JUDGMENT AND ORDER : T. Vaiphei, J. The legality of the order of disqualifications dated 15-12-2015 issued by the respondent No. 2 and the official Gazette notification dated 15-12-2015 issued by the respondent No. 3 disqualifying the 14 petitioners from the Membership of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly ("the Assembly" for short) w.e.f. 15-12-2015 under Article 191(2) read with Paragraph 2(1)(a) and Paragraph 6(1)(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India are under challenge in this writ petition. Before proceeding further, it may be noted that the impugned order of disqualifications had earlier been stayed by the learned Single Judge on 7-1-2016, which was taken to appeal before the Apex Court. The Apex Court, after perusing the records, passed the order dated 18-2-2016 in S.L.P.(C) No. 779-780 of 2016 declining to interfere with the said interim order and instead directing the then Chief Justice (Acting) to place the case before the Division Bench for expeditious disposal, preferably, within two weeks. This is how this writ petition has been taken up by this Division Bench. 2. To say the least, this is a bizarre case; sometime facts can be really stranger than fiction. The said notification is the off-shoot of the order of disqualifications passed by the Speaker of the Assembly against the petitioners, but, interestingly, there are three versions of the disqualification order of the Speaker, which will be dealt with later on. In the general election to the Arunachal Pradesh State Legislative Assembly held in the month of April, 2014, 47 MLAs were elected on the tickets of Indian National Congress (INC); the 14 petitioners herein are some of them. The petitioner No. 14 (Sri T.N. Thongdok) was elected as the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly just after the election. The case of the petitioners is that they were not served with any independent order of the Speaker disqualifying them from their Membership of the Assembly and that they incidentally could caught hold of one of the orders signed by the then Speaker of the Assembly (Sri Nabam Rebia) on 15-12-2015, which was marked to the petitioner No. 4 though by the same order, another petitioner, namely, Sri Kumar Waii was also declared to have incurred disqualification under the 10th Schedule. According to the petitioners, they have reason to believe that there may not be any proper independent order of the Speaker pertaining to their disqualifications; the possibility of manufacturing such an order by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 at some later point of time cannot be ruled out. As they were not served with an independent order of their disqualifications, apart from the document already annexed as Annexure-1, they are not in a position to annex any other order of their disqualifications which might have been issued or shown to have been issued by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In the current Assembly, the party wise composition of the State Legislature is as follows: 1. INC - 47; 2. BJP - 11 and 3. Independent - 2 The total strength of the House is 60. 3. It is the allegation of the petitioners that there was a strong sense of disquiet in the recent past among the 21 MLAs including the petitioners over the style of functioning of the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, namely, Sri Nabam Tuki (the respondent No. 4), who has now ceased to be the Chief Minister of the State during the pendency of this writ petition, and also against the improper behaviour of the respondent No. 2, who happens to be a close relative of the respondent No. 4. The petitioners were, therefore, compelled to voice their concern within the party within the permissible democratic manners for change of leadership of the party in order to bring about better socio-economic advancement of the State. They would like to emphasise that they had remained loyal to the party, and were proud to be the Members of the Indian National Congress Party(I). According to the petitioners, a series of incidents took place recently in the State involving the respondent No. 4 and the petitioners, which heightened the discontentment amongst them. Two of the Members were also alleged to have been forced to resign as Member of the Assembly under duress/coercion. Nevertheless, the 21 MLAs including the petitioners expressed their loyalty to the Party from time to time. 4. Two of the Members were also alleged to have been forced to resign as Member of the Assembly under duress/coercion. Nevertheless, the 21 MLAs including the petitioners expressed their loyalty to the Party from time to time. 4. It is also the case of the petitioners that the 5th Session of the said Assembly concluded on 31-10-2015 where after the Governor of the State of Arunachal Pradesh ("the Governor" for short) in terms of Article 174(1) of the Constitution of India issued an order on 03-11-2015 summoning the 6th Assembly for meeting of its 6th Session at 10.00 a.m. on 14-01-2016 in the Assembly Chamber at Naharlagun. After this order of the Governor, a notice of resolution for removal of the respondent No. 2 from the office of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly was given to the Secretary, Legislative Assembly (respondent No. 3) on 19-11-2015 with a copy endorsed to the Governor. The notice was given by one Sri Tamiyo Taga (BJP), who was the leader of the opposition in the Assembly along with 10 other Members of the BJP and the same was supported by 2 other independent MLAs, wherein some allegations were made against the respondent No. 2 for his conduct of having accepted the purported resignation letter of the said 2 MLAs without personally verifying from them about the correctness of the said resignation letters. The said notice of dismissal was served on the respondent No. 3 on the same date, i.e. 19-11-2015 with a copy endorsed to the Governor. The respondent No. 3, however, did not publish the said notice dated 19-11-2015 in the Bulletin Part-II despite the mandate of the law, nor did the Speaker take any action to publish the same. Neither did the Speaker initiate any action for convening the Session of the House even after the expiry of the mandatory period of 14 days' notice period under Article 179(c) of the Constitution of India. On the contrary, the respondent No. 2 along with the respondent No. 4 and a few other INC Party MLAs started talking about Secretary and the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of having received a notice of resolution for removal of the petitioner No. 14 issued by certain MLAs of the INC Party. On the contrary, the respondent No. 2 along with the respondent No. 4 and a few other INC Party MLAs started talking about Secretary and the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of having received a notice of resolution for removal of the petitioner No. 14 issued by certain MLAs of the INC Party. However, no notification was forwarded to the Governor nor was any action taken by the respondent No. 3 to publish the second notice of resolution. On getting a report about the notice of resolution for removal of the Speaker, the Deputy Secretary to the Governor, under instruction of the Governor, wrote a letter dated 07-12-2015 to the respondent No. 3 asking for a copy of the resolution for removal of Deputy Speaker to be forwarded to the office of the Governor along with the following information: (a) Date of receipt of the notice of the resolution in the Legislative Assembly; (b) Action taken by the Legislative Assembly on the notice; and (c) Highlight of the proceedings, if any. 5. According to the petitioners, it was claimed by the respondent No. 2 in the connected WP(C) No. 7745/2015 that on 07-12-2015, Sri Rajesh Tacho, Chief Whip, Congress Legislature Party (respondent No. 6) filed a petition under Article 191(2) and Paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule read with Paragraph 2(1)(a) & 6(1) & (2), Rule 3(7) and Rule 6 of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1987 ("the Rules" for short), before the respondent No. 2 seeking disqualification of all the 14 petitioners. In the said petition, the Speaker was asked to declare that all the 14 petitioners had voluntarily given up their Membership from the INC and its Legislative Party in terms of the provisions of Paragraph 2(1)(A) of the Tenth Schedule and that all these 14 petitioners had become subject to disqualification thereunder and at the same time the seats held by them in the Assembly had become vacant from the date of the order. It is the specific case of the petitioners that none of them have received any such petition or notice till the filing of the writ petition as is required under the provisions of the Rules and that such knowledge was gathered by them only from the records of WP(C) No. 7745/2015. It is the specific case of the petitioners that none of them have received any such petition or notice till the filing of the writ petition as is required under the provisions of the Rules and that such knowledge was gathered by them only from the records of WP(C) No. 7745/2015. The petitioners claim that they were not aware of the existence of such a petition filed by the respondent No. 6. 6. According to the petitioners, in the petition dated 07-12-2015 seeking their disqualification filed by the respondent No. 6, the name of the petitioner No. 13 (Sri Kalikho Pul) was also included even though he has challenged the order of his expulsion from the INC Party in a suit before the civil Court and that there is an existing interim order of the civil Court staying the order of his expulsion. The revision petition filed by the President, Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee before this Court challenging the interim order was dismissed by this Court in its judgment dated 06-10-2015. It is the contention of the petitioners that when there is an order of injunction from the civil court in favour of the petitioner No. 13, his name could not have been included in the petition filed by the respondent No. 6 seeking his disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. On 08-12-2015, according to the petitioners, the ADC to the Governor went to the Legislative Assembly Secretariat on the instruction of the Governor and met the Secretary, Additional Secretary, OSD to Speaker and Section Officer of the Legislative Assembly Secretariat and apprised them about the letter issued from the Governor's Secretariat regarding notice of resolution for removal of Deputy Speaker. According to the petitioners, as the concerned file was lying in the official residence of the respondent No. 2 at Itanagar, the ADC submitted a note about what he learnt on 08-12-2015 to the Governor's Secretariat. 7. It is the further case of the petitioners that on 09-12-2015, the Governor, in exercise of his power under Article 174(1) of the Constitution of India, issued an order modifying the summons already issued and instead advanced the 6th Session of the Assembly from 14-1-2016 to 16-12-2015. 7. It is the further case of the petitioners that on 09-12-2015, the Governor, in exercise of his power under Article 174(1) of the Constitution of India, issued an order modifying the summons already issued and instead advanced the 6th Session of the Assembly from 14-1-2016 to 16-12-2015. On the same day, i.e. 09-12-2015, the Governor also issued a message under Article 175(2) of the Constitution of India stipulating the resolution for removal of the Speaker as first item on agenda of the Assembly and stating that the petitioner No. 14 should preside over the House in accordance with the provisions of Article 181(1) of the Constitution of India and further mentioned therein that till the Session was prorogued, there should be no change/alteration in the composition of the parties in the House. On 14-12-2015, the State Cabinet, under the Chief Ministership of Sri Nabam Tuki passed a resolution declaring that the decision of the Governor to prepone the Assembly was contrary to the constitutional provisions and advised the Governor to recall or cancel the order dated 09-12-2015 and allow the Sessions to be convened on 14-01-2016. On 14-12-2015, the respondent No. 1/2 issued a note requesting the Home Minister to ensure full proof security in and around the Assembly Building from 15-12-2015 to 18-12-2015, and no individual including the Legislators be allowed to enter the Assembly Building Premises on the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th of December, 2015. In the said letter, the Home Minister directed the DGP to deploy security personnel, and the same was passed on to the Superintendent of Police (City). 8. On 15-12-2015, the Superintendent of Police, Itanagar, wrote a letter to the Secretary, State Legislative Assembly, seeking clarification on the Speaker's note dated 14-12-2015 as to under what provision of law, the request of the respondent No. 2 should be enforced. This, according to the petitioners, was primarily in connection with the request of the respondent No. 2 that no individual including the Legislators be allowed to enter the Assembly Building from 15-12-2015 to 18-12-2015. On the same day, i.e., 15-12-2015, the respondent No. 3 issued the notification disqualifying the petitioners including the petitioner No. 14 from the Membership of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly w.e.f. 15-12-2015 and declaring that consequent to such disqualification, the seats held by them had become vacant. On the same day, i.e., 15-12-2015, the respondent No. 3 issued the notification disqualifying the petitioners including the petitioner No. 14 from the Membership of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly w.e.f. 15-12-2015 and declaring that consequent to such disqualification, the seats held by them had become vacant. Among the MLAs who were disqualified, the name of the respondent No. 13 also figured even though there was already an order of injunction of civil Court staying his expulsion from the INC Party. According to the petitioners, the notification was not preceded by any order of Speaker and none of these disqualified MLAs were served with any such order of the Speaker. Moreover, contend the petitioners, the notification also included the name of one MLA, Sri Lombo Tayeng (petitioner No. 12), who was not even mentioned in the petition dated 07-12-2015, filed by the respondent No. 6, seeking disqualification of the 14 MLAs named therein. The aforesaid petition had the name of an MLA, Sri Wangki Lowang, whose name was not found in the impugned notification dated 15-12-2015. On the same day, i.e., on 15-12-2015, the respondent No. 3 issued a notification holding that two of the MLAs, namely, Sri Wanglam Sawin and Sri Gabriel Denwang Wangsu were not entitled to take part in the proceeding of the House till final disposal of their case by this Court in the matter of acceptance of their resignations by the Speaker. This notification was said to be issued in defiance of the interim order of this Court staying the said notification of the Secretary, State Legislative Assembly, accepting the resignations. Again, on 15-12-2015, the Deputy Speaker passed an order treating the order of the Speaker disqualifying