JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. This appeal has been filed by the appellants-defendants against the judgment and decree dated 5.8.2006, passed by the learned District Judge, Solan, District Solan, H.P., reversing the judgment and decree dated 05.12.2005, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Kasauli, District Solan, H.P, whereby the suit filed by the appellants-plaintiffs has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record, are that the respondents-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the 'plaintiffs’) filed a suit for possession by way of redemption of the mortgage to the effect that the land measuring 1-7-18 bighas and land measuring 1-1-11 Bigha comprised in Khata/Kthatauni No.28/55 and 13/16, total measuring 2-9-9 bighas, situated in Mauza Bandh and Bani, Pargana Ghar, Sub Tehsil Krishangarh was earlier owned by one Ram Baksh and thereafter on his death by his legal heirs Shiv Ram, Kanchnoo, Thankiya etc. out of whom Gopala successor-in-interest of Thankiya, one of the sons of Ram Baksh, had mortgaged his 1/5th share in this land in favour of one Shangaru for a sum of Rs.240/- in the year 1930. It is averred by the plaintiffs that on the death of Shangaru, he was succeeded by Chet Ram and on the death of Chet Ram by his wife Banto, who was recorded as mortgagee in possession of the entire suit land. It is further averred by the plaintiffs that in the year 1974 Banto sold her mortgagee rights in favour of appellants-defendants (hereinafter referred to as the 'defendants’) 1 and 2 and mutation to this effect was accordingly attested by revenue authorities. The plaintiffs alongwith other share holders claiming to have succeeded to the entire land filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage in the trial court. 3. Defendants by way of filing written statement denied the locus standi of the plaintiffs to file the suit and their right and title to the property. It is averred by the defendants that they have purchased the land through registered sale deed. However, it is admitted that Shingaru was mortgagee of the suit land and after his death his estate was succeeded by Chet Ram and on his death Banto stepped into his shoes. It is denied that Banto had remarried after his death in 1953 and she had no right or interest in this suit land. However, it is admitted that Shingaru was mortgagee of the suit land and after his death his estate was succeeded by Chet Ram and on his death Banto stepped into his shoes. It is denied that Banto had remarried after his death in 1953 and she had no right or interest in this suit land. It is also denied that Gopala had mortgaged 1/5th share out of the suit land. It is also alleged by the defendants that the mortgager had lost right, title or interest in the land in the year 1970, therefore, no question of redemption arose. In the aforesaid background, the defendants claimed themselves to be the owners of the suit land and sought dismissal of the suit. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of redemption and possession, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the sale deed No.136 dated 24.8.1974 is wrong, illegal and without jurisdiction and consequently mutation No.224 and 125 are null and void, as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction ? OPP. 4. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, as alleged ? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit, as alleged ? OPD. 6. Whether the suit lacks material better particulars, as alleged? If so its effect? OPD. 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form, as alleged? OPD. 8. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? OPD. 9. Whether the defendants have spent more than Rs.75,000/- on the development of land, as alleged? If so, its effect? OPP. 10. Relief.” 5. Subsequently vide judgment and decree dated 5.12.2005 learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Solan, which came to be registered as Civil Appeal No.8-S/13 of 2006. Learned District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiffs for possession by redemption of the mortgage is decreed and the defendants are ordered to deliver the possession of the suit land, description whereof has been given above. Learned District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiffs for possession by redemption of the mortgage is decreed and the defendants are ordered to deliver the possession of the suit land, description whereof has been given above. Hence present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellants-defendants praying therein for setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 5.8.2006 passed by the learned appellate Court below. 6. This Court vide order dated 11.5.2007 admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the ld.first appellate court has misread the provisions of The H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, which has materially prejudiced the case of the appellants? 2. Whether the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 have overriding effect over The H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976?” 7. Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants, vehemently argued that judgment passed by the first appellate Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law as the same is not based upon the proper appreciation of facts as well as law on the point and as such same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mr.Palsra contended that learned first appellate Court misread the provisions with regard to redemption of mortgage and wrongly placed reliance upon the provisions of H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'Debt Reduction Act’) which was not applicable and attracted in the present case. While inviting the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by learned trial Court, Mr.Palsra strenuously argued that learned trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the provisions of the 'Debt Reduction Act’ are not applicable in the present case since the plaintiffs had lost their right of redemption in the year 1970 i.e. prior to commencement of 'Debt Reduction Act’ in the year 1976. He further invited the attention of this Court to Section 6 of the Act to suggest that same was prospective in nature and in no situation could be made applicable in the case of plaintiffs who had admittedly lost their right to redeem the mortgage in the year 1970. He further invited the attention of this Court to Section 6 of the Act to suggest that same was prospective in nature and in no situation could be made applicable in the case of plaintiffs who had admittedly lost their right to redeem the mortgage in the year 1970. He further invited the attention of this Court to Section 27 of the aforesaid Act to suggest that provisions contained in the Act referred to hereinabove could not be made applicable in the present case, especially in view of the fact that loan in terms of Act was advanced to the plaintiffs by predecessor-in-interest of the defendants prior to commencement of this Act and as such judgment passed by learned first appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. Mr.Palsra further argued that by no stretch of imagination provisions contained in the aforesaid Act could override the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, wherein specific period of limitation of redemption of mortgage is prescribed for 30 years and grace period of 7 years has further been provided for old cases and as such, findings of the learned first appellate Court that the plaintiff was entitled to file suit at any time after commencement of the aforesaid Act deserves to be quashed and set aside being contrary to the provisions contained in the Act itself. While concluding his arguments, Mr.Palsra forcefully contended that bare perusal of judgment passed by learned first appellate Court itself suggests that appellate Court restricted its findings only qua the issue of limitation, whereas all the other material points, as raised in the ground of appeal, were ignored. Whereas, being last fact finding Court, learned first appellate Court was expected to return findings qua all the issues and as such, judgment, totally being contrary to the provisions of law, as alleged, deserves to be quashed and set aside. He further stated that sale deed was executed in the year 1974, but there is nothing on record to suggest that it was challenged by the plaintiffs till 3rd June, 1996, when they filed suit which was completely time barred because limitation for challenging the sale deed is three years, but this aspect of the matter has been totally ignored by the learned first appellate Court and as such judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. 9. In the aforesaid background, Mr.Palsra prayed that instant appeal may be accepted and judgment passed by learned first appellate Court may be quashed and set aside. 10. Mr.Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Mr.Dheeraj K.Vashishta, Advocate, supported the judgment passed by learned first appellate Court. Mr.Sood, while referring to the judgment passed by learned first appellate Court, vehemently argued that same is based upon correct appreciation of facts as well as law on the point and as such there is no scope of interference, whatsoever, in any manner, as the learned first appellate Court has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously. While refuting the contentions, having been put forth by Mr.Palsra, Mr.Sood invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled: Singh Ram (D) Thr.L.Rs. vs. Sheo Ram and Others, AIR 2014 SC 3447 to demonstrate that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act to recover possession commences when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly by payment or deposit by the mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Mr.Sood, while placing reliance upon judgment supra, forcefully contended that an usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. Mr.Sood further contended that it is undisputed that mortgage of land in favour of predecessor-in-interest of the defendants had been effected in the year 1930 and it was usufructuary mortgage as the possession of the property was delivered to the mortgagee with authority to enjoy all rights of the owner. Mr.Sood further contended that it is undisputed that mortgage of land in favour of predecessor-in-interest of the defendants had been effected in the year 1930 and it was usufructuary mortgage as the possession of the property was delivered to the mortgagee with authority to enjoy all rights of the owner. He further stated that earlier period of 30 years was provided for redemption of usufructuory mortgage under Limitation Act, but with the introduction of 'Debt Reduction Act’ debtor could file the suit for redemption of mortgage or for accounts at any time after the commencement of the Act, which admittedly came into force in the year 1953 and as such learned first appellate Court, while accepting the appeal having been preferred by plaintiffs, rightly came to the conclusion that plaintiffs had right to file suit for redemption by virtue of provisions of aforesaid Act because the amount taken under mortgage by the mortgagee was nothing but a loan as defined in definition of land in 'Debt Reduction Act’. 