JUDGMENT : Vineet Kothari, J. The tenants Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and its dealer M/s Roopchand Chhaganlal have filed the present two second appeals aggrieved by the concurrent decree of eviction dated 25/8/1999 of the learned trial court in Suit No. 57/78 Gandhi Vidhya Mandir, Sardarshahar v. BPCL & Anr. and dated 13/12/2003 and of the learned first appellate court in Appeal No. 11/2000 BPCL & Anr. v. Gandhi Vidhya Mandir, in respect of the suit plot of land measuring 120 x 100 sq. ft. in favour of respondent-plaintiff-landlord, Gandhi Vidhya Mandir, Sardar Shahar, Churu, a deemed University under the provisions of UGC Act, 1956, who was given the lease of 3200 bighas of land and for the present plot of land on which the appellant BPCL and its agent dealer being the petroleum products outlet, the lease to the present lessee was executed by plaintiff-respondent - Gandhi Vidhya Mandir way back on 1.4.1959 by a registered lease deed dated 12/8/1959 at the monthly lease rent of Rs.40/- per month. The lease was renewable after 15 years by a mandatory three months notice prior to expiry of 15 years on the part of lessee. After 31/3/1974, when the initial period of 15 years expired, the lessee BPCL or its dealer has not paid any rent to the respondent Gandhi Vidhya Mandir. 2. The lease in question was terminated by the lessor by serving a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act (Ex.5 dated 10.11.1975) and the present suit for eviction was filed by the plaintiff on 30/9/1978. 3. Both the courts below decreed the suit concurrently in favour of the respondent plaintiff with the following findings and observations in favour of the plaintiff Gandhi Vidhya Mandir. 4. 3. Both the courts below decreed the suit concurrently in favour of the respondent plaintiff with the following findings and observations in favour of the plaintiff Gandhi Vidhya Mandir. 4. The relevant portion from the order of learned trial court dated 25/8/1999 is quoted below for ready reference:- mHk; i{k ds vf/koDrkx.k us jktLFkku jkti= 14-07-1988 dks Lohdkj djrs gq, bl rF; dks Lohdkj fd;k gS fd okn izLrqr djus ds i'pkr~ okn ds fopkj.k ds nkSjku oknxzLr ifjlj uxjikfydk ljnkj 'kgj ds vUrxZr vk x;k FkkA pwafd okn izLrqr djus ds le; oknxzLr ifjlj uxjikfydk {ks= ls ckgj FkkA blfy, ml ij jktLFkku ifjlj fdjk;k rFkk csn[kyh fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e ds izko/kku ykxw ugha gkssrs Fks ysfdu okn ds fopkj.k ds nkSjku oknxzLr ifjlj ds ljnkj 'kgj uxjikfydk {ks= esa vk tkus ds dkj.k bl ij jktLFkku ifjlj fdjk;k rFkk csn[kyh fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e ds izko/kku ykxw gks tkrs gSa D;ksafd bl vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 26 ds vuqlkj /kkjk 26- csn[kyh dh fMfØ dk fu"iknu&ftu {ks=ksa esa bl vf/kfu;e dk rRle; izlkj gks mu {ks=ksa esa fLFkr fdlh ifjlj ls fdlh fdjk;snkj dh csn[kyh ds fy;s bl vf/kfu;e ds izkjaHk gksus ls igys ikfjr fdlh fMfØ dk] tgka rd og mDr fdjk;snkjh dh csn[kyh ls] lacaf/kr gS] mlds fo:) flok; /kkjk 13 esa of.kZr vk/kkjksa esa ls fdlh vk/kkj ij rFkk bl vf/kfu;e esa fofufnZ"V ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa] ml le; rd fu"iknu ugha fd;k tk;sxkA tc rd fd ml {ks= esa og vf/kfu;e izo`Rr jgsxkA mDr /kkjk ds vuqlkj vc bl ifjlj ij mDr vf/kfu;e ds izko/kku ykxw gksaxsA tgka rd mHk; i{k ds e/; fu"ikfnr yht dh vof/k fnukad 01-04-1974 dks lekIr gksus rFkk mlh ds vk/kkj ij oknxzLr ifjlj dk fjDr vkf/kiR; oknh dks izkIr djus ds vf/kdkj dk iz'u gS] yht MhM izn'kZ 4 ds vuqlkj oknxzLr ifjlj izfroknhx.k dks fnukad 01-04-1959 dks 15 o"kZ dh yht ij fn;k x;k FkkA tSlk fd fook|d la[;k 4 esa of.kZr fd;k tk pqdk gS] bl yht uohuhdj.k fnukad 01-04-1974 ls rhu ekg iwoZ uksfVl iV~Vsnkj us bl laca/k esa yht MhM dh en la[;k 8 ds vuqlkj dksbZ uksfVl ugha fn;kA blfy, bl yht dk uohuhdj.k 01-04-1974 ls vkxs 15 o"kZ ds fy, ugha gqvk rFkk fnukad 01-04-1974 dks yht dh vof/k lekIr gks x;hA oknh ds vfHkopuksa ds vuqlkj izfroknhx.k us fnukad 31-03-1974 ds ckn mUgsa fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ fdjk;k vnk Hkh ughaa fd;k FkkA blfy, fdjk;s dh vnk;xh ugha fd;s tkus ds dkj.k ;g Hkh ugha dgk tk ldrk fd oknhi{k us fdjk;k Lohdkj dj yht dh vof/k dks uohuhdj.k gksuk Lohdkj dj fy;k gksA bl izdkj ls mHk; i{k ds e/; fu"ikfnr yht dh vof/k fnukad 01-04-1974 dks lekIr gks x;h FkhA oknh }kjk ;g okn o"kZ 1978 esa izLrqr fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk oknh yht dh vof/k lekIr gksus ds mijkUr oknxzLr ifjlj ds {ks= ij jktLFkku fdjk;snkjh vf/kfu;e ds ykxw gks tkus ds dkj.k bl vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 26 ds vuqlkj csn[kyh dh fMfØ dsoy ek= /kkjk 13 esa of.kZr vk/kkjksa ds vk/kkj ij gh dh tk ldrh gS] blds vykok ughaA /kkjk 13 esa fdjk;snkjksa dh csn[kyh ds fy, loZizFke ;g vafdr gS fd /kkjk 13- fdjk;snkjksa dh csn[kyh%& 1- fdlh fof/k ;k lafonk esa vUrfoZ"V fdlh ckr ds gksrs gq, Hkh] tc rd dksbZ fdjk;snkj bl vf/kfu;e ds v/khu