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2016 DIGILAW 2432 (MAD)

A. Jothiramalingam v. Executive Officer/Joint Commissioner, Department of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments

2016-07-22

NOOTY.RAMAMOHANA RAO, S.S.SUNDAR

body2016
JUDGMENT : These Review Applications are filed by the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD)Nos.21429 to 21433 of 2015 challenging the final order passed by this Court on 15.04.2016. 2. Since several grounds are raised relating to mistake of fact and error apparent in the previous judgment of this Court with reference to the findings recorded by this Court, we proceed to deal with these cases, after narrating the facts and events with reference to the documents filed before us so as to consider the points raised herein effectively. 3. The petitioners have filed W.P.(MD)No.21429 to 21433 of 2015 for issuing writ of mandamus, forbearing the respondents herein from evicting the petitioners from their shops situated in Survey No.878/1 and other subdivisions of S.No.878. The facts disclosed in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions has to be briefly summarised as under: 3.1. All the petitioners have constructed shops and are running business. All the shops are located in West Rathaveethi (Giri Veethi), Adivaram, near Palani Temple. It is the case of the petitioners that the Tahsildar, Palani, has issued patta in respect of the property either in the name of the petitioner or the head of their family for the same extent for which they are in physical enjoyment and that they are paying taxes, after getting patta. 3.2. It is the further case of the petitioners that the respondent herein is making hectic efforts to dispossess and evict the petitioners from their property under the guise of G.O.Ms.No.3324, dated 31.08.1974, which is not applicable so far as the property of petitioners is concerned, in the sense that, the subject matter of the writ petitions is not covered by the said Government Order. 3.3. The petitioners who claimed to be in continuous possession and enjoyment of their respective shops, contended that the respondent has no right title or interest over the property concerned. Since the respondent is taking emergent steps to evict the petitioners forcibly and illegally from their own property, the petitioners allege that they have come to this Court, to get their possession protected as envisaged under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It is pertinent to point out that the petitioners have not mentioned any other proceedings or events in their affidavit relating to the properties which are the subject matter in all the writ petitions. 4. It is pertinent to point out that the petitioners have not mentioned any other proceedings or events in their affidavit relating to the properties which are the subject matter in all the writ petitions. 4. Strangely the petitioners have produced before this Court voluminous records after the disposal of the Writ Petitions. Upon perusing the documents, now filed before us, we find that the petitioners have suppressed material facts and events particularly prior proceedings which have a direct bearing to the result of the Writ Petitions. 5. Since this Court in the earlier order dated 15.04.2016, have referred to several documents and judgments in prior proceedings, we find it necessary to narrate the events in chronological order. 6. The Government of Tamil Nadu appears to have issued G.O.Ms.No.3324, dated 31.08.1974 directing that the lands covered by and margin of Giriveethi Road, as detailed in the order, be placed at the disposal of Sri Dhandayuthapani Swami Devasthanam, Palani, free of land value. Out of several survey numbers given in the said Government Order, the property comprised in Survey No.878 was not included but property in S.No.877 is found. It can be seen that the Devasthanam was directed to remove the encroachments by persons who are in enjoyment of the same by putting up shops or by other methods. There was also a direction to the Devasthanam not to lease out the property to the persons who have encroached the land and not to use the land for any remunerative purposes. Hence, it can be noticed that the Devasthanam was directed to bring the entire Giri Veethi Road and Giri Veethi Margin for the convenience of public. 7. Pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.3324, dated 31.08.1974, assigning the lands in respect of Giri Veethi Road and Giri Veethi Road Margin, there appears to be an action initiated by the Devasthanam to remove the encroachment from Giri Veethi and its margin. One Kaliyappan and 13 others filed a Civil Suit in O.S.No.163 of 1975 on the file of the Sub Court, Dindigul, for a declaration that the plaintiffs therein are entitled to the suit properties, as they are entitled to the suit properties by prescribing possessory title and for consequential permanent injunction restraining Sri Dhandayuthapani Swami Devasthanam from in any way interfering with the plaintiffs' possession and enjoyment of the property. The suit properties referred to in the plaint are described in 15 items denoting the possession of respective plaintiffs. From the description of items in the plaint schedule, it can be seen that the suit properties are abutting West Giri Street and hence, it can be deduced that the properties described in the plaint schedule, referred to the land which was assigned to the Devasthanam in Survey No.877. It is also relevant to note that one of the plaintiffs in the suit claimed right on the other end of road margin. However, Survey No.877/2A alone was mentioned in all the items of plaint schedule. 