11. Lastly, Mr.Sood strenuously argued that now, in view of latest judgment supra, there is no force in the present appeal having been preferred by the appellants-defendants because it has been specifically held in the aforesaid case that mere expiry of period of 30 years from the date of mortgage does not extinguish the right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the aforesaid background, Mr.Sood prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 12. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the record of the case carefully. 13. After carefully perusing the pleadings on record as well as provisions of law applicable in the present case, this Court deems it fit to take both the substantial questions of law together for adjudication, as they are closely linked to each other. 14. It clearly emerges from the record that plaintiffs mortgaged the suit land in favour of predecessor-in-interest of appellants-defendants in 1930 and there is no dispute that it was usufructuary mortgage because possession of the property was delivered to mortgagee with the authority to enjoy all rights of the owner. There is also no dispute with regard to the fact that earlier period of redemption of mortgage was 60 years, but, on coming into operation the Limitation Act, 1963, it was reduced to 30 years. There is also no dispute with regard to the fact that earlier period of redemption of mortgage was 60 years, but, on coming into operation the Limitation Act, 1963, it was reduced to 30 years. But, in the cases where old Limitation Act applied, period of 7 years was given as grace period. 15. In the present case, as per defendants, period of limitation of 30 years is provided under Limitation Act after adding grace period of 7 years, which came to an end in the year 1971 and as such suit filed in the year 1996 by the plaintiffs was rightly dismissed being time barred by learned trial Court. Defendants further claimed that provisions of 'Debt Reduction Act’ cannot be made applicable in the present case because the same was applicable to only to that mortgage which was subsisting at that time and no benefit, if any, could be taken by mortgagee whose right to redeem has expired prior to commencement of provisions of 'Debt Reduction Act’. Learned trial Court, while dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs being time barred, came to the conclusion that mortgagee had lost his right for redemption in the year 1970 i.e. 26.6.1970, after expiry of 30 years of period provided under Limitation Act. Learned trial Court further concluded that the provisions of 'Debt Reduction Act’ cannot be made applicable in the case of plaintiffs because this Act itself came in existence in the year 1976 and by that time right of mortgagor to redeem the mortgage had already extinguished. As per trial Court, provisions contained in 'Debt Reduction Act’ were not applicable in the case because it was prospective in nature. Accordingly, learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs being time barred by observing that a dead relief cannot be revived by coming into existence the provisions of 'Debt Reduction Act’ which already came into force in 1976. 16. Learned first appellate Court, taking contrary view, came to the conclusion that as per Section 6 of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1953, mortgagor could file suit for redemption at any time after commencement of this Act because at that relevant time property mortgaged on 1930 was subsisting at the time of commencement of the Act. 16. Learned first appellate Court, taking contrary view, came to the conclusion that as per Section 6 of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1953, mortgagor could file suit for redemption at any time after commencement of this Act because at that relevant time property mortgaged on 1930 was subsisting at the time of commencement of the Act. Apart from above, learned first appellate Court came to the conclusion that admittedly mortgagee Banto had transferred her mortgage rights in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 in the year 1974 vide sale deed Ex.DW-2/A in favour of appellants-defendants, which clearly suggests that, while making sale of mortgagee rights in favour of defendants, she made acknowledgement of her mortgagee right. Perusal of Ex.DW-2/A i.e. mortgage clearly suggests that mortgagee Banto transferred her mortgagee right in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 in the year 1974 vide sale deed. Perusal of aforesaid document Ex.DW-2/A clearly suggests that Banto had not sold the land as an absolute owner, rather she clearly stated in the sale deed that she has the mortgagee right in the landed property and selling the land as mortgagee, meaning thereby that defendants No.1 and 2 entered her shoes as a mortgagee. By no stretch of imagination, they became absolute owners as claimed by them. Now in view of aforesaid background, this Court would proceed to specifically answer the substantial question of law and it would be profitable to reproduce here Section 6 of H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976:- “6. Debtor's right to sue.-Notwithstanding the terms of any contract regarding the date or dates on which a debt shall become due, a suit to which this Act applies for the redemption of a mortgage or for accounts may be instituted by a debtor at any time after the commencement of this Act.” 17. The use of expression “at any time” for filing a suit clearly indicates the intention of legislature to provide a fresh opportunity to the debtor for getting relief under the Act and as such, in no situation, it can be concluded that the aforesaid provision is prospective in nature. The use of expression “at any time” for filing a suit clearly indicates the intention of legislature to provide a fresh opportunity to the debtor for getting relief under the Act and as such, in no situation, it can be concluded that the aforesaid provision is prospective in nature. After carefully perusing the aforesaid provision of law, it is not understood as to how learned trial Court concluded that provision of this Act is applicable prospectively and debtors, who had taken loan as defined under the Act by mortgaging their property prior to commencement of this Act, had no right to institute a suit under Section 6 of this Act. Judgment passed by learned trial Court though suggest that during arguments, having been made by the parties before the trial Court, attention of the trial Court was invited to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kanshi Ram and Another vs. Lachhman (Dead) Through LRs and Others, (2001)5 SCC 546 , but learned trial Court was of the view that same is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, this Court, after carefully perusing the law supra laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, is of the view that the view taken by trial Court, while dismissing the suit, was blatantly incorrect, especially in view of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court wherein, in the aforesaid case Hon’ble Apex Court, while setting aside the judgment passed by High Court, categorically observed that reason given by High Court in support of the findings that the suit was barred by limitation is that more than 30 years had elapsed since the date of mortgage when the suit was filed and as such mortgagor lost his right to redeem the property mortgaged is fallacious because it defeats the object and the purpose of the statute enacted by the legislature especially to give relief to debtors in the State. 18. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce the following paras of the judgment in Kanshi Ram’s case supra : “8. Chapter III in which sections 5 to 9 are included deals with "Suits and Decrees". The sections in the chapter contain non-obstante clauses giving the provisions therein overriding effect over any law for the time being in force or decree or contract or agreement to the contrary. 9. Chapter III in which sections 5 to 9 are included deals with "Suits and Decrees". The sections in the chapter contain non-obstante clauses giving the provisions therein overriding effect over any law for the time being in force or decree or contract or agreement to the contrary. 9. Section 6 provides that notwithstanding the terms of any contract regarding the date or dates on which a debt shall become due; a suit to which this Act applies for the redemption of a mortgage or for accounts may be instituted by a debtor at any time after the commencement of this Act. (emphasis supplied). 15. The object of the Act and the scheme underlying it as obtained from the provisions made therein is to grant relief to debtors and enable them to get back properties mortgaged by them with possession for a loan. The use of expression "at any time" for making an application or filing a suit is indicative of the legislative intent that the Act provides a fresh opportunity to the debtor for getting relief under the Act. The legislature has taken care to make the relevant provisions of the Act granting relief to debtors by giving overriding effect over any law, agreement, contract or decree contrary to the provisions of the Act. It was not disputed before us during hearing of the case that the plaintiffs filed the suit under provisions of the Act for restoration of the possession of the mortgaged property. Undisputedly there is no decree for foreclosure in favour of the creditor/mortgagee. 