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2016 DIGILAW 2472 (HP)

Charan Dass deceased through LRs v. Subhadra Devi

2016-11-23

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, SANDEEP SHARMA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. This LPA is directed against judgment and order, dated 10th October, 2007, made by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 992 of 2003, titled as Smt. Subhadra Devi and ors. versus State of H.P. and another, whereby the writ petition filed by writ petitioners-respondents No. 1 to 4 herein came to be allowed and order, dated 8th October, 2003, made by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) was quashed (for short “the impugned judgment”). 2. The case in hand has a chequered history, is two decades old and the parties are still litigating, is suggestive of the fact that delay has crept-in in taking the lis to its logical conclusion, which has adversely affected the parties. 3. It is beaten law of the land that delay takes away the settings of law. Thus, it is the duty of all concerned to see that the cases are decided as early as possible. 4. The way this case has been dealt with right from the year 1987 till filing of the writ petition is also a glaring example as to how the people are suffering, that too, for trivial issues. 5. It is necessary to notice the brief facts of the case herein. 6. Shri Charan Dass, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, i.e. writ respondent No. 2 (since deceased, now represented through his legal heirs/representatives) purchased the land vide two registered sale deeds, dated 23rd September, 1969. Mutation No. 542 to this effect was attested on 20th April, 1970. At the time of recording the mutation proceedings, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 was present, had not raised any finger qua recording of mutation and was satisfied till 31st January, 1987, when he filed an application before the Settlement Officer, Kangra for correction of the entries in the revenue record. 7. In the said application, it was averred that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 had purchased 3 kanals 1 marla land out of 7 kanals 10 marlas land comprised in khasra No. 732 min vide registered sale deed, dated 23rd September, 1969, from one Shri Chuhru, was given possession towards the path side, but some mischievous elements had got recorded his possession on the other side and had prayed for correction of the entries. 8. The Settlement Officer, Kangra, transferred the said application to Tehsildar (Settlement), Una. 8. The Settlement Officer, Kangra, transferred the said application to Tehsildar (Settlement), Una. The inquiry was conducted by the Settlement Naib Tehsildar, who submitted the report on 8th October, 1987. After perusing the said report, the Tehsildar (Settlement) rejected the application filed by the appellant-writ respondent No. 2. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 questioned the same by the medium of appeal before the Settlement Collector, Kangra, who accepted the appeal vide order, dated 22nd January, 1991, and remanded the case to the Tehsildar (Settlement). The Tehsildar (Settlement) heard the parties, inquired into the matter and again rejected the application vide order, dated 31st January, 1992. 10. Dissatisfied with order, dated 31st January, 1992, made by the Tehsildar (Settlement), the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 filed appeal before the Settlement Collector, Kangra, who, vide order, dated 18th June, 2003, dismissed the appeal with the observations that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 had to assail the mutation before the competent court of jurisdiction, which he had not done, thus, the correction of entry relating to possession, as sought for, could not be made in the revenue record. 11. The said order of Settlement Collector was then questioned by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 before the Divisional Commissioner, Kangra Division by the medium of revision petition, was dismissed vide order, dated 15th January, 1998. The Divisional Commissioner has given the minute details of the facts of the case and history behind it. It has specifically recorded that though, as per one of the sale deeds, dated 23rd September, 1969, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 had purchased land on the southern side (Bhumi Zanab Janoob), but the spot inspections conducted by the field staff did not prove that he was in possession of the said portion of the land. Further held that mutation No. 542 was attested on 20th April, 1970, since then entries had been recorded in various records including jamabandies and record-of-rights and after lapse of such a long period, such record cannot be corrected. 12. Though, the Divisional Commissioner has recorded that since the proceedings before him were in the nature of revision, the evidence was not to be evaluated as the only issue to be determined was the legality of the orders of the revenue authorities. 12. Though, the Divisional Commissioner has recorded that since the proceedings before him were in the nature of revision, the evidence was not to be evaluated as the only issue to be determined was the legality of the orders of the revenue authorities. He, by a speaking order, has held that the facts and merits of the case in hand were rightly appreciated by the authorities below. 13. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 invoked the jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) by the medium of second revision, being Revision Petition No. 224 of 1998, who accepted the same vide order, dated 8th October, 2003, and set aside the orders made by all the three revenue authorities. 