JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—During pendency of writ petition, we are informed that petitioners 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 and 16 have died long back and, therefore, writ petition has abated in respect of these petitioners including criminal proceedings initiated against them. 2. The proceedings in question as also the dispute in the present writ petition is now surviving only in respect of petitioners 1, 2, 4, 5, 12, 13 and 14 only. 3. Sri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Rahul Mishra and Sri Sudeep Kumar, Advocates, have appeared for petitioners; Sri R.C. Yadav, learned Standing Counsel for respondent-1; and, Dr. H.N. Tripathi, Advocate, has appeared for respondent-2. 4. About ten orders passed in a span of more than one and half decade have been challenged collectively in this writ petition. Order dated 26.10.1981 (Annexure 3) is passed by U.P. Water Pollution Board (hereinafter referred to as “Board”) refusing consent to petitioner-1 for discharge of effluent on the ground that effluent discharged by petitioner is highly polluted and has not been properly treated and disposed of. The orders dated 27.3.1982 (Annexure-5), 7.2.1983 (Annexure-35B), 16.8.1984 (Annexure-35C), 25.6.1985 /10.7.1985 (Annexure-12), 6.5.1986 (annexure-31), 7.5.1987 (Annexure-33), 5.10.1987 (Annexure-34A), 10.2.1988 (Annexure-35A) and 10.4.1989 (Annexure-47) also refuse consent under Section 25/26 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1974”) for subsequent years. 5. Petitioner has also prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing proceedings under Section 33 of Act, 1974 pending in Case No. 773 of 1989 in the Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Pollution Control), Lucknow. It has also prayed for quashing of complaint and further proceedings in Case No. 774 of 1989 under Section 44 of Act, 1974 pending in the Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Pollution Control), Lucknow. 6. Brief facts as borne out from writ petition are that petitioner-M/S Daurala Sugar Works (Distillery) is owned by M/s DCM Limited, Delhi having its registered Office at Kanchenjunga Building, 18, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi. Distillery was installed in the year 1943. There is rearrangement of Company ‘DCM Limited’ alongwith three other Companies, i.e., DCM Industries Limited, DCM Shriram Industries Limited and Shriram Industrial Enterprises Limited, approved by Delhi High Court vide order dated 16.4.1990 under Section 391-394 of Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1956”). Distillery was installed in the year 1943. There is rearrangement of Company ‘DCM Limited’ alongwith three other Companies, i.e., DCM Industries Limited, DCM Shriram Industries Limited and Shriram Industrial Enterprises Limited, approved by Delhi High Court vide order dated 16.4.1990 under Section 391-394 of Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1956”). Daurala Sugar Works, Daurala is now a unit of M/s DCM Shriram Industries Limited, New Delhi with effect from 1.4.1990. 7. Since installation of Distillery, the Trade Effluent discharged by it is used to be consumed by nearby growers to irrigate their fields and for that purpose petitioner-company constructed a channel running in about five kilometers. This channel joins a drain (sewer) known as kali Nadi which is neither a river nor watercourse nor stream. 8. Parliament enacted Act, 1974 and State of U.P. framed Rules, namely U.P. Water (Consent for Discharge of Sewage and Trade Effluent) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1981”) which came into force on 30.3.1981. It constituted ‘Board’ for the purpose of giving effect to provisions of Act, 1974 and Rules framed by State Government. Sections 25 and 26 of Act, 1974 required a running Industry to obtain consent from Board for discharging ‘Trade Effluent’ in a stream or well or sewer or on land. State Government issued Notification dated 21.9.1981 specifying 31.12.1981 as the date on or before which consent application should be filed by existing industries. Board vide Notification dated 6.4.1983 laid down effluent standards for discharge in stream and on land. Board fixed BOD level at 100 MG per liter for existing Distilleries. 9. Petitioner-1 submitted application for consent of Board on 29.6.1981. Board declined consent vide letter dated 26.10.1981 and asked petitioner to submit fresh application with certain clarifications. Petitioner-1 replied queries vide letter dated 27.11.1981. Consent was again declined and documents were returned by Board vide letter dated 27.3.1982. Petitioner 1, however, was again permitted to file fresh application. 