the petitioners as void ab-initio and holding that all the 14 disqualified Congress MLAs would continue to be the Members of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. It is contended by the petitioners that this action was needed and actuated on the backdrop of the Notification dated 15-12-2015 inasmuch as till such time when the Deputy Speaker made such an order, no such order disqualifying the petitioners was formally on record nor was it served upon the petitioners or even gazetted or published in the Assembly Bulletin. It is contended by the petitioners that this action was needed and actuated on the backdrop of the Notification dated 15-12-2015 inasmuch as till such time when the Deputy Speaker made such an order, no such order disqualifying the petitioners was formally on record nor was it served upon the petitioners or even gazetted or published in the Assembly Bulletin. The petitioner No. 14 (Deputy Speaker) also rescinded the notification dated 15-12-2015 issued by the Secretary, State Legislative Assembly (respondent No. 3) preventing the participation of Sri Wanglam Sawin and Sri Gabriel Denwang Wangsu in the proceeding of the House. On the same day, the respondent No. 2, in turn, issued a Press release declaring that there should be no Assembly Session from 15th to 18th of December, 2015 and that all orders/notifications issued by the Deputy Speaker on 15-12-2015 should be treated as null and void. 9. According to the petitioners, on 16-12-2015, the petitioner No. 14 issued an order holding that the Press release of the Speaker (Sri Nabam Rebia) (respondent No. 2) that there would be no 6th Session on 16-12-2015 onwards, as illegal and that the 6th Session of the Legislative Assembly should be held as scheduled from 16-12-2015 to 18-12-2015. On the same day, the petitioner No. 14 wrote a letter to the Governor stating that the Assembly premises are locked and Civil and Police administration were defiant and were not co-operating in the holding of the 6th Session of the Assembly and urged him to invoke his special powers under Article 371(h) of the Constitution of India for maintaining law and order and for ensuring opening of the assembly premises coupled with safe passages for all MLAs to the Assembly premises and to provide necessary security for the conduct of proceedings. Another letter dated 16-12-2015 was sent to the Governor by the petitioner No. 14 informing him that he tried his best to enter the Assembly premises but failed as the Assembly premises were locked up; he also enclosed the memorandum to the Governor dated 16-12-2015 signed by 33 MLAs constituting majority in the House of 60 Members, expressing that the Session should have been held in terms of the order and the message of the Governor dated 09-12-2015 to ensure majesty of the Constitution and the office of the Governor. In the said memorandum, the petitioner No. 14 requested the Governor to allow him to hold the Session at any other place adjacent to the Assembly premises within Naharlagun so that the constitutional obligations were discharged. In the said letter, the petitioner No. 14 also conveyed the suggestion of the 33 MLAs that in view of serious law and order problem, the 6th Session of the Assembly might be held at Techi Takar Memorial Community Hall, G-Sector, Naharlagun and sought his approval for the same. On obtaining the approval of the Governor, the Deputy Speaker, by his letter dated 16-12-2015 informed the Director, Department of Information and Public Relations, Government of Arunachal Pradesh about the shifting of the venue and of the holding of the Session at about 2.00 p.m. onwards. The said information was also conveyed to all Members of Electronic, Print and other Media. On 16-12-2015, the 6th Session was held at Techi Takar Memorial Community Hall, G-Sector, Naharlagun, wherein the motion for removal of the Speaker was passed with 33 MLAs of 60 Members House voting in favour of the resolution for removal of the Speaker. Consequently, the notification dated 16-12-2015 was issued by the petitioner No. 14 functioning as the Speaker of the Assembly, who also declared that the office of the Speaker of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly had fallen vacant, whereupon the record of proceeding of the House regarding removal of the respondent No. 2 was published in Bulletin Part-I. 10. It is also the case of the petitioners that the petitioner No. 14, now functioning as the Speaker of the Assembly, wrote to the then Chief Minister (respondent No. 4) informing him about the business of the 6th Session to be conducted on 17-12-2015 and enclosed therewith the Bulletin Part-II and the list of business for 17-12-2015. The 33 MLAs of the 60 Members House presided over by the petitioner No. 14 as Speaker then adopted a motion on Composite Floor Test, showing their no confidence in the Congress Government in the State led by Nabam Tuki (respondent No. 4). The motion for Composite Floor Test was then moved by 11 BJP MLAs and 2 Independent MLAs and the same was passed by all the 33 MLAs including the 20 MLAs from Congress excluding the Deputy Speaker. The motion for Composite Floor Test was then moved by 11 BJP MLAs and 2 Independent MLAs and the same was passed by all the 33 MLAs including the 20 MLAs from Congress excluding the Deputy Speaker. The proceeding of the House was then published in Bulletin Part-I. The petitioner No. 14 thereafter informed the Governor about the proceeding by his letter dated 17-12-2015 and enclosed therewith the Bulletin Part-I and other relevant records. He also sent a report to the Governor on 17-12-2015 informing him about the collapse of Civil and Police administration at Naharlagun on 17-12-2015, which resulted in sitting of the 6th Session at Shoto-Kan Karate Training Hall, Naharlagun. It was at this stage that the respondent No. 1/2 filed the WP(C) No. 7745/2015, which was moved before this Court, wherein he annexed the document such as the application purportedly bearing dated 07-12-2015 of the respondent No. 6 seeking disqualification of the petitioners. In this writ petition, the respondent No. 1/2 (Shri Nabam Rebia) challenged the order dated 9-12-2015 preponing the Session of the 6th Assembly from 14-1-2016 to 16-12-2015, the message of the Governor dated 9-12-2015 stipulating the resolution for removal of the Speaker as the first item of the business in that sitting, the holding of the sitting of the 6th Session of Assembly outside the House, the order dated 15-12-2015 quashing the disqualification of the petitioners herein and the notification and resolution dated 16-12-2015 removing him from the Office of the Speaker of the Assembly. It was only when the petitioners received a copy of this writ petition that they came to learn about the said application dated 07-12-2015 seeking their disqualification. 11. This Court, by the interim order dated 17-12-2015, stayed the order of the Governor dated 09-12-2015 and all the consequential actions arising therefrom. All the petitioners, except the petitioner No. 14 (who then the Deputy Speaker), thereafter filed I.A. No. 2838/2015 in the connected WP(C) No. 7745/2015 challenging the maintainability of the writ petition and seeking its dismissal with a prayer for vacation of the interim order dated 17-12-2015. The petitioner No. 14 (the former Deputy Speaker), filed a separate I.A. No. 2839/2015 seeking the same relief sought for in I.A. No. 2838/2015. The petitioner No. 14 (the former Deputy Speaker), filed a separate I.A. No. 2839/2015 seeking the same relief sought for in I.A. No. 2838/2015. According to the petitioners, the remaining 7 MLAs of INC Party, who had participated in the said Session along with 14 petitioners, had also filed I.A. No. 2828/2015 seeking their impleadment as respondents in WP(C) No. 7745/2015 for opposing the relief sought for in the writ petition. The 11 BJP MLAs with 2 Independent MLAs also filed I.A. No. 2822/2015 seeking their impleadment as respondents in the writ petition to oppose the reliefs sought for by the petitioner (respondent No. 2 in the said writ petition). Both the impleadment applications were allowed by this Court by the order dated 21-12-2015. Without prejudice to the primary contentions made in the Interlocutory Applications, viz, I.A. Nos. 2838 & 2839 of 2015 in WP(C) No. 7745 of 2015, they contended that the impugned notification dated 15-12-2015 disqualifying them from the Membership of the Assembly is void ab-initio and are now preferring this writ petition challenging the legality of the aforementioned notification and orders purportedly passed by the respondent No. 2. The order of the respondent No. 2 has been challenged on the ground of mala fide, violation of the principles of natural justice and violation of the various provisions of the Rules, which resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. The petitioners are, therefore, seeking the intervention of this Court by way of this writ petition to quash the impugned order dated 15-12-2015 disqualifying them under Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the notification dated 15-12-2015 issued by the respondent No. 3 in connection therewith. 12. Opposing the writ petition, the respondent No. 1 (Nabam Rebia) and the respondent No. 6 (Rajesh Tacho) filed their respective affidavits raising preliminary objections against the maintainability of the writ petition. The respondent No. 1/2 submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed inasmuch as the petitioners produced a false and fabricated document such as the impugned speaking order of disqualification before this Court and that the copy of the impugned order filed before this Court was interpolated especially in Paragraph 2 and that 14 original orders have been filed before this Court by the respondent No. 2 on 07-01-2016. The respondent No. 1/2 further contends that the writ petition could not be heard without impleading the Chief Whip of Arunachal Pradesh Congress Legislature Party, who was the complainant and who is, therefore, a necessary party. According to the answering respondent, the petitioners have suppressed the following material facts : (a) The letter dated 04-11-2015 signed by all of them and addressed to the Governor wherein they have opposed the policies of the Government headed by their own party and in fact demanded the interference of the Governor for taking action; (b) The petitioners had meeting with the Governor on 15-12-2015 along with 11 MLAs of the BJP and 2 Independent MLAs and sought his intervention to ensure compliance of his orders dated 09-12-2015 knowing fully well that the INC Party as well as the Government was opposing the said order and decided not to comply with the same being illegal and unconstitutional; (c) They addressed a representation to the Governor on 28-12-2015, which was signed by the 11 MLAs of BJP and 2 Independent MLAs seeking dismissal of the Government and imposition of President Rule in the State of Arunachal Pradesh; (d) These facts ought to have been disclosed in the writ petition as they clearly show that they were not adhering to the directions of the party and were indulging in anti-party activities and thereby voluntarily given up their Membership of the Party; (e) They stood disqualified for their conduct in writing to the Governor in support of the claim of the petitioner No. 13 when he made a claim to the Chief Minister of the State of Arunachal Pradesh despite the fact that he is not the leader of the Arunachal Pradesh Congress Legislature Party and especially when the Legislature Party has elected Sri Nabam Tuki as the leader of Congress Legislature Party; (f) The petitioners especially the petitioner No. 13 stood disqualified the moment he took oath as the Chief Minister of the State of Arunachal Pradesh against the directions of the Congress Legislature Party; (g) As the petitioners did not make candid disclosure of relevant and material facts, they are guilty of misleading the Court and their petition should be dismissed at the threshold without considering the case on merit. 13. 13. It is also contended by the answering respondent that none of the grounds raised by the petitioners in the writ petition could constitute a defense under Article 191(e)(sic) read with Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India; the order of disqualifications was passed on 15-12-2015 and was in operation till 05-01-2016 before the same was challenged on 04-01-2016 by the respondents and that the grounds raised in the writ petition are mere technicalities and after thoughts to avoid the order of disqualifications, which was incurred by the respondents due to their anti-party activities and for defiance of the policies of the party and the directives of Central Leadership which clearly reposed faith in the leadership of petitioner No. 4 and rejected the claim of the petitioner No. 13 to be the leader of Arunachal Pradesh Congress Legislature Party. It is submitted that the Speaker, while acting under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India as quasi judicial authority is playing a role, which is different from the role he plays in his capacity as the Speaker of the Assembly and that the petitioners attracted the disqualification on the ground of having voluntarily giving up Membership of INC of which they were set up as a candidate for election as such Member. It is false to allege that the petitioners were unaware of the order of the disqualifications made by the respondent No. 2 and they in coordination with 11 Members of BJP and 2 Independent Members sought for and were not granted time till 11.40 p.m. on 15-12-2015 by the Governor, who in his report dated 17-12-2015 apprised the President that the 34 MLAs met the Governor by prior appointment and apprised him of the orders passed by the Speaker. In any case, submits the answering respondent, the meeting of these 14 MLAs along with other MLAs of BJP and Independent MLAs with the Governor is enough to constitute a disqualification under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the 10th Schedule of the Constitution of India in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajendra Singh Rana & Ors. Vs. Swami Prasad Maurya & Ors, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 270 . Vs. Swami Prasad Maurya & Ors, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 270 . The writ petition filed by the petitioners are based on innuendos, conjectures and surmises and that they were well aware of the existence of 14 separate orders dated 15-12-2015 passed by the Speaker as obvious from their conduct in the meeting they had with the Governor on 15-12-2015 at 11.40 p.m. 14. It is denied by the answering respondent that the impugned order passed by him is motivated by mala fide and based on extraneous political consideration. He contends that the purported Session of the Assembly held on 16th and 17th of December, 2015 was based on illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the Governor on 09-12-2015. It is also the case of the answering respondent that preponing the Assembly Session from 14-1-2016 to 16-12-2015 by the Governor and directing him not to alter the composition of the party position in the House in purported exercise of his powers under Article 174 and 175(2) of the Constitution of India, is illegal and unconstitutional. According to the answering respondents, the said orders of the Governor were part of a pre-conceived plan, which the petitioners had hatched along with the Members of the Opposition to topple the democratically elected Government led by the INC Party in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The petitioners were given ample opportunity by the PCC Chief, Member of AICC, State in-Charge of Arunachal Pradesh, the Chief Minister and the Chief Party Whip to comply with the policies and the directives of the Central Leadership. They continuously and persistently acted against the interest of the party and defied the directives of the party leadership and supported the cause of the opposition against the interest of the party. They were in touch with the Members of the Opposition to conspire against the ruling National Party and did not bother to attend the meetings of Congress Legislature Party in spite of repeated invitations and advises by the Central Leadership. Besides, they were also hobnobbing with the Governor and Members of the opposition party to topple the Ministry, which is against the interest of the party, which set them as candidate in the Legislative Assembly Election held in 2014. 