JUDGMENT : MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, J. 1. These Letters Patent Appeals are outcome of a common judgment thus; we deem it proper to determine all these appeals by this common judgment. 2. In order to determine the issue involved in these appeals, it is necessary to give a brief resume of relevant facts herein. 3. The petitioners-appellants herein were engaged as Field Assistant-cum-Operator by the respondent-Board somewhere in the year 1987. It is stated that the duties performed by the appellants are those of skilled nature and only the designation as given to the appellants is Field Assistant–cum-Operator and cannot be equated with Class-IV employee. It is averred that initially the petitioners-appellants were engaged on daily wage basis and after completion of 10 years of service, their services were regularized as Field Assistant-cum-Operator, in terms of the Office Memorandum dated 13.8.1997, 18.3.1998 and 1.2.1999, Annexure R1, in all the petitions, in the pay scale of Rs.750-1410, which, in fact, is stated to be the pay scale of Class-IV employee. Petitioners/appellants claim themselves to be entitled to the scale of Class-III employee on the parity of scales given to the Field Assistants, engaged by other autonomous bodies. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of one of the office memorandums Annexure R-1 in CWP (T) No. 3060 of 2008, herein. ?OFFICE MEMORANDUM? On the approval of Hon'ble Chairman/Screening committee as well as completion of 10 years of service as a daily wages worker under the NAAQM Project in HP State Pollution Control Board, Sh. Inderjit Singh S/o Sh. Bhagvan Singh is hereby offered a temporary post of Field Assistant-cum-Operator under the same project in the Pay Scale of Rs.750-30-950-35-1160-40-1320-45-1410 with initial start of Rs.770 from the date of completion of 10 years of service i.e. 31.7.1997 on the following terms and conditions. The appointee will also be entitled for dearness allowance at the rates admissible under State Govt. and subject to the conditions and orders governing the grant of such allowance in force in the Board from time to time:………..? 4. The writ petitioners-appellants herein are stated to have made several requests to the respondent-Board and also served legal notices upon the respondent-Board, but all these failed to yield any result. 5. The petitioners/appellants herein filed Original Applications before the State Administrative Tribunal on 2.8.2000, which came to be registered as CWPs (T) as mentioned hereinafter. 6. 4. The writ petitioners-appellants herein are stated to have made several requests to the respondent-Board and also served legal notices upon the respondent-Board, but all these failed to yield any result. 5. The petitioners/appellants herein filed Original Applications before the State Administrative Tribunal on 2.8.2000, which came to be registered as CWPs (T) as mentioned hereinafter. 6. The Original Applications filed by petitioner (s) Tota Ram came to be registered as CWP (T) No. 6846 of 2008, Inderjeet Singh as CWP (T) No. 3060 of 2008, Surat Singh as CWP (T) No. 6847 of 2008 and by Vijay Kumar as CWP (T) No. 6848 of 2008. The petitioners, in all the petitions, prayed for mainly the following reliefs. ? (i) That the respondent department may very kindly be directed to grant the scale of Rs. 3120/- to the applicant from the date of his service were regularized as Field Assistant-cum-Operator, with all consequential benefits accrued to the applicant, like pay, arrears, etc.etc. alongwith an interest of Rs. 18% P.A. (ii) That the respondent department may very kindly be directed to frame the R&P Rules for the post of Field Assistant-cum-Operator.? 7. Respondent-Board filed the same reply to all the writ petitions. It is apt to reproduce para 3 of the reply filed in CWP (T) No. 3060 of 2008, subject matter of LPA No. 391 of 2011, on merits herein. ?3. That the contents of para 3 of the petition are wrong as stated, hence denied. It is submitted that the petitioner/applicant was initially engaged as a daily wage helper in the year 1987 and was paid daily wages as Class-IV employee which were increased as per Govt. Policy from time to time. Subsequently the petitioner/applicant was regularized w.e.f.31.7.1997 in accordance with the Govt. policy of regularizing all daily wagers who had put in 10 years continuous service as daily wagers vide office Memorandum No. HP.PCB/Estt. /127/ Regularization/96-3285-89 dated 13.8.1987.Annexure R1. He admitted the said appointment without demur and has since been working as such till this day. He is therefore, estopped by his act and conduct to demand any higher scale.? 8. The said writ petitions came to be dismissed vide a common judgment dated 6th April, 2011 in CWP (T) No. 6846 of 2008, alongwith connected matters, hereinafter referred to as ?the impugned judgment?, for short. It is apposite to reproduce concluding para of the impugned judgment herein. 8. The said writ petitions came to be dismissed vide a common judgment dated 6th April, 2011 in CWP (T) No. 6846 of 2008, alongwith connected matters, hereinafter referred to as ?the impugned judgment?, for short. It is apposite to reproduce concluding para of the impugned judgment herein. ?9. Petitioners claim for payment of salary in the pay scale of Class-III employees cannot be said to be based on any substantive right or legal foundation. Claim of parity, based on rules of another autonomous body, in the absence of any material to show similarity with regard to the eligibility, nature of duties, responsibilities etc. also does not even merit consideration. No legally enforceable right of the petitioners stand violated. Consequently present petitions devoid of merit stand dismissed.? 9. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants herein filed the present appeals details of which are being given hereinafter. 