JUDGMENT : Aggrieved by the dismissal of his discharge petition in Crl. M.P. No. 7050 of 2016 in C.C. No. 325 of 2014 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Rajapalayam, the accused has directed this revision. 2. Cr. No. 753 of 2013 has been registered by the police as against the petitioner. After investigation, the Police filed the final report before the said Magistrate for offences under Sections 420, 341, 294(b) and 506(i) of I.P.C., on the ground that the petitioner had cheated the de-facto complainant to the tune of Rs.73,265/- and on 21.09.2013, at about 9.30 a.m., near a place in Rajapalayam, he had wrongfully restrained him and abused him in filthy language and also criminally intimidated him. 3. The learned Magistrate coming to the conclusion that there is ground to proceed further as against the accused has dismissed the discharge petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that out and out it is a civil case. There was business transaction as between both in the supply of charcoal. Some dues arose. Defacto complainant claimed Rs.6,98,265/-. It was settled at Rs.6,25,000/- in full quit. Thereafter, the de-facto complainant, cooked up this case for the balance amount of Rs.73,265/-. In this connection, he has also added criminal flavour to his complaint by alleging that he has abused him in filthy language, wrongfully restrained him and also criminally intimidated him. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that as it is purely a civil case, an offence under Section 420 I.P.C. is not attracted. 6. The leaned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that earlier, the de-facto complainant had lodged a complaint with D.I.G., complaining that the accused has abused him in filthy language. The money issue was over by paying him Rs.6,25,000/- in full quit. However, for the very same matter, again, he has filed a private complaint before the Magistrate. That has become the basis for the present F.I.R. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that criminal intimidation and wrongful restraintment were alleged to have been taken place on 21.09.2013. However, the complaint itself was filed on 20.09.2013. The statement of witnesses is also on similar lines. 8. That has become the basis for the present F.I.R. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that criminal intimidation and wrongful restraintment were alleged to have been taken place on 21.09.2013. However, the complaint itself was filed on 20.09.2013. The statement of witnesses is also on similar lines. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that even taking the allegations as such, it would not warrant an offence under section 506(i) I.P.C. A mere word of threat unaccompanied by any overt act or mere mensrea or expression of outburst will not amount to criminal intimidation. 9. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner also cited Dr. Subramanianswamy v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police, Town Police Station, Pudukottai (2000 (2) L.W. (Crl.) 646). 10. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.side) would submit that the complaint itself has been registered based on the direction of this Court issued in Crl. R.C. (MD) No. 804 of 2013 dated 04.12.2013. Further, the quash petition filed by the petitioner in Crl. O.P. No. 6626 of 2014 also has been dismissed by this Court. Further, upon consideration of the materials, having found that there is ground to proceed further, the learned Magistrate has framed charges as against the petitioner for offences under Sections 420, 341, 294(b) and 506(i) of I.P.C. In such circumstances, the order of dismissal of discharge petition cannot be faulted. And it also does not suffer from any legality or propriety. Further, after framing of the charges, petitioner cannot maintain this revision. 11. I have anxiously considered the rival submissions, perused the impugned order, the materials on record and the decision cited. 12. Framing of charge is an important judicial function of a criminal Court. Under Section 240 Cr.P.C., in a warrant-case instituted upon a police report the Court must consider the materials presented by the police along with its said report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., consisting of F.I.R., statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and documents, if any attached thereto and upon hearing both, 'if there is ground to presume that the accused has committed the offence', the Court has to frame charge. If it is groundless, it must discharge the accused under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 13. If it is groundless, it must discharge the accused under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 13. If we look at the parallel provision in Section 245 Cr.P.C. with regard to a warrant-case instituted upon a complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C., the phraseology employed is different. It says that if upon such consideration, 'if unrebutted it would warrant a conviction'. But in both type of cases the effect is same. 14. It is pertinent to note that even in Section 240 Cr.P.C., although the word 'presume' has been introduced, there must be incriminating materials, disclosing ground to proceed further, a prima facie case to frame a charge. A charge cannot be framed on mere presumption or conjectures without any basis or materials. 