14. The writ petitioners-respondents No. 1 to 4 herein questioned the said order of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) by the medium of CWP No. 992 of 2003, was allowed and the order made by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) came to be quashed and set aside in terms of the impugned judgment. Hence, this appeal. 15. The following questions arise for determination in this appeal: (i) Whether the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), while hearing the second revision, was within its limits and competence to upset the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the revenue agencies including the appellate authority and confirmed by the first revisional authority? (ii) Whether the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) was within its jurisdiction to accept and grant the application, dated 31st January, 1987, which was highly belated? (iii) Whether the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) was within its rights and power to direct the revenue authorities to change the entries in the revenue record made in terms of the mutation in the year 1970, came to be reflected and recorded in the record-of-rights? 16. The answer to all the three questions is in the negative for the following reasons: 17. The Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 (for short “Act”) contains a complete mechanism as to how the entries are to be recorded in the revenue record i.e. Record of Rights, Misal Haqiat, Khasra Girdawari, Jamabandies etc., and also provides remedies. 18. Section 17 of the Act provides that the Financial Commissioner may call for the record of any case pending or disposed of by any officer subordinate to him. It is apt to reproduce Section 17 of the Act herein: “17. 18. Section 17 of the Act provides that the Financial Commissioner may call for the record of any case pending or disposed of by any officer subordinate to him. It is apt to reproduce Section 17 of the Act herein: “17. Power To call for, examine and revise proceedings of Revenue Officers :- (1) The Financial Commissioner may at any time call for the record of any case pending before or disposed of by any Revenue Officer subordinate to him. (2) A Commissioner or Collector may call for the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by, any Revenue Officer under his control. (3) If in any case in which a Commissioner or Collector, has called for a record, is of the opinion that the proceedings taken or order made should be modified or reversed, he shall report the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Financial Commissioner. (4) The Financial Commissioner may in any case called for by himself under sub-section (1) or reported to him or under subsection (3) pass such orders as he thinks fit: Provided that he shall not under this section pass an order reversing or modifying any proceeding, or order of a subordinate Revenue Officer and effecting any question of right between private persons without giving those persons an opportunity of being heard.” 19. Section 17 of the Act provides that the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) and the Divisional Commissioner have revisional powers. The Financial Commissioner (Appeals) can exercise second revisional jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) in revision against the orders passed by the revenue authorities subordinate to it, is alike Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC”). 20. The Apex Court in the case titled as Gurudassing Nawoosing Panjwani versus State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2015 AIR SCW 6277, held that if revisional powers are exercised by a revenue officer having jurisdiction to do so, further revisional power can be exercised by the superior revenue officer or by the State Government. It is apt to reproduce para 30 of the judgment herein: “30. From perusal of the entire scheme of the Code including Section 257, it is manifest that the revisional powers are not only exercisable by the State Government but also by certain other Revenue officers. It is apt to reproduce para 30 of the judgment herein: “30. From perusal of the entire scheme of the Code including Section 257, it is manifest that the revisional powers are not only exercisable by the State Government but also by certain other Revenue officers. There is nothing in the Code to suggest that if these revisional powers are exercised by a Revenue officer who has jurisdiction, it cannot be further exercised by a superior Revenue officer or by the State Government. A fair reading of Sections 257 and 259 suggests that if revisional powers are exercised by a Revenue officer having jurisdiction to do so, further revisional power can be exercised by the superior officer or by the State Government.” 21. In the instant case, though the Divisional Commissioner had exercised its revisional jurisdiction, but the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) was also within its rights in exercising the powers of second revisional authority, but it had to exercise the revisional powers with great care and caution, has fallen in an error in upsetting the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the revenue courts below. 22. It is beaten law of the land that the revisional authority has only to examine the orders on the touchstone of legality and not on the question of facts unless it is found that the orders are perverse and factually incorrect. 