16. In the backdrop of the above the question of limitation is to be considered. The reason given by the High Court in support of the finding that the suit was barred by limitation is that more than 30 years had elapsed since the date of the mortgage (February, 1946) when the suit was filed in 1981. Therefore the mortgagor had lost his right to redeem the property mortgaged. The provisions in section 27 of the Limitation Act have been considered in support of the finding. This reasoning appears to us to be fallacious. It defeats the object and the purpose of the statute enacted by the legislature specially to give relief to debtors in the State. The first appellate Court had given cogent reasons in support of its finding in favour of the appellants. This reasoning appears to us to be fallacious. It defeats the object and the purpose of the statute enacted by the legislature specially to give relief to debtors in the State. The first appellate Court had given cogent reasons in support of its finding in favour of the appellants. The Court held and in our view, rightly that the suit was one for recovery of possession from the mortgagee who was in unauthorised possession of the mortgaged property after the mortgage loan was satisfied. The cause of action for filing such a suit under the Act arose when the enactment was enforced in 1979. Viewed from that angle the suit was filed in time and the trial court and the first appellate Court rightly recorded the findings to that effect. The High Court erred in reversing the concurrent finding of the courts below on the erroneous assumption that the suit was one for redemption of the mortgage simpliciter. It is relevant to note here that the present suit is not one filed under section 60 or 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a suit filed for relief on the basis of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976.” (pp.548-551) 19. After carefully perusing the aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no force in the contention put forth by the counsel representing the appellants-defendants that the learned first appellate Court mis-read the provisions of 'Debt Reduction Act’, rather judgment passed by learned first appellate Court is strictly in conformity with the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment and learned first appellate Court has rightly come to conclusion that suit for redemption under Section 6 of the 'Debt Reduction Act’ could be filed at any time after commencement of the Act. Moreover, mortgage made in the year 1930 was subsisting at the time of coming into force the aforesaid Act because there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that decree, if any, for foreclosure in favour of mortgage was ever passed by any competent Court of law. Hence, this Court sees no illegality in the findings returned by the learned first appellate Court that the plaintiffs had right to file suit for redemption by virtue of provisions of aforesaid Act as undisputedly plaintiffs had taken amount under mortgage by mortgaging land. 20. Hence, this Court sees no illegality in the findings returned by the learned first appellate Court that the plaintiffs had right to file suit for redemption by virtue of provisions of aforesaid Act as undisputedly plaintiffs had taken amount under mortgage by mortgaging land. 20. As far as substantial question of law No.2 is concerned, undoubtedly Limitation Act, 1963 provides limitation for filing the suit, if any, for redemption of mortgage. But, with the introduction of 'Debt Reduction Act’ State Government intended to grant relief to debtors and to enable them to get back properties mortgaged by them with the possession for a loan. Perusal of 'Debt Reduction Act’ clearly suggests that Legislature, while invoking aforesaid Act, has specifically taken care to make the relevant provisions of the Act granting relief to debtors by giving over-riding effect over any law, agreement, contract or decree contrary to the provisions of the Act. Though, after perusing the aforesaid Act, this Court is of the view that after promulgation of the same debtors, as defined in the aforesaid Act, could file suit for redemption at any time after commencement of the Act, but perusal of aforesaid Act suggests that no limitation was provided in the Act; meaning thereby that for determining limitation, if any, for filing suit under 'Debt Reduction Act’, ultimately parties were to fall back upon Limitation Act, 1963. It is settled law that special Act brought by legislature has over-riding effect over any law. But in the present facts and circumstances of the case, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has specifically held that usufructuary mortgagor right under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act continuous till mortgage money is paid and mere expiry of period of 30 years from the date of mortgage does not extinguish right of mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 may not be applicable in the present case. 21. Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram (D) Thr.L.Rs. vs. Sheo Ram and others, AIR 2014 SC 3447 , has upheld the view taken by Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Kishan & Ors. 21. Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram (D) Thr.L.Rs. vs. Sheo Ram and others, AIR 2014 SC 3447 , has upheld the view taken by Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Kishan & Ors. vs. Sheo Ram & Ors., AIR 2008 Punjab & Haryana 77, and over-ruled the judgment passed by Full Bench of this Court in Bhandaru Ram vs. Sukh Ram, AIR 2012 HJP 1, wherein Full Bench of this Court had held that for redemption of usufructuary mortgage, where no time fixed for redemption of mortgage money, limitation period would be 30 years as prescribed under Article 60 of Limitation Act. 22. At this stage, it would be apt to reproduce the view taken by Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Kishan’s case supra:- “Since the mortgage is essentially and basically a conveyance in law or an assignment of debt or for discharge of some other obligation for which it is given, the security must, therefore, be redeemable on the payment or discharge of such debt or obligation. Fact that at one point of time the mortgagor for one or the other reason mortgaged his property to avail financial assistance on account of necessities of life, the mortgagor’s right cannot be permitted to be defeated only on account of passage of time. The mortgagee remains in possession of the mortgaged property; enjoys the usufruct thereof and, therefore, not to lose anything by returning the security on receipt of mortgage debt. The limitation of 30 years under Article 61 (a) beings to run “when the right to redeem or the possession accrues”. The right to redemption or recover possession accrued to the mortgagor on payment of sum secured in case of usufructuary mortgage, where rents and profits are to be set off against interest on the mortgage debt, on payment or tender to the mortgagee, the mortgage money or balance thereof or deposit in the Court. The right to seek foreclosure is coextensive with the right to seek redemption. The right to seek foreclosure is coextensive with the right to seek redemption. Since right to seek redemption accrues only on payment of the mortgage money or the balance thereof after adjustment of rents and profits from the interest thereof, therefore, right of foreclosure will not accrue to the mortgagee till such time the mortgagee remains in possession of the mortgaged security and is appropriating usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest on the mortgaged debt. Thus, the period of redemption or possession would not start till such time usufruct of the land and the profits are being adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount. In view of the said interpretation, the principle that once a mortgage, always a mortgage and, therefore, always re-deemable would be applicable. The plea that after the expiry of period of limitation to sue for foreclosure, the mortgagees have a right to seek declaration in respect of their title over the suit property would not be tenable. The mortgage cannot be extinguished by any unilateral act of the mortgagee. Since the mortgage cannot be unilaterally terminated, therefore, the declaration claimed is nothing but a suit for foreclosure. It is equally well settled that it is not title of the suit, which determines the nature of the suit. The nature of suit is required to be determined by reading all averments in plaint. Such declaration cannot be claimed by an usufructuary mortgagee. Therefore, in case of usufructuary mortgage, where no time-limit is fixed to seek redemption, the right to seek redemption would not arise on date of mortgage but will arise on date when mortgagor pays or tenders to the mortgagee or deposits in Court, the mortgage money or the balance thereof. Thus, it was held that once a mortgage always a mortgage and is always redeemable.” 23. Hon’ble Apex Court in view of conflicting decision on the point having been rendered by Full Benches of two High Courts, referred hereinabove, laid down law in Singh Ram’s case supra affirmed the view taken by Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court asunder:- “10. We have given our anxious consideration to the question of law arising in the cases. 11. We have given our anxious consideration to the question of law arising in the cases. 