esa eSaus ;g fy[kk fn;k Fkk fd vkSj mldks NqM+kvksa eSaus fy[kk fn;k Fkk blesa dSls ugha fy[kk gS irk ugha gSA izn'kZ Mh&2 esa lrh'k ds gkFk esa ?kksVuk gksus dh ckr dSls ugha fy[kh gS irk ugha gS] eSaus rks fy[kk gh nh FkhA izn'kZ Mh&2 fgLlk , ls ch ml le;------ Hkkx x;k lrh'k lqudj xokg us dgk fd eSaus ugha fy[kk;kA izn'kZ Mh&2 esa fdj.k o fcUnw ikl [kM+h Fkh eSaus fy[kk fn;k Fkk blesa dSls ugha fy[kk gS irk ughaA izn'kZ Mh&2 esa esjs ifr dk iqfyl Fkkuk tkuk vkSj ogka ls iqfyl dks ykuk eSaus fy[kk fn;k Fkk blesa dSls ugha fy[kk gS irk ughaA izn'kZ Mh&2 esa lrh'k dk esjs lkeus rhu pkj ?kksVus dh nsok ds flj esa ekjus dh ckr eSaus fy[kk nh Fkh blesa dSls ugha fy[kk gS irk ughaA " 13. PW-3 Kala Makkad, the other eyewitness has also tried to corroborate the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 during his examination-in-chief. Quite interestingly, during his cross-examination, the witness has said that police has not solicited any information from him. PW-3 Kala Makkad, the other eyewitness has also tried to corroborate the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 during his examination-in-chief. Quite interestingly, during his cross-examination, the witness has said that police has not solicited any information from him. PW-3 while contradicting the statement of PW-1 has made an attempt to show presence of PW-3 Smt. Urmila, his mother at the scene of occurrence. Some contradictions in his police statements are also clearly visible during his cross-examination. The relevant part reads as under:- " izn'kZ Mh&3 esa lrh'k ds yM+ds }kjk ;g dguk o fpYykdj dj ;g dguk fd esjs ikik esjs ekek dks ekj jgsa gSa mldks NqM+ok nks ;g ckr izn'kZ Mh&3 esa dSls ugha fy[kh gS irk ugha gS eSaus rks fy[kk nh FkhA izn'kZ Mh&3 esa esjs ns[krs ns[krs lrh'k us nks rhu ?kksVs dh pksVsa ekjus dh ckr eSaus rks iqfyl dks crkbZ Fkh iqfyl us izn'kZ Mh&3 esa ;g ckr dSls ugha fy[kh gS irk ughaA izn'kZ Mh&3 esa nsok dks VSEiksa esa Mkydj vLirky ys x;k Fkk ;g ckr izn'kZ Mh&3 esa dSls ugha fy[kh gS irk ugha gS eSaus rks iqfyl dks crk nh FkhA " As regards recovery of laundry bat, version of PW-3 is evasive as is evident from his following statement:- " eq>s irk ugha fd iqfyl mlh le; ?kksVk ys xbZ ;k ughaA " 14. Now switching on to the testimony of PW-7 Gyan Singh, suffice it to observe that he has turned hostile and completely repudiated the prosecution story. PW-7 has also denied about submission of written report (Ex.P/6) before the SHO, Police Station, Hanumangarh town. 15. PW-8 Vijaypal Singh, S.H.O. & I.O. has mainly dilated on the investigation conducted by him and also proved documents which were produced in support of prosecution case. During his cross-examination, I.O. has stated that when the victim was admitted in the hospital, information was divulged to the Medical Jurist and requisite entry was also made in Rojnamcha. However, requisite entry of Rojnamcha was not produced with the charge-sheet. I.O. has also made an attempt to prove written report (Ex.P/6) submitted by Gyan Singh and has further asserted that PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-7 were eyewitnesses. During his cross-examination, I.O. has not been able to dilate on the medical report of PGI, Chandigarh (Ex.D/4) and stated that only an expert can show the real cause of death of the victim. 16. During his cross-examination, I.O. has not been able to dilate on the medical report of PGI, Chandigarh (Ex.D/4) and stated that only an expert can show the real cause of death of the victim. 16. Now, we deem it just and appropriate to examine the crucial evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the touchstone of expert evidence i.e. PW-9 Dr. Jaspal Badpagga and PW-11 Dr. Yogendra Bansal. 