JUDGMENT : T. MATHIVANAN, J. Invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this memorandum of civil revision has been filed by the first defendant in the suit challenging the order of the trial Court dated 09.09.2015 and made in I.A.No.683 of 2015 in O.S.No.312 of 2015 on the file of the learned Additional District Munsif, Karur. 2. The first defendant in the suit O.S.No.312 of 2015 is the revision petitioner herein whereas the respondents 1 to 3 are the plaintiffs. The fourth respondent herein being the second defendant in the suit had passed away. The respondents 1 to 3 herein have filed the suit O.S.No.312 of 2015 as against the revision petitioner/first defendant as well as against the remaining defendants seeking the following reliefs: (a) granting a decree for declaration declaring that the respondents 1 to 3 /plaintiffs are the Hereditary Trustees-cum-Archakars of the suit temples; and (b) granting a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2, their men, servants, agents or any one on their behalf from in any manner interfering with the day-to-day management of the suit temples and day-to-day performance of poojas in the suit temples by the plaintiffs. 3. Along with the plaint, the respondents/plaintiffs have also filed an interlocutory application in I.A.No.683 of 2015 to grant an order of temporary injunction as against the revision petitioner/first defendant and other defendants in the suit. The revision petitioner/first defendant has contested the suit by filing his written statement. No contest is made on behalf of the fourth respondent/second defendant as he had passed away. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the evidences adduced on both sides, the learned Additional District Munsif, Karur has proceeded to allow the petition granting an order of interim injunction. This order dated 09.09.2015 has been challenged in this revision. 4. Heard Mr. R. Vijayakumar learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.R.Saravanan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 3. 5. Before, we go into the merits of the case, the question of maintainability of this revision is arisen for the consideration of this Court. It is obvious to note that the impugned order seems to have been passed by the trial Court under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Before, we go into the merits of the case, the question of maintainability of this revision is arisen for the consideration of this Court. It is obvious to note that the impugned order seems to have been passed by the trial Court under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As contemplated under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) as well as Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order passed under Section XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC is an appealable order and not revisable order. 6. However, a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can also be maintained before this Court to exercise its power of superintendence to stretch its hand over the Subordinate Courts to set their wrong at right. Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers on the High Court, the power of superintendence over the Courts and Tribunals within the State or within its jurisdiction. It is significant to note here that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution of India is in addition to the power conferred upon this Court to control inferior Courts or Tribunals through Writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate Tribunals within the limits of that authority and ensuring that they obey the law. As observed by the Apex Court in Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board reported in (1998) 9 SCC 310, this power of superintendence is also in addition to the powers of revision under any legislation. However, since it being a supervisory power, it has to be exercised as such, distinct from appellate power. This principle is also laid down by the Apex Court in Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri v. Bhaskar Balwant Aher reported in (2000) 3 SCC 190 (equivalent to AIR 2000 SC 931 ). It is to be noted that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is of an administrative as well as judicial nature. If necessary, the High Court can interfere with the administrative orders of the inferior courts. 7. It is to be noted that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is of an administrative as well as judicial nature. If necessary, the High Court can interfere with the administrative orders of the inferior courts. 7. It may also be relevant to note here that as laid down by the Apex Court in Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh reported in (1979) 1 SCC 560 (equivalent to AIR 1979 SC 381 ), the supervisory power under this Article can be exercised even in those cases in which no appeal or revision lies to the High Court. In M.G. Burjarji v. S.N. Misra reported in (1977) 1 SCC 227 (equivalent to AIR 1976 SC 2446 ), it is held by the Apex Court that this power should not ordinarily be exercised if any other remedy is available to the aggrieved party, even though the pursuing of that remedy may involve some inconvenience or delay. Following three are the cardinal grounds for interference by exercising the supervisory power of the Court with the order of the Subordinate Courts: 1. Want or excess of jurisdiction, 2. Failure to exercise jurisdiction, and 3.violation of procedure or disregard of principles of natural justice. 