ORDER : RAJENDRA MAHAJAN, J. 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is finally heard at the admission stage. The applicant has preferred the application under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. seeking leave to appeal against the order of acquittal dated 24.11.2011 passed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur in Criminal Revision No.278/2011, whereby the learned ASJ has quashed the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'the Act') framed against respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain setting aside the order of framing the charge dated 27.11.2011 passed by the JMFC (Shri Vivek Shukla) Jabalpur, in Criminal Complaint Case No.12763/08. 2. Brief facts of the case for just and proper adjudication of the application are thus: (2.1) On 18.08.2008, the applicant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent No.1 for his prosecution under Section 138 of the Act in the court of JMFC, Jabalpur with the averments that Azad Kumar Jain is one of the partners of firm M/s Mahavir Stationers (for short 'the firm') based at Jabalpur. He does all types of business transactions on behalf of the firm with the tacit consent of the other partners of it. On 15.10.2007, he took a loan of Rs.1,05,000/- in cash from him on behalf of the firm for expansion of business of the firm. Against the payment of loan, he issued three cheques (for short 'the cheques') to him of various amounts. The details of each cheque is given in para-3 of the complaint. All the cheques were drawn by him on the UCO Bank, Main Branch Jabalpur with which the firm maintains the account. On 08.07.2008, he deposited the cheques for encashment in his bank account which he has with the Allahabad Bank, Branch Fawara Chowk, Jabalpur. On 09.07.2008, his bank informed him that the drawer bank had dishonored the cheques on account of insufficient funds in the bank account of the respondent No.1. Thereupon, he gave a demand notice to Azad Kumar Jain in terms of Section 138 of the Act, by registered AD and through Madhur Courier. He refused to receive notice sent by registered AD. However, he received the notice sent through the said courier. Despite the receipt of notice, he did not pay the amount of the cheques. Hence, this complaint. He refused to receive notice sent by registered AD. However, he received the notice sent through the said courier. Despite the receipt of notice, he did not pay the amount of the cheques. Hence, this complaint. (2.2) Vide order dated 23.09.2008, the complaint is registered under Section 138 of the Act. On 27.07.2011, the learned JMFC framed the charge against the respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain under Section 138 of the Act. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain filed the revision which was decided by the impugned order quashing the said charge. (2.3) From a perusal of the impugned order, it appears that respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain has filed the revision on the ground that before the filing of the complaint in the trial court, the applicant gave the demand notice to Azad Kumar Jain in terms of Section 138 of the Act. Thereafter, the applicant filed the complaint against the firm through Azad Kumar Jain. After the registration of the complaint, the trial court issued summons to Azad Kumar Jain for his appearance in the case. The trial court received the summons unserved with a postal endorsement that there is no partner of the firm by the name of Azad Kumar Jain. Thereafter, the trial court issued a bailable warrant of arrest against Azad Kumar Jain and sent it to Police Station, Kotwali, Jabalpur with a direction to serve it upon him. The SHO of the said police station informed the trial court vide letter dated 01.12.2009 that a person by the name of Azad Kumar Jain is not found to be the partner of the firm. Thereafter, the applicant filed an amendment application dated 03.08.2010 in the trial court for the substitution of name of Sanad Kumar Jain in place of Azad Kumar Jain in the array of cause title of the complaint. Vide the order dated 03.08.2010, the trial court allowed the application. Later, the cause title of the complaint was amended by the applicant and in place of Azad Kumar Jain his name is substituted. Thereafter, the trial court issued summons to him and in compliance of the summons, he appeared in the case. Under the circumstances, the complaint is not maintainable against him as the applicant had not served the demand notice upon him under the provisions of Section 138 of the Act, which is mandatory. Thereafter, the trial court issued summons to him and in compliance of the summons, he appeared in the case. Under the circumstances, the complaint is not maintainable against him as the applicant had not served the demand notice upon him under the provisions of Section 138 of the Act, which is mandatory. The learned revisional Judge has accepted the said contention and vide the impugned order quashed the charge against him under Section 138 of the Act which has the effect of the acquittal of him under the said charge. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the address of the firm is rightly mentioned in the demand notice and the same is also mentioned in the complaint. However, the name of the partner of the firm by mistake is typed Azad Kumar Jain instead of Sanad Kumar Jain in the demand notice. After correction of the cause title of the complaint with the permission of the trial court and proper service of summons in the case upon respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain, he cannot challenge the maintainability of the complaint on the ground that he was not served with the notice in terms of Section 138 of the Act prior to the filing of the complaint. He also argued that the aforesaid discrepancy is minor in nature. Hence, the complaint cannot be thrown on the ground of the aforesaid discrepancy. In the interest of justice and the huge amount involved in the case, the learned revisional Judge ought not to have quashed the charge against respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain. On the other hand, he ought to have allowed the prosecution of him. Hence, the impugned order is erroneous in law and on the fact. Therefore, the applicant be permitted to present an appeal against the impugned order. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain argued that it is a mandatory requirement of Section 138 of the Act on the part of the payee or holder of cheque to give notice to the drawer of the cheque in a case of dishonor of cheque for his prosecution under the said Section. In this case, the applicant himself admits that no demand notice is given to respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain prior to filing of the complaint. In this case, the applicant himself admits that no demand notice is given to respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain prior to filing of the complaint. Since, the aforesaid mandatory requirement was not followed by the applicant, the learned revisional Judge rightly quashed the charge against respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain. 5. I have considered the rival contentions, perused the impugned order and material on record. 