vuqKs; fdjk;k iw.kZ ifj.kke rd lanr djus ds fy, rS;kj ;k jtkeUn gks] dksbZ Hkh U;k;ky;] pkgs fdlh fMfØ ds fu"iknu esa vFkok vU;Fkk] fdlh Hkw&Lokeh ds i{k esa mDr fdjk;snkj dks csn[ky djus dh fMfØ ml le; rd ikfjr ugha djsxk vFkok vkns'k ugha nsxk tc rd fd mDr U;k;ky; dk /kkjk 13@1@d ls B rd nh x;h ckrksa ds laca/k esa lek/kku u gks tk;saA mDr ds vuqlkj tc rd fdjk;snkj fdjk;k iw.kZ ifj.kke rd lanr djus ds fy, rS;kj o jtkeUn gksa 'kCn vk;s gSA gLrxr izdj.k esa oknh ds vuqlkj mls fnukad 31-03-1974 rd dk fdjk;k gh vnk fd;k x;k gS rFkk blds i'pkr~ dk fdjk;k izfroknhx.k us vnk ugha fd;k gSA izfroknh la0 1 us vius tokcnkos dh en la[;k 6 esa ;g vafdr fd;k gS fd izfroknh }kjk fdjk;s dh jkf'k cSadlZ pSd }kjk Hksth tkrh jgh gS ijUrq oknh laLFkk }kjk mldk Hkqxrku ugha fy;k x;kA izfroknh la0 1 us vius mDr vfHkopuksa dks izekf.kr djus gsrq fdlh izdkj dh dbZ nLrkosth lk{; vFkkZr~ cSadlZ pSd vkfn izLrqr ugha fd;s gSaA izfroknh la0 1 dh vksj ls izLrqr Mh0MCY;w0 1 txnh'kizlkn us viuh eq[; ijh{kk esa dsoy bruk gh dgk gS fd os r;'kqnk fdjk;k oknh dks vc Hkh nsus dks rS;kj gSA bl lk{kh us izfroknh 1 dh vksj cSadlZ pSd Hksts tkus ckcr ,d 'kCn Hkh ugha dgk gS rFkk uk gh ,slk dgk x;k gS fd izfroknhx.k us 31-03-1974 ds ckn oknh dks oknxzLr ifjlj dk fdjk;k vnk djus dk dksbZ iz;kl fd;k gksA izfroknh la0 2 dh vksj Mh0MCY;w0 2 :ipUn us fdjk;k vnk fd;s tkus ckcr viuh eq[; ijh{kk esa ,d 'kCn Hkh ugha dgk gSA izfr ijh{kk esa bl lk{kh dk dFku gS fd fdjk;k nsus dh ftEesnkjh mldh ugha gS] dEiuh dh gSA bl izdkj ls /kkjk 13 jktLFkku ifjlj fdjk;k rFkk csn[kyh fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e esa vafdr ;g 'kCn dh tc rd fdjk;k iw.kZ ifj.kke rd fdjk;k vnk djus ds fy, rS;kj o jtkeUn gks dh ikyuk izfroknhx.k }kjk ugha dh x;h gSA blds vykok tc yht dh vof/k lekIr gks tkrh gS rFkk ,slh vof/k dh lekfIr ds mijkUr Hkh fdjk;snkj ifjlj esa cuk jgrk gS rks mls e"kZ.k tkfr ekHkkxh (Tenant at Suffarance) dgrs gSa ftldk fu"dklu jktLFkku fdjk;snkjh vf/kfu;e ds ifjlj ij ykxw gksus ds dkj.k /kkjk 13@1 esa fn;s x;s izko/kkuksa esa ls ,d ;k vf/kd izko/kkuksa ds vuqlkj fd;k tk ldrk gSA oknh us izfroknhx.k ds fu"dklu ds fy, ;qfDr;qDr ,oa ln~Hkkoh vko';drk dk vk/kkj Hkh fy;k gS tks jktLFkku ifjlj fdjk;k rFkk csn[kyh fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 13@1@t esa fn;k x;k gSA ftlds laca/k esa fook|d la[;k 7 esa fu.kZ; fn;k tk pqdk gSA bl izdkj ls bu fook|dksa dk fu.kZ; mijksDr izdkj ls fd;k tkrk gSA fook|d la[;k 10%& bu fook|dksa dks fl) djus dk Hkkj oknh ij Fkk ysfdu mHk; i{k ds vf/koDrkx.k us ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk vc Li"V :i ls ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr dj fn;k x;k gS fd /kkjk 106 lEifRr vUrj.k vf/kfu;e dk uksfVl fn;k tkuk vko';d ugha gSA yht ij fn;s x;s ifjlj ds laca/k esa ;fn yht iathd`r gks rFkk yht dh vof/k fuf'pr dh x;h gS rks yht dh vof/k dh lekfIr ij fdjk;snkjh Lor% gh lekIr gks tkrh gSA ,slh lwjr esa fdjk;snkjh lekIr djus ds fy, fdlh uksfVl ds fn;s tkus dh dksbZ vko';drk ugha gSA fof/k ds izko/kkuksa ds vuqlkj izfroknhx.k dh fdjk;snkjh yht dh vof/k dh lekfIr ij gh lekIr gks pqdh Fkh rFkk oknh }kjk Hksts x;s uksfVl fnukad 10-12-1975 dk dksbZ egRo ugha FkkA blfy, bl fook|d dk fu.kZ; oknh ds fo:) fd;k tkrk gSA fook|d la[;k 11 o 12%& bl nksuksa fook|dksa dk fu.kZ; izkjfHkad fook|d ds :i esa U;k;ky; gktk }kjk fnukad 15-02-1986 dks oknh ds i{k esa rFkk izfroknhx.k ds fo:) fd;k tk pqdk gSA fook|d la[;k 13%& bl fook|d dks fl) djus dk Hkkj izfroknh la0 2 ij Fkk ysfdu izfroknh la0 2 ds vf/koDrk us bl ij dksbZ cy ugha fn;k gSA muds vuqlkj bl fook|d dk fu.kZ; muds fo:) dj fn;k tkos rks mUgsa dksbZ vkifRr ugha gSA izfroknh la0 2 dh vksj ls bl fook|d ds laca/k esa dksbZ lk{; Hkh izLrqr ugha dh x;h gSA ,slh lwjr esa bl fook|d dk fu.kZd izfroknh la[;k 2 ds fo:) rFkk oknh ds i{k esa fd;k tkrk gSA vuqrks"k %& pwafd fook|d la[;k 1] 2] 3] 4] 5] 6] 7] 11] 12 o 13 dk fu.kZ; oknh ds i{k esa gqvk gSA blfy, oknh oknxzLr ifjlj dk fjDr dCtk çfroknhx.k ls izkIr djus rFkk oknxzLr ifjlj dk mi;ksx] miHkksx dk [kpkZ :0 1440@& rFkk uksfVl [kpkZ :0 60@& ,oa nkok nk;jh dh fnukad 20-09-1978 ls fu.kZ; dh fnukad rFkk fookfnr ifjlj ds mi;ksx o miHkksx dk [kpkZ :0 40@& çfrekg e; N% çfr'kr C;kt lfgr çkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ds0vkj0 'kekZ flfoy U;k;k/kh'k ¼dfu"B [k.M½ ,oa U;kf;d eftLVªsV] izFke oxZ ljnkj 'kgj ¼pw:½ jktLFkku &%%fu.kZ;%%& vr% okn oknh fo:) çfroknhx.k e; [kpkZ fMfØ fd;k tkdj çfroknhx.k dks vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd os oknxzLr ifjlj ftldk fooj.k okni= dh en la0 4 esa vafdr gS] dk fjDr dCtk Hkou] Vsad vkfn gVkdj fu.kZ; dh fnukad ls nks ekg ds Hkhrj oknh dks lkSai nsosaA blds i'pkr~ oknh dks ;g vf/kdkj gksxk fd og çfroknhx.k }kjk oknxzLr ifjlj ij fufeZr fd;s x;s Hkou o Vsad vkfn dks gVkdj bUgsa gVkus dk [kpkZ çfroknhx.k ls olwy dj oknxzLr ifjlj dk fjDr dCtk izkIr dj ysosaA oknh çfroknhx.k ls ifjlj ds miHkksx ds :0 1440@& rFkk uksfVl [kpkZ :0 60@& dqy :0 1500@& rFkk