JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Chauhan, learned Advocate, for Mr. Munshaw, learned Advocate for the petitioner-Panchayat, and Mr. Shah, learned Advocate for the respondent-Workman. The captioned two petitions arise from the same award. The Panchayat and the workman both have challenged same award in their respective petitions. The writ petition, being Special Civil Application No. 25413 of 2006, is filed by the Panchayat whereas other writ petition, being Special Civil Application No. 10078 of 2007, is filed by the Workman. 1.1 In their respective petitions, the Panchayat and the Workman have challenged the award dated 9-5-2006 passed by the learned Labour Court, Surendranagar, in Reference (L.C.S.) No. 114 of 2005 whereby the learned Labour Court set aside the Panchayat's action terminating service of the workman and directed the Panchayat to reinstate the workman on his original post without back wages. 1.2 For sake of convenience, the Panchayat is referred to as the "petitioner" and the workman is referred to as the "respondent" in this decision. 2. The respondent raised an industrial dispute on the allegation that the petitioner terminated his service w.e.f. 19-12-1985 by an oral order and without following prescribed procedure of law. The respondent alleged that he was continuously working with the petitioner since 1979 and his service came to be terminated w.e.f. 19-12-1985 without payment of compensation and without granting any opportunity of hearing. At the time of termination of his service, the petitioner retained in service persons junior to respondent. The petitioner opposed the reference and in their written statement, the petitioner claimed that the respondent had worked with the petitioner only until 1982 and that during the tenure for which he was engaged in 1980, 1981 and 1982, the respondent had never worked for 240 days in any one phase of 12 months. It was also claimed that during preceding 12 months before his termination also, the respondent had not worked for 240 days. According to the petitioner, the respondent was never engaged after 1982 and the allegation that his service was terminated w.e.f. 19-12-1985 by oral order is incorrect. 2.1 After considering the submissions by the Panchayat and the workman and upon taking into consideration the evidence on record, learned Labour Court passed the award dated 5-1-1999. The said award was challenged by the Panchayat by filing writ petition, being Special Civil Application No. 9079 of 1999. 2.1 After considering the submissions by the Panchayat and the workman and upon taking into consideration the evidence on record, learned Labour Court passed the award dated 5-1-1999. The said award was challenged by the Panchayat by filing writ petition, being Special Civil Application No. 9079 of 1999. By order dated 28-6-2005, the Court partly allowed the petition and set aside the award and remanded the matter for fresh hearing and decision. In the said order dated 28-6-2005, the Court observed, inter alia, that: "3. Mr. Munshaw has contended that though specific contention regarding provisions of Sec. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was raised before the Labour Court, the same was not taken into consideration by the Labour Court. 5. I have heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and have perused the materials placed on record. Having perused the record, it transpires that the respondent workman had not worked since the year 1982 and thereby had not completed 240 days in a year. However, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner Panchayat with regard to consideration of Sec. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be adjudicated by the Labour Court. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded to the Labour Court for deciding afresh. 6. In the premises aforesaid, the petition is allowed. The order dated 5th January, 1999 passed by the Labour Court, Surendranagar in Reference (L.C.S.) No. 244 of 1990, is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Labour Court for decision afresh. Since the Reference is of the year 1990, the Labour Court is directed to dispose of the said Reference within a period of six months from the date of receipt of writ of this order. The Labour Court while deciding the Reference shall not be influenced by the fact that this Court has quashed its earlier order. Since it is stated by Mrs. The Labour Court while deciding the Reference shall not be influenced by the fact that this Court has quashed its earlier order. Since it is stated by Mrs. Shah, that the direction issued by this Court vide order dated 6th July, 2001 in Civil Application No. 6848 of 2001 have not been complied with so far, the petitioner-Panchayat is directed to comply with the directions issued in the said order on or before 31st August, 2005. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs." 2.2 Before proceeding further, it is relevant to mention that after the order dated 28-6-2005 in Special Civil Application No. 9079 of 1999, when the matter was remanded, the original reference i.e. Reference (L.C.S.) No. 244 of 1999 came to be registered as Reference (L.C.S.) No. 114 of 2005. When the Reference was heard afresh, the respondent filed affidavit in lieu of chief examination wherein the respondent claimed that he was employed by the petitioner as daily wager w.e.f. 1979 and that his service came to be terminated by oral order dated 19-12-1985. According to the observation in the impugned award, the respondent was subjected to cross-examination, however, any contrary evidence could not be brought on record by the petitioner from respondent's cross-examination. During the proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the petitioner examined two witnesses namely Mr. Jadav and Mr. Godbole, whose evidence were recorded below Exh. 12 and Exh. 13. After considering the evidence on record and rival submissions, the learned Labour Court passed the award dated 9-5-2006 with above mentioned directions. 3. Learned Advocate for the petitioner-Panchayat submitted that the award is erroneous and contrary to evidence on record. He submitted that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the petitioner's appointment was covered under Sec. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "Act") and that therefore, the termination of the respondent would not amount to retrenchment and consequently, the conclusion by the learned Labour Court that the petitioner committed breach of Sec. 25F and Sec. 25G is incorrect. Learned Advocate for the petitioner further submitted that during the period when the respondent was engaged by the petitioner, he never worked for 240 days in any year, and that therefore also, the conclusion by the learned Labour Court that the petitioner committed breach of Sec. 25F is incorrect and contrary to evidence. Learned Advocate for the petitioner further submitted that during the period when the respondent was engaged by the petitioner, he never worked for 240 days in any year, and that therefore also, the conclusion by the learned Labour Court that the petitioner committed breach of Sec. 25F is incorrect and contrary to evidence. He further submitted that the respondent was engaged for fixed tenure and on daily wage basis, and that therefore, the claim for reinstatement is not justified. Learned Advocate for the petitioner also submitted that the respondent failed to place any evidence on record to establish that he had worked with the petitioner until December, 1985 and learned Labour Court committed error in accepting the respondent's allegation that he worked with the petitioner until December, 1985. 4. Per contra, Mr. Shah, learned Advocate for the respondent workman, submitted that the respondent-Workman had filed affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief and in the said affidavit, he categorically stated that his service was terminated w.e.f. 19-12-1985 and any contrary evidence was not placed on record by the petitioner. He also referred to the application which was submitted by the respondent workman whereby the petitioner-Panchayat was called upon to place on record the respondent's attendance register and pay register, however, the petitioner-Panchayat failed to place on record the said registers for the period from 1982 to 1985, and that therefore, the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in drawing inference that the respondent worked until 1985 and that in the period preceding 12 months, he had worked for 240 days. According to learned Advocate for the respondent, the award does not suffer from any error and petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have considered the rival submissions and material on record. 6. The fact that the respondent was engaged by the petitioner is not in dispute. Actually, the submissions and contentions by the petitioner establish the fact that the respondent was engaged by the petitioner. The petitioner has claimed that the respondent was engaged during 1980, 1981 and 1982 and during the said period, the respondent worked for 101 days, 92 days and 69 days respectively. Under the circumstances, the fact that respondent was employed by the petitioner is undisputed. 6.1 In this background, the question which arises is in light of the respondent's claim that his service was terminated by oral order in 1985. Under the circumstances, the fact that respondent was employed by the petitioner is undisputed. 6.1 In this background, the question which arises is in light of the respondent's claim that his service was terminated by oral order in 1985. On this count, the assertion to the effect that he was in employment during 1983, 1984 and until 19-12-1985 is made by the respondent. Though the respondent had made said assertion, he did not place any material on record or did not examine any witness (e.g. any co-workman) to establish that he had actually worked in 1983 and/or 1984 and/or until 19-12-1985. 