15. Besides, they were also hobnobbing with the Governor and Members of the opposition party to topple the Ministry, which is against the interest of the party, which set them as candidate in the Legislative Assembly Election held in 2014. 15. As far as the allegation regarding violation of the principles of natural justice is concerned, the answering respondents submits that the petitioners deliberately refused to accept the copies of the petition, which were sought to be served upon them in pursuance of the notice issued by him vide order dated 07-12-2015 and that the petitioners have been avoiding service of the notice because they were aware that the Governor had passed an order on 09-12-2015 preponing the Assembly from 14-01-2016 to 16-12-2015 when they were planning to remove the Speaker. They were simply avoiding the service so that the attempt to disqualify them under the Provisions of Tenth Schedule could not succeed on 16-12-2015. It is submitted by the answering respondent that the proceeding under the Tenth Schedule is neither a trial in a Court of law or a departmental proceeding against a Government employee, but proceeding against a representative elected by the people and the Speaker holds the high independent office. The answering respondent reminds this Court that judicial review against the proceedings before the Tribunal/Speaker is limited and that the Tribunal can draw an inference from the conduct of the Members as to whether they have incurred the penalty of disqualification. The application of principle of natural justice is flexible and should not be cast in a rigid mode, and cannot be put in a legal straitjacket. According to the answering respondent, the petitioners deliberately and consciously did not appear before the Speaker on 14-12-2015 and 15-12-2015 to seek an opportunity of hearing or deny the allegations made in the disqualification petition; on the contrary, they deemed it proper to visit Raj Bhavan seeking redressal of their grievances against him. It is submitted by the answering respondent that having opted to take a particular route, it is not open to them to blame him for disqualifying them on 15-12-2015. It is submitted by the answering respondent that having opted to take a particular route, it is not open to them to blame him for disqualifying them on 15-12-2015. It is pointed out by the answering respondent that the petitioner No. 14 in the writ petition filed before this Court himself passed an order on 15-12-2015 quashing his (answering respondent's) order, which is impugned in the present writ petition, while the said order of the petitioner No. 14 is under challenge in WP(C) No. 7745/2015 along with other orders, which were stayed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 17-12-2015. It is also submitted by the answering respondent that in his order dated 15-12-2015, he had recorded his satisfaction that the petitioners voluntarily gave up their Membership of the party and, as such, their contention that his order is in violation of the provision of disqualification rules is perverse. The answering respondent denies that his order is vitiated by perversity and is made in a hot haste thereby rendering his disqualification order perverse. The petitioners did not even acknowledge the notice of the petition, much less, seek time for filing their comments even though the answering respondent is empowered to grant further time if so required by them. When the petitioners chose not to participate in the proceedings and made a conscious choice to avail of other remedies available to them, they cannot have any legitimate grievance if he proceeded against them ex-parte and pass the impugned order of disqualifications. 16. At this stage, it may be noticed that in so far as the acceptance of the resignation letters of the two MLAs, namely, Sri Wanglam Sawin and Sri Gabriel Denwang Wangsu by the answering respondent is concerned, his order has been upheld by this Court in its order dated 12-01-2016, which was subsequently affirmed by the Apex Court and, as such, this issue has no relevance any more. According to the answering respondent, notices were issued upon the petitioners, who were in Delhi at that time and were well aware of the fact that such petitions had been filed and had, in fact, instructed their respective staff not to receive such notices. Services were, therefore, avoided whereupon he was satisfied that the refusal to accept service of notice by the petitioners was deliberate and intentional. Services were, therefore, avoided whereupon he was satisfied that the refusal to accept service of notice by the petitioners was deliberate and intentional. The answering respondent denies that no individual including the Legislators were allowed to enter the Assembly building premises on 16th, 17th and 18th of December, 2015 and categorically asserts that they, in fact, attended the office and further asserts that the petitioner No. 14 attended the office and passed the order dated 15-12-2015 revoking the disqualification of the petitioners including himself. 17. The answering respondent contends that deliberate avoidance of service of notice by the petitioners amounts to deemed service and that no special circumstances could be shown by them as to why presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act should not be drawn against them. The answering respondent categorically asserts that the action and conduct of the petitioners clearly demonstrate that they were well aware of the issuance of notice on 07-12-2015, or of the attempt to serve the notices (which were refused) on 09-12-2015 for the hearing on 14-12-2015 or of the final order being passed against them on 15-12-2015. According to the answering respondent, the plea taken by the petitioners of violation of the principles of natural justice is merely a facade to mislead this Court. It is further submitted that the Governor while sending the Message under Article 175(2) of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with the power of another constitutional authority, namely, the Speaker, vested in him by the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Speaker has no duty to refer any issue regarding the Tenth Schedule to the Governor as he is fully empowered by it to decide such dispute. 18. The Speaker has no duty to refer any issue regarding the Tenth Schedule to the Governor as he is fully empowered by it to decide such dispute. 18. According to the answering respondent, each and every action of the petitioners is corroborative of the facts that they have voluntarily given up Membership of the Congress Legislature Party for the following instances prior to the passing of the order of disqualification dated 15-12-2015 passed by the Speaker:- (a) In the months of September-October, 2015, the 11 MLAs of BJP and 2 Independent MLAs alleged that the Government headed by Chief Minister, Sri Nabam Tuki has been reduced to minority and thereof the Government should be asked to give a floor test; (b) On 04-11-015, the petitioners addressed a letter to the Governor seeking his interference on the allegations made by them against the Government of their own party. (c) Specific allegation was made by the leader of opposition in Arunachal Pradesh State Assembly in his letter dated 12-11-2015 addressed to the Governor that 21 MLAs were not accepting the leadership of the respondent No. 4 and had defied the party whip and the Government had therefore reduced to minority. (d) The Governor in his report dated 19-11-2015 clearly recorded the names of the Legislators, who had attended the meeting, which clarified that both the BJP MLAs and the Governor were aware of the dissident activities and the dissident MLAs who did not attend the meeting. (e) The report dated 19-11-2015 of the Governor clearly recorded that Sri Vs. Narayansami, AICC, In-Charge of Arunachal Pradesh declared that Sri Nabam Tuki as undisputed leader and claimed the Government is 100% stable. He termed that the absence of 21 dissident MLAs in CLP meeting as an act of indiscipline. (f) The respondent did not attend the three CLP meetings dated 08-11-2015, 17-11-2015 and 03-12-2015 and even though they were invited on each and every occasion and that the 21 MLAs collectively signed one letter and denounced his legitimacy as the leader of the Congress Legislature Party. It was a gross misconduct and defiance of the party policies that in spite of AICC General Secretary Sri Vs. Narayanasamy and Secretary Dr. K Jai Kumar making it clear that they support the leadership of the respondent No. 4 and having expressed strong exceptions to the dissident activities of the petitioners. It was a gross misconduct and defiance of the party policies that in spite of AICC General Secretary Sri Vs. Narayanasamy and Secretary Dr. K Jai Kumar making it clear that they support the leadership of the respondent No. 4 and having expressed strong exceptions to the dissident activities of the petitioners. That the respondents continued to act in a manner detrimental to the interest of the party on whose symbol they had contested and won the legislative Assembly Election. (g) It was the decision of the Congress Legislature Party and of the decision of the Central Leadership that they would oppose the order dated 09-12-2015 passed by the Governor, but by attending the meeting dated 15-12-2015 with the Governor seeking his intervention for holding the 6th Session of the Arunachal Pradesh Assembly on 16th and 17th December, 2015. They attracted the vice of disqualification under the 10th Schedule. 19. These are the sum and substance of the case of the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 6 (Sri Rajesh Tacho), who is the Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party, Arunachal Pradesh Assembly, separately filed his affidavit-in-opposition; he is the one who filed the complaint dated 07-12-2015 urging the respondent No. 2 to disqualify the petitioners. The complaint was filed by him on the instructions of, and after consulting, the party High Command communicated though Sri Vs. Narayanasamy, AICC-in-Charge of Arunachal Pradesh and after getting clearance from the President of AICC. He submits that the petitioners are guilty of suppression of material facts and obtained the interim order from this Court on 5th and 7th January, 2015 by manipulation, which alone disentitled them any interim relief. On going through the other contents of this affidavit, I find that the case set up by the respondent No. 6 is in pari materia with the case projected by the respondent No. 1 and, as such, it is not necessary to refer the contents of his affidavit in detail for the sake of brevity. On going through the other contents of this affidavit, I find that the case set up by the respondent No. 6 is in pari materia with the case projected by the respondent No. 1 and, as such, it is not necessary to refer the contents of his affidavit in detail for the sake of brevity. The basic contentions raised by him are that all attempts were made by the Speaker (respondent No. 2) to cause service of notice upon each of the petitioners, but they deliberately avoided the service with a view to frustrate the proceeding for disqualifying them as Members of Legislative Assembly and, as such, it cannot be said that they were not given an opportunity of hearing before issuing the disqualification order by the respondent No. 2 and that the conduct of the petitioners, which were already described in detail by the respondent No. 2 in his affidavit-in-opposition, constitute a clear case of defection, which attracts the wrath of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that there is absolutely no illegality or procedural impropriety in the action of the respondent No. 1 in disqualifying the petitioners, and the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. 20. On perusing the materials on record and after hearing the learned senior counsel appearing for the rival parties, we are of the view that the core issues in this writ petition are as follows: (1) Whether the impugned orders of disqualification in respect of the 14 petitioners were issued by the respondent No. 1 without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. If so, what is the effect of such omissions. (2) Whether the impugned disqualifications contravened the provisions of Rules 6, 7 and 8 of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Rules, 1987 ("the Rules" for short). If so, what will be the consequence of such contraventions. (3) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case projected by both the parties in their respective pleadings, the Speaker was correct in holding that the petitioners had voluntarily given up their membership of the Legislative Assembly warranting their disqualification under Article 191(2) of the Constitution read with paragraph 2(a) of the Tenth Schedule thereto. 