Parvat Singh v. Gram Pancahyat, Makad Seema, Udaipur
2016-02-15
GOPAL KRISHAN VYAS
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Gopal Krishan Vyas, J. The instant civil misc. appeal has been filed by the appellant under Order 43, Rule 1 read with Section 104 CPC against the judgment and decree dated 11.9.2015 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Salumber, District Udaipur in Appeal No. 26/2012 whereby the learned appellate court though allowed the appeal filed by the appellant, but while observing that judgment and decree of the learned trial court is liable to be dismissed, yet instead of decreeing the suit, remanded the matter to the learned trial court for rehearing and re-deciding the matter while setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial court dated 12.10.2011 passed in Civil Suit No.59/2014. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned lower appellate court committed an error of law in remaining the matter to the learned trial court because as per Order 41, Rule 23 and 23A of CPC the remand order can be made where the appellate court considers that retrial of the case is necessary, but from perusal of the impugned judgment of appellate court it is clear that neither any direction has been given nor any observation has been made for retrial of the case is necessary, therefore, the appellate court was under obligation to decide the appeal on its merit. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court if there are already evidence on record than the appellate court should decide the matter on merit in stead of re d of remanding the matter to the learned trial court for deciding the matter afresh as the appellate court itself is having jurisdiction to decide the case on merit. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention towards the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashwin Kumar K. Patel v. Upendra J. Patel & Ors reported in 1999 DNJ (SC) 207 and submits that the judgment impugned may kindly be quashed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment is totally erroneous because the learned trial court accepted that there is an evidence in favour of the appellant, therefore the judgment of the lower appellate court may kindly be quashed and the suit filed by the appellant plaintiff may kindly be decreed as prayed in the suit.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment is totally erroneous because the learned trial court accepted that there is an evidence in favour of the appellant, therefore the judgment of the lower appellate court may kindly be quashed and the suit filed by the appellant plaintiff may kindly be decreed as prayed in the suit. 5.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment is totally erroneous because the learned trial court accepted that there is an evidence in favour of the appellant, therefore the judgment of the lower appellate court may kindly be quashed and the suit filed by the appellant plaintiff may kindly be decreed as prayed in the suit. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant I have perused the finding given by the learned appellate court, which reads as under:- ^^vihykFkhZ ioZr flag us fookfnr Hkwfe ds laca/k esa izkFkZuki= izLrqr dj o"kZ 2002 esa mls fcykuke fd fdLe vkcknh mi[k.M vf/kdkjh ds vkns'k ls ntZ djk;k gS bl izdkj tc fcykuke Hkwfe ml le; ntZ Fkh rks ljiap dks iV~Vk tkjh djus dk dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha FkkA bl izdj.k esa izHkkjh fpfdRlk vf/kdkjh lywEcj ds uke iV~Vk tkjh fd;k tkuk crk;k gS ysfdu og izdj.k esa i{kdkj ugha FkkA vf/koDrk izfroknhx.k dh vksj ls bl laca/k esa vkifRr dh xbZ gS ysfdu fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us bl vkifRr dk rRle; fujkdj.k ugha fd;k gS tcfd vkns'k 01 fu;e 13 tkånhå ds vuqlkj i{kdkj ds laca/k esa izkFkfed Lrj ij gh ,slh vkifRr;ksa dk fujkdj.k djuk vko';d gSA U;k;ky; Lo;a Hkh fdlh vko';d i{kdkj dks la;ksftr fd;s tkus dk vkns'k ns ldrk gS ysfdu ;g U;kf;d izfdz;k ds fcYdqy foijhr gS fd vafre Lrj ij i{kdkj u gksus ds vk/kkj ij vuqrks"k iznku ugha fd;k tk,A bl izdj.k esa fookfnr Hkwfe ij miLokLF; dsUnz cuk;k tkuk crk;k gSA miLokLF; dsUnz cuk;k tkuk crk;k gSA miLokLF; dsUnz xzke iapk;r }kjk cuk;k tkuk crk;k gS] ysfdu mDr miLokLF; dsUnz ds laca/k esa /kujkf'k Lohd`fr gksus] [kpZ gksus vkfn ds fy;s dksbZ Hkh fo'oluh; lk{; i=koyh