23. In the case titled as Manick Chandra Nandy versus Debdas Nandy and others, reported in AIR 1986 SC 446 , the Apex Court has discussed the nature, quality and extent of revisional jurisdiction. It is profitable to reproduce para 5 of the judgment herein: “5. We are constrained to observe that the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the two revisional applications was one not warranted by law. The High Court treated these two applications as if they were first appeals and not applications invoking its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The nature, quality and extent of appellate jurisdiction being exercised in first appeal and of revisional jurisdiction are very different. The limits of revisional jurisdiction are prescribed and its boundaries defined by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The nature, quality and extent of appellate jurisdiction being exercised in first appeal and of revisional jurisdiction are very different. The limits of revisional jurisdiction are prescribed and its boundaries defined by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that section revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised by the High Court in a case in which no appeal lies to it from the decision of a subordinate Court if it appears to it that the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction is thus confined to questions of jurisdiction. While in a first appeal the Court is free to decide all questions of law and fact which arise in the case, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction the High Court is not entitled to reexamine or reassess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the subordinate Court. In the instant case, the Respondents had raised a plea that the Appellant's application under Rule 13 of Order IX was barred by limitation. Now, a plea of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries a proceeding, for a finding on this plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In determining the correctness of the decision reached by the subordinate Court on such a plea the High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question of law or fact, that is it may have to decide collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the subordinate Court has decided such a collateral question rightly the High Court cannot however, function as a Court of first appeal so far as the assessment of evidence is concerned and substitute its own findings for those arrived at by the subordinate Court unless any such finding is not in anyway borne out by the evidence on the record or is manifestly contrary to evidence or so palpably wrong that if allowed to stand would result in grave injustice to a party.” 24. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan versus Tuffail Mohammed, reported in AIR 1991 SC 455 , and Yunis Ali (Dead) Thru his L.Rs. versus Khursheed Akram, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 4372, held that the Courts, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, cannot re-appreciate the evidence and set aside the concurrent findings of the Courts below by taking a different view of the evidence unless the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record. It is apt to reproduce para 15 of the judgment in Yunis Ali's case (supra) herein:- “15. It is well-settled position in law that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent findings of the Courts below by taking a different view of the evidence. The High Court is empowered 26 to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.” 25. The same principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases titled as Chandmal versus Firm Ram Chandra and Vishwanath, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1594 , and Gurdial Singh and others versus Raj Kumar Aneja and others, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1003 . It would be profitable to reproduce paras 12, 13 and 16 of the judgment in Chandmal's case (supra) herein:- “12. There is no dispute regarding the submission made in Para 9 of the additional written statement which is a part of the same written statement filed on behalf of the respondent by one of its partners, Shankarrao Marutirao Sonawane to the effect that one of the partners of the said firm, Ramchandra Madhavrao is occupying the house as a permanent tenant since Samvat 2002. Admittedly, on the basis of this additional Written Statement an additional issue No. 1 was framed at the request of the landlord appellant whether the claim of permanent tenancy of Ramchandra Madhavrao was bona fide. Admittedly, on the basis of this additional Written Statement an additional issue No. 1 was framed at the request of the landlord appellant whether the claim of permanent tenancy of Ramchandra Madhavrao was bona fide. It is evident from the provisions of S. 15(2)(vi) as set out hereinbefore that if the tenant has claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such claim was not bona fide, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house. The Additional Rent Controller as well as the District Judge considered carefully and minutely the evidence adduced on behalf of the tenant-respondent and found that claim of permanent tenancy was not bona fide. Accordingly, the courts below held that the tenant-respondent was liable to be evicted from the suit premises on this ground alone and passed order for eviction from the suit premises. The jurisdiction of the High Court in revision against the order passed on appeal by the District Judge is a limited one and it is almost pari materia with the provisions of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction can interfere with