8. This Court also would like to place it on record that if the interim orders of the subordinate Courts are made without jurisdiction, this Court can interfere by pressing into service the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. On coming to the instant case on hand, the revision petitioner, being the first defendant, has not assigned any reason for exercising the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the impugned order as it is passed under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On coming to the instant case on hand, the revision petitioner, being the first defendant, has not assigned any reason for exercising the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the impugned order as it is passed under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in C. Nagarathnamma v. The District Panchayat Officer, Chittoor and others, reported in AIR 1995 AP 342 citing the decision of that Court in H.R. Shenoy V.M. Murali Krishna reported in (1990) 1 Andh LT 336 (equivalent to AIR 1990 NOC 122) has held that the order granting interim injunction or temporary injunction pending final orders on the injunction petition filed under Order 39, Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only an appealable order under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but not revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure places a clear embargo against an order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate to it. The Calcutta High Court in Malati Santra and Others v. Nanda Dulal Banik and Others reported in AIR 1994 Calcutta 229 has unambiguously observed that an order under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC is an appealable order under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) and therefore, the revision is not competent. Even conversion of a revision into an appeal also is not permitted when the revision is expressly prohibited. 9. With regard to the maintainability of the revision as against the order passed under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC, Hon'ble Justice K.T.Thomas, while speaking on behalf of a Division Bench of the Apex Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S.Chellappan and Others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 695 , has observed that the principle is well recognised that High Court ought to direct party to seek other available remedies before invoking constitutional remedy. Therefore, at the first instance, without any hesitation this Court finds that the revision is not at all maintainable against an order of interim injunction which is an appealable order. 10. Therefore, at the first instance, without any hesitation this Court finds that the revision is not at all maintainable against an order of interim injunction which is an appealable order. 10. As observed in opening paragraphs, the revision petitioner/first defendant has also not stated any reason in the grounds of revision to exercise the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. In ground No.5, the revision petitioner has stated that the status of office of particular temple has to be decided only by the authorities under the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence the present suit is clearly barred under Section 108 of the Act. 11. Drawing the attention of this Court to Ground No.5, Mr.R.Vijayakumar, learned counsel for the revision petitioner has contended that since the learned Additional District Munsif has committed a jurisdictional error as the suit is squarely barred under Section 108 of the Act, this Court can interfere with the order of this Court by exercising the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 12. But the argument advanced by Mr. Vijayakumar is not sustainable because it cannot be heard to say that the suit is not maintainable as it is barred by Section 108 of the Act. The learned District Munsif has held that since there is a rival claim over the status of office of the suit temples, the suit itself is maintainable before the Civil Court. This would be discussed in detail in the later paragraphs as to how the suit is maintainable and Section 108 of the Act is not made applicable insofar as this case is concerned. 13. The respondents 1 to 3 claim that they are the hereditary trustees of the suit temple viz., Sengalmalai Arulmigu Varadaraja Perumal and Venkatramanswamy Vagaiyara Thirukoils. Since the suit in O.S.No.312 of 2015 itself has been filed by the respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs seeking declaratory relief to declare that they are the Hereditary Trustees-cum-Archakars of the suit temple, this Court keeps restriction in discussing anything which is prejudicial to the case of both the parties, because the suit as well as the main petition is pending before the trial Court. 14. The respondents 1 to 3 are the sons of one S.G.Venkatramana Iyer and according to them, they are the present Hereditary Trustees-cum-Archakars of the suit temples. 14. The respondents 1 to 3 are the sons of one S.G.Venkatramana Iyer and according to them, they are the present Hereditary Trustees-cum-Archakars of the suit temples. As it is revealed from the averments of the affidavit filed in support of the petition in I.A.No.683 of 2015, the suit temples were established at Sengalmalai 350 years back by Thirumalai Naicker of Madurai. According to them, the administration of the suit temples had/have been from time immemorial vested with their predecessors by succession. One Subbaiyan, who is their ancestor, was the hereditary trustee of the suit temples. After his demise his two sons, namely Gurusamy Iyer and Ramasamy Iyer had been acting as Archakars-cum-trustees of the suit temples. Later on, the son of Gurusamy Iyer viz., S.G.Venkatramana Iyer was acting as Archakar-cum-Trustee of the suit temples. Another son of Subbaiyan viz., Ramasamy Iyer had alienated the temple lands and subsequently, the same were resumed to the suit temples at the initiative of S.G.Venkatramana Iyer. So, According to respondents 1 to 3, neither Ramasamy Iyer nor his legal heirs had no connection with the suit temple. 