11. We are in agreement with the view taken in the impugned judgment that in a usufructuary mortgage, right to recover possession continues till the money is paid from the rents and profits or where it is partly paid out of rents and profits when the balance is paid by the mortgagor or deposited in Court as provided under Section 62 of the T.P. Act. 12. It will be appropriate to refer to the statutory provisions of the T.P. Act and the Limitation Act:- “T.P. Act 58. "Mortgage", "mortgagor", "mortgagee", "mortgage-money" and "mortgaged" defined. (a) A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being are called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any) by which the transfer is effected is called a mortgage-deed. (b) Simple mortgage-Where, without delivering possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds himself personally to pay the mortgage-money, and agrees, expressly or impliedly, that, in the event of his failing to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee shall have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied, so far as may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called a simple mortgage and the mortgagee a simple mortgagee. (c) Mortgage by conditional sale-Where, the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property– on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale: PROVIDED that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. (d) Usufructuary mortgage-Where the mortgagor delivers possession or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorizes him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage-money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest or in payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called a usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee a usufructuary mortgagee. (e) English mortgage-Where the mortgagor binds himself to repay the mortgage-money on a certain date, and transfers the mortgaged property absolutely to the mortgagee, but subject to a proviso that he will re- transfer it to the mortgagor upon payment of the mortgage-money as agreed, the transaction is called an English mortgage. (f) Mortgage by deposit of title-deeds-Where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and in any other town which the State Government concerned may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds. (g) Anomalous mortgage - A mortgage which is not a simple mortgage, a mortgage by conditional sale, a usufructuary mortgage, an English mortgage or a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of this section is called an anomalous mortgage. 60. (g) Anomalous mortgage - A mortgage which is not a simple mortgage, a mortgage by conditional sale, a usufructuary mortgage, an English mortgage or a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of this section is called an anomalous mortgage. 60. Right of mortgagor to redeem At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage- money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor, and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor either to re-transfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct, or to execute and (where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) to have registered an acknowledgment in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished : Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by the act of the parties or by decree of a court. xxx xxx xxx 62. Right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession In the case of a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagor has a right to recover possession of the property together with the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee,- (a) where the mortgagee is authorised to pay himself the mortgage-money from the rents and profits of the property,-when such money is paid; (b) where the mortgagee is authorised to pay himself from such rents and profits or any part thereof a part only of the mortgage-money, when the term (if any) prescribed for the payment of the mortgage-money has expired and the mortgagor pays or tenders to the mortgagee the mortgage money or the balance thereof or deposits it in court hereinafter provided. xxx xxx xxx Limitation Act:- Art. 61 By a mortgagor (a) To redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged. Thirty years When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues (b) xxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx (emphasis supplied) A perusal of above provisions shows that Article 61 refers to right to redeem or recover possession. xxx xxx xxx Limitation Act:- Art. 61 By a mortgagor (a) To redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged. Thirty years When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues (b) xxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx (emphasis supplied) A perusal of above provisions shows that Article 61 refers to right to redeem or recover possession. While right of mortgagor to redeem is dealt with under Section 60 of the T.P. Act, the right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession is specially dealt with under Section 62. Section 62 is applicable only to usufructuary mortgages and not to any other mortgage. The said right of usufructuary mortgagor though styled as 'right to recover possession’ is for all purposes, right to redeem and to recover possession. Thus, while in case of any other mortgage, right to redeem is covered under Section 60, in case of usufructuary mortgage, right to recover possession is dealt with under Section 62 and commences on payment of mortgage money out of the usufructs or partly out of the usufructs and partly on payment or deposit by the mortgagor. This distinction in a usufructuary mortgage and any other mortgage is clearly borne out from provisions of Sections 58, 60 and 62 of the T.P. Act read with Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Usufructuary mortgage cannot be treated at par with any other mortgage, as doing so will defeat the scheme of Section 62 of the T.P. Act and the equity. This right of the usufructuary mortgagor is not only an equitable right, it has statutory recognition under Section 62 of the T.P. Act. There is no principle of law on which this right can be defeated. Any contrary view, which does not take into account the special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act, has to be held to be erroneous on this ground or has to be limited to a mortgage other than a usufructuary mortgage. Accordingly, we uphold the view taken by the Full Bench that in case of usufructuary mortgage, mere expiry of a period of 30 years from the date of creation of the mortgage does not extinguish the right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act. 13. We may now refer to decisions of this Court. (i) In Prabhakaran & Ors. 13. We may now refer to decisions of this Court. (i) In Prabhakaran & Ors. vs. M. Azhagiri Pillai & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 484 , suit of mortgagor for redemption was held to be within limitation. However, in para 13, it was observed:- “13. Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (referred to as “the old Act”) provided a limitation of 60 years for a suit against a mortgagee to redeem or to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged. The corresponding provision in the Limitation Act, 1963 (“the new Act” or “the Limitation Act” for short), is Article 61 (a) which provides that the period of limitation for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of the immovable property mortgaged is 30 years. The period of limitation begins to run when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. In the case of a usufructuary mortgage which does not fix any date for repayment of the mortgage money, but merely stipulates that the mortgagee is entitled to be in possession till redemption, the right to redeem would accrue immediately on execution of the mortgage deed and the mortgagor has to file a suit for redemption within 30 years from the date of the mortgage. Section 27 of the Limitation Act provides that “at the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished”. This would mean that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Act, the mortgagor would lose his right to redeem and the mortgagee would become entitled to continue in possession as the full owner.” The above observations do not take into account the special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act to recover possession which commences after mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly paid or deposited by mortgagor. Thus, we are unable to accept the same as correct view in law. (ii) In Jayasingh Dhyanu Mhoprekar & Anr. vs. Krishna Babaji Patil & Anr., 1985 (4) SCC 162 , the question of limitation for redemption was not involved. Thus, we are unable to accept the same as correct view in law. (ii) In Jayasingh Dhyanu Mhoprekar & Anr. vs. Krishna Babaji Patil & Anr., 1985 (4) SCC 162 , the question of limitation for redemption was not involved. Question was whether mortgagor’s right of redemption was affected when mortgaged land was allotted to mortgagees by way of grant under the provisions of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950, it was observed:- “6. The only question which arises for decision in this case is whether by reason of the grant made in favour of the defendants the right to redeem the mortgage can be treated as having become extinguished. It is well settled that the right of redemption under a mortgage deed can come to an end only in a manner known to law. Such extinguishment of right can take place by a contract between the parties, by a merger or by a statutory provision which debars the mortgagor from redeeming the mortgage. A mortgagee who has entered into possession of the mortgaged property under a mortgage will have to give up possession of the property when the suit for redemption is filed unless he is able to show that the right of redemption has come to an end or that the suit is liable to be dismissed on some other valid ground. This flows from the legal principle which is applicable to all mortgages, namely “Once a mortgage, always a mortgage”. It is no doubt true that the father of the first defendant and the second defendant have been granted occupancy right by the Prant Officer by his order dated February 5, 1964 along with Pandu, the uncle of Defendant 1. But it is not disputed that the defendants would not have been able to secure the said grant in their favour but for the fact that they were in actual possession of the lands. They were able to be in possession of the one-half