JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is the judgment and award, dated 3rd May, 2011, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-I, Sirmour, District Sirmour at Nahan, H.P. (for short ‘the Tribunal’) in MAC Petition No. 20-MAC/2 of 2008, titled as Smt. Raksha Devi versus Shri Pardeep Kumar & others, whereby the claim petition came to be dismissed (for short ‘the impugned award’). 2. The claimant, being victim of the motor-vehicular accident, had filed the claim petition before the Tribunal for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/-, as per the break-ups given in the claim petition. 3. The respondents resisted and contested the claim petition by filing replies. 4. Following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal: “1. Whether Parmod Kumar died due to rash or negligent driving of Pickup van No. HP-18-B-0220 by respondent No. 2 Mukesh Kumar alias Happy on 28-6-2007, as alleged? ….OPP 2. In case issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioner is entitled to receive compensation, if so to what amount and from whom? ….OPP 3. Whether the risk of the deceased was not covered in the Insurance Policy, as alleged? ….OPR-3 4. Whether the vehicle in question was being plied in violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy, as alleged? ….OPR-3 5. Relief.” 5. The claimant examined Santosh Kumari (PW-1) and Dr. Anil Aggarwal (PW-2). She herself stepped into the witness box as PW-3. Respondents examined Vikas Gupta (RW-1) and driver stepped into the witness box as RW-2. 6. The Tribunal after scanning the evidence, oral as well as documentary, held that the claimant has failed to prove that driver, namely, Mukesh Kumar had driven the offending vehicle, rashly and negligently, at the relevant point of time. The said findings are not tenable for the following reasons. 7. The claimant has specifically pleaded in the claim petition that the accident was outcome of the rash and negligent driving of the driver. FIR (Ext. PW-1/A) under Sections, 279 & 337 of the Indian Penal Code was lodged in Police Station Nahan, which stands proved. Thus, there is prima-facie proof on the record to hold that the accident was outcome of the rash and negligent driving of the driver. 8. FIR (Ext. PW-1/A) under Sections, 279 & 337 of the Indian Penal Code was lodged in Police Station Nahan, which stands proved. Thus, there is prima-facie proof on the record to hold that the accident was outcome of the rash and negligent driving of the driver. 8. It is a beaten law of the land that strict proof is not required, but the claimant has to prove prima-facie that the accident is outcome of rash and negligent driving of the driver. 9. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. versus M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in AIR 1980 SC 1354 . It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 3 of the judgment herein: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specifically when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their “neighbour”. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." (Emphasis Added) 10. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case titled as Oriental Insurance Co. versus Mst. Zarifa and others, reported in AIR 1995 Jammu and Kashmir 81, held that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short ‘the MV Act’ is Social Welfare Legislation and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act. It is profitable to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein: “20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants.” 11. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as Sohan Lal Passi versus P. Sesh Reddy and others, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2627 , herein: “12. ..................While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunals and Courts have to be conscious of the fact that right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. Unless it is established on the materials on record that it was the insured who had wilfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment-debtor in respect of the liability in view of sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act. It need not be pointed out that the whole concept of getting the vehicle insured by an insurance company is to provide an easy mode of getting compensation by the claimants, otherwise in normal course they had to pursue their claim against the owner from one forum to the other and ultimately to execute the order of the Accident Claims Tribunal for realisation of such amount by sale of properties of the owner of the vehicle. The procedure and result of the execution of the decree is well known.” 12. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 13. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 14. A Single Judge of this Court in FAO No. 127 of 1999, titled as Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, decided on 22.08.2005, held that the claimants have to prove the case by leading cogent evidence and applied the mandate of CPC read with the Evidence Act, was questioned before the Apex Court by the medium of Civil Appeal No. 2538 of 2009, titled as Bimla Devi & Ors. versus Himachal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 4298, and the Apex Court set aside the said judgment and held that strict proof is not required. It is apt to reproduce paras 2 and 12 to 15 of the judgment herein: "2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in FAO No. 127 of 1999 whereby and whereunder an appeal preferred against a judgment and award dated 28.10.1998 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II [MACT (I), Nahan] in MAC Petition No. 21-NL/2 of 1997, was set aside. xxx xxx xxx 12. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimants predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 13. The deceased was a Constable. Death took place near a police station. The post mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of a constable has taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 14. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the First Information Report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." 15. Having said so, I am of the considered view that the claimant has prima facie proved that the driver of the offending vehicle had driven the same, rashly and negligently, at the relevant point of time and had caused the accident. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on Issue No. 1 are set aside and the said issue is decided in favour of the claimant and against the respondents. Issues No. 2 to 4. 16 The Tribunal has not returned findings on Issues No. 2 to 4. Thus, I deem it proper to remand this case, with the direction to the Tribunal to return findings on Issues No. 2 to 4, within four weeks w.e.f. 01.12.2016. 17. Parties are directed to cause appearance before the Tribunal on 01.12.2016. 18. The impugned award is set aside and the appeal is allowed, as indicated above. 19. Registry to send the record of the case alongwith a copy of this judgment forthwith so as to reach the Tribunal below well before the date fixed.