the order passed on appeal by the appellate authority only on three grounds i.e. (i) where the original or appellate authority exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) where the original or appellate authority failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) where in following the procedure or passing the order, the original or appellate authority acted illegally or with material irregularity. It is evident from the averments made in para 9 of the additional written statement that one of the partners of the respondent firm, Ramchandra Madhavrao occupied the said premises as a permanent tenant since Samvat 2002. This claim of permanent tenancy was held to be not bona fide by the original Court as well as by the appellate authority on a consideration and appraisement of the evidence adduced on behalf of the tenant-respondent and as such both the courts below passed order of eviction of the tenant-respondent from the suit premises. These are admittedly concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the original and the appellate authority. These are admittedly concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the original and the appellate authority. Moreover, these findings in any view of the matter whatsoever, cannot be held to be either without jurisdiction nor it can amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested with them, nor it can be held to be made by the original or appellate authority illegally or with material irregularity. 13. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 26 of the said Act is confined strictly to the jurisdictional error or illegal exercise of jurisdiction. The finding of the High Court to the effect that it was the duty of the Court in the interest of justice to interfere even with the concurrent finding of facts because on the record, High Court found that there was not a single factor to come to the conclusion that the claim was mala fide or was not bona fide as required by the statute, is entirely baseless and not in accordance with the provisions of S. 26 of the said Act which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. It is pertinent to mention in this connection the decision in J. Pandu v. R. Narsubai, (1987) 1 SCC 573 : AIR 1987 SC 857 . It is a case under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1960. Sub-sec. (2)(vi) of S. 10 of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act which is similar to S. 15(2)(vi) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 sets out two grounds of eviction viz. (1) denial of title of the landlord without bona fides, and(2) claim of permanent tenancy rights without bona fides. It was held that "consequently, either denial of title or claim of permanent tenancy without bona fides will itself be enough to attract S. 10(2)(vi). The order of eviction on this ground, has, therefore, to be sustained. By reason of this conclusion alone the appeal can be dismissed." 14. …........ 15. …........ 16. In the premises aforesaid, the judgment and order passed in revision by the High Court is contrary to law as the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction interfered with the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the original Court as well as the appellate authority. …........ 15. …........ 16. In the premises aforesaid, the judgment and order passed in revision by the High Court is contrary to law as the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction interfered with the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the original Court as well as the appellate authority. The High Court should not have reversed the same in exercise of its revisional Jurisdiction under S. 26 of the said Act. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and uphold the orders of the courts below. The respondent is given three months' time to vacate the suit premises on filing the usual undertaking that they will not induct anybody or transfer the same to any other person and they will go on paying the rent of the premises at the usual rate and will deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises on or before the expiry of the said period to the landlord appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.” 26. In the case titled as Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. versus Dilbahar Singh, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 5018, the Apex Court has held that the revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. It is apt to reproduce paras 25 to 30, 32 and 45 of the judgment herein:- “25. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Acts, a quick observation about the 'appellate jurisdiction' and 'revisional jurisdiction' is necessary. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not viceversa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is coextensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a fullfledged appeal. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a fullfledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the revisional court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction. 26. With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms "legality or propriety", "regularity, correctness, legality or propriety" and "legality, regularity or propriety" which are used in three Rent Control Acts under consideration. 27. The ordinary meaning of the word 'legality' is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal. 28. The term 'propriety' means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 29. The terms 'correctness' and 'propriety' ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, 'correctness' is compounded of 'legality' and 'propriety' and that which is legal and proper is 'correct'. 