6.2 On the other hand, the petitioner-Panchayat did not place any appointment letter on record. Any document evidencing that the respondent was engaged only for fixed period and at the time of employing him it was made clear that his appointment is for fixed tenure and that his service will come to an end upon expiry of the period mentioned in the appointment letter. The appointment letter, if any, was not placed on record. Consequently, the petitioner failed to establish that the respondent was engaged only for fixed tenure and his appointment was covered within purview of clause (bb) of Sec. 2(oo) of the Act. In absence of any document containing such specific contention and in absence of any evidence that such specific condition was informed to the respondent at the time when he was employed and in absence of any material to establish that the concerned workman was aware about such condition and in absence of any evidence establishing that the nature of work for which the person was engaged was of casual/temporary nature, any inference about such condition cannot be drawn and it cannot be concluded in absence of any cogent evidence that the appointment was only for fixed tenure and for specified work. Under the circumstances, the petitioner's contention raised on the ground of Sec. 2(oo)(bb)of the Act cannot be entertained and accepted. The said contention deserves to be rejected and is, accordingly, rejected. 7. Now, comes the question about the total period of employment of the respondent with the petitioner. His employment for the period from 1980, 1981 and 1982 is not in dispute. There is no material on record to establish that the petitioner was engaged in 1979. The said contention deserves to be rejected and is, accordingly, rejected. 7. Now, comes the question about the total period of employment of the respondent with the petitioner. His employment for the period from 1980, 1981 and 1982 is not in dispute. There is no material on record to establish that the petitioner was engaged in 1979. There is also no material on record, except mere assertion that his service was terminated by oral order w.e.f. 19-12-1985. In his deposition, the respondent did not mention name of the concerned officer who allegedly orally informed him on 19-12-1985 that his service is terminated. He also did not examine any co-workman to establish that until 19-12-1985, he was engaged and was working with the petitioner-Panchayat. Under the circumstances, there is no material on record to accept the respondent's claim that he continued in employment until December, 1985. Even the respondent has also not placed any evidence on record to establish that he worked during the period from 1983, 1984 and 1985. Under the circumstances, there was no evidence before the learned Labour Court to hold that the respondent had worked for 240 days in period of 12 months preceding 19-12-1985. This would translate in a situation according to which the service of the respondent came to an end in 1982 and he raised dispute in 1985. 8. Besides this, in the order dated 28-6-2005 in Special Civil Application No. 9079 of 1999, the Court has recorded that "having perused the record, it transpires that the respondent had not worked since the year 1982 and thereby not completed 240 days in a year". The Court also recorded the petitioner's contention raised on the ground of Sec. 2(oo)(bb) in the said order dated 28-6-2005. Despite the said observations in the order dated 28-6-2005, on one hand, the petitioner has not placed any document on record of the petition to establish that the respondent's employment was covered under sub-clause (bb) of Sec.2(oo) of the Act. 9. In this context, profitable reference can be made to the decision in case of S.M. Nijalkar v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, 2003 (4) SCC 27 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: "13. 9. In this context, profitable reference can be made to the decision in case of S.M. Nijalkar v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, 2003 (4) SCC 27 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: "13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration; (ii) the employment was on a contract and not as a daily-wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and (iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract. (iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the above said terms by the employer at the commencement of employment." The said factors must exist and the employer who wants to claim that the employment is covered under Sec. 2(oo)(b) of the Act, must establish said facts with aid of cogent evidence (documents), more particularly the contract/appointment order which would reflect clear and specific term/condition mentioned at Sr. No. (ii) by Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision. In present case, the petitioner failed to establish above discussed aspects. 10. Realizing this situation, learned Advocate for the respondent relied on the details mentioned in Paragraph No. 7 of the impugned award. In Paragraph No. 7 of the award names of the persons who were junior to the respondent and who were retained in service though the respondent's service was terminated are mentioned. In the said Paragraph, names of about 16 persons are mentioned and according to the respondent, the said persons were retained in service after his service was terminated. 