JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The plaintiff claims succession to the estate of Roop Singh an ancestor common to her as well as to the defendants. However, the name of the plaintiff stood excluded by the revenue authorities while theirs on the demise of aforesaid Roop Singh attesting mutation of inheritance qua his estate. The land of Roop Singh, which on his demise stood mutated by way of an attestation of mutation of inheritance standing recorded by the revenue agency in favour of the defendants-petitioners, stood subjected to acquisition by defendant-respondent No. 6. An award stood pronounced wherein compensation stood assessed in favour of the defendants-petitioners, obviously in exclusion of the plaintiff, though she avers in the plaint of hers alike the defendants/petitioners standing entitled to succeed to the estate of Roop Singh on the latters demise. Moreover she anvils a claim to succession to the land subjected to acquisition by defendant No. 6 upon the factum of hers being the grand daughter of deceased Roop Singh. 2. The defendants/petitioners contested the claim of the plaintiff-respondent. They instituted an application for rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC before the learned trial Court, which relief canvassed therein primarily rested on the score of its lacking jurisdiction. However, the application stood disallowed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the instant petition. The learned counsel on either side have been heard at length. The gravamen of the contention addressed before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants is of with a statutory prescription embodied in Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, which is a self contained code, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try besides adjudicate upon a plaint instituted before it under Section 7 CPC stands impliedly ousted. The claim reared besides the relief encompassed therein have been further contended to fall within the domain of or within the ambit of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act empowering the authority envisaged therein to alone to the exclusion of a Civil Court adjudicate upon the issue qua entitlement of the plaintiff-respondent herein to compensation for the land subjected to acquisition by defendant No. 6. 3. 3. The aforesaid contention would marshal force only when there was a lucid and a categorical display in the revenue records of the plaintiff-respondent herein being a legal heir of deceased Roop Singh whereupon on his demise, with the latter leaving no testamentary disposition, she alike the defendants/petitioners herein stood entitled to succeed to his estate besides concomitantly hers standing entitled to receive compensation, for the land/estate of Roop Singh mutated on his demise to her exclusion by the revenue authorities concerned in favour of the defendants/petitioners, on its acquisition standing culminated in an award pronounced by the competent statutory authority. Tersely put the recording of an order of mutation of inheritance on the intestate demise of Roop Singh has been espoused in the plaint to be unwarranted, as a corollary a relief has been prayed therein of the revenue entries prepared in consonance therewith being also liable to be quashed and set-aside. However, with the nature of controversy engaging the parties at lis especially with the ouster of the plaintiff-respondent herein from intestate succession to the estate of one Roop Singh, also her name standing excluded in the relevant apposite revenue papers for capacitating her to agitate before the authority/authorities contemplated in Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, a claim of hers alike the defendants/petitioners herein standing entitled to compensation in proportion to her share in the estate of deceased Roop Singh rather obviously renders her wholly disempowered to meet with any success before the authority/authorities contemplated in Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. Moreso, when the aforesaid authority/authorities envisaged therein would scuttle her claim for compensation to the lands subjected to acquisition on the mere pretext of her name not existing in the apt apposite revenue records. Even otherwise, when the authority/authorities contemplated in Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act are not bestowed with any jurisdiction to render a decree or order for correction of revenue records, any resort thereto by the plaintiff/respondent would be a grossly nugatory exercise. In sequel the correction of the revenue records besides of the revenue entries is imperative rather a precursor to the plaintiff/respondent herein drawing up proceedings under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act before the authority/authorities contemplated therein. In sequel the correction of the revenue records besides of the revenue entries is imperative rather a precursor to the plaintiff/respondent herein drawing up proceedings under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act before the authority/authorities contemplated therein. Since a decree of the genre, as asked for in the plaint falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, any exercise of jurisdiction by it upon the plaint instituted before it by the plaintiff/respondent cannot at all be construed to be wanting in jurisdictional vigour. In aftermath, the invocation of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court by the plaintiff respondent by hers instituting a plaint before it under Section 9 of the CPC is the appropriate remedy to seek correction of the revenue records for facilitating the plaintiff respondent herein to subsequently draw up proceedings under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. Moreover, entertainment of the suit instituted before the learned trial Court by the plaintiff/respondent herein with the reliefs encapsulated therein besides the rendition of a decree if any in her favour by it for reiteration would not be wanting in jurisdictional vigour especially when a decree for correction of revenue records or for correction of revenue entries falls outside the scope or domain of the jurisdiction exercisable by the authority/authorities envisaged in Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. There is no merit in the petition, which is dismissed, impugned order is maintained and affirmed.