JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. The facts and points of law involved in both the writ petitions are identical and hence with the consent of learned counsel of the parties this common order is passed in respect of both the writ petitions. 2. Heard learned counsel, Mr. Somik Deb for the petitioners, learned counsel, Mr. J. Majumder for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5 and learned counsel, Mr. K.K. Pal for respondent Nos. 3 and 4. 3. At the very outset Mr. Deb, learned counsel of the petitioners has submitted that in an earlier Writ Petition (C) No. 897 of 2016 of almost similar nature this Court was pleased to direct the writ petitioner of that case to approach the Tribunal by filing an appeal against the impugned order passed by Municipal Commissioner and it is the humble contention of learned counsel, Mr. Deb that the present writ petitions shall not be dealt with similarly since the impugned orders passed by the Municipal Commissioner are beyond jurisdiction and therefore the orders are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 4. On the contrary learned counsel, Mr. Pal and Mr. Majumder for the respondents have submitted that once an order is passed by the Municipal Commissioner and a provision is prescribed to prefer an appeal against the order under the Tripura Municipal Act, 1994 (for short, Municipal Act) itself, the writ petitions should not be entertained and the parties, if feel aggrieved may approach the Tribunal by filing an appeal and so the writ petitions should be dismissed since equally efficacious relief is available under the statute. 5. It is an admitted position that the petitioners for construction of multistoried building in their respective land submitted building plans to the Municipal Corporation in the year 2007. It is the case of the petitioners that the building plans, submitted according to rules, were supposed to be sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation within sixty days from the date of receipt of the building plan and if no communication made within sixty days from the date of receipt of the building plan, as prescribed under Section 125 of the Municipal Act, it should be presumed that the building plans submitted by the petitioners were approved and/or sanctioned and the Municipal Corporation cannot direct the petitioners to demolish the building on the ground that the building plan was not sanctioned and/or approved. 6. 6. Learned counsel, Mr. Deb has submitted that the writ petitions are maintainable since the impugned orders dated 23.05.2016 passed by the Municipal Corporation to demolish the entire construction is beyond jurisdiction. According to Mr. Deb, an order for demolition may be made by the Municipality as per Section 133(1) of the Municipal Act and “Municipality” means the constituted body of the Municipality as defined in Section 2(22) of the Municipal Act and the Municipal Commissioner has no authority to pass such an order. Since the impugned orders were without jurisdiction, the writ petitions should be entertained and the petitioners cannot be compelled to approach the appellate forum as prescribed in Section 133(3) of the Municipal Act. In support of his contention learned counsel, Mr. Deb has referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 (para 15) wherein the Apex Court has observed thus: “15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” 7. Referring to the above observation of the Apex Court learned counsel, Mr. Deb has submitted that the entire proceedings initiated by the Municipal Commissioner and the impugned orders of demolition passed by him are wholly without jurisdiction and so the writ petitions should be decided on merit. 8. Mr. Referring to the above observation of the Apex Court learned counsel, Mr. Deb has submitted that the entire proceedings initiated by the Municipal Commissioner and the impugned orders of demolition passed by him are wholly without jurisdiction and so the writ petitions should be decided on merit. 8. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has further contended that the Municipal Commissioner issued notices to the petitioners referring to orders passed by this Court in WP (C) (PIL) No. 10 of 2015 and the Municipal Commissioner did not apply his mind at all in the particular case of the petitioners, rather the notices were issued only referring to the direction of this Court in the writ case and hence the orders are nothing but nullity for not applying the mind of the Municipal Commissioner to the facts of the particular case and for not deciding the matter assigning reason. He has also referred the case of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja and Another vs. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302 (para 11, 12, 13 and 14) and the case of Manohar Lal vs. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557 (para 21 and 23). Mr. Deb, learned counsel therefore prayed for issuing formal notice to the respondents and to pass an interim order staying operation of the impugned orders dated 23.05.2016 pending disposal of the writ petitions. 9. Per contra learned counsel, Mr. Pal referring to the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court in WP (C) (PIL) No. 10 of 2015, specially orders dated 06.10.2015, 23.02.2016 and 30.03.2016 has submitted that the Municipal Commissioner was directed by this Court to identify those buildings constructed unauthorizedly and to issue notices to the owners of the buildings to submit the sanctioned building plans and to initiate action, if the buildings were constructed unauthorizedly without sanctioned plans. As per direction of the Division Bench of this Court the Municipal Commissioner has taken action since the petitioners constructed building without a sanctioned building plans and it is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Commissioner to issue notice and to direct demolition of the building. He has referred Section 84 of the Municipal Act which authorizes the Municipal Commissioner to act in accordance with law. 10. The Municipal Corporation as defined in Section 2(22) of the Municipal Act is a juristic person. The Municipality has not been made a party in the present writ petitions. He has referred Section 84 of the Municipal Act which authorizes the Municipal Commissioner to act in accordance with law. 10. The Municipal Corporation as defined in Section 2(22) of the Municipal Act is a juristic person. The Municipality has not been made a party in the present writ petitions. However, without entering into that aspect let us see whether the Municipal Commissioner has the authority to act under Section 133 of the Municipal Act or not. Learned counsel, Mr. Deb has vehemently argued that the decision to demolish a building invoking provisions of Section 133(1) of the Municipal Act can be taken only by the Municipality, which means the elected executive body of the Municipality and not by the Municipal Commissioner. So, the whole exercise made by the Municipal Commissioner was beyond jurisdiction. The contention of learned counsel, Mr. Pal on the other hand is that the Municipality executes its business/action through its officers. The policy decisions are taken by the Municipal Corporation and its executive body but the executing officers are the officers of the Municipality who are responsible to implement the provisions of the Municipal Act. Section 84 of the Municipal Act prescribes thus: “84. It shall be the duty of every Municipality to perform the functions and implement the scheme envisaged by this Act including the matters listed in Schedule II and those assigned by the State Government. For different provisions of this Part Municipality shall mean person or authority to whom powers and functions have been allocated or delegated by general or special order of Executive body.” 11. A reading of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that the Municipality shall mean the person or authority to whom powers and functions have been allocated or delegated by general or special order of its executive body. There is no challenge that the person who issued the notices and passed the impugned orders is not the Municipal Commissioner authorized by the executive body of the Municipality. So, while the notices were issued by the Municipal Commissioner and the impugned orders were passed by the Municipal Commissioner himself being the authorized person of the Municipality, I am of considered opinion that the Municipal Commissioner has jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 133(1) of the Municipal Act. 12. So, while the notices were issued by the Municipal Commissioner and the impugned orders were passed by the Municipal Commissioner himself being the authorized person of the Municipality, I am of considered opinion that the Municipal Commissioner has jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 133(1) of the Municipal Act. 12. Section 133(3) of the Municipal Act clearly stipulates that the appeal against an order made by the Municipality shall lie with the Municipal Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. While such a Tribunal has been constituted and it is functioning, the petitioners if they feel aggrieved by the impugned orders dated 23.05.2016 may approach the Tribunal ventilating all the grounds including that of the question of jurisdiction are concerned. 13. Since an equally efficacious relief is available under the Municipal Act itself against such an order of demolition, I think the writ petitions should not be entertained before the process prescribed by law is exhausted. 14. Therefore, I am of considered opinion that the present writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the provision of Section 133(3) of the Municipal Act and the petitioners, if so advised may challenge the order presenting an appeal before the Municipal Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from today and during this period the Municipality shall not take any coercive measure to implement the impugned orders dated 23.05.2016. 15. With the above observations the writ petitions stand dismissed as not maintainable.