nkok nk;jh dh fnukad 20-09-1978 ls ifjlj ds mi;ksx o miHkksx ds pkyhl :i;s çfrekg dh nj ls fu.kZ; dh fnukad rd ds dqy :i;s N% çfr'kr C;kt lfgr izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA fu.kZ; dh fnukad ls okLrfod dCtk çkIr gksus rd oknh çfroknhx.k ls e/;orhZ ykHk ds :i esa pkyhl :i;s çfrekg dh nj ls :i;s çkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxkA mijksDrkuqlkj fMfØ ipkZ cuk;k tkosA ds0vkj0 'kekZ flfoy U;k;k/kh'k dfu"B [k.M ,oa U;kf;d eftLVsªV izFke oxZ ljnkj 'kgj ¼pq:½ jktLFkku 5. The relevant portion of the order of first appellate court dated 13/12/2003:- geus fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMfØ fnukad 25-08-1999 dk voyksdu fd;kA fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; lkexzh] nLrkost rFkk fof/k dk lE;d~ :i ls fo'ys"k.k vFkok fof/kd =qfV ugha ikbZ tkrh gS fd ftlds vk/kkj ij mDr fu.kZ; o fMfØ esa fdlh izdkj dk gLr{ksi dk vk/kkj ik;k tk,A fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMfØ iq"V fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS vkSj vihykFkhZ dh ;g vihy [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; ikbZ tkrh gSA vr% vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls izLrqr ;g vihy lkjghu gksus ls [kkfjt dh tkrh gSA fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; o fMfØ fnukad 25-08-1999 dks iq"V fd;k tkrk gSA ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq, [kpkZ vihy Hkh izR;FkhZ vihykFkhZx.k ls izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gksaxsA ipkZ fMfØ tkjh gksA xksis'k pUæ nhf{kr vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k] pq: 6. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants have preferred these second appeals, namely Civil Second Appeal No. 70/2004 filed by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. in this on 3/3/2004 and Civil Second Appeal No. 47/2004 by the dealer M/s Roopchand Chhaganlal on 16/2/2004. Both these appeals were admitted and following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration by this Court. 7. Order dated 19/3/2004 passed in Civil Second Appeal No.47/2004: Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.R. Panwar Mr. R.K. Thanvi, for appellant. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. The following substantial questions of law are involved in this appeal:- 1. Whether the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the suit in respect of suit land which is agricultural land and Section 207 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 takes away the jurisdiction of the civil court? 2. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the courts below is vitiated on account of the fact that on the date of institution of suit i.e. 30.9.1978, the provision of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 was not applicable to the area where the subject matter of the suit is situated? 3. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is vitiated on account of non-consideration of material evidence produced by the appellant-defendant during pendency of appeal under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC? 4. 3. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is vitiated on account of non-consideration of material evidence produced by the appellant-defendant during pendency of appeal under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC? 4. Whether judgment and decree of courts below is vitiated on account of non-consideration of the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction as envisaged under Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950? 5. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is vitiated on account of noncompliance of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC? Admit. Issue notice. Issue notice of stay petition also. Meanwhile, the appellant shall not be dispossessed from the suit premises subject to that appellant deposits arrears of rent and mesne profits, if any within a period of one month and further continue to pay or deposit the monthly rent in accordance with law. Sd/- (H.R.Panwar), J. 8. Order dated 1.4.2004 passed in Civil Second Appeal No.70/2004: Hon'ble Mr. Prakash Tatia, J. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, for the appellant. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appeal against the same judgment filed by one of the appellants has already been admitted by this Court after framing substantial questions of law on 19th March, 2004. Therefore, this appeal, onvolving one more substantial question of law in addition to the questions framed, may also be admitted. In view of the above, this appeal also deserves to be admitted as this appeal is also against the same judgment, which is impugned in the SBCSA No.47/2004. Following substantial questions of law are involved in this appeal:- 1. Whether the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the suit in respect of suit land which is agricultural land and Section 207 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 takes away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court? 2. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is vitiated on account of the fact that on the date of institution of suit i.e. 30.9.1978, the provision of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 was not applicable to the area where the subject matter of the suit is situated? 3. 2. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is vitiated on account of the fact that on the date of institution of suit i.e. 30.9.1978, the provision of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 was not applicable to the area where the subject matter of the suit is situated? 3. Whether the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court is vitiated on account of non-consideration of material evidence produced by the appellant-defendant during pendency of appeal under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC ? 4. Whether judgment and decree of Courts below is vitiated on account of non-consideration of the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction as envisaged under Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 ? 5. Whether the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court is vitiated on account of noncompliance of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC ? 6. In view of Section 5(2) of the Act of 1976, whether the Government of India was a necessary party ? Admit. Issue notice of the main appeal as well as stay petition. Meanwhile, the appellant shall not be dispossessed from the suit premises subject to that appellant deposits arrears of rent and mesne profits, if any within a period of one month and further continue to pay or deposit the monthly rent in accordance with law. Sd/- (Prakash Tatia), J. 9. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Hukum Singh appearing for Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Mr. R.K. Thanvi, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Narendra Thanvi appearing for the defendant dealer M/s Roopchand Chhaganlal made the following submissions challenging the eviction decree passed by the courts below. (i) By the Act of 1976, the original Company M/s Burma Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Company was created by the Act of Parliament and all the property rights of the said company, which were later on taken over the BPCL, vested in Union of India and, therefore, the Union of India was the necessary party in the present eviction suit and the plaintiff respondent having failed to implead the Union of India as party respondent in the present case, the eviction decree deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. (ii) The entire land of the plaintiff respondent was an agricultural and, therefore, Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1956 bars the present civil suit as only the Revenue Court could have the jurisdiction for giving the decree of possession to the plaintiff in a Revenue suit filed in a Revenue Court and not the civil court exercising the powers under the Transfer of Property Act or the Rent Control Act, 1950. (iii) Since during the pendency of the trial, the area in question fell within the municipal limits and Rent Control Act became applicable and the court below has also granted the decree of eviction on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord Institution for raising the construction of a hostel and other facilities for the students of the said Educational Institution, therefore, without raising and establishing the proper ground of eviction under Section 13 of the Rent Control Act, 1950, no such eviction decree could have been passed as Section 13 of the Act which is a non obstante clause & which permits a decree of eviction on specific grounds only and even such decree cannot be given, if the tenant is ready and willing to deposit the rent due for the demised premises. (iv) That out of the huge chunk of land of 3200 bighas, a small plot of land of 120 x 100 ft. is in possession of the defendants on which they are carrying on their business and, therefore, it cannot be said to be bonafidely required by the plaintiff landlord as they have other alternative land available to them to create the facilities for the need of the students of the said Educational Institution. Therefore, the eviction decree on this ground cannot be upheld. 10. Opposing the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Therefore, the eviction decree on this ground cannot be upheld. 