21. Unfolding his case, Mr. 21. Unfolding his case, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, submits that no copy of the complaint filed by the respondent No. 6 ("the complaint" for short) before the respondent No. 1 for disqualifying the petitioners as members of the Assembly was ever served upon each of them as evident from the body of the impugned order; the impugned order was passed ex-parte without complying with the rules of natural justice thereby rendering them unable to defend themselves before their disqualification. This, according to the learned senior counsel, is in contravention of Rule 7(3) of the Rules, which is a mandatory provision, the violation thereof is sufficient to quash the impugned orders of disqualification. It is his contention that the contents of para 7 of the complaint itself would demonstrate that the respondent No. 1 himself was aware of the fact that the petitioners were at the relevant time in New Delhi seeking the intervention of the Central Congress Leadership, but he proceeded to issue notice to each of the petitioners at their Itanagar residences, which reveals that the respondent No. 1 had a pre-conceived and pre-determined agenda to deny an opportunity to the petitioners to defend themselves; there cannot be any presumption that the petitioners were staying at their respective residences at the time the process server went to serve the notice and it was for the respondent No. 2 to think of a suitable mechanism for communicating the notice to each of the petitioners so that they could reply to such notice. He further submits that the Rules does not contemplate pasting of the notice at the residential wall of the petitioners assuming but not admitting that such pasting was done by the process server. He maintains that the order of the respondent No. 1 does not contain any satisfaction as required under Rule 7(4) to the effect that he would avail of the alternative to proceed to determine the question of disqualification himself without referring the complaint to the Committee. He maintains that the order of the respondent No. 1 does not contain any satisfaction as required under Rule 7(4) to the effect that he would avail of the alternative to proceed to determine the question of disqualification himself without referring the complaint to the Committee. It is also his contention that the mandate of affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the Members of the Legislative Assembly to defend themselves provided for under Rule 7(7) of the Rules has been given a go by on non-existent grounds nor were copies of the orders contemplated under Rule 8(1)(b) of the Rules ever served upon the petitioners except the petitioner No. 4, who had collected the same on his own, thereby negating the rules of natural justice. The learned senior counsel forcefully submits that it is not necessary for this Court to examine the case on merit, and it may first consider the question as to whether the impugned orders of disqualification have been issued by the respondent No. 1 without hearing the petitioner and if the answer is YES, the need for deciding the case on merit will stand obviated. Proceeding further, the learned senior counsel submits that once it is found by this Court that principles of natural justice have been violated by the respondent No. 1 in issuing the impugned orders of disqualification, it is not necessary to probe further as to whether prejudice has been caused to the petitioners; non-observance of natural justice is by itself sufficient proof of prejudice. Inasmuch as the impugned orders of disqualification were passed without observing principles of natural justice, they are a nullity and must be quashed. 22. According to the learned senior counsel, there is no such thing as empty formality theory; no tribunal can reasonably hold that the case of the defendant would make no difference even if an opportunity of hearing is given to him. In support of his contentions with respect to violation of principles of natural justice, the learned senior counsel draws support from the following decisions of the Apex Court:- (i) Balachandra L. Jarkiholi and others Vs. B.S. Yeddyurappa and others, (2011) 7 SCC 1 ; (ii) D. Sudakhar (2) and others Vs. D.N. Jeevaraju and others, (2012) 2 SCC 708 ; (iii) M/s RB Shreeram Durga Orasad and Fatehchand Nursing Das Vs. B.S. Yeddyurappa and others, (2011) 7 SCC 1 ; (ii) D. Sudakhar (2) and others Vs. D.N. Jeevaraju and others, (2012) 2 SCC 708 ; (iii) M/s RB Shreeram Durga Orasad and Fatehchand Nursing Das Vs. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) and another, (1989) 1 SCC 628 ; (iv) Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) & others, (2014) 9 SCC 105 ; (v) SL Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and others, (1980) 4 SCC 379 ; (vi) Ravi S. Naik Vs. Union of India and others, 1994 (2) SCC 641 and (vii) Jagjit Singh Vs. State of Haryana and others, (2006) 11 SCC 1 . The learned senior counsel, therefore, submits that the impugned orders of disqualification issued without observing principles of natural justice, being a nullity, cannot be sustained in law and is liable to be quashed. According to the learned senior counsel, the only course of action open to this Court is to refrain from deciding the case on merit by itself, but to leave it for the decision of the Speaker, who is vested by the Constitution with the jurisdiction to decide as to whether the petitioners have incurred the wrath of disqualification under Article 191(2) read with the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. Supplementing the submission of the learned senior counsel, Mr. PK Tiwari, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, contends that what the respondent No. 2 did in the instant case such as his half-hearted approach in the manner of causing service of notice upon the petitioners at Itanagar when he clearly knew from the contents of para 7 of the complaint statements to deny defense to the petitioners clinchingly prove that he was practicing fraud while proceeding with the disqualification case and fraud, therefore, vitiates impugned orders of disqualification passed by him. He relies on Indian National Congress (I) Vs. Institute of Social Welfare and others, (2002) 5 SCC 685 and Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) Vs. M/s Shaw Wallace, (1992) 1 SCC 534 to fortify his submission. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order cannot stand and is liable to be quashed even without hearing the case on merit. 23. Refuting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Institute of Social Welfare and others, (2002) 5 SCC 685 and Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) Vs. M/s Shaw Wallace, (1992) 1 SCC 534 to fortify his submission. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order cannot stand and is liable to be quashed even without hearing the case on merit. 23. Refuting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. P.K. Goswami, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 contends that the case cannot be decided only on the basis of violation of principles of natural justice; assuming but not admitting that there is violation thereof and that the respondent No. 2 is ready to prove that the petitioners No. 1 to 14 have voluntarily given up their membership of the Assembly within the meaning of Article thereby rendering observance of natural justice inconsequential. In any case, contends the learned senior counsel, when the petitioners were deliberately avoiding service of notice in order to frustrate the disqualification proceedings against them, the respondent No. 1 has no alternative but to proceed with the proceedings, which resulted in the impugned orders of disqualification. He maintains that principles of natural justice are flexible rules and are not cast in a rigid mode and cannot be put in a legal straitjacket, more so, when disqualification proceedings involving elected representatives of the people cannot be equated with a civil or criminal trial or even departmental proceeding. According to the learned senior counsel, the petitioners deliberately and consciously chosen not to appear before the respondent No. 1 either on 14-12-2015 and 15-12-2015 to seek an opportunity of hearing or for contesting the complaint against them and instead they opted to approach Raj Bhajan seeking redressal of their grievance against the respondent No. 1. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel that having opted to take the Raj Bhavan route, it is now not open for the petitioners to blame the respondent No. 1 for having disqualified them on 15-12-2015; their very conducts disentitle them to any discretionary relief from this Court, which is, after all, a court of equity. Having himself quashed the impugned orders of disqualification, argues the learned senior counsel, the petitioner No. 10 is barred from filing this writ petition. Having himself quashed the impugned orders of disqualification, argues the learned senior counsel, the petitioner No. 10 is barred from filing this writ petition. Finally, referring to the conducts of the petitioners adumbrated in the counter of the respondent No. 1, the learned senior counsel maintains that from the undisputed facts and circumstances of the case, only one conclusion can be drawn, namely, the petitioners have voluntarily given up membership of the INC(I) thereby attracting the wrath of disqualification, and if only one such conclusion can be drawn, no prejudice could conceivably be caused to them, only on the proof thereof that the impugned orders of disqualification can be interfered with by this Court. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to dismiss the writ petition, which is devoid of merit. Though the learned senior counsel argues on the merit of the case at length, I do not propose to deal with such contentions as yet in view of disturbing development following the production of the original records with respect to the impugned orders of disqualification. 24. Before proceeding further, we may also record the submissions made by Mr. M. Krishnamani, the learned senior counsel for the respondent 6 concerning non-observance of principles of natural justice. The learned senior counsel reminds this Court that the justiciability of the order of the Speaker is limited only to illegality, perversity, mala fide and procedural improprieties; if the view taken by the respondent No. 1/2 is a reasonable view, a writ court will not interfere even if another view is more reasonable; the proceedings under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution are not a departmental enquiry for disciplinary action. He maintains that it was the petitioners who avoided service of notice upon which the respondent No. 1/2 proceeded to hear the complaint and disqualified them; this is not a case of no opportunity but is a case whether sufficient opportunity was granted to the petitioners or not. When the facts are indisputable, and they lead to only one conclusion, namely, the petitioners have voluntarily given up their membership of the INC(I), where is the need for observance of natural justice, he questions; this is a fit case where useless formality rules can be invoked, after all, knowledge of the proceedings by the petitioners by itself dispensed with notice. He maintains that non-hearing per se could cause no prejudice and de facto prejudice shall have to be shown, which the petitioners have miserably failed to do so in this case. According to the learned senior counsel, the petitioners were held captives of the BJP at Delhi-their addresses were unknown as they were not at Arunachal Bhavan-attempts were, therefore, made to serve notices upon them at their Itanagar bungalows where they normally reside, but their men chased out the process server (P.K. Dutta), who submitted a report by affidavit to this effect; there is thus effective service of notice upon each of the petitioners. It is his submission that there may be cases where the law requires compliance with principles of natural justice, but an irresistible conclusion can be drawn by a Court that no prejudice has been caused to the delinquent and the non-compliance is in regard to an action of directory nature; the instant case is one where no prejudice is caused to any of the petitioners. He, therefore, submits that there was no violation of principles of natural justice by the respondent No. 1/2 before issuing the impugned order of disqualifications and even if such procedural impropriety is found also, non-observance of natural justice will not have material bearing on the case inasmuch as there are unimpeachable evidence of series of revolting activities by the petitioners depicting their drifting away from the Congress Party. To buttress his contentions, the learned senior counsel relies on Kihoto Kilohan Vs. Zachilhu & others, 1992 Supp(2) SCC 651; Jagjit Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 1 ; Biecco Lawrie Ltd. and another Vs. State of West Bengal and another, (2009) 10 SCC 32 ; State Bank of Patiala and others Vs. SK Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 ; Competition Commission of India Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744 ; Prabin Ram Phukan and another Vs. State of Assam and others, (2015) 3 SCC 605 ; Aligarh Muslim University and others Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 and Dhannanjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and others, (1995) 3 SCC 757 . 25. Mr. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744 ; Prabin Ram Phukan and another Vs. State of Assam and others, (2015) 3 SCC 605 ; Aligarh Muslim University and others Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 and Dhannanjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and others, (1995) 3 SCC 757 . 25. Mr. HS Paonam, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 4, supplementing the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1/2 and the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 4, maintains that non-issue of notice or mistake in the issue of notice or defective service of notice does not affect the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1/2, if otherwise reasonable opportunity of being heard has been given, and it is only if prejudice has been caused by the non-issue or invalid service of notice that the proceeding would be vitiated. He, however, goes on to submit that irregular service of notice would not render the proceedings invalid; more so, if the petitioners by their conduct have rendered service impracticable or impossible. In the instant case, contends the learned senior counsel, the conduct of the petitioners in avoiding service of notice upon them or in instructing their men to chase out the Dak Runner have undoubtedly rendered such service impracticable or impossible; the Speaker was left with no choice but to hear the complainant and dispose of the same resulting in the order of disqualifications, for which they have no legitimate grievance to make. He draws support for his submission from Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. Subhash & Co., (2003) 3 SCC 454 , Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India and others, (2007) 4 SCC 54 ; M/s Madan and co. Vs. Wazir Jaivir Chand, (1989) 1 SCC 264 and Balachandra L. Jarkiholi Vs. B.S. Yeddyurappa, (2011) 7 SCC 1 . 26. Article 191(2) of the Constitution says that a person shall be disqualified for being a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. Both Article 191(2) of the Constitution and the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution were introduced by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 52nd Amendment indicates that the amendment was introduced to combat the growing menace of political defection in the country. Both Article 191(2) of the Constitution and the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution were introduced by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 52nd Amendment indicates that the amendment was introduced to combat the growing menace of political defection in the country. This is what it said: "The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern. If it is not combated, it is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democracy and the principles which sustain it. With this object, an assurance was given in the Address by the President to Parliament that the Government intended to introduce in the current session of Parliament an anti-defection Bill. This Bill is meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the above assurance." 