30. The expression "regularity" with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play. 31. …........ 32. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, 1980 4 SCC 259 that where both expressions "appeal" and "revision" are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression "revision" is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression "appeal". The use of two expressions "appeal" and "revision" when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think, is not without purpose and significance. The use of two expressions "appeal" and "revision" when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think, is not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an 'appeal' and so also of a 'revision'. If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial Court or the subordinate Tribunal which is never the case. The classic statement in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, 1975 2 SCC 246 that revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal, commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second Court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent. 33 to 44. ….......... 45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.” 27. Admittedly, mutation was attested in presence of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2. He had never raised any finger and had not questioned the findings made by the revenue agencies that he was not in possession of the land in question, thus, the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) has fallen in an error in upsetting the orders made by the Divisional Commissioner, Assistant Settlement Officer and the Tehsildar (Settlement). 28. The Apex Court in the case titled as Narasamma & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 2653, held that the entries in the revenue record reflects as to who was in possession on the date of entry. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of para 12 of the judgment herein:- “12. ….. It is true that the entries in the revenue record cannot create any title in respect of the land in dispute but it certainly reflects as to who was in possession of the land in dispute on the date the name of that person had been entered in the revenue record...........” (Emphasis added) 29. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 had neither explained the delay in the application filed in the year 1987 for correction of the entries in the revenue record nor in the appeal, revision, second revision and the writ petition, thus, was caught by delay. 30. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 had neither explained the delay in the application filed in the year 1987 for correction of the entries in the revenue record nor in the appeal, revision, second revision and the writ petition, thus, was caught by delay. 30. The Apex Court in the case titled as State of West Bengal and others versus Karan Singh Binayak and others, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1543 , held that rectification of record-of-rights sought after a considerable long delay is not proper. It is apt to reproduce paras 17 and 18 of the judgment herein:- “17. The period of 25 years under the lease expired in the year 1976. The notification under the Act was issued on 11th November, 1954. In 1957 record of rights was prepared under Section 44 of the Act according to which the land was held retainable under Section 6(1)(b) of the Act. The possession was handed over to the original owners in 1981 on liquidation of the lessee on an order being passed by the High Court directing official liquidator to disclaim the property which was later transferred to the writ petitioners in terms of the agreements of sale entered in the year 1988 and sale deeds in 1992-93. Meanwhile, in the year 1991 on proceedings being taken under the ULC Act, 6145.90 square meter of the land was held to be excess under the said Act. In June 1993, the plans were sanctioned and construction commenced. It can, thus, be seen that after the preparation of record-of-rights, not only the appellants did not take any steps and slept over the matter but various steps as above were taken by the respondents in respect of the land in question. The argument that the proceedings under the ULC Act or the preparation of record-of-rights were ultra vires and the acts without jurisdiction and, therefore, those proceedings would not operate as a bar in appellants invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, C.P.C. by virtue of conferment of such power under Section 57A of the Act is wholly misconceived and misplaced. The inherent powers cannot be used to reopen the settled matters. These powers cannot be resorted to when there are specific provisions in the Act to deal with the situation. The inherent powers cannot be used to reopen the settled matters. These powers cannot be resorted to when there are specific provisions in the Act to deal with the situation. It would be an abuse to allow the reopening of the settled matter after nearly four decades in the purported exercise of inherent powers. It has not even been suggested that there was any collusion or fraud on behalf of the writ petitioners or the erstwhile owners. There is no explanation much less satisfactory explanation for total-inaction on the part of the appellants for all these years. 