10. Opposing the aforesaid submissions, Mr. D.D. Chitlangi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff Gandhi Vidhya Mandir submitted that at the time of execution of lease in the present case in the year 1959 and after expiry of the period of 15 years in the year 1974, the Act of 1976, under which the Burmah Shell Company was created by the Act of Parliament, which was later on taken over by the BPCL, therefore, lease having expired even before the year 1976, which was never renewed or extended by the plaintiff respondent, the Union of India cannot be said to be a proper party in the present case and its non-impleadment does not affect the maintainability the eviction suit. Mr. D.D.Chitlangi submitted that even otherwise the BPCL is a body corporate which can be sued in its own name and, therefore, the BPCL and its dealer, who are appellants before this Court, cannot raise this objection. 11. Mr. D.D.Chitlangi also submitted that the plea of bar of jurisdiction of civil court raised by the lessee is also not maintainable, since the area in question admittedly fell within the municipal limit when the suit was pending and at the time of passing of the eviction decree by the trial court as well as by the appellate court and since the grounds under Rent Control Act,1950, namely default in payment of rent and bona fide need of the landlord of the suit land in question were duly specified and established by the plaintiff landlord, therefore, the decree under the Rent Control Act could very well be granted by the courts below and same do not deserve any interference by this Court. The civil court had proper jurisdiction in the matter and the lease was properly determined by efflux of time as per Section 111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act and the lease was determined by serving a notice under Section 106 of the Act, therefore, the decree of eviction deserves to be maintained. Mr. The civil court had proper jurisdiction in the matter and the lease was properly determined by efflux of time as per Section 111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act and the lease was determined by serving a notice under Section 106 of the Act, therefore, the decree of eviction deserves to be maintained. Mr. D.D. Chitlangi also pointed out that unfortunately no rent has been paid by the lessee ever since 1974 and the appellant-defendants are unauthorisedly and illegally in possession of the suit land in question and the bona fide need of the Educational Institution for which the land in question is required, the findings of the courts below on that aspect of the matter are findings of fact based on relevant evidence and the tenant or the lessee cannot dictate terms in this regard as to which part of the land would be suitable for what purpose to the plaintiff Institution. It is well settled that the plaintiff landlord is the best judge for adjudging its business and personal needs including institutional requirements. 12. Mr. D.D. Chitlangi also urged that the notice seeking extention of lease of the defendant BPCL dated 21/7/1974 was not served before the expiry of three months of the lease period and on the other hand the lessor had terminated the lease by serving a notice even prior to that, therefore, lease stood determined & terminated on 31/3/1974 for all purposes and the lessee has also not paid any rent to the lessor thereafter, and, thus, in these circumstances the eviction decree deserves to be maintained. He also drew the attention of the Court towards the definition of word ‘Premises' in Section 3 (v) of the Rent Control Act, 1950, which includes any land not being used for agricultural purposes and thus, he submitted that the petrol pump was established on the land in question by the lessee, which is a commercial enterprise and, therefore, their argument about non-maintainability of the suit before the civil court runs counter to the said definition. 13. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the record of the case. In the considered opinion of this Court, both the present second appeals filed by the lessee BPCL & its dealer M/s Roopchand Chhaganlal have no merit and deserve to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 14. 13. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the record of the case. In the considered opinion of this Court, both the present second appeals filed by the lessee BPCL & its dealer M/s Roopchand Chhaganlal have no merit and deserve to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 14. The first contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that the Union of India is a necessary party in the suit is misconceived because even prior to the incorporation of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976, the lease in question given in favour of erstwhile Burmah Shell Company on 20/9/1959 for a period of 15 years stood expired in 1974 and, therefore, the subsequent take over of the erstwhile company by the BPCL upon enactment of the Act of 1976 vesting the properties of such oil company in the Union of India cannot be given a retrospective effect and, therefore, this contention ex facie cannot be sustained and deserves to be rejected and same is hereby rejected. 