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2016 DIGILAW 2519 (ALL)

Manoj Kumar Gupta v. Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Barabanki

2016-07-20

RAJAN ROY

body2016
JUDGMENT Rajan Roy, J. – Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. As the opposite parties no. 3 to 5 are the legal heirs of the original tenant who had sub-let the premises to the predecessor in interest of petitioners and as their rights are not in conflict with that of the petitioners rather they are in consonance with them and as the opposite parties no. 6 to 8 who are legal heirs of the original landlady are already represented through counsel and as this Court does not intend to enter into merits of the issues involved in the appeal or in the application for impleadment, therefore, considering the order proposed to be passed, the issuance of notice to them is dispensed with. 3. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners/sub-tenants of the Premises in question have challenged the judgment dated 11.05.2016 passed by the Appellate Court in the Rent appeal under Section 22 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 bearing No. 07 of 2012 on an application filed by the petitioners herein under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. for being impleaded as respondents therein. 4. The factual background leading to this writ petition in brief is that one Mohal Lal was the original tenant of the premises in question. It is said that he sub-let the tenanted premises to his brother Madan Mohan Gupta. The petitioners are the sons of the said sub-tenant. The opposite parties no. 3 to 5 are the legal heirs of the original tenant. The opposite parties no. 6 to 8 are the legal heirs of Smt. Savitri Devi daughter of Bhagwan Dai the original land lady, who after the death of Bhagwan Dai filed an application under Section 21 for release of the tenanted premises in question. Smt. Savitri Devi died during pendency of the proceedings whereupon the opposite parties no. 6 to 8 were substituted in her place in P.A. Case No. 11 of 1998 filed by her. In the Application under Section 21 in para 7 it was stated that the original tenant Mohan Lal had given the premises to his brother Madan Mohan Gupta few years ago and Shri. Madan Mohan Gupta was running the shop. It was also stated that the original tenant has no concern with the said shop after its handing over to Madan Mohan Gupta. 5. It was also stated that the original tenant has no concern with the said shop after its handing over to Madan Mohan Gupta. 5. P.A. Case No. 11 of 1998 was allowed initially vide judgment dated 26.08.2003, however, in appeal the said judgment was set-aside vide judgment dated 24.07.2004 and the matter was remanded back to the Prescribed Authority for taking a decision afresh on the question of sub-letting as the same, in spite of being disputed, was not considered. Thereafter, the Prescribed Authority decided the matter afresh on the question of sub-letting while reiterating the findings on the other issues in terms of the earlier judgment. The Prescribed Authority opined that the alleged sub-tenancy firstly could not be proved. The rent receipt issued by Bhagwan Dai in favour of Mohan Lal with stipulation on the font page that the shop shall not be sub-let and alleged endorsement on the back page that the same was being sub-let to Madan Mohan Gupta was disbelieved considering the contradiction therein as also the contradictory report of the experts as adduced by the parties regarding signatures thereon. 6. Moreover, the Prescribed Authority went on to hold that under Section 25 (1) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 sub-tenancy could not be created by a tenant in respect of the whole of the building under his tenancy, however, under Sub-section 2 thereof a tenant with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate, could sub-let a part of the building. Based on the aforesaid provision it held firstly that there was a prohibition of sub-letting. Moreover, the alleged consent of the landlord by itself was not sufficient unless it was also approved by the District Magistrate. Relying upon various decision in favour of the aforesaid and distinguishing those filed by the tenant the Prescribed Authority allowed the application. Against this the original tenant filed an Appeal under Section 22 of the Act bearing No. 13 of 1972. During its pendency he died and the legal heirs who are arrayed as opposite parties no. 3 to 5 were substituted in his place. 7. At this appellate stage the sub-tenant sought impleadment by moving the application under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. relying upon the alleged admission of sub-tenancy in the application under Section 21 filed by the land lady. 3 to 5 were substituted in his place. 