27. The provisions of the Tenth Schedule apply to members of either House of Parliament or the State Legislative Assembly or, as the case may be, either House of the Legislature of a State. Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule makes provisions for disqualification on the ground of defection. Sub-paragraph (1) deals with a member belonging to a political party. It provides for disqualification in two situations, viz., (i) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; and (ii) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority, and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention. Paragraph 4 removes the bar of disqualification on the ground of defection in a case of merger of a political party with another political party. In sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 the question as to whether a member of a House has become subject to disqualification under the Schedule is required to be referred for the decision of the Chairman or, as the case may be, the Speaker of such House and his decision shall be final. In sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 the question as to whether a member of a House has become subject to disqualification under the Schedule is required to be referred for the decision of the Chairman or, as the case may be, the Speaker of such House and his decision shall be final. As per the proviso, where the question is as to whether the Chairman or Speaker, as the case may be, has become subject to such disqualification, the question shall be referred to such member of the House or decision as the House may elect and his decision shall be final. Under sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 6, all proceedings under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 in relation to any question as to disqualification of a member of a House under the Schedule are to be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Article 122 or, as the case may be, proceedings in the Legislature of a State within the meaning of Article 212. Paragraph 7 bars the jurisdiction of all courts in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member of a House under the Schedule. Paragraph 8 empowers the Chairman or the Speaker of a House to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule and such rules may provide for matters specified in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-paragraph (1). At this stage, it may not be out of place to reproduce the relevant portion of paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule, which are as follows: "Disqualification on ground of defection.-(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2[* * *] 4 and 5, a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House- (a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority, and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention. Explanation. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-paragraph,- (a) an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member;" 28. Paragraph 8(1) of the Tenth Schedule empowers the Chairman or the Speaker of a House to make rules to give effect to the provisions of the Schedule. It is in exercise of the powers conferred by this paragraph that the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the Arunachal Pradesh framed a set of rules called "The Members of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1987" ("the Rules" for short). As our enquiry is presently limited to the issue concerning observance of natural justice, I may refer to the relevant clauses of Rule 6, 7 and 8 of the Rules, which appear to be relevant for this case: "6.(1) No reference of any question as to whether a member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule shall be made except by a petition in relation to such member made in accordance with the provisions of this rule. (2) A petition in relation to a member may be made in writing to the Speaker by any other member: * * * (3) The Secretary shall,- (a) as soon as may be after the receipt of a petition under the proviso to sub-rule (2), make a report thereof to the House; and * * * 7.(1) On receipt of a petition under rule 6, the Speaker shall consider whether the petition complies with the requirement of that rule. (2) If the petition does not comply with the requirement of rule 6, the Speaker shall dismiss the petition and intimate the petitioner accordingly. (3) If the petition complies with the requirements of rule 6, the Speaker shall cause copies of the petition and of the annexures thereto to be forwarded,? (i) to the member in relation to whom the petition has been made, and (ii) where such member belongs to any legislature party and such petition has not been made by the leader thereof, also to such leader, and such member or leader shall, within seven days of the receipt of such copies, or within such further period as the Speaker may for sufficient cause allow, forward his comments in writing thereon to the Speaker. (4) After considering the comments, if any, in relation to the petition, received under sub-rule (3) within the period allowed (whether originally or on extension under that sub-rule), the Speaker may either proceed to determine the question or, if he is satisfied, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case that it is necessary or expedient so to do, refer the petition to the Committee for making a preliminary enquiry and submit a report to him. (5) The Speaker shall, as soon as may be after referring a petition to the Committee under sub-rule (4), intimate the petitioner accordingly and make an announcement with respect to such reference in the House or, if the House is not then in session, cause the information as to the reference to be published in the Bulletin. (6) Where the Speaker make the reference under sub-rule (4) to the Committee, he shall proceed to determine the question as soon as may be after receipt of the report from the Committee. (7) The procedure which shall be followed by the Speaker for determining any question and the procedure which shall be followed by the Committee for the purpose of making a preliminary inquiry under sub-rule (4) shall be, so far as may be, the same as the procedure for enquiry and determination by the Committee of any question as to breach of privileges of the House by a member, and neither the Speaker nor the Committee shall come to any finding that a member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule without affording a reasonable opportunity to such member to represent his case and to be heard in person. * * * 8.(1) At the conclusion of the consideration of the petition, the Speaker or, as the case may be, the member elected under the proviso to sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule shall, by order in writing, (a) dismiss the petition, or (b) declare that the member in relation to whom the petition has been made has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, and cause copies of the order to be delivered or forwarded to the petitioner, the member in relation to whom the petition the petition has been made and to the leader of the legislature party, if any, concerned. (2) Every decision declaring a member to have become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule shall be reported to the House forthwith if the House in session, and if the House is not in session, immediately after the House resembles. (3) Every decision referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be published in the Bulletin and notified in the official Gazette and copies of such decision forwarded by the Secretary to the Election Commission of India and the Government of Arunachal Pradesh." 29. Even a cursory look at the provisions extracted above will show that principles of natural justice are sufficiently incorporated therein. Members of Legislative Assembly are elected by the people in exercise of their democratic right to choose their own rulers unlike the people in the banana republics or some totalitarian States. The policy of the State is that even though political defection should be frowned upon or eliminated altogether from our polity, but in doing so, the member against whom a complaint is lodged with the Speaker for such misconduct must be given an opportunity of hearing before he is penalised with disqualification. The Rules framed by the Speaker of the Arunachal Pradesh Assembly is intended to strike a proper balance between the need to punish political defection on the one hand and the requirement to give fair hearing to such member before disqualifying him. It is now a well-settled proposition of law without reference to cases that in the context of the introduction of sub-article (2) of Article 102 and Article 191 of the Constitution, a proceeding under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is one to decide whether a member has become disqualified to hold his position as a Member of the Assembly on the ground of defection. A proceeding under the Tenth Schedule gets started before the Speaker only on a complaint being made that certain persons belonging to a political party had incurred disqualification on the ground of defection. In other words, there must be a complaint lodged without which the Speaker has no suo motu power to take cognizance of the vice of defection attracting the wrath of disqualification. To meet the claim so raised, the member of the Assembly against whom the proceedings are initiated has the right to show that the party has merged with another political party and hence the penalty of para 2 is not attracted. To meet the claim so raised, the member of the Assembly against whom the proceedings are initiated has the right to show that the party has merged with another political party and hence the penalty of para 2 is not attracted. Thus, the whole proceeding under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is initiated or gets initiated as a part of disqualification of a member of the House. The rules prescribed by various legislatures including the Arunachal Pradesh Legislature contemplate the making of an application to the Speaker when there is a complaint that some member or members have voluntarily given up his membership or their memberships in the party. It is only then that in terms of the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is called upon to decide the question of disqualification raised before him in the context of para 6 of the Tenth Schedule. The Speaker has necessarily to decide that question of disqualification as a Tribunal. In the context of such a claim against a member to disqualify him, that member, in addition to a plea that he had not voluntarily given up his membership of the Party or defied the whip issued to him or that there has been a merger of his party with another party in terms of para 4 of the Tenth Schedule. Call it a defence or whatever, a claim under para 4 of the Tenth Schedule, is really an answer to a prayer for disqualifying the member from the legislature on the ground of defection. Therefore, in a case where a Speaker is moved by a legislature party or the leader of a legislature party to declare certain persons disqualified on the ground that they have defected, it is certainly open to them to plead that they are not guilty of defection in view of the fact that there has been a merger or that their conduct does not amount to voluntarily giving membership of the political party. In that context, the Speaker cannot say that he will first decide whether there has been a merger as an authority and thereafter decide the question whether disqualification has been incurred by the members, by way of a judicial adjudication sitting as a Tribunal. In that context, the Speaker cannot say that he will first decide whether there has been a merger as an authority and thereafter decide the question whether disqualification has been incurred by the members, by way of a judicial adjudication sitting as a Tribunal. It is a part and parcel of his jurisdiction as a Tribunal while considering a claim for disqualification of a member or members to decide that question not only in the context of the plea raised by the complainant but also in the context of the pleas raised by those who are sought to be disqualified that they have not incurred disqualification in view of a split in the party or in view of a merger. 30. It is against the backdrop of the legal proposition enunciated above that we propose to decide the question as to whether an opportunity of hearing was indeed given to each of the petitioners before issuing the impugned order of disqualifications. At this stage, however, it must be noticed that there are allegations and counter allegations between the parties that the speaking orders produced by the petitioners and the ones produced by the respondents are forged/manufactured documents. To go to the bottom of controversy, the original record of the respondent No. 2 pertaining to the disqualification proceedings was requisitioned by this Court on 1-3-2016, and the same was produced by the respondent No. 3 on 4-3-2016 under sealed cover. The original record so produced makes an interesting reading. As this record is likely to throw light on the dispute, we reproduce the same hereunder in extenso: "Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly ***** File No. LA/LEG-37/2015(PT) Subject : Disqualification on the ground of defection A petition has been filed by Mr. Rajesh Tacho, Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party against the following members: 1. Shri Prem Khandu, MLA 2. Shri Kumar Wali, MLA 3. Shri Kameng Dolo, MLA 4. Shri Markio Tado, MLA 5. Shri Jarkar Gamlin, MLA 6. Shri P.D. Sona, MLA 7. Shri Mutchu Mithi, MLA 8. Shri Kamlung Mossang, MLA 9. Shri Phosum Khimhun, MLA 10. Shri W. Lowangdong, MLA 11. Shri T. Wangham, MLA 12. Shri Lombo Tayeng, MLA 13. shri Kaikho Pul, MLA 14. Shri Kumar Wali, MLA 3. Shri Kameng Dolo, MLA 4. Shri Markio Tado, MLA 5. Shri Jarkar Gamlin, MLA 6. Shri P.D. Sona, MLA 7. Shri Mutchu Mithi, MLA 8. Shri Kamlung Mossang, MLA 9. Shri Phosum Khimhun, MLA 10. Shri W. Lowangdong, MLA 11. Shri T. Wangham, MLA 12. Shri Lombo Tayeng, MLA 13. shri Kaikho Pul, MLA 14. Shri T.N. Thongdok, MLA Notice be issued to all the above members to appear before the undersigned on 14th December, 2015 at 10.30 hrs in the Office Chamber at Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Naharlagun. Accordingly, notices to the Hon'ble Members signed for immediate dispatch. 07/12 Illegible (Nabam Rebia) Speaker 07th December, 2015. Secretary, LA Nobody present today neither received any reply. Put up for consideration/further order on 15-12-2015. Sd/ Illegible 14/12/15 Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Naharlagun. File No. LA/Leg-27/2015 Dated 15th December, 2015. Sub:- Disqualification of MLA's under Rule-3 Sub-Rule 7 of the Members of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly Disqualification on Ground of Defection Rules, 1987. Notes & Order May like to re-call letter received from Hon'ble Chief Minister and Leader of CLP, Vide No.