10. For the purpose of setting up “Effluent Treatment Plant”, petitioner-1 made an application to Collector on 13.7.1981 requesting for allotment of 31.38 acres land in Village Daurala and Machri, adjacent to petitioner-Distillery which was taken by State Government under U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “UP Act, 1960”). 10. For the purpose of setting up “Effluent Treatment Plant”, petitioner-1 made an application to Collector on 13.7.1981 requesting for allotment of 31.38 acres land in Village Daurala and Machri, adjacent to petitioner-Distillery which was taken by State Government under U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “UP Act, 1960”). Correspondence continued but petitioner could not get land as desired for setting up “Effluent Treatment Plant” whereupon petitioner made its own efforts with individual farmers and could get land in June’ 1984 and June’ 1985 measuring 18.43 acres. 11. On 7.5.1983 and 16.8.1984 similar orders were passed by Board rejecting petitioner’s application for consent. Petitioner also moved application on 9.3.1985 to the Board requesting for grant of consent in which it also mentioned a time bound programme for setting up “Effluent Treatment Plant”. Board however declined consent vide order dated 25.6.1985/10.7.1985. Petitioner-1, however, was permitted to continue with the plan of setting up “Effluent Treatment Plan”. The standards fixed by Board vide Notification dated 6.4.1983 were very stringent and no proven technology was available to bring down distillery effluent to the prescribed standards, hence a lot of correspondence took place between Members and Office Bearers of All India Distillers’ Association and Central Government etc. in which Distillers’ Association all through made attempts to have implementation of such standards deferred and to allow Distilleries to install Treatment Plant in phases so as to reduce effluent upto the extent of 95 per cent, i.e., to bring down BOD upto 3000 to 4000. 12. Board issued a notice to petitioner under Sections 25 and 26 read with 44 of Act, 1974 with further advise to complete installation of “Effluent Treatment Plant”. 13. Fifth time application was submitted by petitioner for consent on 4.1.1986. Since petitioner’s unit continuously was running without consent under Section 25/26, Board filed application in March’ 1986 under Section 33 of Act, 1974 before Chief Judicial Magistrate for a direction to petitioner-distillery to stop discharge of effluent. An ex parte order was passed by Magistrate on 29.3.1986 restraining Distillery from discharging effluent in Kali Nadi. Petitioner filed objection and thereafter Magistrate passed order on 17.5.1986 suspending interim order dated 29.3.1986 and directing petitioner to submit progress report of “Effluent Treatment Plant” to Board. An ex parte order was passed by Magistrate on 29.3.1986 restraining Distillery from discharging effluent in Kali Nadi. Petitioner filed objection and thereafter Magistrate passed order on 17.5.1986 suspending interim order dated 29.3.1986 and directing petitioner to submit progress report of “Effluent Treatment Plant” to Board. It also directed petitioner-1 to ensure that it does not discharge polluted effluent without treatment and will try its best to bring polluted effluent near about standards prescribed by Board. 14. Petitioner’s application dated 4.1.1986 for consent was declined by Board vide order dated 6.5.1986. 15. Sixth application was submitted seeking consent on 30.12.1986 which was also rejected on 7.5.1987. Next application seeking consent was filed by petitioner 1 on 12.6.1987 which was rejected by Board on 5.10.1987. Then further application was filed on 9.12.1987 which was rejected on 10.2.1988. 16. In the pending proceedings under Section 33, Magistrate passed an order on 31.8.1987 directing petitioner-factory to bring down pollution level in ‘Trade Effluent’ upto prescribed standard by 15.10.1987. On 9.9.1987, sample was taken and BOD content in the sample were found as 775 MG/Liter and 725 MG/Liter. Petitioner made all efforts to bring down BOD level but could not reduce BOD level as required, though it could be reduced by over 97 per cent. 17. Petitioner sought further time from Magistrate to bring down BOD standard as required. Magistrate did not extend time and passed stop order on 17.10.1987. Thereagainst, petitioners filed Criminal Revision No. 342 of 1987 before District Judge wherein initially an interim order was passed but ultimately revision was dismissed by Sri S.K. Samadhiya, 11th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut. Thereafter, Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred aforesaid Criminal Case vide order dated 31.1.1989 to the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate, Pollution Control Board, Lucknow. Special Judicial Magistrate passed an order on 14.3.1989 directing Board to submit report by 15.4.1989 on the following aspects: “(i) Whether the Distillery of the petitioners’ Company is in operation or not? (ii) Whether the order dated 26.9.98 of XIth Additional Sessions Judge rejecting Revision of the petitioner has been challenged in the High Court and whether any stay order has been granted? (iii) What action has been taken by the Effluent Board on the directions of the orders of CJM dated 17.10.1987 and order of XIth Additional Sessions Judge dated 26.9.1988?” 