15. The aforesaid S.G.Venkatramana Iyer had got four sons by name V.Subramaniya Iyer, V.Sridhar Iyer, V.Mohan Kumar Iyer, who were the plaintiffs and one Rajaram Iyer. The said Rajaram Iyer had settled at Chennai and he had relinquished his right of hereditary trustee in favour of the plaintiffs. After the demise of S.G.Venkatramana Iyer, the respondents 1 to 3, being his sons, have been acting as hereditary trustees in the line of succession and was also performing poojas in the suit temple as Archakars right from the year 1991. The respondents 1 to 3 have also stated various reasons supporting their claim as hereditary trustees to the suit temples. 16. They have also stated that their father S.G. Venkatramana Iyer had made several efforts to protect the properties of the temple and to perform poojas etc., in the suit temples and they have also stated that their father S.G.Venkatramana Iyer, in the capacity of hereditary trustee of the suit temples, had initiated several legal steps to retrieve the property of the temples. They have got no objection with regard to the fact that the suit temples are under the purview of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department. 17. They have got no objection with regard to the fact that the suit temples are under the purview of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department. 17. Even after the affiliation with the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, the plaintiffs are continuing their office as Hereditary Trustees-cum-Archakars till date. Their father S.G. Venkatramana Iyer had died in the year 1981 leaving behind them and the said Rajaram Iyer as his legal heirs and hence they are the hereditary trustees of the temple and they are performing the poojas in the suit temples in exercise of their right as hereditary trustees. 18. It is an admitted fact that the suit temple is a public temple. According to respondents/plaintiffs, during the celebration of Kumbabishegam, several committees were formed for facilitating the Thirupani work and under the above circumstance, the revision petitioner/first defendant was appointed as Head of the Committee and his work was restricted only to collect funds and spend the same towards the celebrations of Kumbabishegam and not more than that. They have also contended that neither the first respondent nor his ancestors had/has absolutely no role in administering the suit temple. As per the respondents/plaintiffs the office of the trusteeship of the suit temples is hereditary in nature and hence neither the first respondent nor his ancestors had never acted as trustees of the suit temples. 19. On account of misunderstanding between the respondents/plaintiffs and the revision petitioner and his son 4th respondent herein, the revision petitioner has proclaimed that he is the hereditary trustee of the suit temples. When the respondents /plaintiffs had approached the third respondent, viz., the Joint Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, Tiruchirappalli, they were informed that an order was passed in O.A.No.18 of 2007/B4 dated 20.02.2014 by the third defendant in the suit and by virtue of the said order, the first respondent seems to have been appointed as the hereditary trustees of the suit temples by the third defendant. According to the respondents/plaintiffs, the revision petitioner/first defendant has created and forged some documents in collusion with the officials of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department and obtained an order behind their back without actually impleading them as a party respondent. In fact, they were not arrayed as parties to the aforesaid proceedings in O.A.No.18 of 2007. According to the respondents/plaintiffs, the revision petitioner/first defendant has created and forged some documents in collusion with the officials of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department and obtained an order behind their back without actually impleading them as a party respondent. In fact, they were not arrayed as parties to the aforesaid proceedings in O.A.No.18 of 2007. They have also contended that since they are not parties to the proceedings in O.A.No.18 of 2007 on the file of the third defendant, the order passed by the third defendant is not at all binding on them. 20. They have also contended that the signature of the second respondent/plaintiff has been forged in active collusion with the Inspector of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department and they have also lodged a complaint before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur. With reference to maintainability of the suit before the civil Court, despite there is a bar under Section 108 of the Act, the respondents have contended that though there is a provision for preferring an appeal before the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department as against the order of the third defendant, they have got a civil right to institute a regular suit for the relief of declaration to declare themselves as hereditary trustees of the suit temples. They have also stated the reason for instituting the civil suit to decide as to who is the hereditary trustees. As contemplated under Section 63 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, the authorities of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department have got powers to decide as to whether the office of the trusteeship is hereditary or non-hereditary. 