share of the plaintiffs in the lands in question only by reason of the mortgage deed. But it is not disputed that the defendants would not have been able to secure the said grant in their favour but for the fact that they were in actual possession of the lands. They were able to be in possession of the one-half share of the plaintiffs in the lands in question only by reason of the mortgage deed. If the mortgagors had been in possession of the lands on the relevant date, the lands would have automatically been granted in their favour, since the rights of the tenants in the watan lands were allowed to subsist even after the coming into force of the Act and the consequent abolition of the watans by virtue of Section 8 of the Act. The question is whether the position would be different because they had mortgaged land with possession on the relevant date.” Apart from judgments mentioned in reference order, reference may be made to some other judgments dealing with the issue. (iii) In Harbans vs. Om Prakash, (2006) 1 SCC 129 , this Court upheld the view that limitation for redemption does not start from date of mortgage in a usufructuary mortgage and held that view in State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Ram Rakha & Ors., (1997) 10 SCC 172 was contrary to earlier view in Seth Gangadhar vs. Shankar Lal, 1959 SCR 509 . It was observed:- “7. Reference may be made to certain paragraphs in Seth Gangadhar v. Shankar Lal, 1959 SCR 509 which read as follows : “[4.] It is admitted that the case is governed by the Transfer of Property Act. Under Section 60 of that Act, at any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right on payment or tender of the mortgage money to require the mortgagee to reconvey the mortgaged property to him. The right conferred by this section has been called the right to redeem and the appellant sought to enforce this right by his suit. Under this section, however, that right can be exercised only after the mortgage money has become due. The right conferred by this section has been called the right to redeem and the appellant sought to enforce this right by his suit. Under this section, however, that right can be exercised only after the mortgage money has become due. In Bakhtawar Begam v. [pic]Husaini Khanam, ILR (1914) 36 All 195 (IA at p. 89) also the same view was expressed in these words : 'Ordinarily, and in the absence of a special condition entitling the mortgagor to redeem during the term for which the mortgage is created, the right of redemption can only arise on the expiration of the specified period.’ Now, in the present case the term of the mortgage is eighty-five years and there is no stipulation entitling the mortgagor to redeem during that term. That term has not yet expired. The respondents, therefore, contend that the suit is premature and liable to be dismissed. * * * [6.] The rule against clogs on the equity of redemption is that, a mortgage shall always be redeemable and a mortgagor’s right to redeem shall neither be taken away nor be limited by any contract between the parties. The principle behind the rule was expressed by Lindley, M.R. In Santley v. Wilde, (1899) 2 Ch. 474 in these words: 'The principle is this: a mortgage is a conveyance of land or an assignment of chattels as a security for the payment of a debt or the discharge of some other obligation for which it is given. This is the idea of a mortgage: and the security is redeemable on the payment or discharge of such debt or obligation, any provision to the contrary notwithstanding. That, in my opinion, is the law. Any provision inserted to prevent redemption on payment or performance of the debt or obligation for which the security was given is what is meant by a clog or fetter on the equity of redemption and is therefore void. It follows from this, that “once a mortgage always a mortgage”.’ [7.] The right of redemption, therefore, cannot be taken away. The courts will ignore any contract the effect of which is to deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem the mortgage. It follows from this, that “once a mortgage always a mortgage”.’ [7.] The right of redemption, therefore, cannot be taken away. The courts will ignore any contract the effect of which is to deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem the mortgage. One thing, therefore, is clear, namely, that the term in the mortgage contract, that on the failure of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage within the specified period of six months the mortgagor will have no claim over the mortgaged property, and the mortgage deed will be deemed to be a deed of sale in favour of the mortgagee, cannot be sustained. It plainly takes away altogether, the mortgagor’s right to redeem the mortgage after the specified period. This is not permissible, for 'once a mortgage always a mortgage’ and therefore always redeemable. The same result also follows from Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. So it was said in Mohd. Sher Khan v. Seth Swami Dayal, AIR 1922 PC 17 : 'An anomalous mortgage enabling a mortgagee after a lapse of time and in the absence of redemption to enter and take the rents in [pic]satisfaction of the interest would be perfectly valid if it did not also hinder an existing right to redeem. But it is this that the present mortgage undoubtedly purports to effect. It is expressly stated to be for five years, and after that period the principal money became payable. This, under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, is the event on which the mortgagor had a right on payment of the mortgage money to redeem. [14.] In comparatively recent times Viscount Haldane, L.C. repeated the same view when he said in G. and C. Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co. Ltd, 1914 AC 25 (AC at pp. 35-36): 'This jurisdiction was merely a special application of a more general power to relieve against penalties and to mould them into mere securities. The case of the common law mortgage of land was indeed a gross one. The land was conveyed to the creditor upon the condition that if the money he had advanced to the feoffor was repaid on a date and at a place named, the fee simple would revest in the latter, but that if the condition was not strictly and literally fulfilled he should lose the land forever. The land was conveyed to the creditor upon the condition that if the money he had advanced to the feoffor was repaid on a date and at a place named, the fee simple would revest in the latter, but that if the condition was not strictly and literally fulfilled he should lose the land forever. What made the hardship on the debtor a glaring one was that the debt still remained unpaid and could be recovered from the feoffor notwithstanding that he had actually forfeited the land to the mortgagee. Equity therefore, at an early date began to relieve against what was virtually a penalty by compelling the creditor to use his legal title as a security. My Lords, this was the origin of the jurisdiction which we are now considering, and it is important to bear that origin in mind. For the end to accomplish which the jurisdiction has been evolved ought to govern and limit its exercise by equity judges. That end has always been to ascertain, by parol evidence if need be, the real nature and substance of the transaction, and if it turned out to be in truth one of mortgage simply, to place it on that footing. It was, in ordinary cases, only where there was conduct which the Court of Chancery regarded as unconscientious that it interfered with freedom of contract. The lending money, on mortgage or otherwise, was looked on with suspicion, and the court was on the alert to discover want of conscience in the terms imposed by lenders.’ [15.] The reason then justifying the Court’s power to relieve a mortgagor from the effects of his bargain is its want of conscience. [pic]Putting it in more familiar language the Court’s jurisdiction to relieve a mortgagor from his bargain depends on whether it was obtained by taking advantage of any difficulty or embarrassment that he might have been in when he borrowed the moneys on the mortgage. Was the mortgagor oppressed? Was he imposed upon? If he was, then he may be entitled to relief. [16.] We then have to see if there was anything unconscionable in the agreement that the mortgage would not be redeemed for eighty-five years. Is it oppressive? Was he forced to agree to it because of his difficulties? Now this question is essentially one of fact and has to be decided on the circumstances of each case. [16.] We then have to see if there was anything unconscionable in the agreement that the mortgage would not be redeemed for eighty-five years. Is it oppressive? Was he forced to agree to it because of his difficulties? Now this question is essentially one of fact and has to be decided on the circumstances of each case. It would be wholly unprofitable in enquiring into this question to examine the large number of reported cases on the subject, for each turns on its own facts. The section is unqualified in its terms, and contains no saving provision as other sections do in favour of contracts to the contrary. Their Lordships therefore see no sufficient reason for withholding from the words of the section their full force and effect.’ [17.] First then, does the length of the term — and in this case it is long enough being eighty-five years itself lead to the conclusion that it was an oppressive term? In our view, it does not do so. It is not necessary for us to go so far as to say that the length of the term of the mortgage can never by itself show that the bargain was oppressive. We do not desire to say anything on that question in this case. We think it enough to say that we have nothing here to show that the length of the term was in any way disadvantageous to the mortgagor. It is quite conceivable that it was to his advantage. The suit for redemption was brought over forty-seven years after the date of the mortgage. It seems to us impossible that if the term was oppressive, that was not realised much earlier and the suit brought within a short time of the mortgage. The learned Judicial Commissioner felt that the respondents’ contention that the suit had been brought as the price of landed property had gone up after the war, was justified. We are not prepared to say that he was wrong in this view. We cannot also ignore, as appears from a large number of reported decisions, that it is not uncommon in various parts of India to have long-term mortgages. Then we find that the property was subject to a prior mortgage. We are not aware what the term of that mortgage was. We cannot also ignore, as appears from a large number of reported decisions, that it is not uncommon in various parts of India to have long-term mortgages. Then we find that the property was subject to a prior mortgage. We are not aware what the term of that mortgage was. But we find that that mortgage included another property which became free from it as a result of the mortgage in suit. This would show that the mortgagee under this mortgage was not putting any pressure on the mortgagor. That conclusion also receives support from the fact that the mortgage money under the present mortgage was more than that under the earlier mortgage but the mortgagee in the present case was satisfied with a smaller security. Again, no complaint is made that the interest charged, which was to be measured by the rent of the property, was in any manner high. All these, to our mind, indicate that the mortgagee had not taken any unfair advantage of his position as the lender, nor that the mortgagor was under any financial embarrassment. [18.] It is said that the mortgage instrument itself indicates that the bargain is hard, for, while the mortgagor cannot redeem for eighty-five years, the mortgagee is free to demand payment of his dues at any time [pic]he likes. This contention is plainly fallacious. There is nothing in the mortgage instrument permitting the mortgagee to demand any money, and it is well settled that the mortgagee’s right to enforce the mortgage and the mortgagor’s right to redeem are coextensive.” 8. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in Panchanan Sharma v. Basudeo Prasad Jaganani, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 574 it was clearly held that when there is no stipulation regarding period of limitation it can be redeemed at any time. It was, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 576, para 3) “The sale certificate, Ext. C-II does not bind the appellant and, therefore, the mortgage does not stand extinguished by reason of the sale. It is inoperative as against the appellant.” 9. Though the decision in State of Punjab case prima facie supports the stand of the appellant, the decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ganga Dhar case according to us had dealt with the legal position deliberately and stated the same succinctly.” (iv) In Parichhan Mistry (Dead) by L.Rs. It is inoperative as against the appellant.” 9. Though the decision in State of Punjab case prima facie supports the stand of the appellant, the decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ganga Dhar case according to us had dealt with the legal position deliberately and stated the same succinctly.” (iv) In Parichhan Mistry (Dead) by L.Rs. & Anr. vs. Acchiabar Mistry & Ors., (1996) 5 SCC 526 , it was observed:- “2. The High Court came to the conclusion that the mortgagors having failed to pay a portion of the rent for realisation of which the landlord had filed a suit and obtained a decree and that said decree being put to execution and the mortgagee having paid up the decretal dues, the mortgagor loses his right of redemption and, therefore the suit for redemption must fail. The [pic]learned Judge came to the conclusion that the equity of redemption, in the facts and circumstances of the case was extinguished and, therefore, the mortgagor is not entitled to redeem. The short question that arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was right in coming to a conclusion that right of redemption got extinguished and the mortgagor had no right of redemption. It is true that a right of redemption under a mortgage deed can come to an end, but only in a manner known to law. Such extinguishment of right can take place by contract between the parties or by a decree of the court or by a statutory provision which debars the mortgagors from redeeming the mortgage. The mortgagor’s right of redemption is exercised by the payment or tender to the mortgagee at the proper time and at the proper place, of the mortgage money. When it is extinguished by the act of the parties the act must take the shape and observe the formalities which the law prescribes. The expression “act of parties” refers to some transaction subsequent to the mortgage and standing apart from the mortgage transaction. A usufructuary mortgagee cannot by mere assertion of his own or by a unilateral act on his part, convert his position on moiety of the property as mortgagee into that of an absolute owner. It is no doubt true that the mortgagee would be entitled to purchase the entire equity of redemption from the mortgagor. A usufructuary mortgagee cannot by mere assertion of his own or by a unilateral act on his part, convert his position on moiety of the property as mortgagee into that of an absolute owner. It is no doubt true that the mortgagee would be entitled to purchase the entire equity of redemption from the mortgagor. The mortgagee occupies a peculiar position and, therefore, the question as to what he purchases at a court sale is a vexed question, but being in an advantageous position where the mortgagee availing himself of his position gains an advantage he holds, such advantage is for the benefit of the mortgagor. It has been so held by this Court in the case of Sidhakamal Nayan Ramanuj Das v. Bira Nayak, AIR 1954 SC 336 and Mritunjoy Pani v. Narmanda Bala Sasmal, (1962) 1 SCR 290 . This being the position of law if for some default in payment of rent a rent decree is obtained and the mortgagee pays off the same even then the mortgage in question is liable to be redeemed at the option of the mortgagor. The mortgagee cannot escape from his obligation by bringing the equity of redemption to sale in execution of a decree on the personal covenant. By virtue of purchase of the property by the mortgagee in court sale, no merger takes place between the two rights nor the mortgage stands extinguished.” (v) In Achaldas Durgaji Oswal (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. vs. Ramvilas Gangabisan Heda (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 614 , this Court upheld the view that right of redemption was not lost despite failure of a mortgagor in a usufructuary mortgage to make deposit in terms of a preliminary decree for redemption. It was observed:- “7. Mr Mohta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand, would submit that whereas Order 34 Rule 7 would apply both in respect of the suit for foreclosure and redemption of mortgage, Order 34 Rule 8 thereof refers to final decree in redemption suit only. The learned counsel would contend that having regard to the well-established rule “once a mortgage always a mortgage”, the right of a mortgagor to redeem the mortgage would continue unless the same is extinguished either by reason of a decree passed by a court of law or by an agreement of parties. The learned counsel would contend that having regard to the well-established rule “once a mortgage always a mortgage”, the right of a mortgagor to redeem the mortgage would continue unless the same is extinguished either by reason of a decree passed by a court of law or by an agreement of parties. The learned counsel pointed out that in this case the application for drawing up of a final decree was filed within a period of three years from the date of making the deposit and thus the same was not barred by limitation. Findings 8. Usufructuary mortgage is defined in Section 58 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act in the following terms: “58. (d) Where the mortgagor delivers possession or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorises him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage-money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in [pic]lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an usufructuary mortgagee.” 9. Mortgagor, despite having mortgaged the property might still deal with it in any way consistent with the rights of the mortgagee. He has an equitable right to redeem the property after the day fixed for payment has gone by but his right or equity of redemption is no longer strictly an equitable estate or interest although it is still in the nature of an equitable interest. (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 32, p.264.) 10. The right of the mortgagor, it is now well settled, to deal with the mortgaged property as well as the limitation to which it is subject depends upon the nature of this ownership which is not absolute, but qualified by reason of the right of the mortgagee to recover his money out of the proceedings. The right to redeem the mortgage is a very valuable right possessed by the mortgagor. Such a right to redeem the mortgage can be exercised before it is foreclosed or the estate is sold. The right to redeem the mortgage is a very valuable right possessed by the mortgagor. Such a right to redeem the mortgage can be exercised before it is foreclosed or the estate is sold. The equitable right of redemption is dependent on the mortgagor giving the mortgagee reasonable notice of his intention to redeem and on his fully performing his obligations under the mortgage. 11. The doctrine of redemption of mortgaged property was not recognised by the Indian courts as the essence of the doctrine of equity of redemption was unknown to the ancient law of India. The Privy Council in Thumbasawmy Mudelly v. Mohd. Hossain Rowthen called upon the legislature to make a suitable amendment which was given a statutory recognition by reason of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act which reads thus: “60. Right of mortgagor to redeem.