8. The suit came to be dismissed by judgment and decree dated 31.12.1977, specifically holding that the plaintiffs therein are the trespassers, having no right to question the assignment in favour of the Devasthanam. The appeal filed by the plaintiffs in A.S.No.61 of 1978 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Madurai, against the dismissal of the suit in O.S.No.163 of 1975 was also dismissed by a judgment dated 22.02.1979. Though the plaintiffs preferred a Second Appeal in S.A.No.880 of 1983 before this Court, they preferred W.P.No.9101 of 1983, for issuing a writ of mandamus forbearing Sri Thandayuthapani Swami Devasthanam, from taking eviction proceedings against them from the land comprised in T.S.No.877/2A, without following due process of law. The Writ Petition was dismissed holding that the petitioners, who are the plaintiffs in the previous suit, can agitate their claim, if any, only in the second appeal and not in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Strangely, the second appeal in S.A.No.880 of 1983 was dismissed as not pressed on 24.10.1997. 9. Within few months from the date of disposal of the Second Appeal, civil suits in O.S.No.276 of 1998 to 286 of 1998 against the respondent herein and other authorities of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department were filed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property which is in Survey Nos.877/2A and 878. From the description of the suit property (only the plaint in O.S.No.280 of 1998 is produced before us), it can be seen that the subject matter of the suit is only the shop adjoining West Giri Veethi. From the description of the suit property (only the plaint in O.S.No.280 of 1998 is produced before us), it can be seen that the subject matter of the suit is only the shop adjoining West Giri Veethi. Paragraph 10 of the plaint is extracted as under: “The plaintiff humbly submits that after 7-9-83, the third defendant did not take any steps to remove the alleged encroachment and evict the plaintiff an d plaintiff and also the other persons in possession of plots. All of them including the plaintiff have denied the title of the defendants and to their knowledge they have been in open and continuous possession of their respective portions. The plaintiff herein was 3rd plaintiff in the earlier suit. The plaintiff has been asserting his title, possession and enjoyment and to the knowledge of the defendants and has perfected his title by adverse possession. The inaction of the defendants iin not taking possession of the properties situate in S.No.877/2A for over 12 years from 7-9-83 clearly extinguished and lost and the title of the plaintiff has been perfected by adverse possession.” 10. For the first time, the plaintiffs have also included T.S. No.878 along with T.S.877/2A which is the subject matter of the previous suit and the writ petition. In the plaint, it is also the case of the respective plaintiffs that the portions in their occupation of land is comprised both in Survey No.877/2A and 878. It was also the case of the plaintiffs therein that there is no demarcation boundary between the portions fall in the two survey numbers. The second set of suits appears to have been filed, when a further attempt was made by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department to evict the encroachers by invoking the provisions of Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. During the pendency of suit, the plaintiffs filed interlocutory applications in I.A.Nos.482 to 492 of 1998 in O.S.No.276 of 1998 to 286 of 1998 before the Sub Court, Palani, for interim injunction against the defendants in the suit viz., Joint Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department and two others. Third defendant in the suit is the Executive Officer of Arulmigu Thandayuthapani Swami Thirukovil, Palani. The Sub Court dismissed all the interlocutory applications for interim injunction by a detailed order dated 09.06.1999. Third defendant in the suit is the Executive Officer of Arulmigu Thandayuthapani Swami Thirukovil, Palani. The Sub Court dismissed all the interlocutory applications for interim injunction by a detailed order dated 09.06.1999. A reading of the entire order reveals that the order holds good even for disposing of the suits as well. 11. It appears that the suits in O.S.Nos.276 to 286 of 1998 were transferred to District Munsif Court, Palani, in 2004 and the same suits were re-numbered as O.S.No.83 of 2004 to O.S.No.87 of 2004. (Only four numbers are given and facts about remaining suits not given) It appears that the plaintiffs in the suit thereafter allowed the suits to be dismissed for default. Though decrees relating to some of the suits alone were produced before us, we go by the statements of the counsels for both sides for recording a finding as to the manner of disposals of second set of suits. It is also placed on record that the temple has also filed a suit against five of the encroachers for declaration that the defendants are not entitled to raise any constructions in S.F.No.877/2A which is under the control and management of the Devasthanam and for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants in the suit from making any further construction in the land in Survey No.877/2A. The relief for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to hand over possession of the encroached area in Survey No.877/2A was also prayed in the suit. Some of the persons, who are allegedly in encroachment, appears to have been given a representation dated 30.11.2015 to the Executive Officer of the Temple stating that the portions in their occupation in Survey No. 878 is their patta land and that the temple has no right to evict them from their patta land, as if it is an encroached portion. Pursuant to the said representation, the review petitioners have filed Writ Petitions in W.P. (MD)Nos. 21429 to 21433 of 2015 seeking for issuance of writ of mandamus forbearing the respondent herein from in any way evicting the petitioners from their shops constructed in Survey No.878/1, 878/6, 878/4, 878/2 and 878/7. 12. Pursuant to the said representation, the review petitioners have filed Writ Petitions in W.P. (MD)Nos. 21429 to 21433 of 2015 seeking for issuance of writ of mandamus forbearing the respondent herein from in any way evicting the petitioners from their shops constructed in Survey No.878/1, 878/6, 878/4, 878/2 and 878/7. 