ij izLrqr ugha dh gSA ;g vR;Ur gh vk'p;Ztud gS fd xzkeoklh ;g dgrs gSa fd mDr fuekZ.k mDr xzke iapk;r }kjk fd;k x;k gksA xzke iapk;r ds ikl ,sls fuekZ.k dk;Z ds laca/k esa dksbZ /ku laca/kh] Lohd`fr laca/kh bR;kfn fdlh izdkj dh lk{; ugha gSA dfFkr fuekZ.k dk;Z okn nk;j djus ds le; gh izkjEHk gqvk gSA fof/kd n`"VkUr&neu xksMk o vU; cuke j.kok o vU; 1992¼2½ lhå,yå,å 29 ds ekeys esa ekuuh; dukZVd mPp U;k;ky; us ;g fl)kUr izfrikfnr fd;k gS& ftl fu"ks/kkKk ds okn esa dCts dk vuqrks"k ugha pkgk x;k gS ,oa oknh dh Hkwfe ij izfroknh dk vfrdzek.k izekf.kr gksrk gS rks U;k;ky; U;k; iznku djus ds fy, dCtk dh fMdzh nsus ds fy, l{ke gSA bl izdkj xzke iapk;r ekdMlhek ds }kjk u rks iV~Vk fn;k tkus ds fy;s vf/kdkfjrk Fkh u gh iV~Vk izekf.kr djk;k gS vkSj oknh dh Hkwfe gksrs gq, mls iV~Vk tkjh djus dk vf/kdkj ugha Fkk vr% izfroknhx.k bl fook|d dks vius i{k esa izekf.kr djus esa vlQy ugha gSA fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us bl fook|d ds laca/k esa fof/k ,oa rF; ds vuq:i fofu'p; ugha fd;k gS vr% bl fook|d dk Hkh iqu% fofu'p; gksuk U;k;fgr esa vko';d gSA 10- fook|d laå 1] 4 o 5 ds vUrxZr fu"d"kZ fudyrk gS fd fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds rF;ksa ,oa fof/k lEer tks fu"d"kZ fn;k gS og fof/k lEer ugha gSA vr% izdj.k dks iqu% lquokbZ gsrq fjek.M fd;k tkuk mfpr gSA 11- bl izdj.k esa vU; fook|dksa dk fu.kZ; bUgha rhuksa eq[; fook|dksa ij vk/kkfjr gSaA pwafd bu nksuksa gh fook|dksa dk fu.kZ; rF; ,oa fof/k ds vuq:i ugha gksus ds dkj.k [kf.Mr fd;k x;k gS rFkk i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; dk foospu ,oa lacaf/kr fof/k dk fd;k tkuk U;k;ksfpr izrhr gksrk gSA vr% vkisf{kr fu.kZ; o fMdzh fnukad 12-10-2011 [kf.Mr fd;k tkdj i=koyh dks iqu% fu.khZ; fd;s tkus gsrq mHk; i{kksa dks lquokbZ dk volj nsdj fjek.M fd;k tkuk vko';d gSA** 6.
Upon perusal of the above, I am of the opinion that the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Ashwin Kumar K. Patel (supra) is not applicable in the present case because as per the finding given by the learned lower appellate court there is no finding in the judgment of the learned trial court with regard to presumption of the document under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1972. Therefore, obviously if no finding was given by the learned trial court then, there was no material to reverse the any erroneous finding given by the learned trial court. In view of the above fact, I have perused the para no.8 of the judgment in the case of Ashwin Kumar K. Patel (supra), which reads as under: "8. In our view, the High Court should not ordinarily remand a cause under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC to the lower Court merely because it considered that the reasoning of the lower court in some respects was wrong. Such remand orders lead to unnecessary delays and cause prejudice to the 5 parties to the case. When the material was available before the High Court, it should have itself decided the appeal one way or other. It could have considered the various aspects of the case mentioned in the order of the trial Court and considered whether the order of the trial Court ought to be confirmed or reversed or modified. It could have easily considered the documents and affidavits and decided about the prima facie case on the material available. In mattes involving agreements of 1980 (and 1996) on the one hand and an agreement of 1991 on the other, as in this case, such remand orders would lead to further delay and uncertainty. We are, therefore, of the view that the remand by the High Court was not necessary. 7. Upon perusal of the above adjudication made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is obvious that as per above verdict ordinarily the matter should not be remanded under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC to the lower court because reasoning of the lower court in some respect may be wrong but here in this case, there is no finding with regard to presumption, therefore, the first appellate court has rightly remanded the case to the trial court to decide the case afresh. 8.
8. In view of the above, without interfering in the judgment dated 11.9.2015 the instant appeal is disposed of with direction to the learned trial court to decide the suit within a period of three months from the date of receiving certified copy of this order.