—At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage-money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor, and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor either to retransfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct, or to execute and (where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) to have registered an acknowledgement in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished: Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by decree of a court. The right conferred by this section is called a right to redeem and a suit to enforce it is called a suit for redemption. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to render invalid any provision to the effect that, if the time fixed for payment of the principal money has [pic]been allowed to pass or no such time has been fixed, the mortgagee shall be entitled to reasonable notice before payment or tender of such money.” 12. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to render invalid any provision to the effect that, if the time fixed for payment of the principal money has [pic]been allowed to pass or no such time has been fixed, the mortgagee shall be entitled to reasonable notice before payment or tender of such money.” 12. A right of redemption, thus, was statutorily recognized as a right of a mortgagor as an incident of mortgage which subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists. The proviso appended to Section 60, as noticed hereinbefore, however, confines the said right so long as the same is not extinguished by an act of the parties or by a decree of court. 13. In the Law of Mortgage by Dr Rashbehary Ghose at pp. 231-32 under the heading “Once a mortgage, always a mortgage”, it is noticed: “In 1681 Lord Nottingham in the leading case of Howard v. Harris firmly laid down the principle: 'Once a mortgage, always a mortgage’. This is a doctrine to protect the mortgagor’s right of redemption: it renders all agreements in a mortgage for forfeiture of the right to redeem and also encumbrances of or dealings with the property by the mortgagee as against a mortgagor coming to redeem. In 1902 the well-known maxim, 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage’, was supplemented by the words 'and nothing but a mortgage’ added by Lord Davey in the leading case of Noakes v. Rice in which the maxim was explained to mean 'that a mortgage cannot be made irredeemable and a provision to that effect is void’. The maxim has been supplemented in the Indian context by the words 'and therefore always redeemable’, added by Justice Sarkar of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal. It is thus evident that the very conception of mortgage involves three principles. First, there is the maxim: 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage’. That is to say, a mortgage is always redeemable and if a contrary provision is made, it is invalid. And this is an exception to the aphorism, modus et conventio vincunt legem (custom and agreement overrule law). Secondly, the mortgagee cannot reserve to himself any collateral advantage outside the mortgage agreement. Thirdly, as a corollary from the first another principle may be deduced, namely, 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage, and nothing but a mortgage’. And this is an exception to the aphorism, modus et conventio vincunt legem (custom and agreement overrule law). Secondly, the mortgagee cannot reserve to himself any collateral advantage outside the mortgage agreement. Thirdly, as a corollary from the first another principle may be deduced, namely, 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage, and nothing but a mortgage’. In other words, any stipulation which prevents a mortgagor from getting back the property mortgaged is void. That is, a mortgage is always redeemable. The maxim 'once a mortgage always a mortgage’ may be said to be a logical corollary from the doctrine, which is the very foundation of the law of mortgages, that time is not of the essence of the contract in such transactions; for the protection which the law throws around the mortgagor might be rendered wholly illusory, if the right to redeem could be limited by contract between the parties. Right to redeem is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and is inseparable from it so that the right is coextensive with the mortgage itself. The right subsists until it is [pic]appropriately and effectively extinguished either by the acts of the parties concerned or by a proper decree of the competent court.” 4. In The Law of Mortgages by Edward F. Cousins at p. 294, in relation to protection of the right to redeem, it is stated: “But the protection of embarrassed mortgagors could not be achieved by the mere creation of the equitable right of redemption. As soon as the practice in equity to allow redemption after the contract date became known, mortgagees sought to defeat the intervention of equity by special provisions in the mortgage-deed. These provisions were designed either to render the legal right to redeem illusory, and thus prevent the equity of redemption from arising at all, or to defeat or clog the equity of redemption after it had arisen. For example, the mortgage contract might provide for an option for the mortgagee to purchase the mortgaged property, thus defeating both the legal and equitable right to redeem, or might allow redemption after the contract date only upon payment of an additional sum or upon performance of some additional obligation. Consequently, the Chancellor began to relieve mortgagors against such restrictions and fetters on the legal and equitable rights to redeem imposed by special covenants in the mortgage. Consequently, the Chancellor began to relieve mortgagors against such restrictions and fetters on the legal and equitable rights to redeem imposed by special covenants in the mortgage. The protection of a mortgagor against all attempts to defeat or clog his right of redemption involved the creation of subsidiary rules of equity, invalidating the various contrivances which ingenious conveyancers devised. These rules are sometimes summed up in a maxim of equity 'once a mortgage always a mortgage’. This means that once a contract is seen to be a mortgage no provision in the contract will be valid if it is inconsistent with the right of the mortgagor to recover his security on discharging his obligations. Provisions offending against the maxim may either touch the contractual terms of redemption, rendering the right to redeem illusory, or they may touch only the equitable right to redeem after the passing of the contract date, hampering the exercise of the right. Provisions of the latter kind are termed 'clogs’ on the equity of redemption. Greene, M.R. in Knightsbridge Estates v. Byrne7 emphasized that provisions touching the contractual right to redeem are not properly to be classed as clogs on the equity of redemption. But it is evident that such provisions are in substance clogs on the equity of redemption, since they tend to defeat it altogether.” 15. In Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage, the nature of the right of redemption is stated thus: “The rights of redemption.— The right to redeem a mortgage was formerly conferred on the mortgagor by a proviso or condition in the mortgage to the effect that, if the mortgagor or his representative should pay to the mortgagee the principal sum, with interest at the rate fixed, on a certain day, the mortgagee, or the person in whom the estate was vested, would, at the cost of the person redeeming, reconvey to him or as [pic]he should direct (a). This is still the practice in the case of a mortgage effected by an assignment of the mortgagor’s interest (b). A proviso for reconveyance was no longer appropriate after 1925 for a legal mortgage of land [which has to be made by demise (c)], and it is not necessary to have a proviso for surrender of the term in such a mortgage, since the term ceases on repayment (d). A proviso for reconveyance was no longer appropriate after 1925 for a legal mortgage of land [which has to be made by demise (c)], and it is not necessary to have a proviso for surrender of the term in such a mortgage, since the term ceases on repayment (d). Nevertheless, in order to define the rights of the mortgagor and the mortgagee, a proviso is inserted expressly stating that the term will cease at the date fixed (e). It has been seen (f) that, at law, whatever form the mortgage took, upon non-payment by the appointed time, the estate of the mortgagee became absolute and irredeemable, but that equity intervened to enable the mortgagor to redeem after the date of repayment. There are, therefore, two distinct rights of redemption — the legal or contractual right to redeem on the appointed day and the equitable right to redeem thereafter (g). The equitable right to redeem, which only arises after the contractual date of redemption has passed, must be distinguished from the equity of redemption, which arises when the mortgage is made (g).” 16. The question which falls for consideration in this appeal must be considered keeping in view the statutory right of the mortgagor in terms of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. By reason of Article 61 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation provided for a suit to redeem or recover the possession of immovable property mortgaged by a mortgagor is thirty years from the date of accrual of right to redeem or recover possession. Article 137 which is a residuary provision provides for limitation of three years in a case where no period of limitation is provided. 20. The statutory provisions, as noticed hereinbefore, are required to be construed having regard to the redeeming features of usufructuary mortgage, namely, (a) there is a delivery of possession to the mortgagee, (b) he is to retain possession until repayment of money and to receive rents and profits or part thereof in lieu of interest, or in payment of mortgage- money, or partly in lieu of interest and partly in payment of mortgage- money, (c) there is redemption when the amount due is personally paid or is discharged by rents or profits received, and (d) there is no remedy by sale or foreclosure. 21. 