JUDGMENT By the Court.—By means of this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has challenged the notifications issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (herein after referred to as the “Act 1894”), published vide Gazette notification dated 24.11.2005 proposing to acquire 181.308 hectares of land, including the land of the petitioner, in villages Achcheja, Sabadi and Chamri for Planned Development at the instance of Hapur Pilakhua Development Authority (in short “HPDA”). Provisions of Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act 1894 was also invoked on the ground urgency and requirement of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act 1894 was dispensed. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act 1894 was made on 13.7.2006 and published in daily newspaper dated 17.7.2006. 2. There is no dispute about the fact that the same notifications were subject-matter of challenge in at least 31 writ petitions, leading writ petition being 2104 of 2006, Lahari Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, which were connected and heard together by another Division Bench and were dismissed vide judgment and order dated 23.5.2016. 3. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, has tried to distinguish the said judgment by urging that dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act 1894 by invoking urgency under the provisions of Section 17 of the said Act was not considered in the said case and the said issue having been raised in this petition, the ratio of the said judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present case. 4. The argument advanced and the distinctions being tried to be made is without any substance. In paragraph 20 onwards of the judgment dated 23.5.2016, the Division Bench has dealt with the issue. It may be relevant to extract paragraph 20 of the said judgment : “20. Now we propose to consider substantial issue raised to challenge acquisition proceedings, “whether dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A of Act, 1894 by invoking urgency under Section 17 of Act, 1894 is justified in this case.” After considering the various judicial pronouncements on the issue of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, the issue has been answered in paragraph 40, 41 and 42 as under : “40. In the present case high pace of population influx in Hapur Township, as pleaded by respondents, is not in dispute. Shortage of residential accommodations and unplanned residential constructions by local inhabitants at a great pace is also not in dispute. HPDA is an authority having been constituted under U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 was under an obligation to immediately take care of planned development in City. Where overall development was going at a great pace and residential accommodations were in scarcity, proposal of HPDA made in June, 2005 was considered by Collector. It made inquiry and thereafter sent report to Government proposing immediate and urgent acquisition of land and within five months of entire process, acquisition notification under Section 4 was issued on 24.11.2005. Declaration under Section 6 was issued in July, 2006, i.e., within seven months. In the meantime same landowners filed writ petitions assailing notification dated 24.11.2005 and respondents authorities also got engaged in litigation.” “41. Looking to entire facts and circumstances, need of land by HPDA in public interest for planned development cannot be said to be superficial or imaginary. It is founded on substantial and undisputed material, fortified from the fact that rapic pace of development has compelled Government to declare Hapur Township alongwith some other areas of District Meerut, Ghaziabad and Bulandshahar to constitute a independent Revenue District having District Headquarters at Hapur Town with the name and title “Panchsheel Nagar” vide notification dated 22.9.2011.” “42. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that it is not a case where it can be said that there was no urgency and exercise of power under Section 17(4) is arbitrary or founded on no substantial or factual justification. Hence we decline to accept contention of learned counsel for petitioners that dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A of Act, 1894 is illegal, arbitrary and founded on no material showing urgency.” 5. Thus, it cannot be said that, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the validity of invocation of urgency clause was not considered by the Division Bench dismissing the writ petition challenging the same notification which is under challenge in the present writ petition. Thus, it cannot be said that, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the validity of invocation of urgency clause was not considered by the Division Bench dismissing the writ petition challenging the same notification which is under challenge in the present writ petition. Further, Division Bench has also taken note of the fact that except two all other writ petitions have been filed between 2008 to 2013 with a huge delay without there being explanation of delay and held that all the writ petitions filed in 2008 onwards deserves to be dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay and laches. 6. As already observed above, the present writ petition was also filed in 2008 and there is no explanation for delay and laches in approaching this Court and thus, we do not find any reason to take a different view than one taken by other Division Bench. It is well-settled that in acquisition matters delay constitute a serious hurdle and fatal, if remained unexplained. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aflatoon and others v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1974 SC 2077 , has held as under : “A valid notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allow Government to complete acquisition proceedings on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to land owners at the time when the notification was published, would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners.” 7. The Division Bench judgment in the case of Lahari Singh and others (supra) has already taken notice of the fact that out of 181.308 hectares of land, sought to be acquired under the impugned notifications, the Collector took possession of 175.0018 hectares of land on 11.7.2008 and handed over the same to HPDA. In respect of rest of land i. e. 6.3062 hectares, initially possession could not be taken due to interim orders passed by this Court but thereafter possession of most of remaining land has also been taken on 16.2.2012 and on various other dates. In respect of rest of land i. e. 6.3062 hectares, initially possession could not be taken due to interim orders passed by this Court but thereafter possession of most of remaining land has also been taken on 16.2.2012 and on various other dates. Division Bench has also noticed the fact that acquired land belong to 1146 farmers out of which 948 farmers entered into agreement under U.P. Land Acquisition (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award) Rules, 1977 and compensation was paid to them to the tune of Rs. 1,09,07,04,869/-. HPDA after taking possession of acquired land has laid down 19.165 kilometers road as per lay out plan and other development activities like, sewer line, drains etc., overhead tanks for water supply have already been constructed. Against proposed 4395 flats, 3914 plots/flats have already been allotted to different persons. Therefore, substantial development has already taken place and acquisition substantially has completed. 8. It is, thus, clear that entire acquisition proceedings have come to logical conclusion and all the writ petitions filed by tenure holders challenging the notification have already been dismissed and thus for the aforesaid facts and reasons, we find no reason to take a different view from the Division Bench in the case of Lahari Singh and others (supra). 9. Writ petition accordingly, stands dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 10. However, there shall be no order as to costs. ———————