18. Apart from the facts stated above, even when the appellants woke from its slumber, the manner in which they acted has already been noticed and it is apparent therefrom that stage they did not proceed to take action for the correction of the record-of-rights. They did not at that stage invoke Section 57A of the Act. What they did was to issue an order suspending the sanction of the building plan and directed the Chairman of the Municipality to ask the respondents to suspend the construction according to the plain sanctioned by the municipality. In proceedings of the writ petition wherein the said order was challenged, it does not appear that appellants took the stand of the land vesting in it and the further stand that the record-of-right was prepared without jurisdiction or that the proceedings under the ULC Act were void and without jurisdiction. The stand taken by them was that proceedings under the ULC Act were not genuine. The competent authority was called in those proceedings and stood by the documents signed by him. The statements issued under the ULC Act were held to be genuine. The order directing suspension of the plans and stoppage of construction were quashed by a learned single Judge of the High Court. The order of the learned single Judge was upheld in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court. After the decision of the Division Bench, the appellants started proceedings in question under Section 57A purporting to Act on the basis that 1957 record-of-rights was based on defective, wrongful and irregular record and it was not a bar for revision of records on the basis of new and genuine facts. After the decision of the Division Bench, the appellants started proceedings in question under Section 57A purporting to Act on the basis that 1957 record-of-rights was based on defective, wrongful and irregular record and it was not a bar for revision of records on the basis of new and genuine facts. The notice issued even within less than three weeks of the decision of the Division Bench itself shows that the appellants were aware of the proceedings of the writ petition but did not think it proper to move the High Court and seek a clarification that they could reopen the matter explaining to the High Court the circumstances under which in response to the writ petition they had not taken the stand before the High Court on the basis whereof they were seeking to exercise power under Section 57A after lapse of nearly 38 years. It is evident that they knew about the factum of liquidation of the lessee. Despite that, notice of proceedings under Section 57A was directed to be issued to the mill and not to writ petitioners on whose petition the order of the District Magistrate was set aside by the High Court. Two months later i.e. on 15th May, 1995, the order was passed noticing that nobody had appeared to oppose those proceedings. The appellants purported to take paper possession on 5th September, 1996. There is nothing on the record to suggest that any attempt was made to serve the notice dated 15th March, 1995 or the order dated 15th May, 1995 on the respondents who, it seems, came to know of these proceedings only towards the end of 1996 when proceedings were initiated for breach of Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is difficult to comprehend, the applicability of Section 144, Cr.P.C. to the fact situation. To say the least the appellants have been wholly negligent and having slept over the matter for nearly 40 years, they could not reopen the matter in the manner sought to be done.” (Emphasis added) 31. In another case titled as I. Chuba Jamir & Ors. versus State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, the Apex Court has held that the inordinate delay is a very valid and important consideration. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein:- “17. In another case titled as I. Chuba Jamir & Ors. versus State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, the Apex Court has held that the inordinate delay is a very valid and important consideration. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein:- “17. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. This aspect of the matter was also brought to the notice of the Single Judge but he proceeded with the matter without saying anything on that issue, one way or the other. It was, therefore, perfectly open to the Division Bench to take into consideration the conduct of the appellants-writ petitioners and the consequences, apart from the legality and validity, of the reliefs granted to them by the learned single Judge.” 32. The same principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as Banda Development Authority, Banda versus Moti Lal Agarwal and Ors., reported in 2011 AIR SCW 2835. It is apt to reproduce paras 15 and 25 of the judgment herein:- “15. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of the BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9 years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief to respondent No.1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized for implementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. xxx xxx xxx 25. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. xxx xxx xxx 25. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to respondent No.1.” 33. The Apex Court in the case titled as Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others versus T.T. Murali Babu, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 1142, held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is worthwhile to reproduce para 16 of the judgment herein:- “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 34. The same principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as State of Jammu and Kashmir versus R.K. Zalpuri and others, reported in AIR 2016 SC 3006 , paras 26 and 27 whereof read as under:- “26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias" 'thanks to God'.” 