15. Equally devoid of merit is the contention raised by the learned counsels for the defendants about the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the present suit. Not only the area fell within the municipal limits upon it being declared as urban area, removing the bar of Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act qua the present suit, but looking to the nature of the suit itself, namely 'eviction suit', upon the termination of lease also, the Revenue Court cannot be said to have any jurisdiction to decide such suits. Moreover, the definition of the term ‘Premises' as defined under the Rent Control Act under which the decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff also includes within its ambit any land not being used for agricultural purposes. Since, admittedly, the land in question was being used by the defendants for carrying on the business of sale of petroleum products i.e. sale of petrol & diesel etc., the case fell within the scope and ambit of Rent Control Act, 1950 upon its enforcement in the Municipal Limits of Churu and, therefore, the civil court had the proper jurisdiction to decide the same. Thus, the second contention of the learned counsels for the defendants also fails and is hereby rejected. 16. Thus, the second contention of the learned counsels for the defendants also fails and is hereby rejected. 16. Coming to the merits of the defence of lessee/tenants, this Court is of the view that in view of the non-extension of the period of lease by the parties after 31/3/1974, the lease stood determined by efflux of time itself. Clause (8) of the lease agreement, which provides for such extention, is quoted below for ready reference:- 8. If the lessees shall be desirous of renewing this present lease and of such desire shall have given to the lessor not less than three months notice in writing prior to the expiration hereof, the lessor shall grant to them a renewed lease of the said premises for a further period of 15 years to commence from the date of expiry here of at the same rent and upon the same terms and conditions in all respects as are reserved and contained here in (excluding only this present covenant for renewal). 17. Since the notice from the side of lessee seeking extension of lease was not given before the stipulated period of three months before expiry of the lease term of 15 years on 31/3/1974, therefore, the lease stood expired or determined by efflux of time on 31/3/1974. On the other hand, by the letter dated 5/3/1974, the plaintiff Gandhi Vidhya Mandir informed the lessee M/s Burmah Shell Company that the plaintiff institution was not willing to renew the above mentioned lease agreement. Before filing the suit for eviction, the plaintiff Institution also served a notice through its Advocate Shri Arjun Lal Gupta on 10/11/1975 asking the lessee to handover the possession of demised premises and pay the mesne profits @ Rs.600/- per month. There is no document on record to indicate any extention of lease period beyond the initial period of 15 years, which period expired on 31/3/1974. The renewal of the lease was neither automatic nor as a matter of right in favour of the lessee. It is strange that the lessee like BPCL, a Government Company, retained the possession for last 37 years without paying a single penny to the plaintiff Educational Institution - Gandhi Vidhya Mandir, a deemed University, which is expected to propound and propagate the ideals of the father of the Nation Mahatama Gandhi. It is strange that the lessee like BPCL, a Government Company, retained the possession for last 37 years without paying a single penny to the plaintiff Educational Institution - Gandhi Vidhya Mandir, a deemed University, which is expected to propound and propagate the ideals of the father of the Nation Mahatama Gandhi. The lessee BPCL & its dealer are plain and simple business persons and huge plot of land on which they have set up their business, carries high market value now and they are enjoying the possession and making profits without paying a single penny to the landlord or lessor, an educational institution. 18. This Court is of the considered opinion that the bona fide need of the plaintiff as noted by the courts below that it wanted to develop a hostel and other related facilities for the students of the said University at this place, the defendant-tenants can hardly dictate terms in this regard and it is well settled legal position that the landlord is the best judge to determine such needs. Moreover, they are pure findings of facts concurrently recorded in favour of the plaintiff respondent and, therefore, do not call for interference by this Court. There is no perversity in the same. 19. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors. - (2005) 8 SCC 252 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the eviction is sought for bona fide requirement of landlord, the relevant date on which the said need has to be adjudged is the date of filing the suit and subsequent events taking place during the period of litigation like engaging in other activity or business for which premises in question is required do not upset such bona fide need unless such subsequent events are of such a nature & dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it lose significance altogether and the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord relief when litigation at last reaches the final stage. 20. In Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan - (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement observed as under:- The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. 20. In Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan - (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement observed as under:- The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dicate to the landlord how and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court was rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thought that because of her age she needed to be looked after. That was a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. The gratuitous advice given by the High Court was uncalled for. There is nothing to show that she had any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of the family friend. On the other hand, she was there merely by sufferance. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bonafides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances. 21. More over, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court itself in a recent decision of two Judges bench in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 287 , which has been later on reaffirmed by three Judges bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra & anr. v. Super Max International Private Ltd. & Ors. - (2009) 9 SCC 772 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly noticed that even the trend of Apex Court has shifted from pro-tenant from 1950s to 1990s to pro-landlord from 1990s onwards. v. Super Max International Private Ltd. & Ors. - (2009) 9 SCC 772 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly noticed that even the trend of Apex Court has shifted from pro-tenant from 1950s to 1990s to pro-landlord from 1990s onwards. The relevant extracts from the judgments in case of Satyawati Sharma (supra) & Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. are quoted below for ready reference: 12. There has been a definite shift in the court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. In these cases the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide safeguard for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments. 22. The relevant para 71 of the judgment of Apex Court in Super Max International (P) Ltd. (supra) is quoted below for ready reference: 71. We reaffirm the views expressed in Satyawati Sharma and emphasize the need for a more balanced and objective approach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant. This is not to say that the Court should lean in favour of the landlord but merely that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all tenants, as a class, are in dire circumstances and in desperate need of the Court's protection under all circumstances. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq. ft. in a building, situate at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs. 5236.58/-, plus water charges at the rate of Rs. 515.35/- per month more than amply highlights the point) 23. This Court in the case of LR's of Prakash v. Poornima (SBCSA No.132/2009, decided on 11.05.2011) also emphasized that landlord was the best judge of his needs in the following terms:- 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. 5236.58/-, plus water charges at the rate of Rs. 515.35/- per month more than amply highlights the point) 23. This Court in the case of LR's of Prakash v. Poornima (SBCSA No.132/2009, decided on 11.05.2011) also emphasized that landlord was the best judge of his needs in the following terms:- 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. S.N. Pungalia strongly opposed these submissions and urged that no substantial question of law arises in the present second appeal and the finding of facts returned by the courts below are based on cogent and relevant evidence and the second appeal deserves to be dismissed as the bona fide need of the landlord was fully established before the learned trial court and as per the catenae of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not for the tenant to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should satisfy his bona fide need for his business place and from the facts found by the courts below it was clear that the very source of livelihood of plaintiffs was the STD PCO Booth, which is presently run under the staircase and they need bigger premises for carrying out this business. 