6. Before entering into merits of the case, it will be seen what are the requirements of the demand notice to be given to a drawer before filing the complaint against him for his prosecution under Section 138 of the Act? 7. The Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed (2008 (1) MPLJ SC 441) has held that before filing of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act giving a demand notice to the drawer in terms of Clause (b) of the Proviso to Section 138 of the Act is mandatory. Similar view is taken by the Supreme Court in Rahul Builders (M/s) v. Arihant Fertilizers and Chemicals (M/s) and another ( 2008 (2) SCC 321 ) and M/s Sarav Investment and Financial Consultants Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Llyods Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Funds and Anr. (2007 AIR SCW 6482) 8. In case of Rahul Builders (supra), the complainant gave a demand notice to the accused to make payment of outstanding amount of bill instead of calling upon him to pay amount payable under the dishonored cheque. The Supreme Court has held that the demand notice was not strictly given in terms of Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act. Hence, the demand notice is invalid. Only aforesaid ground, the Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused. 9. In Mahendralal Shivhare v. State of M.P. ( 2008 (3) MPLJ 102 SC), an amount of rupees eight lacs was due on the accused. He issued two cheques, each of rupees two lacs, to the complaint. One of which was dishonored by the drawer bank on the ground of insufficient funds in the account of the accused. Instead of demanding the amount of dishonored cheque of rupees two lacs by the demand notice, the complainant sent the demand notice of the whole amount of rupees eight lacs. One of which was dishonored by the drawer bank on the ground of insufficient funds in the account of the accused. Instead of demanding the amount of dishonored cheque of rupees two lacs by the demand notice, the complainant sent the demand notice of the whole amount of rupees eight lacs. Upon the aforesaid facts of the case, the Supreme court held that the demand notice had not been given to the accused for the demand of amount of the dishonored cheque. Hence, the demand notice was invalid. Upon the very reason, the Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused holding that it is an abuse of the process of the court. 10. In Phool Singh Rana v. Shailendra Kumar Dubey (2007 (ii) MPJR S.N. 16), the complainant had not served a demand notice in terms of Proviso (b) to Section 138 upon the accused. Thereupon, this court quashed the criminal proceedings for want of valid demand notice. 11. In Akhilesh Saraf (Dr.) v. Usha Tiwari (Smt.) ( 2011 (I) MPLJ 644 ), the accused was neither a signatory to the dishonored cheque nor partner of the firm. Moreover, he had nothing to do with the business of the firm. This court held that the essential ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are missing. Resultantly, the complaint was quashed. 12. The crux of the afore stated case-laws is that the provisions of Section 138 of the Act mandate payee or holder of the cheque to give a demand notice to the drawer by a mode prescribed in the Act prior to the filing of the complaint and it must be for the amount of dishonored cheque. If the said ingredients are missing in the demand notice, then it will be rendered invalid. Upon which, the criminal proceeding against the drawer/accused is liable to be quashed. 13. Now, I will advert to the facts of the present case. It is obvious from the material on record and the admission made by the applicant that the demand notice in respect of dishonored cheques in terms of Section 138 of the Act was given to Azad Kumar Jain before filing the complaint in the trial court. Moreover, he is neither the signatory of the cheque nor the partner of the firm nor he had anything to do with the business of the firm. Moreover, he is neither the signatory of the cheque nor the partner of the firm nor he had anything to do with the business of the firm. In fact, respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain is the partner of the firm and he is the drawer of the dishonored cheques. His name is substituted in the array of cause title of the complaint in place of Azad Kumar Jain during the trial of the case. This means that the applicant had not given demand notice to respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain prior to the filing of the complaint in the trial court. From a perusal of the complaint, it is evident that the complainant has not made all the partners of the firm, the accused of the case and he had not given them the demand notices as well. As per the record, the demand notice sent by the applicant to Azad Kumar Jain by the registered post was returned un-served with the endorsement of the postal department to the effect that the name of addressee is not correct. In view of the above, the applicant ought to have made a short inquiry as to the correct names of the partners of the firm and thereafter within stipulated period he ought to have sent a fresh demand notice to them or at least the drawer of the cheques respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain as claimed by the applicant. Hence, he has to suffer the legal consequences for not having sent a demand notice to respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain, the drawer of the cheques, before filing the complaint. I do not see any merit in the plea raised by the learned counsel for the applicant that although Azad Kumar Jain is not the partner of the firm, yet the demand notice was sent to the correct address of the firm where it does its business because it is within the right of so called Azad Kumar Jain to refuse the demand notice on the ground that he is not the partner of the firm. 14. In view of the above discussions, I hold that the learned revisional Judge has rightly quashed the charge under Section 138 of the Act framed against respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain by the trial court vide the impugned order. 14. In view of the above discussions, I hold that the learned revisional Judge has rightly quashed the charge under Section 138 of the Act framed against respondent No.1 Sanad Kumar Jain by the trial court vide the impugned order. I, therefore, am of the opinion that there is no ground much less legal to interfere with the impugned order. In the result, the application under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. moved by the applicant is dismissed in limine at the admission stage. 15. Accordingly, this M.Cr.C. is finally disposed of. 16. The records of both the courts below be sent back with a copy of this order. Certified copy as per rules.