-CM9 (A.P)-10/2015, Dated 7th December 2015. Regarding Disqualification on the ground of Defection along with the said letter the following document has been enclosed. (1) A copy of the Petition. (Page-4C) (2) A copy of circular issued by President, APCC. (Page-14 to 38C) (3) Letter issued by General Secretary, AICC. (Page-47 to 68C) Submitted for further order please. Notes at above. All the relevant papers enclosed below for the further order Pl. Sd/- Illegible 15-12-2015 May endorse file to H.S. for necessary order. Sd/- Illegible 15-12-2015 Ref. note at pre-page The letter addressed to HS by HCM and Leader of CLP and its enclosures including Petition submitted by Shri Rakesh Tacho, Chief Whip of Congress Legislature Party, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Naharlagun for disqualification of 14 members of Sixth Legislative Assembly for anti-party activities under 10th Scheduled of Constitution of India has been examined. All the relevant documents in support of the petition are enclosed for kind consideration by HS. The power to disqualify of a member and/or of group of members are vested to Speaker under the provision of Article 191 of the Constitution of India and Rules framed under Tenth Schedule of Constitution of India namely Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of grounds of Defection) Rules, 1987. The power to disqualify of a member and/or of group of members are vested to Speaker under the provision of Article 191 of the Constitution of India and Rules framed under Tenth Schedule of Constitution of India namely Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of grounds of Defection) Rules, 1987. As stated above, Hon"ble Speaker may, on being satisfied himself, pass necessary order as deem fit. Sd/- Illegible (M. Lasa) 15/12/2015 Secretary, (LA) I have carefully perused the records for disqualification of 14 (Fourteen) Members of Sixth Legislative Assembly placed before me by the Secretary, Legislative assembly. I have also carefully gone through the issues raised by the CLP Leader and the Chief Minister. I have carefully examined all the papers submitted to me by Shri Rajesh Tacho, Chief Whip of Congress Party. On going through the records and all metrials placed before me by the Petitioner Shri Rajesh Tacho, Chief Whip and DO letter of CLP leader under Article 191(2)(a) and rules framed under Tenth Schedule of Constitution of India, namely, Arunachal Pradesh (Disqualification on the Ground of Defection) Rules, 1987, I am fully satisfied with the points raised therein and I find that this is a fit case for disqualification of 14 (fourteen) Members, namely. 1. Shri Pema Khandu, MLA, 3-Mukto (ST) Assembly Constituency. 2. Shri T.N. Thongdok, MLA, 5-Kalaktang (ST) Assembly Constituency 3. Shri Kumar/Wali, MLA, 8-Bameng (ST) Assembly Constituency 4. Shri Kameng Dolo, MLA, 12-Pakke-/Kessang (ST) Assembly Constituency. 5. Shri Markio Tado, MLA, 20-Tali (ST) Assembly Constituency 6. Shri Jarkar Gamlin, MLA, 31-Along East (ST) Assembly Constituency 7. Shri P.D. Sona, MLA, 33-Mechuka (ST) Assembly Constituency 8. Shri Lombo Tayeng, MLA, 39-Mebo (ST) Assembly Constituency. 9. Shri Mutchu Mithi, MLA, 43-Roing (ST) Assembly Constituency 10. Shri Kaikho Pul, MLA, 45-Hayuliang Assembly Constituency. 11. Shri Kamlung Mossang, MLA-50 Miao (ST) Assembly Constituency 12. Shri Phosum Kimhun, MLA-52 Changlang South (ST) Assembly Constituency. 13. Shri Wanglin Lowangdong, MLA, 57-Boduria-Pumao Assembly Constituency 14. Shri T. Wangham, MLA, 59-Longding-Pumao (ST) Assembly Constituency. Given under my seal & Signature Sd/- (Nabam Rebia) Speaker December 15, 2015. Secretary/LA Illegible 15/12/2015 Sd/- Illegible Addl. Secy 15/12/2015 U/s (Leg) Sd/- Illegible 15/12/2015 SO(Leg) Sd/- Illegible 15/12/2015 Hon'ble Speaker Notes & Order notification is placed below for approval/signature plse. S(L) Sd/- Illegible 15/12/15 For approval and sign Pl. Shri T. Wangham, MLA, 59-Longding-Pumao (ST) Assembly Constituency. Given under my seal & Signature Sd/- (Nabam Rebia) Speaker December 15, 2015. Secretary/LA Illegible 15/12/2015 Sd/- Illegible Addl. Secy 15/12/2015 U/s (Leg) Sd/- Illegible 15/12/2015 SO(Leg) Sd/- Illegible 15/12/2015 Hon'ble Speaker Notes & Order notification is placed below for approval/signature plse. S(L) Sd/- Illegible 15/12/15 For approval and sign Pl. U/s (L) Sd/- Illegible 15/12/15 Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly Speaker’s Cell Subject : Sitting Arrangement in the House 14(fourteen) Members who have been disqualified from the Membership are not entitle to seat in House and take part in the proceeding of House any more. Please ensure that sitting arrangement are made accordingly. Sd/- Illegible (Nabam Rebia) December 15, 2015 Secretary, LA Sd/- Illegible 15/12/2015 Hon'ble Speaker's order at above. Accordingly a notification is placed below for approval and signature plse. For approval and sig pl." 31. The orders and nothings extracted in the foregoing are reproduced from the original record produced by the respondent No. 3 (Secretary/Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly). Though a desperate attempt is made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 to persuade us to hold that the order dated 15-12-15 found in the original record cannot be taken as the final order as revealed by the subsequent noting which said that "Hon'ble Speaker Notes and order notification is placed for approval/signature plse". According to the learned senior counsel, the main orders of disqualification were separately issued, which were produced before the Apex Court. We have carefully gone through the so-called orders, which are fourteen in number, and examination of these orders cannot persuade us to hold that these orders really form a part of the said original record. We say so because the orders placed before the Apex Court are, in the first place, undated and, in the second place, are not even endorsed to anyone including the petitioners. It may also be noticed that there is no reference at all to these orders in the original record/file produced by the respondent No. 3 before this Court. In these orders, it was sought to be made out that notices were sent to each of the petitioners through Sh. P.K. Dutta, Dak Runner of the Assembly, but they were not present at their residences and the Dak Runner was chased out as indicated by him in the affidavit to that effect filed by him. In these orders, it was sought to be made out that notices were sent to each of the petitioners through Sh. P.K. Dutta, Dak Runner of the Assembly, but they were not present at their residences and the Dak Runner was chased out as indicated by him in the affidavit to that effect filed by him. Now, a perusal of the original file again will reveal that no such affidavit is found therein nor was any mention thereof made by the respondent No. 2 in his order. All the nothings in the original file also did not make any whisper of statement about the filing of such affidavit by the Dak Runner. Under such circumstances, we find force in the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the 14 orders produced before the Apex Court on 18-2-2016 in connection with SLP(C) No. 779-780 of 2016 are false and fabricated documents. In our opinion, there is no other order apart from the order dated 15/12/2015, which is in the nature of a composite order, found in the original file whereby the respondent No. 2 disqualified the petitioners for voluntarily giving up their membership of the Indian National Congress (I). 32. We have read and re-read the composite order of disqualifications and the previous nothings of the respondent No. 2 and other officials of the Assembly, which form a part of the said original file to find out as to whether there is any evidence to show that notice was ever sent to each of the petitioners before issuing the composite order of disqualification, but in vain. The composite order was preceded by the order dated 7-12-2015 of the respondent No. 2 which said that notice should be issued to all the members to appear before him on 14-12-2015 at 10-30 hrs (10.30 AM or 10.30 PM?) in his Office Camber at the Legislative Assembly Secretariat. The record further reveals that no mention is made about the service of notice upon any of the petitioners between 7-12-2015 and 14-12-2015, when the respondent No. 2 noted that nobody was present on that day nor did he receive a reply. He then proceeded to order that the matter be put up on 15-12-2015 for consideration/further order. The record further reveals that no mention is made about the service of notice upon any of the petitioners between 7-12-2015 and 14-12-2015, when the respondent No. 2 noted that nobody was present on that day nor did he receive a reply. He then proceeded to order that the matter be put up on 15-12-2015 for consideration/further order. On the fateful day, i.e. 15-12-2015, one of the officials of the Assembly put up the "Notes & Order" suggesting "to re-call" (recall?) letter received from the Hon'ble Chief Minister and Leader of CLP, Vide No.- CM(A-P)-10/2015 dated 7th December 2015 and enclosing therein the following documents 1) a copy of Petition, 2) A copy of the circular issued by President, APCC and 3) Letter issued by General Secretary, AICC. Thereafter, another noting referring to the said notes remarked that all the relevant papers were enclosed thereunder for further order. The note was thereafter apparently endorsed to the Speaker. At this stage, it may be observed that not a single service report of the Dak Runner is to be found or mentioned in those nothings. Nor is there any evidence to show that any attempts was made to issue notices upon the petitioners nor were such notices actually handed over to the Dak Runner for service either. Coming back to the earlier narrative, the matter was placed before the respondent No. 3 before it reached the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 3 acknowledged the receipt of those enclosures and placed the same before the respondent No. 2 for his consideration and at same time remarked that the respondent No. 2 had the power under Article 191 of the Constitution to disqualify the petitioners and that he might pass necessary order as deemed fit. This was followed by the composite order disqualifying all the petitioners in a single stroke of pen. 33. It may be noted that in the said composite order, the respondent No. 2 had simply observed that he carefully perused the record for disqualification of the 14 Members of the Sixth Legislative Assembly, which was placed before him by the respondent No. 3, as well the issue raised by the respondent No. 4. He also remarked that he had examined all the papers submitted to him by the respondent No. 6. He also remarked that he had examined all the papers submitted to him by the respondent No. 6. He then proceeded to record that on going through the records and all materials placed before him by the complainant (respondent No. 6) under Article 191(2)(a) (sic) and rules framed under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, namely, Arunachal Pradesh (Disqualification on the Ground of Defection) Rules, 1987, he was fully satisfied with the points raised therein and held that was a fit case for disqualification of the petitioners. On the basis of such satisfaction, the respondent No. 2, therefore, passed the composite order of disqualification of the petitioner from the membership of the 6th Legislative Assembly of the Arunachal Pradesh. It is interesting to note that from the nothings of the original file commencing from 7-12-2015, it is evident that the respondent No. 2 did not even bother to record that the complaint/petition complied with the requirements of Rule 7) of the Rules or caused copies of the complaint and of the annexures thereto to be forwarded to the member against whim complaint has been made, etc. or ever consider the question as to whether to refer the complaint to the Committee for making a preliminary inquiry and submitting a report to him nor did he publish in the Bulletin or notify in the official Gazette his decision of disqualification of the petitioners. That apart, which is more important, there is not an iota of evidence to show that notice was issued or served upon any of the petitioners. Even if notices were served upon or were actually received by the petitioners also, whether it would be possible for them to appear before the respondent No. 2 when he by the note dated 14/12/15 requested the Home Minister of the State to provide full proof security in and around the Assembly building w.e.f. 15-18 December, 2015 and not to allow the MLAs to enter the Assembly building premises on 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th December, 2015, which request was promptly acted upon by the Home Minister by endorsing it to Superintendent of Police, City. With the kind of direction coming from their political bosses, it is naive to think that a police officer would defy such an order (even if the order is illegal); it must be remembered that the respondents were still the Government of the day at that time. True, the S.P./Capital by his letter dated 15-12-2015 sought clarification from the respondent No. 3 as to under what provision of law/rules, MLAs could be debarred from entering the House premises, but then there is also no evidence to establish that such an attempt was made by the petitioners despite such an order, but the SP did not allow them to enter the House premises. In any case, this is no substitute for proof of service of notice upon any of the petitioners or to prove that the latter knew the initiation of disqualification proceedings against them by the respondent No. 2. It is, however, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 that when there is enormous evidence of the petitioners hobnobbing with the Governor, who undoubtedly knew the notice for their removal, which prompted him to issue the order for not altering the composition of the House, it is unthinkable that they were never aware of the notices issued upon them. In our opinion, such conclusion cannot be drawn by this Court inasmuch as there is no evidence of service of notice upon each of the petitioners. There is, therefore, considerable force in the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that no duty is cast upon the petitioners to enquire as to whether notices were issued upon them by the respondent No. 2 or not. 34. Thus, on going through the original file, the inference is irresistible and the conclusion inescapable that no notice was ever served upon any of the petitioners nor was any genuine attempt made by the respondent No. 2 to serve such notices upon them. As already noticed, the nothings/orders found in the file between 7-12-2015 and 15-12-2015 are conspicuous by the absence of any step taken by the respondent No. 2 or his office to effectuate service of notice upon any of the petitioners. As already noticed, the nothings/orders found in the file between 7-12-2015 and 15-12-2015 are conspicuous by the absence of any step taken by the respondent No. 2 or his office to effectuate service of notice upon any of the petitioners. The next question to be determined now is what is the legal position about notice or non-notice or defective notice and what will be the legal consequence of non-service of notice or improper service of notice? To answer these questions, it will be profitable to quote from the decision of the Apex Court in CST Vs. Subhasi & Co., (2003) 3 SCC 454 . This is what it said in paragraph 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the judgment: "16. "Notice", in its legal sense, may be defined as information concerning a fact actually communicated to a party by an authorised person, or actually derived by him from a proper source, or else presumed by law to have been acquired by him, which information is regarded as equivalent to knowledge in its legal consequences. Dictionary further states: Co Lit 309 Tomlin's Law Dictionary 17. Notice is making something known, of what a man was or might be ignorant of before. And it produces diverse effects, for, by it, the party who gives the same shall have the same benefit, which otherwise he should not have had; the party to whom the notice is given is made subject to some action or charge, that otherwise he had not been liable to; and his estate in danger of prejudice. 