ORDER : 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by first appellate Court by which the first appeal filed by the appellants/plaintiffs was dismissed by the said Court affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit. 2. The appellants/plaintiffs instituted a Civil suit claiming restoration of possession enumerated under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1963') alleging inter-alia that he was dispossessed forcefully by the defendants on 07-05-1983 illegally, though he entered lawfully into the possession over the suit property, described in the plaint scheduled under a registered sale-deed dated 02-05-1983 (Ex.P-1) said to have been executed by one Bhondu in his favour for a consideration of Rs.4,000/-. 3. Defendants No.1 & 2 also filed their counter claim claiming title. They contested the claim on the ground that Palton, defendant No.1 is the owner of the suit property allotted to him in a partition held among his brothers in 1975 saying further that said Bhondu had no alienable interest over the suit land as the same was not allotted to him in partition and that on the basis of forged sale-deed, the plaintiff is trying to construct a house without having any valid title. 4. The said Bhondu (since deceased), represented by his L.Rs., respondents No.3 to 7 accepted the claim of the plaintiff by filing his written statement on 28-03-1985 while rest of the defendants were treated ex-parte. 5. Upon hearing the parties, the trial Court dismissed the suit by its judgment and decree dated 28-10-1999 finding inter-alia; a. that, the plaintiff's vendor Bhondu had no alienable interest over the suit property and, therefore, the plaintiff's possession over the suit property cannot be treated as lawful possession by virtue of alleged sale, Ex. P-1. b. that, mere 5 days possession of the plaintiff over the suit property cannot be held to be his continuous possession and, plaintiff's possession could be held as encroacher; c. that, plaintiff failed to establish that his possession was juridical over the suit property; and, in consequence by dismissing the plaintiff's claim, trial Court allowed the counter-claim of defendant No.1 holding him the owner of the suit property. 6. The Trial Court by its judgment and decree dismissed the suit and decreed the counter-claim as stated above. 6. The Trial Court by its judgment and decree dismissed the suit and decreed the counter-claim as stated above. The first appellate Court by its judgment held that plaintiff's suit as framed is in-fact based upon title and dismissed the appeal. It was also held that the plaintiff's vendor Bhondu had no alienable interest over the suit property and, therefore, by virtue of alleged sale-deed, plaintiffs possession cannot be held to be lawful possession and in consequence affirmed the decree of the trial Court. 7. The second appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC') on the ground that the Court below ought not to have entered into question of title in a suit for restoration of possession instituted under Section 6 of the Act, 1963. Once having held that plaintiff was in possession the Court below ought to have restored his possession by exercising the power under Section 6 of the Act, 1963. 8. Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs would submit that the trial Court has committed legal error in entering into question of title in a suit for restoration of possession instituted under Section 6 of the Act, 1963. Similarly, counter-claim could not have been entertained in a suit for restoration of possession instituted under Section 6 of the Act, 1963. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs and considered the rival submissions made therein and also gone through the record extensively. 10. It is not in dispute that plaintiff had instituted civil suit for restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Act, 1963 seeking recovery of possession based on previous possession which was dismissed by trial Court. Against that judgment and decree, First Appeal under Section 96 of CPC was filed which was also dismissed by the appellate Court and against the dismissal of the first appeal, the second appeal under Section 100 of CPC has been filed. 11. The short question for consideration would be whether such an appeal was maintainable in view of the bar created in sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, 1963. 12. 11. The short question for consideration would be whether such an appeal was maintainable in view of the bar created in sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, 1963. 12. At this stage, it is appropriate to notice sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, 1963 which reads as under:- “(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.” 13. A careful perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, 1963 would show that the bar created under sub-section (3) of Section 6 is of an appeal and/or review and the appeal against the order or decree in any suit instituted under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1963 is expressly prohibited and barred. However, legislature has taken care of the person aggrieved against the order or decree passed in suit instituted under Section 6 of the Act, 1963 by providing remedy under sub-section (4) of Section 6 that such aggrieved persons/defendants can institute a suit based on title and establish his title to recover possession thereof. 14. However, it is pertinent to note that by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, 1963, the appeal as well as review is barred but revision before this Court under Section 115 is not barred and in an appropriate case, it can be availed by the person aggrieved. The Nagpur High Court in the matter of Bhojraj Krishnarao and Anr. Vs. Sheshrao Diwakarrao and Ors., AIR 1949 Nagpur 126 relying upon the two earlier judgments of the Nagpur High Court held as under:- “5. The Specific Relief Act has provided a remedy for a person who is aggrieved by the decree passed in a suit under Section 9, Specific Relief Act. His remedy is by way of a suit based on title. It is well established that the High Court does not, except in a very extreme case, interfere by way of revision, where a separate remedy is available to the applicant, vide Samsherkhan v. Abdul Sattarkhan A.I.R. (13) 1926 Nag. 290, Pragilal v. Khilawansingh A.I.R. (33) 1946 Nag. 393.” 15. The decision of Nagpur High Court has been followed with approval by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a decision in the matter of Shree Onama Glass Works Ltd. Vs. 290, Pragilal v. Khilawansingh A.I.R. (33) 1946 Nag. 393.” 15. The decision of Nagpur High Court has been followed with approval by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a decision in the matter of Shree Onama Glass Works Ltd. Vs. Shri Ram Harak Panday and Ors., AIR 1966 MP 282 holding that revision under Section 9 of the Act of 1877 (which is pari-materia provision to Section 6 of the Act of 1963) can be justified only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, it is held that against the order or decree based in a suit instituted under Section 6(1) of the Act, the remedy of appeal or review is expressly barred by virtue of provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 6(1) of the Act. However, the decision or order thereunder can be challenged by filing revision under Section 115 of the CPC only in exceptional cases or where there is grave injustice or error of law otherwise it is upon to the person aggrieved by decision in a suit filed under Section 6 of the Act, 1963 to file suit for establishing his title as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the said Act. 16. As a consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC is held to be barred by sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, 1963 and appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. However, the plaintiffs/appellants shall have liberty to proceed in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act, 1963 or avail the remedy of revision, if it comes with the parameter of extreme case as pointed out by the Nagpur and Madhya Pradesh High Courts in above stated judgments. No order as to costs.