17. PW-9 Dr. Jaspal Badpagga has identified three lacerated wounds on the head of the victim of equal dimensions i.e. 2½ x ½ cm. While proving injury report of the deceased (Ex.P/19) the witness has accepted the suggestion of the defence that such injury can be caused by falling on a hard surface or pointed object. The relevant part of statement of PW-9 reads as under: " ;g ckr lgh gS fd izn'kZ ih&19 dh mij ls ;fn dksbZ fxjs vkSj uhps iFkjhyh mcM+ [kkcM+ ;k uqdhyh txg gks rks ,slh pksV vkus dh lEHkkouk ls badkj ugha fd;k tk ldrkA izn'kZ ih&19 esa eSaus fgLlk b ls ,Q eSaus eqvk;uk ds le; ekStwn ltZu dh jk; ls fy[kk Fkk fd bldks fdlh mPp laLFkku esa bykt ds fy, Hkstk tkosA eq>s ;g Hkh ;kn ugha gS fd izn'kZ ih&9 esa b ls ,Q tks eSaus fy[kk Fkk oks fdl ltZu ds dgus ij eSaus fy[kk FkkA izn'kZ ih&19 esa ,slk dksbZ uksV esjs }kjk Mkyk x;k ugha gSA fd tc eSaus cynsoflag dks tc eSaus ns[kk rks ml le; mldh gkyr [kjkc gksA eq>s ;g irk ugha gS fd et:c cynso flag ds ,Dljs gq, ;k ugha eSaus cynsoflag ds ,Dljs djokus dh fgnk;r nh FkhA eSa ;g ugha crk ldrk fd cynsoflag gk;j lSaVj ds fy, vLirky ls fdrus cts jokuk gqvkA " 18. PW-11 Dr. Yogendra Bansal, Assistant Professor of PGI, Chandigarh has opined that injuries were caused on the head of victim by blunt object. He has further stated that the interregnum period between sustaining of injuries and death is approximately ten days and post mortem was conducted after one day and five hours. PW-11 Dr. Yogendra Bansal, Assistant Professor of PGI, Chandigarh has opined that injuries were caused on the head of victim by blunt object. He has further stated that the interregnum period between sustaining of injuries and death is approximately ten days and post mortem was conducted after one day and five hours. The relevant excerpts of the statement of PW-11 in the form of his opinion reads as under:- " jk;%& esjh jk; esa e`rd dh e`R;q dzsfu;ks lSjhcy Msest dh otg ls gqbZ ftldh otg flj ij CyaV pksV }kjk gqbZ pksVksa ds dkj.k gS lkjh dh lkjh pksVsa e`R;q ls igys gh ikbZ xbZ tks fd CyaV vksCtsDV ds }kjk gks ldrh gSA pksV yxus vkSj e`R;q ds chp dk yxHkx le; djhc 10 fnu vkSj e`R;q vkSj 'ko ijh{k.k ds chp ,d fnu ikap ?k.Vs dk le; FkkA " 19. Being an expert in forensic science, the witness has not been able to show which injury besides injury No. 3 was fatal and could have caused death of the victim. The relevant part of the statement of PW-11 reads as under:- " pksV la[;k 3 ds vykok reke pksVsa tks e`rd ds flj ij Fkh mlls e`rd dh e`R;q gqbZ gS batjh uEcj 3 ds vykok ,slh lkr pksVksa ls eSa ;g ugha crk ldrk fd fdl ,d pksV ls e`R;q dkfjr gqbZ Fkh vt[kqn dk fd lHkh pksVksa ds dkj.k e`R;q gqbZ FkhA eSa ;g ugha crk ldrk fd e`rd dks fdlh vkSj vPNs U;qjksltZu ls bykt fn;k tkrk rks e`rd ds cpus dh lEHkkouk Fkh ;k ugha blds ckjs esa U;wjksltZu gh crk ldrk gSA " 20. A cumulative reading of the evidence of all the witnesses and upon harmonious construction, it is apparent that prosecution has not been able to prove which injury other than injury No. 3 was fatal so as to cause death of the victim. Admittedly, death of victim occasioned ten days after the incident is also a mitigating factor to prove the gravity and magnitude of the injuries suffered by the victim. It is far more disquieting that even the expert of forensic science has not tendered his straight forward opinion to prove the cause of death. PW-11 Dr. Yogendra Bansal during his deposition is not sure so as to prove which injury besides injury No. 3 was fatal culminating into most probable result i.e. death. 21. It is far more disquieting that even the expert of forensic science has not tendered his straight forward opinion to prove the cause of death. PW-11 Dr. Yogendra Bansal during his deposition is not sure so as to prove which injury besides injury No. 3 was fatal culminating into most probable result i.e. death. 21. There remains no quarrel that nature of offence whether it is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder depends upon the degree of risk to human life. At this stage, we are also persuaded to observe that the alleged weapon of offence was a domestic article and by applying the test of prudency, it is rather difficult to comprehend that the same can be utilised as a weapon for commission of offence. Even the evidence of expert is confined to injury No. 3 for proving the same as fatal to life. The prosecution evidence, to a great extent, hovers around the alleged cause of acrimony between the appellant and the deceased namely doubt of the appellant about chastity of his wife and involvement of victim in this behalf. The presence of deceased in the house of appellant during odd hours i.e. about 9:15 p.m. and recovery of his dead body from the cot further strengthens the theory that appellant has acted in grave and sudden provocation upon witnessing something unpleasant and obnoxious. Therefore, in totality, we are afraid, this was not an overt act of the accused-appellant with premeditated mind to liquidate the victim. Witnessing something unusual has prompted the appellant-accused and that is why he has acted in spur of moment for giving one fatal blow of laundry bat on the head of the deceased. 