JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. All these appeals are the outcome of one vehicular accident, therefore, the same were clubbed and are being disposed of by this common judgment. FAO Nos.239 & 379 of 20114 2. These appeals have been filed against the common award, dated 25th March, 2014, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (III), Shimla, H.P., (for short, the Tribunal), in MAC Petition No.117-S/2 of 12/10, titled Ram Kali and others vs. Manohar Singh Thakur and others, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.10,58,440/-, with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realization, came to be awarded in favour of the claimants and the insurer was saddled with the liability, (for short, the impugned award). 3. Feeling aggrieved, the claimants have questioned the impugned award by the medium of FAO No.379 of 2014, while the insurer has challenged the same by way of FAO No.239 of 2014, on the grounds taken in the memos of appeals. FAO Nos.476 & 577 of 2016 4. These appeals are directed against the common award, dated 1st July, 2016, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla, H.P., (for short, the Tribunal), in MAC Petition No.26-S/2 of 2014, titled Manorma Thakur and others vs. Manohar Singh Thakur and others, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.45,86,912/-, with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realization, came to be awarded in favour of the claimants and the insurer was saddled with the liability, (for short, the impugned award). 5. The claimants have questioned the impugned award by way of FAO No.476 of 2016 and the insurer has laid challenge to the impugned award by filing FAO No.577 of 2016, on the grounds taken in the memos of appeals. 6. In order to determine all the appeals, it is expedient to have a glance of the facts of the case. The claimants have questioned the impugned award by way of FAO No.476 of 2016 and the insurer has laid challenge to the impugned award by filing FAO No.577 of 2016, on the grounds taken in the memos of appeals. 6. In order to determine all the appeals, it is expedient to have a glance of the facts of the case. It has been averred that on 15th November, 2009, at about 6.30 p.m., deceased Meena Ram was traveling as labourer, while deceased Narinder Thakur was traveling as owner of the goods, in Tipper bearing No. HP-63-2466, which met with an accident due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending Tipper, namely, Bhupinder Singh, as a result of which both – Meena Ram and Narinder Thakur – lost their lives. The claimants filed two separate claim petitions. Claim Petition No. 117-S/2 of 12/10, titled Ram Kali and others vs. Manohar Singh Thakur and others, was filed by the dependants of deceased Meena Ram and Claim Petition No.26-S/2 of 2014, titled Manorma Thakur and others vs. Manohar Singh Thakur and others, was filed by the legal heirs of deceased Narinder Thakur, claiming compensation to the tune of Rs.15.00 lacs and Rs.50.00 lacs, respectively, as per the break-ups given in the claim petitions. 7. The Tribunal determined both the claim petitions by the medium of two different awards, as detailed above, are the subject matter of instant appeals. 8. During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the insurer/appellant in FAO No.239 of 2014 and FAO No.577 of 2016 argued that the Tribunal has fallen into an error in holding that, at the time of accident, the offending Tipper was being driven by Bhupender Singh. In fact, the offending Tipper was being driven by Narender Thakur. In support of his submission, he relied upon the FIR recorded in regard to the accident, which was lodged against Narender Thakur. The learned counsel for the insurer further submitted that the amount awarded by the Tribunal, in both the claim petitions, is excessive. He also argued that the claimants, in Claim Petition No.26-S/2 of 2014, filed the same after a long gap, i.e. after about seven years of the accident, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed on account of delay. He also argued that the claimants, in Claim Petition No.26-S/2 of 2014, filed the same after a long gap, i.e. after about seven years of the accident, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed on account of delay. It was also submitted that the Tribunal has awarded interest at higher rate, is not commensurate with the prevailing rate of interest. 9. Mr. Suneet Goel and Mr. Lakshay Thakur, learned counsel for the appellants/claimants in FAO Nos.476 of 2016 and 379 of 2014, respectively, submitted that the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is inadequate and needs to be enhanced. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 11. The claimants in claim petitions have specifically pleaded that the deceased Meena Ram and Narender Thakur were traveling in the offending vehicle as labourer and as owner of goods, respectively, which fact has been admitted by the owner in his replies filed to the claim petitions. Accordingly, there was no necessity to lead evidence to prove that the deceased were traveling as labourer and owner of goods in the offending Tipper. Still, the claimants in Claim Petition No.117-S/2 of 2012/2010, have examined PW-4 Mohan Singh, who was one of the occupants in the offending vehicle. He deposed that at the time of accident, the offending vehicle was being driven by Bhupinder Singh rashly and negligently. Further stated that in the FIR Ext.PW-1/A, it was wrongly mentioned that the offending vehicle, at the time of accident, was being driven by Narinder Thakur. This witness was cross-examined by the learned counsel for the insurer, but failed to extract anything and was not able to shatter his statement. The Tribunal has rightly made discussion in paragraphs 10 to 28 of the award impugned in FAO Nos.239 and 379 of 2014 and has rightly come to the conclusion that Bhupinder Singh was driving the offending vehicle at the time of accident. 12. The insurer has not led any evidence to prove that the driver Bhupinder Singh was not having a valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident, has failed to discharge the onus. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal, on the above issues are upheld. 13. 12. The insurer has not led any evidence to prove that the driver Bhupinder Singh was not having a valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident, has failed to discharge the onus. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal, on the above issues are upheld. 