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2016 DIGILAW 247 (HP)

Balkrishan v. State of H. P.

2016-03-15

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the learned writ Court, whereby the claim of the petitioner for directing the respondents to consider him as Supervisor and pay him salary accordingly from the date of his initial engagement, that is, March, 1992, stands rejected. The facts in brief may be noticed. 2. The appellant is matriculate and was engaged as a Beldar by the respondents in March, 1992 and claimed that ever since his appointment, was working as Supervisor. He further claimed that the persons appointed much after him had been designated as Supervisors whereas, this benefit had been denied to him. The petitioner made various representations and thereafter ultimately filed Original Application before the Tribunal. 3. In response to the claim, the respondents had submitted that the appellant had been appointed as a Beldar and had, therefore, rightly been paid the wages of Beldar. The appellant filed rejoinder and annexed therewith muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7 in support of his contention that he marked the presence of workers who were on duty and thus according to him this was sufficient proof to prove that he had been working as Supervisor. 4. On closure of the Administrative Tribunal, the Original Application came to be transferred to this Court and was registered as CWP(T) No. 4885 of 2008 and came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge on 13.07.2009. 5. The learned Single Judge made elaborate discussion on the aforesaid muster rolls, as is evident from Paras 9 and 10 of the impugned judgment, which reads as under:- “9. The petitioner has heavily relied on muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7 in order to show that he had been working as Supervisor. The muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7 were issued in the name of J.S. Verma, Junior Engineer, Darlaghat. The muster rolls Annexure A-2/1 to A-2/4 and A-2/7 were issued for Beldars whereas muster rolls Annexure A-2/5 and A-2/6 were issued for Beldars and Masons. The petitioner has marked his presence by signing muster rolls Annexure A-2/1 to Annexure A-2/7. It is the case of the petitioner that right from the year 1992 he had been working as Supervisor and not as Beldar. The muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7 were not issued for any Supervisor. The petitioner has marked his presence by signing muster rolls Annexure A-2/1 to Annexure A-2/7. It is the case of the petitioner that right from the year 1992 he had been working as Supervisor and not as Beldar. The muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7 were not issued for any Supervisor. The petitioner has marked his presence by signing muster rolls Annexures A-2/2 to A-2/6 but on these muster rolls he has nowhere indicated that he has marked his presence by signing these muster rolls as Supervisor. 10. It appears the muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7 were not issued and maintained properly. It is the case of the respondents that petitioner was engaged as Beldar and he never worked as Supervisor. On the contrary, it is the case of the petitioner that he has worked as Supervisor though muster rolls of Beldar were issued to him. The muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7, do not show that petitioner actually worked as Beldar or Supervisor but he has signed these muster rolls in token of his presence. The obvious inference from the stand of the respondents is that petitioner was paid wages of Beldar. In what capacity the petitioner has marked his presence and signed these muster rolls Annexures A-2/1 to A-2/7 that has not been made clear.” After making these observations, the petition was ordered to be dismissed. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner/appellant filed the instant appeal and has reiterated all those grounds which he had taken before the learned writ Court. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 8. At the outset, it may be stated that in order to satisfy ourselves regarding the claim set forth by the appellants, we called for the original muster rolls for the relevant period. Having minutely gone through the muster rolls for the entire period one comes to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner had only worked as a Beldar and not as a Supervisor from the date of his initial appointment. For the year 1992-1993 onwards, majority of the muster rolls have been marked by one Jamna Dass. For the year 1995 again, the attendance in majority of the muster rolls have been marked by Jamna Dass and in one muster roll, the attendance has also been marked by Roop Ram. For the year 1992-1993 onwards, majority of the muster rolls have been marked by one Jamna Dass. For the year 1995 again, the attendance in majority of the muster rolls have been marked by Jamna Dass and in one muster roll, the attendance has also been marked by Roop Ram. Similarly for the muster rolls of the year 1997, it is one Govind, who alongwith petitioner has marked the attendance. In the muster rolls for the year 1999, it is again Jamna Dass, who has marked the attendance. It is only in the year 2000 that majority of the attendance in the muster roll has been marked by the appellant. However, thereafter again the attendance is being marked by some other persons. Thus, the entries in the muster rolls of the relevant period do not support the contentions of the appellant. 9. Further the documents annexed as Annexure A-2/1 to A-2/7 are only selective copies of the muster rolls wherein the attendance has undisputedly been marked by the appellant. But as discussed above, these are only stray entries and, therefore, do not in any manner establish that the appellant was in fact working as a Supervisor from the date of his initial appointment as is being claimed by him. 10. Moreover, the findings recorded by the learned writ Court are pure findings of fact which normally cannot be interfered with in this appeal except on well established principles. Having said so, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear the costs.