11. Mr. Shah, learned Counsel, would submit that even if it is assumed that respondent's service was terminated in 1982 and not in 1985 as claimed by the respondent, then also, from the details placed on record by the petitioner-Panchayat, Ms. Nituben Tribhovanbhai, Mr. Hareshbhai Hansrajbhai and Mr. 11. Mr. Shah, learned Counsel, would submit that even if it is assumed that respondent's service was terminated in 1982 and not in 1985 as claimed by the respondent, then also, from the details placed on record by the petitioner-Panchayat, Ms. Nituben Tribhovanbhai, Mr. Hareshbhai Hansrajbhai and Mr. Ishwarbhai Trikamdas who were employed in April, 1981, April, 1982 and October, 1981 respectively (i.e. after the respondent was employed in 1979 or 1980 as claimed by the petitioner) the said persons were retained in service and accordingly Sec. 25G was violated at the time of terminating his service. 12. The petitioner-Panchayat has not denied the respondent's claim that the said three persons continued in employment after 1982. The said tacit admission or absence of denial by the petitioner that the service of the said three persons continued even after 1982 establishes breach of Sec. 25G inasmuch as the said persons were appointed after the respondent was appointed and are undisputedly junior to the respondent. The aforesaid discussion establishes the respondent's claim that the petitioner violated Sec.25G at the time when his service was terminated. 13. In this view of the matter, even if the petitioner's contention that the breach of Sec.25F is not established, is, for testing the other contention is entertained, then also, the learned Labour Court's conclusion that the petitioner committed breach of Sec. 25G cannot be faulted. Section 25G operates independently and is not dependent on Sec. 25F and for applicability and operation of Sec. 25G, it is not necessary to establish breach of Sec. 25F. The petitioners' contention against the learned Labour Court's conclusion about breach of Sec. 25G is based on erroneous reading and construction of Sec. 25G. When the learned Counsel for the petitioners claims that despite the fact that the workman had not worked for 240 days, breach of Sec. 25F was not established and consequently, the action would not amount to breach of Sec. 25G, the petitioner ignores the effect, scope, purport and requirements of Sec. 25G of the Act, the learned Labour Court committed error in holding that the action of relieving the respondent is in breach of Sec. 25G. According to the petitioner said conclusion is recorded disregarding the fact that the workman had not worked for 240 days and consequently, the petitioner had not violated Sec. 25F of the Act. According to the petitioner said conclusion is recorded disregarding the fact that the workman had not worked for 240 days and consequently, the petitioner had not violated Sec. 25F of the Act. At first blush and on initial reading of Sec. 25G it strikes that the said provision is part of the same family namely, Chapter VA which comprises Sec. 25A to Sec. 25J and that the said Sec. 25G is intertwined with and closely attached to Sec. 25F and Sec. 25H. However, on closure examination of the scheme of Chapter VA and definition of the term "retrenchment" under Sec. 2(oo) of the Act, it emerges that said Sec. 25G operates independently and its operation or applicability is not dependent on compliance or breach of Sec. 25F. It also emerges that for attracting the applicability and operation of Sec. 25G, it is not necessary to establish breach of Sec. 25F. It is true that Sec. 25F, Sec. 25G and Sec.25H collectively provide against arbitrary retrenchment of workman and also provide a safety valve against employer's "pick-and-choose" action and against employer's action of "hire and fire at will". It also provides protection to the workman against employer's action of selectively and arbitrarily driving out a workman with a view to making room for and accommodating another person in his place. In many cases, it may so happen that the workman or the post/position may not have become redundant and need for the particular work or operation and the need for the person to perform the said work may continue, but the employer may, for ulterior reasons, want to replace the person manning the post by appointing some other person. The reason for such substitution or replacement may not be necessarily associated with any fault or mistake in performance of duties by the concerned person, but still the employer may want to relieve such person for undisclosed reasons. Section 25G and Sec. 25H provide protection against such whims and fancy of the employer. Actually, ingrained in Sec. 25G, and so also in Sec. 25H, are the principles of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, namely equality and fairness. Section 25G despises motivated retrenchment and aims at nipping in the bud the tendency of harassing or victimizing one employee by bestowing favour to other person. Actually, ingrained in Sec. 25G, and so also in Sec. 25H, are the principles of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, namely equality and fairness. Section 25G despises motivated retrenchment and aims at nipping in the bud the tendency of harassing or victimizing one employee by bestowing favour to other person. When Sec. 25G is examined in light of this objective and in light of entire scheme of the Act and particularly Chapter VA, then, it comes out, clearly, that it operates independently and it is not dependent on breach and/or compliance of Sec. 25F of the Act. Section 25G of