21. On the other hand, the revision petitioner has contended in his counter statement that the reliefs claimed by the respondents / plaintiffs are barred under the provisions of Section 108 of the Act and that any dispute in respect of the management of a religious institution shall be resolved only by the authorities constituted under the Act. The revision petitioner would contend that he had headed the Thirupani committee as he had been in the management of the temple as the hereditary trustee and electricity service connection was secured for the temple in his name in the capacity as the hereditary trustee. The revision petitioner would contend that he had headed the Thirupani committee as he had been in the management of the temple as the hereditary trustee and electricity service connection was secured for the temple in his name in the capacity as the hereditary trustee. He would further contend that the respondents/plaintiffs are well aware of the proceedings in O.A.No.18 of 2007 and in fact, the second respondent/plaintiff had given a statement before the Inspector confirming the management of the temples by him and also accepting the fact that they are doing only poojas in the temple. According to the revision petitioner, since one of the plaintiffs, viz., the second plaintiff had admitted and accepted the management of the suit temples with the revision petitioner, the suit itself is not maintainable in view of the estoppel by admission. The revision petitioner has also contended that the respondents/plaintiffs had moved the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, Chennai with an appeal against the orders passed in O.A.No.18 of 2007 on the file of the Joint Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, Tiruchirapalli and therefore, the respondents/plaintiffs cannot be heard to say that they need not approach the Commissioner by way of appeal and that they can approach the Civil Court. The revision petitioner has also contended that since the respondents/plaintiffs have chosen the jurisdiction of the Joint Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, they are not entitled to file the suit. 22. During the course of enquiry as many as 29 documents were exhibited on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs. On the other hand, 26 documents were exhibited on the part of the revision petitioner/first defendant. 23. The learned District Munsif, on considering the documents exhibited before him and on striking a balance between the contentions made by both the parties, has ultimately proceeded to grant an order of interim injunction as against the revision petitioner/first defendant. Insofar as this revision petition is concerned, for the purpose of disposing the revision on merit the following two crucial questions are arisen: 1. Whether the Joint Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department has got power to decide the status of office? 2. Whether the Joint Commissioner has got power to decide as to who is the hereditary trustee ? 24. Apparently there is rival claim with regard to the hereditary trusteeship of the suit temples. Whether the Joint Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department has got power to decide the status of office? 2. Whether the Joint Commissioner has got power to decide as to who is the hereditary trustee ? 24. Apparently there is rival claim with regard to the hereditary trusteeship of the suit temples. The respondents 1 to 3 have claimed that they are the Hereditary Trustees-cum-Archakars of the suit temples. On the other hand, the revision petitioner has claimed as if he is the hereditary trustee of the suit temples which is duly declared by the Joint Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department in O.A.No.18 of 2007 dated 20.02.2014. 25. As argued by Mr.R.Saravanan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs, the respondents 1 to 3 were not parties to the above said proceedings in O.A.No.18 of 2007. Mr.R.Vijayakumar, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has contended that on coming to know about the order passed by the Joint Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department dated 20.02.2014 and made in O.A.No.18 of 2007, the respondents/plaintiffs had moved the Office of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, Chennai-8 with the appeal against the orders in O.A.No.18 of 2007, but this fact had been wantonly suppressed by them in the plaint as well as in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. According to Mr.R.Vijayakumar, any dispute in respect of the management of a religious institution shall be resolved only by the authorities constituted under the Act and as contemplated under Section 108 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959), the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted. He has also fairly admitted while advancing the argument that the authorities under the Act were empowered to declare the nature of hereditary trusteeship to a temple. He has also maintained that the principle underlying the jurisdiction and powers of the civil Court was that the rival claimants also belonging to the same group which has secured an order under Section 63 (b) of the Act. He has also maintained that the principle underlying the jurisdiction and powers of the civil Court was that the rival claimants also belonging to the same group which has secured an order under Section 63 (b) of the Act. He has also submitted that Since the respondents/plaintiffs had admitted themselves that they had been doing pooja service in the temples, the management had not been in their hand and it is only in the hands of the revision petitioner as his ancestors had been managing the temple and paying emoluments to the poojaris, as such, it could not be maintained that there were rival claimants over the issue of hereditary nature of the office of the trust. 26. The arguments advanced by Mr. R. Vijayakumar is not sustainable because the plaintiffs as well as the first defendant, who is the revision petitioner herein, have placed their rival claims over the issue as to who is the hereditary trustee of the suit temples and therefore, it cannot be said that there is no rival claim. Under this circumstance, this Court finds that it may be better to extract the provisions of Section 63(b) of the Tamil nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1959: "63. Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to decide certain disputes and matters.- Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, shall have power to inquire into and decide the following disputes and matter.