21. Order 34 Rules 7 and 8 do not confer any right upon the usufructuary mortgagee to apply for final decree which is conferred on the mortgagee on other types of mortgages. By reason of sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of Order 34, a mortgagor is entitled to make an application for final decree at any time before a final decree debarring the plaintiff from all rights to redeem the mortgaged property has been passed or before the confirmation of a sale held in pursuance of a final decree passed under sub-rule (3) of this Rule. No such application is again contemplated at the instance of the usufructuary mortgagee. By reason of sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of Order 34, a right of redemption is conferred upon the mortgagor of a usufructuary mortgage. Such a provision has been made evidently having regard to the right of redemption of a mortgagor in terms of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act and further, having regard to the fact that a usufructuary mortgagee would be entitled to possess the property in question till a final decree of redemption is passed. 22. The right of redemption of a mortgagor being a statutory right, the same can be taken away only in terms of the proviso appended to Section 60 of the Act which is extinguished either by a decree or by act of parties. [pic]Admittedly, in the instant case, no decree has been passed extinguishing the right of the mortgagor nor has such right come to an end by act of the parties. 23. A right for obtaining a final decree for sale or foreclosure can be exercised only on payment of such money. Such a right can be exercised at any time even before the sale is confirmed although the final decree might have been passed in the meanwhile. The mortgagee is also not entitled to receive any payment under the preliminary decree nor is the mortgagor required to make an application to recover before paying the same. 24. Such a right can be exercised at any time even before the sale is confirmed although the final decree might have been passed in the meanwhile. The mortgagee is also not entitled to receive any payment under the preliminary decree nor is the mortgagor required to make an application to recover before paying the same. 24. Even, indisputably, despite expiry of the time for deposit of the mortgaged money in terms of the preliminary decree, a second suit for redemption would be maintainable.” (vi) In Prithi Nath Singh vs. Suraj Ahir, (1963) 3 SCR 302 , this Court approved the observations of Allahabad High Court in Rama Prasad vs. Bishambhar Singh, AIR 1946 All 400 , that Sections 60 and 62 of T.P. Act make distinction in right of a usufructuary mortgagor and other mortgagor as follows:- “11. In Ramprasad v. Bishambhar Singh, AIR 1946 All 400 , the question formulated for determination was whether the suit being a suit to recover possession of the mortgaged property after the mortgage money had been paid- off was a suit “against the mortgagee to redeem” or “to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged”. Braund, J., said, at p. 402: “Now, it is quite obvious that that section (Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act) can only refer to a case in which a mortgagor under a subsisting mortgage approaches the Court to establish his right to redeem and to have that redemption carried out by the process of the various declarations and orders of the Court by which it effects redemption. In other words, Section 60 contemplates a case in which the mortgage is still subsisting and the mortgagor goes to the Court to obtain the return of his property on repayment of what is still due. Section 62, on the other hand, is in marked contrast to Section 60. Section 62 says that in the case of a usufructuary mortgage the mortgagor has a right to “recover possession” of the property when (in a case in which the mortgagee is authorised to pay himself the mortgage money out of the rents and profits of the property) the principal money is paid-off. As we see it, that is not a case of redemption at all. As we see it, that is not a case of redemption at all. At the moment when the rents and profits of the mortgaged property sufficed to discharge the principal secured by the mortgage, the mortgage came to an end and the correlative right arose in the mortgagor “to recover possession of the property”. The framers of the Transfer of Property Act have clearly recognised the distinction between the procedure which follows a mortgagor's desire to redeem a subsisting mortgage and the procedure which follows the arising of a usufructuary mortgagor's right to get his property back after the principal has been paid-off.” (vii) In Hamzabi & Ors. vs. Syed Karimuddin & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 414 , it was observed:- “2. The right of the mortgagor to redeem had its origin as an equitable principle for giving relief against forfeiture even after the mortgagor defaulted in making payment under the mortgage deed. It is a right which has been jealously guarded over the years by courts. The maxim of “once a mortgage always a mortgage” and the avoidance of provisions obstructing redemption as “clogs on redemption” are expressions of this judicial protection. (See: Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit (1989) 1 SCC 458 in this context.) As far as this country is concerned, the right is statutorily recognised in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section gives [pic]the mortgagor right to redeem the property at any time after the principal money has become due by tendering the mortgage money and claiming possession of the mortgaged property from the mortgagee. The only limit to this right is contained in the proviso to the section which reads: “Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by decree of a court.” 3. While the expression “decree of court” is explicit enough, the phrase “act of parties” has given rise to controversy. One such act may be when the mortgagor sells the equity of redemption to the mortgagee. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam, (1977) 3 SCC 247 has said that: (SCC p. 254, para 34)” (viii) Contrary view has been expressed in Sampuran Singh & Ors. vs. Smt. Niranjan Kaur (Smt.) & Ors., (1999) 2 SCC 679 as follows:- “14. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam, (1977) 3 SCC 247 has said that: (SCC p. 254, para 34)” (viii) Contrary view has been expressed in Sampuran Singh & Ors. vs. Smt. Niranjan Kaur (Smt.) & Ors., (1999) 2 SCC 679 as follows:- “14. Submission was, as aforesaid, that right to redeem only accrues when either the mortgagors tender the amount of mortgage or the mortgagees communicate satisfaction of the mortgage amount through the usufruct from the land. This submission is misconceived, as aforesaid, if this interpretation is accepted, then till this happens the period of limitation never start running and it could go on for an infinite period. We have no hesitation to reject this submission. The language recorded above makes it clear that right of redemption accrues from the very first day unless restricted under the mortgage deed. When there is no restriction the mortgagors have a right to redeem the mortgage from that very date when the mortgage was executed. Right accruing means, right either existing or coming into play thereafter. Where no period in the mortgage is specified, there exists a right to a mortgagor to redeem the mortgage by paying the amount that very day in case he receives the desired money for which he has mortgaged his land or any day thereafter. This right could only be restricted through law or in terms of a valid mortgage deed. There is no such restriction shown or pointed out. Hence, in our considered opinion the period of limitation would start from the very date the valid mortgage is said to have been executed and hence the period of limitation of 60 years would start from the very date of oral mortgage, that would be from March 1893. In [pic]view of this, we do not find any error in the decision of the first appellate court or the High Court holding that the suit of the present appellants is time-barred.” However, facts mentioned in para 3 show that possession remained with mortgagor and it was not a case of usufructuary mortgage. 14. We need not multiply reference to other judgments. Reference to above judgments clearly spell out the reasons for conflicting views. 14. We need not multiply reference to other judgments. Reference to above judgments clearly spell out the reasons for conflicting views. In cases where distinction in usufructuary mortgagor’s right under Section 62 of the T.P. Act has been noted, right to redeem has been held to continue till the mortgage money is paid for which there is no time limit while in other cases right to redeem has been held to accrue on the date of mortgage resulting in extinguishment of right of redemption after 30 years. 15. We, thus, hold that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly. 16. On this conclusion, the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court will stand affirmed and contrary view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Bhandaru Ram (D) Thr. L.R. Ratan Lal vs. Sukh Ram (supra) will stand over-ruled.” (pp.3452-3464) 24. Since Hon’ble Apex Court has held that mere expiry of period of 30 years from the date of mortgage does not extinguish the right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, there may not be any application of provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 and as such substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 25. Perusal of judgment passed by learned trial Court clearly suggests that suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed being time barred and as such this Court sees no force much less substantial force in the contention of Mr.Palsra that learned first appellate Court failed to deal with the other relevant issues apart from limitation, while accepting the appeal having been preferred by the plaintiffs because perusal of judgment passed by learned first appellate court clearly suggests that learned first appellate Court has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously. 26. 26. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this appeal is dismissed. The judgment passed by the learned first appellate Court below is upheld and that of the learned trial Court is set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiffs is decreed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.