the Act does not require compliance of the condition necessary for attracting Sec. 25F viz. work/service of minimum 240 days in 12 months preceding the date of retrenchment. The only requirement for attracting Sec. 25G is to establish that at the time when the service of the claimant workman came to be terminated, some persons junior to him was/were retained in service and the principle of "last come, first go" was not followed. If the said fact is established, then, breach of Sec. 25G would stand established and that would render the action of termination of the workman contrary to and in violation of statutory provision. The expression "retrenched" used in Sec. 25G does not refer to the workman retrenched under and as per Sec. 25F of the Act. The expression "retrenched" employed in Sec. 25G is related to the term "retrenchment" defined under Sec. 2(oo) of the Act and the retrenchment contemplated under Sec. 25F cannot and does not circumvent or curtail or restrict either the meaning or the ambit of Sec. 25G or of the expression "retrenched" in Sec. 25G of the Act. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 9 of the decision in the case of Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 , the Sec. 25G borrows and applies the concept of "last come, first go" but the term "retrenchment" is not and cannot be restricted only to the cases covered by Sec. 25F. In the said decision, Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that: "9. The plain language of Sec. 25H speaks only of re-employment of 'retrenched workmen'. The ordinary meaning of the expression "retrenched workmen must relate to the wide meaning of 'retrenchment' given in Sec. 2(oo). In the said decision, Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that: "9. The plain language of Sec. 25H speaks only of re-employment of 'retrenched workmen'. The ordinary meaning of the expression "retrenched workmen must relate to the wide meaning of 'retrenchment' given in Sec. 2(oo). Section 25F also uses the word 'retrenchment' but qualifies it by use of the further words 'workman' who has been in continuous service for not less than one year". Thus, Sec. 25F does not restrict the meaning of retrenchment but qualifies the category of retrenched workmen covered therein by use of the further words workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year. It is clear that Sec. 25F applies to the retrenched workman who has been in continuous service for not less one year and not to any workman who has bean in continuous service for less than one year; and it does not restrict or curtail the meaning of retrenchment merely because the provision therein is made only for the retrenchment of a workman who has been in continuous service for not less the one year. Chapter V-A deals with all retrenchments while Sec. 25F is confined only to the mode of retrenchment of workmen in continuous service for not less than one year. Section 25G prescribes the principle for retrenchment and applies ordinarily the principle of 'last come first go' which is not confined only to workmen who have been in continuous service for not less than one year, covered by Sec. 25F." Under the circumstances, in present case, when breach of Sec. 25G is established, it translates into fact-situation, and leads the Court to the conclusion that the petitioner's action viz. terminating the respondent's service while retaining juniors to him, is illegal and in violation of statutory provision. The termination of respondent's service in violation of statutory condition/provision would invite and justify the direction to reinstate the respondent. Therefore, the direction by the learned Labour Court requiring the petitioner to reinstate the respondent cannot be faulted and the petitioner's contention against said direction is not sustainable and does not deserve to be entertained. The said contention fails, and that therefore, it is, accordingly, rejected. By the impugned award, the learned Labour Court has not granted benefit of back wages and the order is restricted to the direction to reinstate the respondent without back wages. The said contention fails, and that therefore, it is, accordingly, rejected. By the impugned award, the learned Labour Court has not granted benefit of back wages and the order is restricted to the direction to reinstate the respondent without back wages. The learned Labour Court has not committed any error on that count. Therefore, the petition filed by the Panchayat, i.e. Special Civil Application No. 25413 of 2006, fails and it is hereby rejected. So far as Special Civil Application No. 10078 of 2007 is concerned, Mr. Shah, learned Counsel for the workman, submitted that he does not press the petition i.e. the workman does not press claim for back wages and/or the claim for continuity of service and so far as the respondent's claim for continuity of service is concerned, the respondent will pursue appropriate remedy as may be considered appropriate in accordance with law. In view of said submission by Mr. Shah, learned Counsel for the workman, the petition, being Special Civil Application No. 10078 of 2007, filed by the workman is rejected as withdrawn. Rule is discharged. Ad-interim relief, granted earlier, stands vacated.