- (b) whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee;? The extraction of Section 108 of the Act is also very much essential. Section 108 of the Act reads as under: "108. Bar of suits in respect of administration or management of religious institutions, etc. - No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law, except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this Act. 27. - No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law, except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this Act. 27. What Section 108 of the Act envisages is that for determining or deciding which provision is made applicable in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution, no suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted in any Court of law except under and in conformity with the provisions of the Act. 28. This Court finds that it may also be better to extract the provision of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred .- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all Suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” 29. Now it is to be seen as to whether the jurisdiction of the trial Court is expressly or impliedly barred under Section 108 of the Act from taking cognizance of the present suit. Insofar as Section 63(b) of the Act is concerned, it is thus made clear that the decision of the Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to be confined to the status of trusteeship viz., whether it is hereditary or not. Insofar as the present suit in O.S.No.312 of 2015 is concerned, the core question is as to who among the respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs and the revision petitioner is the hereditary trustee. Therefore, this issue is not covered by the provision of 63(b) of the Act and hence the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not ousted and as such the trial Court is having competency to entertain the suit. This view has been supported by the decision of this Court in Aviyur Mariamman Temple, by hereditary trustee Parasuraman v. T.N.Sundaramoorthy Pillai and anr. reported in 1981 (1) MLJ 392 . This view has been supported by the decision of this Court in Aviyur Mariamman Temple, by hereditary trustee Parasuraman v. T.N.Sundaramoorthy Pillai and anr. reported in 1981 (1) MLJ 392 . In the said case, Justice Ramanujam, a learned single Judge of this Court as he then was has observed as under: "It is by now well-settled that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 57(b) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 corresponding to Section 63(b) of Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959 is confined to a decision whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee, i.e., that decision should be in relation to the status of the office of trusteeship, namely whether it is hereditary or not and that it is not competent for the Deputy Commissioner to go into the further question as to who among the competing claimants is a hereditary trustee as such a matter is not covered by the above provision. This is clear from the decisions in Krishnasami Raja v. Krishna Raja (sic) and Rengayya Goundar v. Karuppa Naicker (1971) 1 M.L.J. 358 . In view of the above decisions with which I am in entire agreement, the question as to who as between the rival claimants is a hereditary trustee cannot be decided by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 63(b) of Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959 and if such a decision had been referred by him under Exhibit A-4 the same cannot bind the civil Court and the civil Court has to decide that question independently on the evidence adduced by the parties." 30. In an another case in the State of Madras represented by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department Fort St. George, Madras -9 and Others v. A.V.Rathnasabapathy Gurukkal and 6 Others reported in 1993-2- L.W.47, Justice J.Janarathanam, a learned Judge of this Court has held that the facts of the case are so eloquent to speak for themselves that the trusteeship of the suit temple was hereditary for the family of T, as demonstrated by the proceedings. The relief claimed for in the suit is for a declaration that the plaintiff is the only legal heir entitled to succeed to the office of the hereditary trusteeship of the suit temple. The relief claimed for in the suit is for a declaration that the plaintiff is the only legal heir entitled to succeed to the office of the hereditary trusteeship of the suit temple. Such a question cannot at all be decided by the authorities under the provisions of the Act; but a civil Court alone is competent to deal with such a question. 31. On coming to the instant case on hand, admittedly the dispute is between two parties viz., respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs on the one hand and the revision petitioner/first defendant on the other hand. Hence, the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department is not directly concerned with the issue prevailing between the two parties. Therefore, the civil Courts jurisdiction is not take away and therefore, it has got jurisdiction to try the civil suit of this nature. This view has been supported by the decision of this Court in Sri Vallaba Ganesar Devasthanam, Sannadhi Street, Tiruvannamalai, represented by (1) Kailasa Mudaliar and Others v. A Anandavadivelu Mudaliar and Others reported in (1980) Madras Law Journal Reports 140. In the said case, Justice S Padmanabhan, a learned single Judge of this Court as he then was has observed as under: "The principle on which the jurisdiction of the civil Court is excluded under Section 108 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959 are now well settled. If the dispute raised in the suit relates to the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter for the determination of which a provision has been made in the Act, the bar under Section 108 of the Act will be attracted. On the other hand if the question arising for adjudication falls outside the scope and ambit of Section 108 of the Act, then the civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the bar of exclusion of jurisdiction provided for under Section 108 cannot be invoked.” It