18. "Notice is a direct and definite statement of a thing as distinguished from supplying materials from which the existence of such thing may be inferred." (Per Parke, B. Burgh Vs. Legge, (1989) 5 M&W 418 : 8 LJ Ex 258 ER 177) 19. The dictionary gives some other definitions of "notice" as: The legal instrumentality by which knowledge is conveyed, or by which one is charged with knowledge. The term "notice" in its full legal sense embraces a knowledge of circumstances that ought to induce suspicion or belief, as well as direct information of that fact. In its popular sense "notice" is equivalent to information intelligence, or knowledge. 20. In Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd. Vs. S.P. Kasture AIR (1968) 565 : 21 STC 326 it was observed as follows: (AIR pp. In its popular sense "notice" is equivalent to information intelligence, or knowledge. 20. In Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd. Vs. S.P. Kasture AIR (1968) 565 : 21 STC 326 it was observed as follows: (AIR pp. 575-76, para 23) "23. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Gokhale that a notice under Section 11(4)(a) or 11-A(1) is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under those provisions or that it is the very foundation for the proceedings to be taken under those provisions. The notice contemplated under Rule 32 is not similar to a notice to be issued under Section 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. All that Sections 11(4) and 11-A(1) prescribe is that before taking proceedings against an assessee under those provisions, he should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In fact, those sections do not speak of any notice. But Rule 32 prescribes the manner in which the reasonable opportunity contemplated by those provisions should be afforded to the assessee. The period of 30 days prescribed in Rule 32 is not mandatory. The rule itself says that 'ordinarily' not less than 30 days' notice should be given. Therefore, the only question to be decided is whether the defects noticed in those notices had prejudiced the appellants. It may be noted that when the assessees received the notices in question, they appeared before the assessing authority, but they did not object to the validity of those notices. They asked for time for submitting their explanation. The time asked for was given. Therefore, the fact that only nine days were given to them for submitting explanation could not have in any manner prejudiced them. So far as the mistake in the notice as regards the assessment year is concerned, the assessees kept silent about that circumstance till 1958. It was only when they were sure that the period of limitation prescribed by Section 11-A had expired, they brought that fact to the notice of the assessing authority. It is clear that the appellants were merely trying to take advantage of the mistakes that had crept into the notices. They cannot be permitted to do so. We fail to see why those notices are not valid in respect of the periods commencing from 1-2-1953 till 31-10-1955. We are unable to agree with Mr. It is clear that the appellants were merely trying to take advantage of the mistakes that had crept into the notices. They cannot be permitted to do so. We fail to see why those notices are not valid in respect of the periods commencing from 1-2-1953 till 31-10-1955. We are unable to agree with Mr. Gokhale's contention that each one of those notices should be read separately and that we should not consider them together. If those notices are read together as we think they should be, then it is clear that those notices give the appellants the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Sections 11(4)(a) and 11-A(1). In Chatturam Vs. CIT (1947) 15 ITR 302 : AIR 1947 FC 32 the Federal Court held that any irregularity in issuing a notice under Section 22 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 does not vitiate the proceeding; that the income tax assessment proceedings commence with the issue of the notice but the issue or receipt of the notice is, however, not the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer to make the assessment or of the liability of the assessee to pay the tax. The liability to pay the tax is founded on Sections 3 and 4 of the Income Tax Act which are the charging sections. Section 22 and others are the machinery sections to determine the amount of tax. The ratio of that decision applies to the facts of the present case. In our opinion, the notices issued in the year 1955 are valid notices so far as they relate to the period commencing from 1-2-1953 to 31-10-1955." 21. Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being violative of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and, therefore, proceedings are left open. All that is done is that the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect is vacated but the proceedings are not terminated. [See Guduthur Bros. Vs. ITO, (1960) 40 ITR 298 : AIR 1960 SC 1326 and Supdt. (Tech. I), Central Excise Vs. Pratap Rai (1978) 3 SCC 113 : 1978 SCC (Crl.) 371 : 1978 SCC (Tax) 149 : (1978) 114 ITR 231.. In CST Vs. R.P. Dixit Saghidar (2009) 9 SCC 324 it was held as follows: (SCC p. 325, para 5) "5. We are unable to subscribe to the view of the High Court. (Tech. I), Central Excise Vs. Pratap Rai (1978) 3 SCC 113 : 1978 SCC (Crl.) 371 : 1978 SCC (Tax) 149 : (1978) 114 ITR 231.. In CST Vs. R.P. Dixit Saghidar (2009) 9 SCC 324 it was held as follows: (SCC p. 325, para 5) "5. We are unable to subscribe to the view of the High Court. The aforementioned passage quoted from the Tribunal's order shows that the Tribunal was of the view that once the order is quashed by the Assistant Commissioner, he could not in law remand the case for a decision afresh. As has been noted, before the Assistant Commissioner the counsel for the respondent had contended that the ex parte order should have been set aside because no notice had been received. When principles of natural justice are stated to have been violated it is open to the Appellate Authority, in appropriate cases, to set aside the order and require the assessing officer to decide the cases de novo. This is precisely what was directed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal, in our opinion, was clearly in error in taking a contrary view." This view is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. 22. The emerging principles are: (i) Non-issue of notice or mistake in the issue of notice or defective service of notice does not affect the jurisdiction of the assessing officer, if otherwise reasonable opportunity of being heard has been given. (ii) Issue of notice as prescribed in the Rules constitutes a part of reasonable opportunity of being heard. (iii) If prejudice has been caused by non-issue or invalid service of notice the proceeding would be vitiated. But irregular service of notice would not render the proceedings invalid; more so, if the assessee by his conduct has rendered service impracticable or impossible. (iv) In a given case when the principles of natural justice are stated to have been violated it is open to the Appellate Authority in appropriate cases to set aside the order and require the assessing officer to decide the case de novo. 23. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not considered the question of prejudice, grant of reasonable opportunity in the aforesaid perspective. 24. 23. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not considered the question of prejudice, grant of reasonable opportunity in the aforesaid perspective. 24. In view of what has been stated in R.P. Dixit case learned Single Judge was justified in directing de novo assessment by an order of remand. The direction was appropriate as the only ground on which the interference was made related to the violation of principles of natural justice by alleged improper service of notice. The Division Bench was not justified in upsetting the direction. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. 25. We however make it clear that no opinion has been expressed by us on any aspect except limitation. It shall be open to the assessee to raise all other issues before the assessing officer which shall be considered in the proper perspective and in accordance with law." 35. As already noticed, there is absolutely no evidence to show that any notice was ever served upon any of the petitioners. Therefore, the instant case is one where it can truly be said that this is a case of non-issue of notice and not a mistake in the issue of notice or defective service of notice. Though Rule 7(3) of the Rules does not say so in many words, the fact that the Speaker is required to serve copies of the complaint together with its annexures to the member goes to show that the concept of reasonable opportunity of hearing is imported therein. To give reasonable opportunity of hearing, notice must be served upon the member being made subject to disqualification. This is made clear by the Apex Court in Ravi S. Naik Vs. Union of India and others, 1994 Supp(2) SCC 641, where it observed that principles of natural justice have an important place in modern administrative law. They have been defined to mean "fair play in action". They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but shared in common by all men. An order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is procedurally ultra vires and, therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. An order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is procedurally ultra vires and, therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. After all, in a case where the Speaker is moved by a legislature party or leader of a legislature party to declare certain person disqualified on the ground of defection, it is always open to him to take the plea that he has not given up membership of the party or defied the whip or that there has been a merger. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on the part of the Speaker, before hearing him, to jump to the conclusion that a case for disqualification has been made out. It is part and parcel of his jurisdiction as a Tribunal while considering a claim for disqualification of a member or members to decide that question not only in the context of the plea raised by the complainant but also in the context of the pleas raised by those who are sought to be disqualified that they have not incurred disqualification in view of a merger or their actions do not amount to voluntarily giving up membership of the party which elected them. That is the reason why in spite of the finality imparted to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen by paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule such a decision is subject to judicial review on the ground of non-compliance with rules of natural justice. But while applying the principles of natural justice, it must be borne in mind that "they are not immutable but flexible" and they are not cast in a rigid mould and they cannot be put in a legal strait-jacket. Whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 36. In the view that we have taken that this is a case of non-service of notice to any of the petitioners, the course of action open to us, as suggested by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, appears to be to quash the impugned order of disqualifications and remand the case to the Speaker of the Assembly for fresh consideration by him in accordance with law. Mr. PK Goswami, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 as well as Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, appears to be to quash the impugned order of disqualifications and remand the case to the Speaker of the Assembly for fresh consideration by him in accordance with law. Mr. PK Goswami, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 as well as Mr. M. Krishnamani, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 6 and Mr. HS Paonam, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 4, vehemently oppose such course of action. It is their submission that as the present Speaker is the petitioner No. 10, he cannot be expected to be impartial or free from bias; this will be tantamount to an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and not even from Caesar's wife to Caesar. They argue that in the event of the petitioner No. 10 adjudicating his own case and that of the other petitioners, grave miscarriage of justice is inevitable, which must be prevented by this Court. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel, however, submits that when the jurisdiction to decide disqualification cases is conferred upon the Speaker of the Assembly alone by the Constitution, this Court has no jurisdiction to appoint any other authority to decide such dispute; to do so would be re-writing the Constitution, which is absolutely impermissible. To remove any apprehension of partiality/bias in the minds of the respondents in such adjudicatory process, this Court may very well direct the respondent No. 2 to constitute a Committee in accordance with Rule 7(4) of the Rules for making preliminary enquiry and submit a report to him. To counter this, Mr. PK Goswami, the learned senior counsel argues that when the facts in this case are indisputable and only one conclusion is deducible therefrom, namely, the petitioners have voluntarily given their membership of INC(I) and have in the process incurred the wrath of disqualification under paragraph 2(a) of the Tenth schedule to the Constitution, it is not at all necessary or justified for this Court to remand it to the Speaker but to uphold the impugned order of disqualifications and dismiss the writ petition. The principles of natural justice should not be expanded in such a manner as to make the application of the principles a mockery. 37. The principles of natural justice should not be expanded in such a manner as to make the application of the principles a mockery. 37. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned senior counsel, we are of the view that we cannot certainly uphold the impugned disqualification orders, which have become a nullity for violation of principles of natural justice. In our opinion, the apprehension of the respondents that they are not likely to get justice from the Speaker is clearly misconceived. It must not be overlooked that the petitioner No. 10, who has now become the Speaker of the Assembly, is subject to disqualification as he is one of the Members who was disqualified by the respondent No. 2. In this context, the application of the proviso to paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule has come in handy. In our opinion, the Parliament was very much alive to the possibility of a crisis of this nature to come up in course of time. For better appreciation of this issue, it will be apposite to refer to paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule, which is in the following terms: "6. Decision on questions as to disqualification on ground of defection. - (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a House has become subject: Provided that where the question which has arisen is as to whether the Chairman or the Speaker of a House has become subject to such disqualification, the question shall be referred for the decision of such member of the House as the House may elect in this behalf and his decision shall be final. (2) All proceedings under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph in relation to any question as to disqualification of a member of a House under this Schedule shall be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Article 122 or, as the case may be, proceedings in the Legislature of a State within the meaning of Article 212." 38. True, relegating the disqualification question to the current Speaker may give rise to the possibility, of bias on his part and may not be the ideal solution, yet we must not overlook the constitutional provision of vesting such adjudicatory power only to him, who is required to function as a Tribunal exercising quasi-judicial powers. True, relegating the disqualification question to the current Speaker may give rise to the possibility, of bias on his part and may not be the ideal solution, yet we must not overlook the constitutional provision of vesting such adjudicatory power only to him, who is required to function as a Tribunal exercising quasi-judicial powers. In the constitutional scheme of this nature, we have no alternative but to consider the question of invoking the doctrine of necessity. This doctrine came up for consideration before the Apex Court in State of U.P. Vs. Sheo Shanker Lai Srivastava, (2006) 3 SCC 276 , and was decided in the following manner : "12. It is not in dispute that the Lok Ayukta was the disciplinary authority. The power to impose punishment on the appellant vested only in him. When the Lok Ayukta appointed one Shri S.K. Arora, a retired Director of Defence Estate, an objection thereto was taken by the appellant himself stating that no person from outside should be appointed as the Inquiry Officer. In the aforementioned situation, the Lok Ayukta had no other option but to take upon himself the burden of holding the departmental proceedings. The appellant, therefore, cannot be permitted to raise any contention that the disciplinary proceeding should have been conducted by some other officer. It has not been contended that any other officer working in the office of the Lok Ayukta was available for conducting such enquiry. 13. It is true that the principle of natural justice is based on two pillars : (i) nobody shall be condemned without hearing; and (ii) nobody shall be a judge in his own cause. 14. It is, however, well known that the principles of natural justice can be excluded by a statute. They can also be waived. 15. In a case where doctrine of necessity is applicable compliance with the principles of natural justice would be excluded. 16. Referring to the doctrine of necessity, Sir William Wade in his Administrative Law stated: "But there are many cases where no substitution is possible, since no one else is empowered to act. Natural justice then has to give way to necessity; for otherwise there is no means of deciding and the machinery of justice or administration will break down." It was further stated : "In administrative cases the same exigency may arise. Natural justice then has to give way to necessity; for otherwise there is no means of deciding and the machinery of justice or administration will break down." It was further stated : "In administrative cases the same exigency may arise. Where the statute empowers a particular minister or official to act, he will usually be the one and only person who can do so. There is then no way of escaping the responsibility, even if he is personally interested. Transfer of responsibility is, indeed, a recognised type of ultra vires. In one case it was unsuccessfully argued that the only minister competent to confirm a compulsory purchase order for land for an airport had disqualified himself by showing bias and that the local authority could only apply for a local Act of Parliament." 17. In M.P. Special Police Establishment Vs. State of M.P. (2004) 8 SCC 788 : 2005 SCC (Crl.) 1 a Constitution Bench of this court observed that as the office of the Lok Ayukta is held by a former Judge of this court, it would be difficult to assume that such authority would give a report without any material whatsoever. Although no law was laid down in this behalf, but, evidently those observations are pointers to show that normally a report from such a high officer should not be disbelieved. 18. It is not that the Lok Ayukta was not inclined to get the matter inquired into by an outsider. He appointed one Shri S.K. Arora. It is the appellant himself who raised an objection there against. He categorically stated that no outsider should be appointed as an Inquiry Officer although he took a different stand in his first show-cause. He, therefore, waived his right - see Manak Lal Vs. Dr. Prem Chand, 1957 SCR 575 : AIR 1957 SC 425 SCR at p. 586. 19. In the aforementioned situation, the Lok Ayukta had no other option but to proceed with the inquiry. Despite the fact that he was the disciplinary authority himself, as well as a witness, he had no other option but to inquire into the charges against the appellant. Furthermore the appellant did not deny or dispute, as noticed hereinbefore, the recovery of the documents from the almirah. Despite the fact that he was the disciplinary authority himself, as well as a witness, he had no other option but to inquire into the charges against the appellant. Furthermore the appellant did not deny or dispute, as noticed hereinbefore, the recovery of the documents from the almirah. In that view of the matter, it was for the appellant, who had knowledge about the documents and which had been kept by him in the almirah, to show that as to how he had dealt with the same. He being the Private Secretary was a man of confidence. He was bound to follow the prevailing practise. It was his duty to place all the complaints and letters received from other departments before the Lok Ayukta. The office of a Lok Ayukta is of great importance. People approach the Lok Ayukta with various grievances. They require urgent enquiry. It is not difficult to presume that only because such complaints were received, a practise developed that no almirah should be kept under lock and key. The appellant must be presumed to have knowledge thereabout. Despite the same he had put his almirah under lock and key. He refused to hand over the key when called upon to do so. He did not cross-examine the only witness who was available. He also did not examine himself. He did not examine any defence witness. He did not show any remorse and in that view of the matter, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the order of punishment passed by the Lok Ayukta suffered from any infirmity." 39. In view of the mandate of the Constitution, it is thus impermissible for us to by-pass the Speaker as the adjudicatoy authority to decide the dispute arising out of the complaint/petition lodged by the respondent No. 6. In fairness, however, we should not simply assume that the Speaker would be partial in exercising his adjudicatory function as the Parliament has reposed faith in him to be fair; sometimes, responsibility may also change the perspective of a functionary like the current Speaker. Nevertheless, to allay the apprehension of the respondents, the Speaker shall have to constitute a Committee as contemplated by rule 7(4) of the Rules. Nevertheless, to allay the apprehension of the respondents, the Speaker shall have to constitute a Committee as contemplated by rule 7(4) of the Rules. As we decide to quash the impugned disqualification orders for non-observance of principles of natural justice, we do not think it necessary to deal with the merit of the case or refer to the numerous decisions of the Apex Court cited by the counsel, especially by Mr. P.K. Goswami, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1/2 as they mostly relate to the merit of the case. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents stands overruled as violation of principles of natural justice strikes at the root of the case. 40. The offshoot of the foregoing discussion is that this writ petition succeeds. The impugned order of disqualifications dated 15-12-2015 found in the original record and the official Gazette Notification dated 15-12-2015 issued by the respondent No. 2 are hereby quashed. Necessarily, the so-called disqualification orders both bearing dated 15-12-2015 produced by the petitioners and the respondents respectively are to be treated as non-est, and are, therefore, inoperative having no force of law. Consequently, we issue the following directions: (1) the Speaker (the petitioner No. 10) shall take appropriate action within the next 15 days to convene the House for the election of a member to decide on the question of his disqualification and that of the remaining petitioners on the basis of the petition lodged by the respondent No. 6 and the election shall be completed within the next fifteen days; (2) The member so elected shall decide the question of disqualification of the petitioners in accordance with law within two months of his election; both the parties shall be given an opportunity of hearing before taking decision on disqualification. (3) If the disqualification issue cannot be disposed of by the member so elected for reasons attributable to the act of omission or commission on the part of the Speaker (the petitioner No. 10) or of the member so elected or of the other petitioners within the next three months, the impugned disqualification orders shall stand revived without further reference from this Court. (4) It is made clear that the member so elected shall take up the cases of all the petitioners including that of the petitioner No. 10 and dispose of the same in one proceeding. 41. (4) It is made clear that the member so elected shall take up the cases of all the petitioners including that of the petitioner No. 10 and dispose of the same in one proceeding. 41. Before parting, we feel it to be our duty to point out a thing or two warranted by the facts and circumstances of this case. The existing system of conferring power upon the Speaker of the Assembly or upon a member to be elected by the House where the Speaker has become the subject of disqualification, to decide the question of disqualification on the ground of defection under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution has left much to be desired, can hardly result in a fair and just decision and has also given a go by to one of the two principles of natural justice, namely, bias. After all, the Speaker or the member so elected will always be the one supported by the ruling party. What should be the remedy. In our opinion, the time has now come for the Parliament to seriously think of amending paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution to take away the power of the Speaker to decide on the questions of disqualification on ground of defection, or, for that matter, to elect a member to decide such question and entrust it to an independent body to ensure impartial and effective decision. The Parliament may also seriously ponder the suggestion of one of our greatest parliamentarians, the late Madhu Limaye, who in his article in the Kolkata daily, The Telegraph, published sometime in 1985 when the Bill was under consideration in the Parliament. According to him, the main reason for defection being the lure of ministerial berth in the Government, the practical solution for eliminating the evils of defection does not lie in disqualifying a Member but in denying him a ministerial berth. The other alternative is to make the post of Speaker apolitical like in England where once he is so elected, he severs all kinds of relationship with his party and is re-elected unopposed. "Once a Speaker, always a Speaker" is the famous maxim in U.K. This can make him insulated from the rough and tumble of politics and decide the disqualification issue fairly and fearlessly. "Once a Speaker, always a Speaker" is the famous maxim in U.K. This can make him insulated from the rough and tumble of politics and decide the disqualification issue fairly and fearlessly. We are not unmindful of the fact that none of above options can ensure a fool-proof system, but when the existing dispensation has miserably failed us, the time has really come to explore other alternatives. In any case, the bottom line is that it is not really the system which fails us; it is rather the individuals who operate the system who fails us. After all, law can always be bent or circumvent to suit one's convenience. Nevertheless, we still hope and trust that the member so elected will rise to occasion and come to an impartial decision on this issue so that the faith reposed in him by the Parliament is vindicated. Secondly, we have taken the liberty of citing some decision not cited at the bar, but we do not think this to be improper. This reminds us of the following observations of Lord Denning in the Discipline of Law, at p. 289 (Indian Reprint): "Thus rebuked, I may as well make a confession. On many occasions I have done my own researches and given an opinion on matters on which the Court has not had the benefit of the arguments of counsel or of the judgment of the Court below. I have done this because vary much in their ability and I do not think that their clients should suffer by any oversight or mistake of counsel. If it is a new point or a new matter which could alter the outcome of the case, then the right course is to inform counsel and put the case in the list for further hearing. But if it is just the elaboration of existing points or matters, there is no such need - although I do know of one authority where the defendant failed on every point argued on their behalf, but succeeded on a new point which was taken by the Judges themselves after the argument was concluded. It was Shaw Vs. Great Western Rly. (1894) 1 QB 373."