7. At this appellate stage the sub-tenant sought impleadment by moving the application under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. relying upon the alleged admission of sub-tenancy in the application under Section 21 filed by the land lady. It is this application which has been rejected as being premature by the Appellate Court on 11.05.2016. 8. Both the learned counsel for the parties addressed the Court on the merits of the application as regards whether the sub-tenant was a necessary and proper party or not. 9. With reference to the provisions contained in Section 25 read with Section 3 (a) it was contended by Shri. U.K. Srivastava, learned counsel appearing the opposite parties no. 6 to 8 that sub-letting was prohibited and there was no approval of the District Magistrate under Section 25 (2), therefore, it being invalid as held by the Prescribed Authority, the sub-tenant and his legal heirs were neither necessary nor proper party and did not have any right. 10. It was contended by Shri. M.A. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/sub-tenant herein that if sub-tenancy was admitted in the Application under Section 21 and as the rent had been received from the sub-tenant through tenant in Chief by the landlords, therefore, in view of the various pronouncements reported in (1990) 1 ARC 523; Kanhaiya Lal v. Prescribed Authority, Agra and Ors., (1990) 1 ARC 524; Subhash Chandra Gupta v. VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad and Ors., (1982) 8 ALR 632 ; Smt. Shyam Kumar Gupta v. Shanker Sahai and Another, (1984) 1 ARC 248; Shyam Babu v. District Judge, Moradabad and others, (1991) 17 ALR 286; Bal Krishan v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others and (1998) 1 ARC 218; Shiv Kumar v. Sajida and Others, they had a right to be heard. 11. He also relied upon the rent receipt which was disbelieved by the Prescribed Authority but most of all he contended that application could not have been dismissed as premature, as, if the appeal is finally decided then at what stage his client would have a right of seeking impleadment is not known nor mentioned in the appellate order. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned order, the Court finds that the learned Appellate Court has not dismissed the application for impleadment on merits. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned order, the Court finds that the learned Appellate Court has not dismissed the application for impleadment on merits. As far as the contention of Shri. U.K. Srivastava based on Rule 22 of the Rules 1972 that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. are not applicable to the proceedings in question is concerned, with respect, even if the provisions itself is not applicable, the principles contained therein would be attracted and party claiming itself to be necessary and proper party can always seek impleadment, but, this apart, as, the Appellate Court has not dismissed the application for impleadment on merits but has dismissed it only on the ground of it being premature, it is inexplicable as to what would be the stage at which such an application would be maintainable. This aspect of the matter has not been dealt with. While this Court can understand the difficulty faced by the Appellate Court as the disposal of the application on merits would have involved touching upon issues which were involved in the appeal etc. but then the solution to this predicament was to defer the hearing of the application and take it up while deciding the question of sub-letting and not to dismiss it as premature. Once the application is dismissed as premature and thereafter, appeal itself is decided finally, assuming that it is decided against the appellant-opposite party no. 3 to 5, what would happen to the rights of the petitioners/applicants seeking impleadment to be heard on their application at least, therefore, without entering into merits of their entitlement to impleadment etc. as there is no adjudication on this issue by the Appellate Court, the impugned order for the reasons aforesaid is not sustainable and is set-aside. 13. The application for impleadment of the petitioners shall stand restored with a direction to the Appellate Court that while deciding the appeal it would first of all consider and decide the question of subtenancy and while doing so it shall also consider and decide the application for impleadment filed by the petitioners herein. 14. 13. The application for impleadment of the petitioners shall stand restored with a direction to the Appellate Court that while deciding the appeal it would first of all consider and decide the question of subtenancy and while doing so it shall also consider and decide the application for impleadment filed by the petitioners herein. 14. It is made clear that this Court has not entered into the merits of any of the issues involved whether in the appeal or on the application for impleadment and it shall be open for the Appellate Court to take an independent decision as per law. 15. The petition is allowed in part in the aforesaid terms.