is also observed as follows: "It is equally settled that if, in a suit, any matter in respect of which a provision is made under the Act had to be incidentally decided the jurisdiction of the civil Court will not be excluded. To be more specific if any other question in respect of which the power is conferred on the Deputy Commissioner to decide under Section 63 of the Act, arises incidentally, for consideration in a suit, the jurisdiction of the civil Court will not be excluded. Notwithstanding Section 108 of the Act, where the dispute relating to a temple is only between two private parties and the board is not directly concerned, the civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit.” 32. As observed in the above cited decision it is reiterated that where the dispute is relating to as to who is the hereditary Trustee of a temple between two private parties and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board is not directly concerned with the issue, the civil Court has got jurisdiction to try the suit. There is no second thought on this settled principle of law. This Court in order to fortify this view has made reference to Ponniah Nadar and Others v. Chellian Nadar and Others reported in (1970) 2 MLJ 526 . In this case it has been observed as follows: "It is true that initial jurisdiction to determine the question whether a temple and its properties constituted a public trust lies with the Deputy Commissioner under Section 63 of the Act XXII of 1959. It is also true that under Section 108, no suit in respect of the administration of a religious institution can be instituted in any Court except in conformity with the provisions of the Act. But, notwithstanding Section 108 of the Act, where the dispute relating to a temple was only between two private parties and the H.R. And C.E.Board was not directly concerned, the civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. 33. Insofar as the present application I.A.No.683 of 2015 is concerned, the dispute centers around as to which of the rival claimants is entitled to be the trustee of the suit temples to exercise their right hereditarily and therefore, this issue cannot be brought within the amplitude of Section 63(b) and the bar under Section 108 of the Act will not apply (see S.Rangayya Gounder (died) and others v. Karuppa Naicker and Others reported in (1971) 1 MLJ 358 ). In V.S.Thiagaraja Mudaliar v. Bava C.Chokkappa Mudaliar and Others (Civil Appeal No.1792 of 1967) reported in (1974) 2 Supreme Court Cases 58 and Brahadeeswaran Shanmugha Sundram v. Bava C.Chokkappa Mudaliar and Others. While penning down the judgment on behalf of a three Judges Bench, Mr.Justice D.G. Palekar has observed as follows: "So there was unanimity amongst all the parties that the office was one of a hereditary trustee and the only dispute was who, out of the Bava family, was entitled to succeed to that office after Vaithilinga's death. In the normal course any-body making such a claim for the exclusion of others would have had to file a suit in the Civil court for a declaration that he was entitled to succeed to the office. In fact, Gopalaswami had done this by filing a suit in the court of the District Munsif." 34. On the other hand, with regard to the maintainability of the re division under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, Mr.R.Vijayakumar, has made reference to a decision of this Court in J.M. Richard and Others v. Church of South India Synod, rep. By its General Secretary and Others reported in (2012) 3 MLJ 394 . In this case, a learned single Judge of this Court has held that if the trial Court on the basis of some documents filed, has come to a prima facie conclusion in favour of the plaintiff and if an order of interim injunction has been granted, the same shall not be interfered within a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, if the trial Court has no jurisdiction to decide the suit, the Court has got power to correct the said order exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. This Court has carefully gone through the above cited decision and finds that this decision is not made applicable to the instant case on hand. The suit O.S.No.312 of 2015 as well as the application in I.A.No.683 of 2015 are not barred under the provisions of Section 108 of the Act and therefore, the civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is also not maintainable. 36. The suit O.S.No.312 of 2015 as well as the application in I.A.No.683 of 2015 are not barred under the provisions of Section 108 of the Act and therefore, the civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is also not maintainable. 36. The trial Court, on examination of the documents, produced on both sides has found that the respondents 1 to 3/plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case in support of their claim and the trial Court has also found that the balance of convenience is also in favour of respondents/plaintiffs and on considering this aspects, the trial Court has proceeded to grant an interim injunction on the ground that the respondents/plaintiffs have prima facie proof that they have been functioning as the hereditary trustees of the suit temples. The trial Court has also found that if the injunction is not granted in favour of the plaintiffs, they would be put into irreparable loss and hardship and hence, pending trial of the suit, an order of interim injunction has been granted by the trial Court which does not suffer from infirmity or discrepancy. Therefore, the interference of this Court is not warranted. In view of the above fact, the Civil Revision Petition filed by the revision petitioner is dismissed and the impugned order dated 09.09.2015 and made in I.A.No.683 of 2015 in O.S.No.312 of 2015 is confirmed. The learned Additional District Munsif, Karur is directed to dispose of O.S.No.312 of 2015 as expeditiously as possible on merits in the manner known to law. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Petition dismissed.