13. To Deal with the next ground urged by the learned counsel for the insurer that the claim petition was filed after a long delay, it is apt to record herein that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (for short, the Act), has gone through a sea change and rigours of Limitation Act have been taken away. Prior to coming into force the amended Act, limitation was prescribed for filing the claim petitions by the victims of a vehicular accident. However, after noticing that the prescribing of limitation was operating harsh and in many cases was likely to cause injustice, the Act was amended and Sub Section (3) of Section 166 of the Act came to be deleted, which amendment came into force w.e.f. 14th November, 1994. The consequence of the above said amendment was that the Claim Petition, in a vehicular accident, could be filed by the victim at any time. 14. The Apex Court in Dhannalal vs. D.P. Vijayvargiya and others, AIR 1996 SC 2155 , while examining the effect of omitting Sub-section(3) of Section 166 of the Act, has held that there is no limitation prescribed for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It was also held that where a claim petition was filed, while sub section (3) of Section 166 of the Act was operative, the same could not be dismissed on the ground that at the time of its filing it was barred by limitation under Sub-Section (3) of Section 166 of the Act: “6. Before the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid subsection (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, which came in force w.e.f. 14-11-1994. The effect of the Amendment Act is that w.e.f. 14-11-1994, there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. The effect of the Amendment Act is that w.e.f. 14-11-1994, there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident, of the bread earner of the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims that he met with the accident on 4-12-1990, and he was being treated as an indoor patient till 27-9-1991. According to us, in its wisdom the Parliament, rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition. 7. In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166, is not be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14-11-1994, when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14-11-1994. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14-11-1994, when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14-11-1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14-11-1994, in respect of such accident ? Whether a claim petition filed after 14-11-1994, can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section (3) of Section 166, was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of subsection (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14-11-1994 ? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994, by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158, which provides : "As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner of such report, forward the some to such Claims Tribunal and Insurer". In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer incharge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days or receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of said section by the Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14-11-1994, in respect of the accident which took place on 4-12-1990, in view of the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation.” 15. Having said so, the contention of the learned counsel for the insurer qua delay is negatived. 16. Now coming the plea whether the impugned awards are excessive or inadequate, deceased Meena Ram was a labourer. The Tribunal, after taking into account all the factors, assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.7,800/- per month and after deducting 1/3rd, the Tribunal has rightly held that the claimants lost source of dependency to the tune of Rs.6,240/- per month. The deceased, at the time of accident, was 45 years of age. The Tribunal, after taking into account all the factors, assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.7,800/- per month and after deducting 1/3rd, the Tribunal has rightly held that the claimants lost source of dependency to the tune of Rs.6,240/- per month. The deceased, at the time of accident, was 45 years of age. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , which decision was also upheld by the larger Bench of the Apex Court in Reshma Kumari and others vs. Madan Mohan and another, 2013 AIR (SCW) 3120 read with the 2nd Schedule attached with the Act, the Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier of 13. 17. Having said so, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal vide award impugned in FAO Nos.239 of 2014 and 379 of 2014, is upheld. 18. As far as the award, impugned in FAO Nos.476 and 577 of 2016, is concerned, the Tribunal, after referring to the material on record, has rightly assessed the monthly income of the deceased Narinder Thakur, at Rs.42,902/-. After deducting 1/3rd amount towards the personal expenses of the deceased, the Tribunal has rightly assessed the loss of source of dependency to the claimants at Rs.28,602/-. The deceased, at the time of accident, was 48 years of age, thus, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma’s case (supra) read with the 2nd Schedule attached with the Act, the Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier of 13. 19. Different rates of interest have been awarded by the Tribunal in both the claim petitions i.e. at the rate of 9% in one claim petition and at the rate of 7% in the other. It is beaten law of the land that the rate of interest should be awarded as per the prevailing rates, in view of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in cases titled as United India Insurance Co. It is beaten law of the land that the rate of interest should be awarded as per the prevailing rates, in view of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in cases titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others versus Patricia Jean Mahajan and others, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 281 ; Santosh Devi versus National Insurance Company Ltd. and others, reported in 2012 AIR SCW 2892; Amrit Bhanu Shali and others versus National Insurance Company Limited and others, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 738 ; Smt. Savita versus Binder Singh & others, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 2053; Kalpanaraj & Ors. versus Tamil Nadu State Transport Corpn., reported in 2014 AIR SCW 2982; Amresh Kumari versus Niranjan Lal Jagdish Pd. Jain and others, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 433 , and Mohinder Kaur and others versus Hira Nand Sindhi (Ghoriwala) and another, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 434 , and discussed by this Court in a batch of FAOs, FAO No. 256 of 2010, titled as Oriental Insurance Company versus Smt. Indiro and others, being the lead case, decided on 19.06.2015. 20. Accordingly, it is held that the amount of compensation, in both the awards, shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petitions till realization. 21. In view of the above discussion, the impugned awards are modified, as indicated above. The Registry is directed to release the amount, alongwith interest as above, in favour of the claimants in FAO Nos.239 & 379 of 2014, forthwith, through their bank accounts, strictly in terms of the impugned award and the excess amount, if any, be released in favour of the insurer through payee’s account cheque. In FAO Nos.476 & 577 of 2016, the insurer is directed to deposit the amount of compensation with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, within six weeks from today, and on deposit, the amount be released in favour of the claimants through their bank accounts forthwith, strictly in terms of the impugned award, after proper identification. 22. Both the appeals stand disposed of accordingly.