18. (iii) What action has been taken by the Effluent Board on the directions of the orders of CJM dated 17.10.1987 and order of XIth Additional Sessions Judge dated 26.9.1988?” 18. On 15.4.1989, Court passed following order: ^^eqdnek is'k gqvkA ifjoknh i{k dh vksj ls fof/k vf/kdkjh mifLFkrA foi{kh dh vksj ls dksbZ ugh cksykA eqdnek fnukad 17-4-89 dks vfxze vkns'k gsrq is'k gks pwafd blh okn ls lacaf/kr eqdnek fnukad 17-4-89 dks fu/kkZfjr gSA^^ “The case presented. Legal Officer is present from complainant side. None responded on behalf of opposite party. Put up this case on 17.4.1989 for further orders since another matter related to this case is fixed for 17.4.1989.” (English Translation by Court) 19. Proceedings are now going on, though once final order was passed by Magistrate, there was no occasion to continue with the same proceedings after transferring the same to Special Judicial Magistrate. 20. In the meantime, it is submitted that effluent sample taken on 17.11.1987 was analysed and report dated 7.12.1987 prepared by Industrial Toxicology Research Centre, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as “ITRC”) found BOD contents as under: “(1) BOD of inlct of secondary treatment : 10200 mg/ltr (2) BOD of outlet of secondary treatment : 875 mg/ltr (3) BOD of final discharge after dilution : 98.8 mg/ltr 21. Petitioner with huge investment and continuous efforts installed Treatment Plant and has been able to bring down pollutants level to optimum. There is no intentional and deliberate violation of Act, 1974 and Rules and Regulations framed thereunder as also the standards laid down by Board, hence, proceedings under Section 25, 26 and 33 of Act, 1974 are illegal. The prosecution lodged by Board is without any foundation and ignoring sincere endeavour on the part of petitioner-1 to treat Trade Effluent in the most effective manner for which it has also installed Treatment Plant after investing huge amount in consultation with experts available in the Country. The entire prosecution launched against petitioner is malicious and bad in law. Directors of Company have been made accused without specifying as to how they have any nexus with the act complained and therefore implication of all Directors of Company is illegal and bad. It is only with the purpose to harass them. The order passed by Magistrate directing all the accused to appear before him is without any application of mind. Directors of Company have been made accused without specifying as to how they have any nexus with the act complained and therefore implication of all Directors of Company is illegal and bad. It is only with the purpose to harass them. The order passed by Magistrate directing all the accused to appear before him is without any application of mind. Petitioner-company has nominated vide Board of Directors’ resolution dated 26.12.1984, Sri Gyanendra Kumar, Chief Engineer, Daurala Sugar Works as person in-charge of and responsible to Company for compliance and observance of provisions of Act, 1974 under due intimation thereof to the Board but still it has implicated all Directors of Company in a wholly arbitrary and illegal manner. Directors have exercised all due diligence with regard to installation of Effluent Treatment Plant and hence are not liable for imputation of any offence punishable under Act, 1974. Standard fixed by Board in 1983 were almost impossible to attain and out of 28 Distilleries in State of U.P., hardly a few distilleries have installed a Treatment Plant in both phases which show that it was not possible to run Distillery maintaining standard of Trade Effluent as prescribed by Board. Therefore, requiring petitioners to comply with a provision which is almost impossible is illegal and arbitrary. No person can be required to do some thing which is impossible. It is said that before rejection of application for consent, no opportunity was afforded and the orders were passed ex parte, in violation of principles of natural justice. 22. Standards have been revised by Board vide Notification dated 19.9.1992, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure SA-9 to the Supplementary-affidavit sworn by Dr. M.C. Bardiya in November, 1994. 