12. This Court has passed a reasoned order after observing that the petitioners have approached this Court seeking a writ of mandamus forbearing the respondents from in any way evicting the petitioners from the lands, suppressing the earlier suits and other proceedings initiated against the respondents. It was specifically pointed out by this Court that the petitioners, who are guilty of suppression of material details, are not entitled to any relief. However, while narrating the events and considering the documents, the fact that the survey No.878 is not the subject matter of the previous suit in O.S.No.163 of 1975 and G.O.Ms.No.3324, dated 31.08.1974, has not been noticed. This indicates that this Court proceeded by assuming that the previous suit in O.S.No.163 of 1975 is also in respect of the Survey No.878. 13. In the Review Petitions, the learned Senior Counsel vehemently argued that the suit filed in O.S.No.163 of 1975, has nothing to do with the present land in issue, for which, patta was granted in favour of the petitioners. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the properties in issue are different from properties which are the subject matter in O.S.No.163 of 1975 and that the conclusions of this Court, that the claims of petitioners were already negatived by the Civil Court is factually incorrect and hence, the order of this Court suffers from error apparent on the face of record. The crux of the argument is therefore emanates from the statements of facts recorded by this Court by assuming Survey No.878 as part of the suit properties in the earlier civil litigations. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out another mistake whereby this Court has wrongly referred to the third set of suits namely O.S.No.83 to 87 of 2004 as a different set of suits, ignoring the fact that they are only the same suits which were filed in O.S.Nos.276 to 286 of 1998. 14. In this context, it is necessary to consider whether the order of this Court can be reviewed. 15. 14. In this context, it is necessary to consider whether the order of this Court can be reviewed. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the review petitions by referring to Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code. The objection of the respondent does not survive in view of the categorical decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivdeo Singh and others vs. State of Punjab reported in, AIR 1963 SC 1909 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Art. 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palbable errors committed by it.” 16. In another case viz., A.T.Sharma vs. A.P.Sharma reported in, AIR 1979 SC 1047 , the judgment of the Constitution Bench above referred to was relied upon and further scope of review has been limited to the grounds enshrined in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted as under: “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1963 SC 1909 ) there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneau's on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. But it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneau's on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.? 17. The above judgment also was quoted with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in many other cases including the judgment in the case of Smt. Meera Bhanja vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in, AIR 1995 SC 445. 18. Hence, we hold that this Court is entitled to exercise the power of Review even while exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the procedure contemplated for re- hearing may not be indulged and it is not possible to re-open the whole case as contemplated under Order 47, Rule 8. 19. Before going into the merits of these Review Applications, we proposed to consider the scope of review with reference to some of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and our High Court. In the case of Smt. Meera Bhanja vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in AIR 1995 SC 445, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. But it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.” It has been further held in paragraph 12 as follows: “12. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has over-stepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. by merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent in view of the settled legal position indicated by us earlier. In substance, the review Bench has re-appreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as Court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. Even if the earlier Division Bench findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate court. learned Counsel for the respondent was not in a position to point out how the reasoning adopted and conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be supported within the narrow and limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It would not have been reviewed by re-considering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed.” 20. It is a settled proposition of law that review is not an appeal in disguise and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again reiterated that a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. A judgment may be opened to review inter alia if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of record. A judgment may be opened to review inter alia if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be deducted by a process of reasoning, can hardly said to be error apparent on the basis of record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. Exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be re-heard and corrected. 21. In the case of Kerala Seb Vs. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Limited reported in, (2005) 6 SCC 651 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated the legal position in respect of review petition in paragraph 10 in the following words: "10.....In a review it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record to permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise." 22. In the decision in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. and another Vs. State of Bihar and another reported in, (2006) 1 SCC 509 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated the legal position as under in paragraph 12: "12....Though the review may have been maintainable but the appellants could not be allowed to reagitate the points which had already been decided by the Court. The review could be granted only if there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record. We do not find any such apparent mistake on the face of the record. The review could be granted only if there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record. We do not find any such apparent mistake on the face of the record. The High Court in its order dated 30.08.2001 had taken the view that the amount deposited in the Court by the appellants was in lieu of the market fee for the benefit of the Market Committee, and therefore the Market Committee was entitled to receive the same. Two views are possible on this point but the same cannot be a ground for reviewing the said order as it does not fall within the scope of review jurisdiction." 23. After referring to the plethora of judgments, on the scope of review, a Division Bench of this Court in Management of Bharath Heavy Electrical Limited vs. V. Pradeep Nalankilli reported in, (2009) 4 MLJ 783 has culled out the principles that can be deduced from the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: “(a) A review can be granted only if there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record. (b) A mistake apparent on record must be an obvious and apparent mistake and not something which can be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions. (c) An error which is not self evident and is to be deducted by process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. (d) Even if two views are possible on the issue raised, that by itself cannot be a ground for reviewing the order as it does not fall within the scope of review jurisdiction. (e) In a review, it is not open to the Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion even if that is possible. (f) If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the Court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. (g) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. (g) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. (h) The expression 'exercise of due diligence used in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC should be an exercise which ought to have been made prior to the filing of the review and not one after the pronouncement of the order under review.” While dealing with the case on facts the Hon'ble Division Bench has further held “on the other hand, the review petitioners by producing some new materials and by relying upon those materials wants this Court to re- appreciate the whole evidence and come to a different conclusion which is wholly impermissible in review jurisdiction.” 24. In the case of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd., vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi reported in, AIR 1980 SC 674 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 9 has held as follows: “9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the fact of the record.” 25. Coming to the facts in the present case, as we have noticed, the properties which are located in the margin of Giri Veethi are the subject matter of the previous suits and previous writ petitions. The predecessors in title of the petitioners filed civil suits and writ petitions earlier against the respondent in respect of the properties including the property in Survey No.878. Hence, the petitioners have suppressed the material facts and documents when they filed the writ petition. Therefore, the observation in paragraph 9 of the order under review is perfectly justified. 26. The predecessors in title of the petitioners filed civil suits and writ petitions earlier against the respondent in respect of the properties including the property in Survey No.878. Hence, the petitioners have suppressed the material facts and documents when they filed the writ petition. Therefore, the observation in paragraph 9 of the order under review is perfectly justified. 26. Going by the properties described in O.S.No.163/1975, we find that the petitioners' predecessors in interest are not in possession of any property which lies on the south of their respective shops located in West Giri Veethi. Hence, it can be inferred that the claim of petitioners in respect of Survey No.878 coexist with their claim in respect of Survey No.877/2A. Since it is a fact that Survey No.878 is also included in second set of suits i.e., O.S.No.276 of 1998 to O.S.No.186 of 1998, the petitioners cannot be heard to say that the subject matter of the present writ petitions is entirely different from the subject matter in O.S.No.276 of 1998 to 286 of 1998. 27. It was also contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioners that the second set of suits were not pursued to its logical end as they were allowed to be dismissed for default. Further, it was also argued that the prayer in the second set of suits was only for permanent injunction and that there is no legal impediment for raising a claim on title. We are not considering the legality of the judgment passed by this Court earlier as it is the duty of an appellate Court and it is impermissible in law to consider the merits of the findings in this review petitions. 28. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon some of the judgments for the proposition that the second set of suits being dismissed for default, there is no final adjudication on merits so as to attract the doctrine of Respondent judicata. 29. We need not go into the issue whether the second set of suits would operate as res judicata or not as the writ petitioners have successfully prevented the respondent authorities from evicting the encroachments from 1975 to 2016 under the pretext of pendency of successive suits and the writ petition earlier. It was this conduct of the writ petitioners that weighed this Court while disposing the writ petitions earlier. 