JUDGMENT Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner initially challenged the suspension order by filing Writ Petition No.1942 (SB) of 2015: Jitendra Rajpoot vs. Allahabad Bank and others, and by means of order dated 18.12.2015, the said writ petition was dismissed as infructuous on the basis of instructions supplied by the learned counsel for the bank, who stated that the representation of the petitioner has been rejected and the order would be served upon him very shortly. Thereafter, the rejection order has been challenged by means of the present writ petition. 3. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that witnesses have not supported the prosecution case before the Sessions Court and if their statement is taken into consideration, then the petitioner cannot be fastened with the criminal liability. It is also submitted that the representation has not been decided by application of mind and the relevant facts have not been taken into consideration. 4. This Court while considering the identical issue in Writ Petition No.50 (SB) of 2013: Mata Badal Singh vs. Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank and another, dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 05.07.2016, wherein suspension order was not challenged. This Court in the aforesaid order, observed as under: "So far the first argument, that has been advanced, by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he has been placed under suspension for a period of beyond three months i.e. indefinite period is concerned, from the material on record, it is clearly established that on 01.08.2011, he was trapped by the C.B.I. for taking bribe and thereafter, placed under suspension by an order dated 03.08.2011. Later on, by an order dated 27.08.2011, the Chairman/competent authority of the Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank has accorded sanction under Section 19(1)(C) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for the prosecution of the petitioner for the offence under Section 7 and 13(2)r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in respect of the act done by him. Accordingly, a criminal case has been registered against the petitioner, in which, a charge sheet has been filed. Accordingly, a criminal case has been registered against the petitioner, in which, a charge sheet has been filed. So the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), wherein it has been held that an employee cannot be kept under suspension beyond a period of three months and if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not served on the delinquent officer and if the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for extension of the suspension, as the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him, as such the facts of the said case are not applicable in the present case, rather the present facts are on entirely different footing. Further, while taking into consideration the judgment passed in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.648 of 2015: Dilip Kumar Soni vs. Allahabad Bank and others, vide order dated 29.05.2015 held as under: "....................We have considered submissions of the rival parties and perused the record. Rule 12(1)(b) of the Regulations of 1976 provides that an officer/employee may be placed under suspension by the competent authority where a case against him in respect of criminal offence is under inspection, inquiry or trial. Rule 12(2) of the Regulations provides that an officer/employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the competent authority w.e.f. the date of detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise for a period exceeding 48 hours. Rule 12(5) provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this Regulation shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by an authority competent authority to do so. Sub-Rule (b) of Rule 12(5) provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this Regulation may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or deemed to have made the order. Initially the petitioner herein was placed under suspension vide order dated 24.12.2012 under Regulation 12(2), referred to above, on the ground of his detention exceeding 48 hours in connection with a criminal charge. Initially the petitioner herein was placed under suspension vide order dated 24.12.2012 under Regulation 12(2), referred to above, on the ground of his detention exceeding 48 hours in connection with a criminal charge. By the time his application for revocation of the suspension under Regulation 12(5)(b) came up for consideration, not only the competent authority had sanctioned his prosecution under Section 19 of the Act on being satisfied that a prima facie case existed against him, but the criminal case also became pending against him before the Special Judge, Anti Corruption, C.B.I. (West), Lucknow, thereby attracting the provisions contained in Regulation 12(1)(b) allowing the suspension to continue on account of pendency of an investigation, inquiry or trial in respect of any criminal offence. In these circumstances, on a perusal of the impugned order, we find that it contains cogent reasons for declining to revoke the suspension which does not suffer from any error in the eyes of law. We do not find any valid ground for interference in the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, specially in view of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party and referred hereinabove. As far as the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, we are of the view that as the petitioner was Branch Manager in a nationalized bank, his position was one of Trust vis.-a-vis. the Bank and its customers and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held in the case of Bank Employees that they have to maintain the highest degree of integrity, sincerity and trust and any act breaching the same has to be viewed seriously. The petitioner herein is alleged to have demanded and accepted bribe for which the criminal case is pending against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, therefore, under these circumstances, persuaded by the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, we are of the view that the opposite parties are justified in refusing to revoke the suspension, as, if the petitioner is put back in service with such serious charges, neither the possibility of repetition of the earlier acts, as alleged, can be ruled out nor the serious consequences flowing therefrom for the Bank. The Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and others v. Deepak Kumar Bhola (supra) has observed that it would be inconveivable that a Bank should allow an employee to continue to remain on duty when he is facing serious charges of corruption and misappropriation of money. Accordingly, it quashed the judgment of the High Court quashing the order of suspension of an employee of the Allahabad Bank, i.e. the same Bank involved herein. In view of the above, we are of the view that the proposition laid down in Ajay Kumar Choudhary's case (supra) relied by the petitioner cannot be applied to the facts of the present case, specially as the petitioner being an employee of the Bank stands on a different footing, vis.-a-vis. other employees. For the reasons aforesaid, the petition lacks merits and is dismissed." 5. The said situation also exists in the present case, so the argument in question has no force and is accordingly rejected. 6. So far the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding Regulation-30 of the Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010, the relevant portion quoted hereinbelow: "30. Officer or employee arrested for debt or on a criminal charge-(1) An officer or employee who is arrested for debt or on a criminal charge or detained in pursuance of any process of law for the time being in force, may, if so directed by the Competent Authority, be treated as being or having been under suspension from the date of his arrest, and or detention, as the case may be, up to such date or during such period as the Competent Authority may direct." 7. The petitioner cannot derive any benefit from the same in view of the facts stated hereinabove because as per the admitted facts of the case, the petitioner has been caught red handed by the C.B.I. for taking bribe and in respect of the said incident, prosecution has already been sanctioned and a criminal case is pending, in which a charge sheet has been filed. 8. Thus, when the proceedings against the petitioner have been initiated under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and in context of discharge of his official function/duties and in case the petitioner is allowed to discharge his duties, it shall not be in the interest of the equity rather shall be repugnant to the context. 8. Thus, when the proceedings against the petitioner have been initiated under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and in context of discharge of his official function/duties and in case the petitioner is allowed to discharge his duties, it shall not be in the interest of the equity rather shall be repugnant to the context. Hence, there is no justification to set aside the suspension order, because Apex Court in the case of Secretary to Govt., Prohibition and Excise Department Vs. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157 , observed that even if a criminal trial or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to the Court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon him to place an employee under suspension and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned. (See also: U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad Vs. Sanjeev Ranjan (1993) Supp. (3) SCC 483; and State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena and others (1996) 6 SCC 417 . For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this writ petition, and the same is dismissed." 9. The petitioner is facing the criminal trial, which has not come to an end and, therefore, in these circumstances, challenge to the rejection order on the petitioner's representation would amount to questioning the validity of the suspension order, which appears to be illegal and arbitrary. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.