15. At the stage of framing of charges, the Court cannot shift the evidence. At this stage, it cannot indulge in appreciating the evidence. It cannot act like a trial Court. At this stage, the probative value of the materials collected by the police cannot be looked into. At this stage, the Court has to take the said materials as such to find out whether there is any ground to proceed further as against the accused. However, to find out this, without going to the acceptability aspect of those materials, the Court can analyse the materials. 16. Now, in the present case, admittedly, as between the accused and the de-facto complainant, there were business transaction relating to supply of charcoal by the de-facto complainant to the accused. In this connection, dues to the tune of Rs.6,98,265/- arose. In this connection, dispute arose between both sides. 17. It is a money matter. Yet, a complaint has been lodged by the de-facto complainant to the D.I.G. This has also been mentioned in the counter filed by the prosecution. There seems to be some mediation. Admittedly, a cheque for Rs.6,25,000/- has been given by the accused to the de-facto complainant. It was accepted. The cheque was also encashed by him. Petitioner thought that the matter was over. But it was not. Because, thereafter, he has been made an accused in a subsequent complaint filed by the de-facto complainant. 18. First, the defacto-complainant presented a complaint before the D.I.G. As already stated, the matter was settled between the parties by the petitioner paying Rs.6,25,000/- in full to the de-facto complainant. Thereafter, the de-facto complainant did not stop. But it was not. Because, thereafter, he has been made an accused in a subsequent complaint filed by the de-facto complainant. 18. First, the defacto-complainant presented a complaint before the D.I.G. As already stated, the matter was settled between the parties by the petitioner paying Rs.6,25,000/- in full to the de-facto complainant. Thereafter, the de-facto complainant did not stop. He filed a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Rajapalayam complaining of commission of offences under Sections 420, 506(i), 341 and 294(b) of I.P.C. and sought for a direction under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. 19. The learned Magistrate considering that it is a civil matter, refused to entertain the complaint. He has refused to direct the police to investigate the matter. 20. Aggrieved, the de-facto complainant had preferred revision before this Court in Crl. R.C. (MD) No. 804 of 2013. This Court, has also referred to the civil nature of the case. However, with respect to the other allegations, it had directed further action. Only in that circumstances, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate has forwarded the complaint to the police. Based on the said complaint, the present case in Crime No.753 of 2013 has been registered by the Police. Statement under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., has been recorded from the witnesses. 21. This Court, while dealing with the said revision, directed taking of further action on the complaint preferred by the de-facto complainant. As stated already, the learned Magistrate directed the Investigation Officer to register a case, investigate it and file the final report as per law. Therefore, the direction issued by this Court in Crl. R.C. (MD) No. 804 of 2013 will not deter us from considering the correctness of the dismissal of petitioner's discharge petition by the learned Magistrate. In other words, the Court can consider whether based on the materials collected by the police, is there a ground to proceed further as against the accused. 22. Equally dismissal of the quash petition in Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 6626 of 2014 filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on account of the fact that charge sheet (final report) has been filed will not also stand in the way of this Court considering whether there is ground to proceed further. 23. 22. Equally dismissal of the quash petition in Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 6626 of 2014 filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on account of the fact that charge sheet (final report) has been filed will not also stand in the way of this Court considering whether there is ground to proceed further. 23. A close scrutiny of the allegations in the F.I.R, which is based on the complaint filed before the Magistrate shows that it is a matter of recovery of balance amount of Rs.73,265/-. The said amount has been disputed by the accused on the ground that the entire matter was over once for all by his paying Rs.6,25,000/- to the de-facto complainant. In such circumstances, there is no question of presence of dishonest intention on the part of the accused at the very inception of the transaction of supply of charcoals and non-payment of balance money. Therefore, in this case, an offence under Section 420 I.P.C., is not attracted. 