30. It was this conduct of the writ petitioners that weighed this Court while disposing the writ petitions earlier. 30. It can be noticed that the previous suit came to an end by the dismissal of S.A.No.880 of 1983 pursuant to an endorsement made by the counsel for appellant praying for dismissal of appeal as not pressed, by judgment and decree dated 24.10.1997. The second set of suits in O.S.Nos.276 of 1998 to O.S.No.286 of 1998 came to be filed in the year 1998. The averments in the plaint shows that the plaintiffs therein claimed title by adverse possession and prayed for permanent injunction as if they are in possession as lawful owners. In the second suit, Survey No.878 has been included. The interlocutory application in I.A.No.472 of 1998 to 482 of 1998 in O.S.No.276 of 1998 to O.S.No.286 of 1998 were dismissed by a common order dated 09.06.1999 by the Sub Court, Palani, after considering each and every plea raised by the plaintiffs in the suit. The findings of the Sub Court to dismiss the interlocutory applications give a clear indication that the plaintiffs were re-agitating the same issues which were concluded against them in the previous suit in O.S.No.163 of 1975. There was no further appeal against the order in I.A.No.482 of 1998 and batch. The subsequent transfer of suits to District Munsif Court, Palani, was not brought to the notice of this Court earlier. In the decree in O.S.No.87 of 2004, the date of filing of the suit is mentioned as 02.04.2004. Hence, in the absence of material records or specific pleading, this Court, earlier was bound to proceed only on the basis of available records by assuming that O.S.No.276 of 1998 to O.S.No.286 of 1998 are different from O.S.No.83 of 2004 to O.S.No.87 of 2004. Similarly, the dismissal of suits in O.S.No.83 of 2004 and batch for non- prosecution was not brought to the notice of this Court before the final order was passed. The petitioners who are expected to plead and produce the relevant materials cannot blame the Court for this factual discrepancy. The petitioners have suppressed willfully certain facts and important documents and suffered an order. The petitioners are now producing before this Court, new materials which were very much available with them and seek review of the earlier order solely placing reliance on these new materials. The petitioners have suppressed willfully certain facts and important documents and suffered an order. The petitioners are now producing before this Court, new materials which were very much available with them and seek review of the earlier order solely placing reliance on these new materials. This is not permissible having regard to the scope of review by applying the principles reiterated by various judicial pronouncements. 31. The legal submission on the effect of dismissal of suits for non-prosecution, cannot be countenanced by this Court in the review petition as there was willful suppression of material facts particularly about the previous suits and their disposal. The learned Senior Counsel has not disputed the fact that the present writ petitioners are only litigating under the plaintiffs in the previous suits. The dismissal of second set of suits for non-prosecution, after the dismissal of injunction applications by a detailed order, considering all the issues raised by the plaintiffs therein, brings about a logical inference that the plaintiffs have abandoned their claim of title over the properties in Survey Nos.877/2A and 878. 32. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is also equitable and discretionary. Hence, it is expected from the petitioners approaching the Writ Court to come up with clean hands and put forward all the facts before this Court without concealment and suppression. If the Court finds suppression of relevant and material facts, the petition can be dismissed without considering the merits of the claims. Hence, for the reasons stated in paragraph 9 of the earlier orders impugned in these review petitions, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 33. The petitioners are seeking relief only in respect of Survey No.878/1 and other subdivisions of Survey No.878 based on patta issued in their favour. The extent for which patta has been issued to the petitioners in Survey No.878 is meagre. In W.P. (MD) No.21429 of 2015, the petitioner claims patta for 11 Sq. meters. As disclosed in the previous suit, the possession of respective plaintiffs were in respect of their shops in Survey No.877/2A. In the first suit, the plaintiffs therein did not claim any right or title or possession in respect of any land adjoining Survey No.877/2A. Though the subsequent suits refer to Survey No.878, the plaintiffs therein describe the property as Keez Poramboke registered in the name of Chettigal Madam. In the first suit, the plaintiffs therein did not claim any right or title or possession in respect of any land adjoining Survey No.877/2A. Though the subsequent suits refer to Survey No.878, the plaintiffs therein describe the property as Keez Poramboke registered in the name of Chettigal Madam. In such circumstances, title to the property in favour of petitioners cannot be readily inferred. Had there been an eviction of encroachment as it was proposed in 1975 by the temple authorities in terms of assignment, there would not have been a claim in respect of the small piece in Survey No.878. Now, the petitioners are trying to obstruct the eviction proceedings initiated against them to remove the shops constructed by them in the property of temple, by claiming ownership over a small piece of land adjoining Survey No.877. 34. Having regard to the facts narrated above and the conduct of the petitioners, this Court feels that it is not possible for us to take a different view and hence, the Review Applications are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Review Petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected civil miscellaneous petitions are closed.