22. We have also made an endeavour to critically analyse the evidence of three eyewitnesses. At the outset, it may be observed that all the three eyewitnesses are closely related, PW-1 Parmanand, PW-2 Smt. Urmilia, his wife and PW-3 Kala Makkad his son. A bare perusal of statement of these three witnesses makes it amply clear that their narration of the incident is depicting a parrot-like version. In common parlance, statements of all these three witnesses are not inspiring confidence so as to prove that accused-appellant has given blow on the head of the deceased with intention to cause death. A bare perusal of statement of these three witnesses makes it amply clear that their narration of the incident is depicting a parrot-like version. In common parlance, statements of all these three witnesses are not inspiring confidence so as to prove that accused-appellant has given blow on the head of the deceased with intention to cause death. The statement of PW-7 who has turned hostile though his presence at the scene of occurrence is admitted by the other witnesses is also sufficient to discredit the testimony of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 to a great extent. Moreover, serious contradictions in the statements of all these three witnesses from their earlier version i.e. their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has also casted shadow on their testimony. The embellished version of all these three witnesses in their court statements cannot loose sight for recording our satisfaction about requisite sting in their testimony to establish the intention of the accused-appellant to commit offence of murder. 23. Supreme Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Rampal: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 165 while considering the fact that the accused assaulted the deceased twice with the knife on his back resulting in his death declined to interfere with the judgment of High Court in altering the conviction of respondent from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC. 24. In yet another judgment, Supreme Court in the case of Arjun v. State of Maharashtra: 2012 Cr.L.R.(SC) 506 opined that if the accused has not committed any act with pre-meditation and the act was committed in a heat of passion without taking undue advantage or acting in cruel manner, the offence is punishable under Section 304 Part I and not under Section 302 IPC. The Court held,- "17. Considering the background facts as well as the fact that there was no premeditation and the act was committed in a heat of passion and that the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner and that there was a fight between the parties, we are of the view that this case falls under the fourth exception to Section 300 IPC and hence it is just and proper to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part 1 IPC and we do so." 25. In a recent judgment, Supreme Court in the case of Chenda @ Chanda Ram v. State of Chhatisgarh: (2013) 12 SCC reiterated the same principle to alter the punishment of the accused for life to imprisonment for a period of ten years with fine. 26. The Division Bench of this Court in D.B.Criminal Appeal No. 291/2010: Meetha Lal v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 09.12.2015 discussed the offence under Section 299 and 300 IPC threadbare and has held,- ".......In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury.......sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature." 27. In view of the foregoing discussion and the law laid down by the Supreme Court and by this Court, we are persuaded to hold that learned Trial Court has seriously erred in recording finding of guilt against the accused-appellant for murder instead of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and consequently the appeal to that extent merits acceptance in part. 28. The upshot of above discussion is that appeal of the appellant is allowed in part and the conviction of the accused-appellant is hereby altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC and sentence awarded to the appellant by the learned Trial Court of imprisonment for life is reduced to the imprisonment for a period of ten years.