ORDER : Anand Byrareddy, J. 1. The petition coming on for preliminary hearing in ("B" Group) is considered for final disposal given the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. Heard the learned Senior Advocate Shri. Jayakumar S. Patil, appearing for the counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate, as well as the counsel appearing for other respondents. 3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:-- "The second respondent is a society registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959("KCS Act" for brevity). It is a federation and its area of operation is the entire State of Karnataka. Its members consist of other societies which are engaged in credit business and they are enrolled as life members of the second respondent. The Managing Committee of the second respondent is said to consist of 21 directors and are elected from five groups. Group No. 4 consists of Bijapur, Bagalkot, Bellary, Koppal, Raichur, Gulbarga, Bidar and Yadgir districts from which five directors are elected. Insofar as the election was concerned, the term was a period of five years commencing from the year 2014. The calendar of events was said to have been issued on 28.06.2014 to elect the committee of management of the second respondent and the election was slated on 31.7.2014. The petitioner was said to be a delegate from Sree Billuru Gurubasava Pathina Sahakara Sangha Niyamitha, Bagalkot, and he contested the elections. The fifth respondent was said to be a delegate from the Eeshnya Karnataka Valmiki Nayakara Pathina Sahakara Niyamitha, Gulbarga. It is stated that the fifth respondent is working as a Deputy Transport Commissioner, Gulbarga. The fifth respondent being a government servant was required to obtain prior permission of the Government to contest the election. According to the petitioner, he appeared to have sought permission by letter dated 18.9.2015, but he had not sought permission to contest the particular election since there was no notification issued in respect of the calendar of events, as on the date of the letter. However, the Secretary to Government, Department of Transport is said to have granted permission by letter dated 04.12.2013 to the fifth respondent to contest the election, but it was not in respect of the election which was proposed to be held on 20.07.2014. However, the Secretary to Government, Department of Transport is said to have granted permission by letter dated 04.12.2013 to the fifth respondent to contest the election, but it was not in respect of the election which was proposed to be held on 20.07.2014. It is the petitioner's allegation that the fifth respondent had filed his nomination to the above elections on the basis of the said permission, which according to the petitioner was invalid and illegal. The petitioners and others are said to have filed objections at the time of scrutiny of nomination of the fifth respondent. The third respondent is said to have raised objections to the effect that the Under Secretary to Government, Department of Transport had no authority under the Karnataka Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966 to grant such permission. But over-ruling the objections, the nomination of the fifth respondent was said to have been accepted. The fifth respondent was declared as elected, as there was no contest, on 20.07.2014 as per Annexure-"A". The petitioner claims that he had secured the next highest number of votes vis-à-vis the number of votes secured by the fifth respondent. Therefore, it is contended that if the election of the fifth respondent is set aside he would be declared as elected as he held the next highest number of votes. The petitioner being aggrieved by the declaration of results as declared by the third respondent, had questioned the election of the fifth respondent by filing a writ petition before this Court in W.P. No. 35704/2014 which was disposed of by an order dated 20.08.2014 holding that the petitioner had an alternative efficacious remedy to challenge the election of the fifth respondent. Therefore, the petition was disposed of reserving such liberty. The petitioner had then approached the Registrar and had filed objection questioning the election of the fifth respondent as on 19.09.2014. Therefore, the petition was disposed of reserving such liberty. The petitioner had then approached the Registrar and had filed objection questioning the election of the fifth respondent as on 19.09.2014. That dispute has been rejected on 22.12.2014 holding that the cause of action for the petitioner's dispute arose on 20.07.2014 and the time within which the dispute could have been raised was thirty days and further at the time when the cause of action arose the forum prescribed for raising such a dispute was the Civil Court and hence, the dispute could not be entertained by the Registrar as the Registrar was without jurisdiction in relation to the date on which the cause of action arose and has accordingly rejected the dispute. It is that which is sought to be questioned in the present petition." 