23. After revised standards and installation of Treatment Plant, petitioner-Factory has been found discharging Trade Effluent as per prescribed revised standards and there is no violation of provisions of Act, 1974. The proceedings initiated by Board under Sections 33 and 44 of Act, 1974 are malicious, there is no mens rea or intention on the part of petitioner to flout any provision thereof and, therefore, all the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 24. The proceedings initiated by Board under Sections 33 and 44 of Act, 1974 are malicious, there is no mens rea or intention on the part of petitioner to flout any provision thereof and, therefore, all the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 24. Learned counsel for petitioner has addressed us at a great length taking great pain to show that Act, 1974 being a new legislation, after framing of Rules in 1981, petitioner-Company made earnest efforts to treat Trade Effluent in most effective manner so as to reduce pollutants and bring standards to the nearest possible as prescribed by Board, but since those standards were impossible to achieve, petitioner Company failed to do so. Further, installation of Treatment Plant took a longer time of seven years, firstly, due to delay in acquiring requisite area of land and secondly, for installation of plant since its technology was not commonly available and petitioner-company has to consult and engage various experts in the field and for all these reasons, the bona fide of petitioner to comply with the requirement of Act, 1974 is writ large and there is no reason to penalize petitioner for some lapses, if got committed due to the reasons beyond the control of petitioner. 25. However, having gone through the entire record and looking to the detailed submissions, in our view the scope of judicial review in this writ petition is very limited. The number of orders impugned in this writ petition are very large, but in effect same can be classified in two categories; first, orders passed by Board refusing to grant consent under Section 25/26; and, second, criminal proceedings initiated by Board for defiance on the part of petitioners in observing mandate of Act, 1974 by filing applications under Section 33 and 44 which are pending before the appropriate Court having jurisdiction in the matter. 26. Now so far as first category’s orders are concerned whereby Board has refused consent, it is an admitted position that petitioner-Company continued to run its factory and discharging Trade Effluent which was not treated so as to bring down pollutants upto the standard prescribed by Board. Meaning thereby petitioner continued to discharge ‘Trade Effluent’ on the land/sewer/stream, as the case may be, without its treatment to bring down pollutants so as to comply with the standards prescribed by Board and that too without any consent of Board. Meaning thereby petitioner continued to discharge ‘Trade Effluent’ on the land/sewer/stream, as the case may be, without its treatment to bring down pollutants so as to comply with the standards prescribed by Board and that too without any consent of Board. Apparently, this action on the part of petitioners and its continued running of Factory and discharge of Trade Effluent which was polluted beyond the standards prescribed by Board, was bound to cause health hazards to the public at large. The applications filed by petitioner-1 seeking consent of Board did not satisfy requirement of Statute inasmuch admittedly Trade Effluent was not treated or could not be treated at that time so as to bring down pollutants to the prescribed level. Board, therefore, committed no mistake either in law or otherwise in rejecting consent and in view of these admitted facts, on merits we find no justification at all to interfere therewith. 27. The substantial argument at this stage is that standards prescribed by Board were such that no person despite best efforts and installing available technology, could have achieved. Statute does not require a person to do something which is impossible and for such things petitioners cannot be penalized at all. 28. The proposition of law in its abstract form is well established. There are three maxims i.e.”Lex Non Cogit ad impossibilia”, “impotentia Excusat legim” and “neon tenatur ad impossibilia”. Law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. Where law creates a duty and a party is unable to perform it without any default in him and has no remedy over there, the law will excuse him. 29. The aforesaid doctrines have been accepted, approved and applied by Courts in India also. As long back as in Cochin State Power and Light Corporation Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1965 SC 1788, Court followed the aforesaid maxims and held; “The performance of this impossible duty must be excused in accordance with the maxim, lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel the doing of impossibilities) and Sub-section (4) of Section 6 must be construed as not being applicable to a case where compliance with it is impossible.” (para 8) 30. A Constitution Bench of seven Hon’ble Judges in Re Presidential Pool, 1974 (2) SCC 33 , held as under: “The maxim of law impotentia excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him.” Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (See Broom’s Legal Maxims 10th Edition at pp. 162-163 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Ed. at p.268).” (para 15) 31. In State of Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1082 , Court, while considering a case under National Security Act, applied the aforesaid doctrine and held as under: “Mr. Jethmalani placed before us a passage from Broom’s Legal Maxims (p. 162), 10th Edn., where the doctrine of impossibility of performance (lex non cogit ad impossibilia) has been discussed. It has been indicated therein that however mandatory the provision may be, where it is impossible of compliance that would be a sufficient excuse for non-compliance, particularly when it is a question of the time factor. Keeping the attendant circumstances of this case in view, we find it difficult to hold that the time taken by the State Government can amount to withholding of the representation which resulted in non-compliance of Section 10 of the Act so as to vitiate the detention.” (Para 10) 32. Keeping the attendant circumstances of this case in view, we find it difficult to hold that the time taken by the State Government can amount to withholding of the representation which resulted in non-compliance of Section 10 of the Act so as to vitiate the detention.” (Para 10) 32. In Industrial Financial Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 1841 , it was held as follows: “The Latin Maxim referred to in the English judgement “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” also expressed as “impotentia excusat iegem” in common English acceptation means, the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. There ought always thus to be an invincible disability to perform the obligation and the same is akin to the Roman Maxim, “nemo tenetur ad impossibilia.” (para 30) 33. In Rajesh D. Darbar v. Narsing Rao Krishnaji Kulkarni and others, (2003) 7 SCC 219 , it was held: “The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia i.e. the law does not compel a man to do that what he cannot possibly perform. The applicability of the above said maxim has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, 1987 (4) SCC 398 , Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, 1996 (2) SCC 459 and Mohd. Gazi v. State of M.P., 2000 (4) SCC 342 .” (Para 6) 34. This is followed again in Ram Chandra Singh v. Sabitri Devi and others, 2003 (8) SCC 319 . 35. A Constitution Bench of five Hon’ble Judges also considered the aforesaid maxim in Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, AIR 2003 SC 1987 and held as under: “The maxim of law impotentia excusat legem is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat Iegem is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him”. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him”. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (See Broom’s Legal Maxims 10th Edition at pp. 1962-63 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Ed. p. 268). These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Special Reference 1 of 1974, (1975) 1 SCR 504 . Situations may be created by interested persons to see that elections do not take place and the caretaker Government continue in office. This certainly would be against the scheme of the Constitution and the basic structure to that extent shall be corroded.” (para 154) 36. Recently in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, AIR 2005 SC 592 , Court has again followed and approved the aforesaid maxim by referring to the earlier judgment in Rajesh D. Darbar (supra) and said: “The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia, i.e. the law does not compel a man to do that what he cannot possibly perform....” (Para 107) 37. In HUDA and another v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar, 2005 (1) SCC 191 , referring to certain English decisions, Court has observed as under: “Apart from the said section and various provisions in various other Acts, there is the general principle that a party prevented from doing an act by some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first subsequent opportunity (see Sambasiva Chari v. Ramaswami Reddi, 1898 (8) Madras Law Journal 265). The underlying object of the principle is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. The underlying object of the principle is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then the act should be considered to have been done within that period