35. The Divisional Commissioner has rightly discussed all the aspects of the case. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 was supposed to be vigilant and had to seek the relief within time, if aggrieved, which he had not done and now the entries made in the revenue record cannot be allowed to be changed on mere asking, that too, in the record-of-rights. 36. The Financial Commissioner (Appeals) has not held that the inquiry/spot inspection conducted by the field staff relating to the possession was not factually and legally correct. It has also not given any reasons how the first revisional authority, appellate authority and the revenue authority failed to appreciate the facts of the case. 37. The learned Single Judge has discussed all the aspects and we are of the view that the Writ Court has rightly made the impugned judgment. If, at all, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 was aggrieved by any entries made in the record-of-rights, the remedy perhaps was to file a suit for declaration in terms of the mandate of Specific Relief Act, which he has not chosen to file. 38. Our this view is fortified by the judgment in the case titled as Jagtar Singh and others versus Swaran Singh, reported in 1979 Simla Law Journal (P&H) 89. It is apt to reproduce para 5 of the judgment herein:- “5. It is settled law that when that Khasra girdawari entries have been incorporated in the latest and subsequent jamabandi, the revenue officers cannot change them in summary proceedings under the provisions of Punjab Land Revenue Act and in such case only course open to an aggrieved party is to seek relief from competent civil court by filing a regular civil suit. This view finds support from the ruling of the Financial Commissioner given in 1970 PLJ 30, Reg., Prehlad Bhagat and another Vs. Karta Ram and another in which it was held that where entries in khasra girdawari have been incorporated in Jamabandi the Revenue Officers have no right to order corrections of a such entries and these can only be corrected by filing a regular suit. Shri B.S. Sodhi, learned counsel for respondent has not given any satisfactory rebuttal of the above proposition of Law. In view of this the orders passed by the Assistant Collector and the Collector cannot be sustained in eye of law and have to be set aside.” 39. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case titled as The Chief Secretary to Government Punjab and others versus Chawli and others, reported in 1980 PLJ 10, held that if any person considers himself aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession by an entry in record-of-rights or in an annual record, he may institute a suit for declaration of his right under the Specific Relief Act. 40. In another case titled as Dharam Singh and others versus The State of Haryana and others, reported in 1983 Punjab Law Journal 210, it has been held by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana that an aggrieved party can file a suit under the Specific Relief Act to rectify the entry in the revenue record. Further held that only the legal errors regarding jurisdiction or material irregularity could be rectified by the Financial Commissioner. It is worthwhile to reproduce para 5 of the judgment herein: “5. From the combined reading of these provisions it is plain that the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court is subject to other provisions of the Act and under section 45 of the Act, an aggrieved party can file a suit under the Specific Relief Act to rectify the entry in the revenue record. Even the Assistant Collector and the Collector who are the officers for the determination of the fact, had found as a fact that respondent No. 3 did not remain in possession after the death of Maya Ram, his father and the application for correction was dismissed. Only the legal errors regarding the jurisdiction or material irregularity could be rectified by the Financial Commissioner. Only the legal errors regarding the jurisdiction or material irregularity could be rectified by the Financial Commissioner. Be that as it may, since the matter is concluded by the Civil Court, the Financial Commissioner who was performing the duties of a Revenue Officer under the Act, could not sit over the findings of the Civil Court between the parties. The decision of the Civil Court is binding, in my view on the Revenue Officers.” 41. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2, under the garb of the proceedings right from the year 1987, dragged the respondents No. 1 to 4 herein in the lis without any fault on their part. 42. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-writ respondent No. 2 wanted to have rectification in order to record his possession over the portion of land, which was not in his possession and virtually, wanted the change of misal haqiat, record-of-rights and jama-bandies, which cannot be done merely by making application and the remedy was before the Civil Court, as discussed hereinabove. 43. More so, if such a belated application is allowed, that will have an effect of taking away the settings of law, which have attained finality. 44. All the questions are answered accordingly. 45. Viewed thus, the learned Single Judge has rightly made the impugned judgment, needs no interference. 46. Having said so, the appeal merits to be dismissed and is dismissed alongwith all pending applications with costs quantified at Rs. 20,000/- to be deposited with the H.P. High Court Bar Association Welfare Funds within two weeks.