4. The learned Senior Advocate, Shri. Jayakumar S. Patil, would point out that the circumstances of the case would give rise to a piquant situation, namely, there was an amendment of Section 70 of the KCS Act, by Act No. 3 of 2013 with effect from 11.01.2013 whereby clause (c) of Sub-section 2 was omitted and Sub-sections 4 and 5 were introduced in Section 70, which read as follows:-- "(4) All disputes related to the election of the members of the board and the election of President, Vice-President, Chairman, Vice-Chairman or any other Office-bearer shall be filled in the jurisdictional Civil Court. (5) All disputes pending with the Registrar as on the date of the constitution of cooperative election commission shall be disposed of by the Registrar as if this amendment had not been made." These provisions were on the Statute book as on the date of the election. However, by Act No. 35 of 2014 which came into effect from 06.09.2014, the said Sub-sections 4 and 5 were omitted resulting in a situation where the election dispute could no longer be filed before the Civil Court and one could take recourse to proceedings only before the Registrar and it was in that fashion that the dispute was lodged before the Registrar. The petitioner instead of prosecuting a writ petition before this Court could have filed an election dispute before the Civil Court in terms of the deleted provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 70. The petitioner instead of prosecuting a writ petition before this Court could have filed an election dispute before the Civil Court in terms of the deleted provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 70. But not having chosen to do so, this Court subsequently having granted liberty to pursue the alternative remedy as on that date, by virtue of the order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 35704/2014, the alternative remedy available as on that date continued to be before the Civil Court. The petitioner had applied for a certified copy of the order on 25.08.2014 and he was supplied with a copy on 08.09.2014, by which time Act of 35 of 2014 had deleted sub-section (4) of Section 70 thereby the alternative remedy available to the petitioner was only before the Registrar. Hence, it is contended that the petitioner has pursued the remedy known to law and even if there was a delay in filing the dispute, it was possible for the petitioner to explain the reason for the delay, which could have been condoned under Section 70(A) of the KCS Act. The authority not having chosen to do so and having interpreted sequence of events and the provisions of law in a narrow fashion has resulted in the impugned order being passed and therefore seeks that the petition be allowed. 5. The respondents have filed statement of objections seeking to justify the impugned order. 6. However, from the above sequence of events it is no doubt true that the petitioner's remedy in the first instance was to approach the Civil Court which he had not chosen to do, but had filed a writ petition before this Court. This Court having disposed of the writ petition on 20.08.2014 and though the certified copy of the order was ready on 04.09.2014, the petitioner has received the same only on 08.09.2014 by which time by a coincidence the Act was amended on 06.09.2014 again relegating an election dispute to the Registrar and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was taken away. Therefore, the petitioner's remedy was only before the Registrar. Therefore, the petitioner's remedy was only before the Registrar. The view taken by the Registrar that the cause of action arose on 20.07.2014 and the petitioner ought to have approached the Civil Court with the dispute and that he would not have jurisdiction on account of the cause of action having arisen at a point of time when the Civil Court alone had jurisdiction, may not be the correct view having regard to the sequence of events. The Supreme Court in the case of New India Insurance Company Limited vs. Smt. Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC 840 ] had addressed a circumstance where on account of a change in the law and consequent change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and the effect it would have on a dispute with reference to Section 110A and 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act, as it then stood, and interpreting the same has held that there was no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that such a change of law operated retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective. 7. In the present scenario, it is evident that the Registrar was originally vested with the jurisdiction to decide election dispute. It is only by the amendment brought about in the year 2013 that the Civil Court was conferred with the jurisdiction for a temporary period, till it was taken away by amendment Act No. 35 of 2014 with effect from 06.09.2014. Therefore, the jurisdiction again vested with the Registrar. There are no express words debarring the Registrar from entertaining disputes, the cause of action for which may have arisen earlier. Therefore, the jurisdiction again vested with the Registrar. There are no express words debarring the Registrar from entertaining disputes, the cause of action for which may have arisen earlier. Hence, there is no difficulty in holding that even if the cause of action arose when such jurisdiction was taken away from the Registrar, it is the Registrar alone who has the jurisdiction at present. Therefore, the petitioner should not be left without any remedy and consequently the election dispute, notwithstanding that the cause of action for such dispute arose at a point of time when the Civil Court alone had jurisdiction, if the petitioner is in a position to explain the delay in approaching the authority, the Registrar would have to consider such application and that the delay could even be condoned and the dispute could be adjudicated. 8. In that view of the matter, the petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Registrar. The petitioner is granted liberty to file an application seeking condonation of delay and it may even be explained to the satisfaction of the Registrar having regard to the above sequence of events apart from the pendency of the matter before this Court and who shall consider such application and the dispute in accordance with law and dispose of the same. Since the election was of the year 2014 and since the term is for a period of five years and since more than one year has already expired, it would be appropriate that the election dispute is decided at the earliest, subject to condonation of delay in the first instance.