24. In the case of Denzil Najrath v. LR's of Balwant Singh & Ors. reported in 2011 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217 this Court has held under: Having heard learned counsels for the parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and evidence recorded by the learned trial court, this Court is satisfied that the findings of the fact about the bona fide need of the landlord recorded by the learned trial court are not perverse in any manner. They are based on cogent reasons and evidence and no interference in the impugned judgment is required to be made in the present first appeal of the defendant-tenant. The owner-plaintiff, Swarn Singh has clearly stated in paras 7 and 8 of his affidavit that the available house with the plaintiff's family was very small of three rooms and for a family of two married brothers and three married sisters and parents of them, the said accommodation was very short of the requirement and, therefore, they needed the suit house for their own residential purposes. Nothing in the cross-examination was even asked from the said deponent about the relationship and number of family members and, therefore, the averments made in the affidavit was sufficient proof unshaken in the cross-examination of the said deponent, namely, Swarn Singh. It is well settled that findings about the bona fide need of the landlord are findings of fact and unless they can be said to be perverse or without any foundation, the same cannot be interfered with by the appellate court; and even though this is first appeal as the trial Court was that of learned Additional District Judge, Sri Karanpur and requirement of substantial question of law may not be there as such as is required for second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C., still this Court is satisfied that decree under appeal deserves no interference and the present appeal filed by the defendant-tenant has no merit. 25. This Court is also of the considered view that even if the lease was terminated or determined by efflux of time under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and a notice was also served when the Rent Control Act was not applicable to the said area, but later on when the said Act was enforced during the pendency of the suit, since on the basis of available evidence on record, the decree has been given by the courts below on the grounds of default in payment of rent, which is admitted in the present case, and the bona fide need of the landlord, such a decree which is ultimately given under the Rent Control Act, 1950 deserves to be maintained and does not require any interference by this Court and the second appeals filed by both the defendants are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed with costs which is quantified at Rs.50,000/- for each of the appellant to be paid to the respondent plaintiff within three months. The eviction decree given by the courts below is upheld. 26. The eviction decree given by the courts below is upheld. 26. In the circumstances of the case, it is directed that the appellant-defendant-tenants shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property in question to the respondent-plaintiff landlord on or before 31/12/2016 and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs.20,000/- per month (Rupees Twenty Thousand per month) from March, 2016 and will further continue to pay the mesne profit each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent/plaintiff and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period upto 31/12/2016, as mentioned above, for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction as granted by the Courts below would become executable forthwith. The appellant defendant - tenants shall also clear all the arrears of rent and mesne profit and pay the same to the respondent-plaintiff @ Rs.600/- p.m. for 1.4.1974 till February 2016 within three months from today, otherwise the same will bear interest @ 9% per annum. The appellant-lessees, both of them, shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit property or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and if it is so done, the same would be treated as void. The appellant-defendants-lessee or its shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the Trial Court within three months and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises is not handed over to the respondent-plaintiff on or before 31/12/2016, as mentioned above, or mesne profits are not paid as directed above, besides the expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the appellant defendant shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. Copy of this judgment be sent to the parties concerned and trial court forthwith. Appeal dismissed with cost of Rs. 50,000/-.