24. In his private complaint, the de-facto complainant had also alleged that the accused has scolded him in filthy language. It is not mentioned when and where the petitioner has so scolded him. Further, the said incident is stated to have taken place prior to the filing of his first complaint to the D.I.G. As stated in the counter filed by the prosecution that complaint was over by way of settlement between the parties. Again, the de-facto complainant cannot stick on to the said allegation. Further, in their statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the de-facto complainant and his two witnesses have stated that the said incident had taken place on 21.09.2013. However, the private complaint itself was filed before the learned Magistrate on 20.09.2013. The de-facto complainant tried to put the cart before the horse. The same is the position with regard to his allegation of wrongful restraintment under Section 341 of I.P.C. 25. In the F.I.R., it is alleged that the petitioner had criminally intimidated the de-facto complainant by stating that if he demand Rs.73,265/- he will finish him. It is pertinent to note that in the F.I.R., he did not mention when and where the alleged criminal intimidation was made. In his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the de-facto complainant had stated that it was on 21.09.2013. The complaint itself was on 20.9.2013. It is pertinent to note that in the F.I.R., he did not mention when and where the alleged criminal intimidation was made. In his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the de-facto complainant had stated that it was on 21.09.2013. The complaint itself was on 20.9.2013. The petitioner is stated to have told him that he will file a false complaint against him and see that he is put behind the bars. 26. The offence of criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503 I.P.C., which runs as under: ''503. Criminal intimidation.- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.'' 27. The said offence is punishable under Section 506 I.P.C. It has two parts. Less serious type of criminal intimidations have been made punishable under the first part of the Section and serious type of criminal intimidations have been made punishable under the second part of the Section. As per Section 503 I.P.C., the overt act of the accused must be such that it must create an alarm in the mind of the victim. By the effect of the intimidation the victim must be panicky. The effect of the intimidation is such that it shall cause immediate fear in his mind. 28. In Dr. Subramanianswamy v. The State through the Inspector, Town Police Station, Pudukottai (2000 (2) L.W. (Crl.) 646) with regard to the offence of criminal intimidation, it was held that mere mens rea would not be sufficient to attract commission of an offence in the absence of actus reus. 29. In Dr. Subramaniaswamy (supra), this Court has referred to the following observations of C. Shivappa, J. made in Crl. O.P. No. 1039 of 1996; “Part II of Sec.506 I.P.C. is attracted if the criminal intimidation includes threat to cause death or grievous hurt. 29. In Dr. Subramaniaswamy (supra), this Court has referred to the following observations of C. Shivappa, J. made in Crl. O.P. No. 1039 of 1996; “Part II of Sec.506 I.P.C. is attracted if the criminal intimidation includes threat to cause death or grievous hurt. Mere outburst is not sufficient to hold that it would fall within the mischief of Sec.506 I.P.C. In the instant case, the averment in the complaint and the statements in the depositions, if taken together, there are no allegations in the whole complaint that the petitioner ever made any attempt or did any act in pursuance of his alleged expression.” 30. It is seen from the above that mere outburst or any words of anger without any overt act will not amount to criminal intimidation. It could also be said that mere mens rea without any actus reus/overt act will not make it an offence under Section 506(i) or under Section 506(ii). 31. Thus, in the present case, even taking the allegations as such, it would not warrant an offence under Section 506(i) of I.P.C. 32. Charges are framed based on the accusations supported by incriminating materials collected by the police during investigation. The trial Court following the guidelines provided in Section 240 Cr.P.C. if it finds that there is ground to proceed further, it dismisses the discharge petition filed by the accused. In such circumstances, two situations will arise. One is an order framing charge and the other one is an order directing framing of charge. Both type of orders are subject to the judicial review of revisional power of the Court under Section 397 r/w 401 Cr.P.C. The correctness of the post event, namely, the dismissal of the discharge petition is being judicially examined by an higher forum under Section 397 Cr.P.C. Therefore, framing of the charge cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a revision filed to canvass the correctness of the order dismissing the discharge petition or the order framing the charge. A wrong decision to frame charge or an unsustainable dismissal of a discharge petition can be revised by the Court on the altar of legality, propriety, regularity, fundamental judicial procedure and settled principles of law. 33. In view of the foregoings, this Court is of the view that there is no ground to proceed further in this case. A wrong decision to frame charge or an unsustainable dismissal of a discharge petition can be revised by the Court on the altar of legality, propriety, regularity, fundamental judicial procedure and settled principles of law. 33. In view of the foregoings, this Court is of the view that there is no ground to proceed further in this case. The impugned order of dismissal suffers from legality and accepted principles of law. Consequently, the accused is to be discharged from the case. 34. In the circumstances, ordered as under: (1) This revision is allowed. (2) The impugned order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Rajapalayam in Crl. M.P. No. 7050 of 2016 in C.C. No. 325 of 2014 is set aside. (3) The accused is discharged from the case. (4) The connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.