if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. The reason is that law does not compel the performance of an impossibility. (See Hossein Ally v. Donezelle ILR 5 Calcutta 906). Every consideration of justice and expediency would require that the accepted principle which underlies Section 10 of the General Clauses Act should be applied in cases where it does not otherwise in terms apply. The principles underlying are lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a man to do the impossible) and actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of Court shall prejudice no man).” (para 5) 38. We, therefore, have no hesitation in observing that, if the material on record justify an inference that standards prescribed by Board were impossible to attain, obviously petitioner cannot be and should not be penalized for not attaining the same. But then it has to be pleaded and proved by substantial material on record that standards prescribed by Board are impossible to attain. The Board has exercised power which is akin to legislative power by prescribing standards of Trade Effluent which can be discharged after treatment so that it may not create any health hazards to public at large or to environment in general. Except pleading that standards were not possible to attain, we do not find any material on record to show that the said standards were impossible to attain. There is no technological analysis by any expert body, placed on record to show that standards prescribed by Board were not achievable. Mere fact that petitioners and other Distilleries at the relevant point of time did not or could not attain those standards is one thing and to suggest that standards were not achievable is another thing. On mere pleading of petitioners and that too quite vague, the legislative exercise of Board in prescribing standards for discharge of Trade Effluent neither can be interfered nor can be said to be unachievable. On mere pleading of petitioners and that too quite vague, the legislative exercise of Board in prescribing standards for discharge of Trade Effluent neither can be interfered nor can be said to be unachievable. When somebody pleads that it is being required to do something which is impossible, it has to show that a person similarly placed, having all the possible aid and assistance with him, cannot achieve something which it is required to do so. 39. Contention is that installation of Treatment Plant in a single phase so as to attain prescribed standards was not possible, but that cannot be equated with the submission that standards prescribed by Board were unachievable. We, therefore, reject the above submission and hold that it was for petitioner to take all steps to comply strictly the provisions of Act, 1974 which was a welfare legislation for protection of environment in general and for safety and health of general public. 40. Now coming to question, whether proceedings initiated by Board by filing applications under Sections 33 and 44 of Act, 1974 are ex facie illegal so as to justify exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 for quashing the same, here also, we find no substance in the arguments advanced on behalf of petitioners. 41. Complaints filed by Board satisfy ingredients of Sections 33 and 44 and it is not the case of petitioners that Court concerned has no jurisdiction or that applications filed by Board are otherwise not maintainable under relevant Statute. Rest of the submissions that some of Directors are not in-charge or not responsible for functioning of Company are the arguments in defence which will be considered by Court concerned when petitioners shall appe ar and place their defence before it. At this stage, our scope of interference is very limited. It is akin to the cases wherein writ petitions are filed for quashing of First Information Report wherein it has been held repeatedly that only scope of judicial review is to peruse First Information Report and treating allegations contained therein to be true, to find out whether an offence under Sections mentioned in the report is made out or not. If the offence is made out, Court will not interfere by quashing the report. Whatever possible defence the accused person may have, that will be seen by Court concerned and not by a writ Court. If the offence is made out, Court will not interfere by quashing the report. Whatever possible defence the accused person may have, that will be seen by Court concerned and not by a writ Court. When we examine the matter in the light of above principles, we find no ground to interfere with the proceedings pending before Magistrate concerned justifying quashing of any order or proceedings. 42. In the result and in the ultimate discussion, it is evident that writ petition has no merits. 43. Dismissed with cost which we quantify to Rs. 25,000/-. —————–—