10. CWP (T) No. 3060 of 2008 titled Indeerjeet Singh versus H.P. State Pollution Control Board, is subject matter of LPA No. 391 of 2011, CWP (T) No. 6848 of 2008 titled Vijay Kumar versus H.P. State Pollution Control Board, is subject matter of LPA No. 366 of 2011, CWP (T) No. 6846 of 2008 titled Tota Ram versus H.P. State Pollution Control Board is subject matter of LPA No. 413 of 2011 and CWP (T) No. 6847 of 2008 titled Surat Singh versus H.P. State Pollution Control Board is subject matter of LPA No. 445 of 2011. 11. The appellants/writ petitioners are virtually seeking pay parity on the analogy of pay scale of the Field Assistants working in other autonomous bodies/departments of the State. 12. The writ petitioners/appellants have not given details as to how they are entitled to the said pay scales and whether duties and responsibilities discharged by them are similar to that of their counterparts, in order to determine the claim of parity. 13. The Apex Court in a case titled as State of Haryana and others versus Charanjit Singh and others etc. etc., reported in AIR 2006 Supreme Court 161, held that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has no mechanical application in every case. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein: ?17. 13. The Apex Court in a case titled as State of Haryana and others versus Charanjit Singh and others etc. etc., reported in AIR 2006 Supreme Court 161, held that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has no mechanical application in every case. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein: ?17. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj, Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology and Tarun K. Roy lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.? 14. It would also be profitable to reproduce para 13 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in New Delhi Municipal Council versus Pan Singh & Ors., reported in 2007 AIR SCW 1705, herein: ?13. They, thus, formed a class by themselves. A cut-off date having been fixed by the Tribunal, those who were thus not similarly situated, were to be treated to have formed a different class. They could not be treated alike with the others. The High Court, unfortunately, has not considered this aspect of the matter.? 15. The Apex Court in cases titled as State of Madhya Pradesh and others versus Ramesh Chandra Bajpai, reported in (2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 635, and State of Punjab & Anr. They could not be treated alike with the others. The High Court, unfortunately, has not considered this aspect of the matter.? 15. The Apex Court in cases titled as State of Madhya Pradesh and others versus Ramesh Chandra Bajpai, reported in (2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 635, and State of Punjab & Anr. versus Surjit Singh & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 6759, has discussed the development of law right from the year 1960 till 2009. It is apt to reproduce para 30 of the judgment delivered in Surjit Singh’s case supra, herein: ?30. Mr. Swarup may or may not be entirely correct in projecting three purported different views of this Court having regard to the accepted principle of law that ratio of a decision must be culled out from reading it in its entirety and not from a part thereof. It is no longer in doubt or dispute that grant of the benefit of the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' depends upon a large number of factors including equal work, equal value, source and manner of appointment, equal identity of group and wholesale or complete identity.? 16. The Apex Court in the case titled as Steel Authority of India Limited and others versus Dibyendu Battacharya, reported in (2011) 11 Supreme Court Cases 122, has discussed the development of law and the judgments made by the Apex Court right from the year 1968, in paras 18 to 29 of the judgment. It is apt to reproduce paras 30 and 31 of the judgment herein: 30. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that parity of pay can be claimed by invoking the provisions of Articles 14 and 39 (d) of the Constitution of India by establishing that the eligibility, mode of selection/recruitment, nature and quality of work and duties and effort, reliability, confidentiality, dexterity, functional need and responsibilities and status of both the posts are identical. The functions may be the same but the skills and responsibilities may be really and substantially different. The other post may not require any higher qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts. The person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and prove that all things are equal between the concerned posts. The other post may not require any higher qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts. The person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and prove that all things are equal between the concerned posts. Such a complex issue cannot be adjudicated by evaluating the affidavits filed by the parties. 31. The onus to establish the discrimination by the employer lies on the person claiming the parity of pay. The expert committee has to decide such issues, as the fixation of pay scales etc. falls within the exclusive domain of the executive. So long as the value judgment of those who are responsible for administration i.e. service conditions etc., is found to be bonafide, reasonable, and on intelligible criteria which has a rational nexus of objective of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is not prohibited in law to have two grades of posts in the same cadre. Thus, the nomenclature of a post may not be the sole determinative factor. The courts in exercise of their limited power of judicial review can only examine whether the decision of the State authorities is rational and just or prejudicial to a particular set of employees. The court has to keep in mind that a mere difference in service conditions does not amount to discrimination. Unless there is complete and wholesale/ wholesome identity between the two posts they should not be treated as equivalent and the Court should avoid applying the principle of equal pay for equal work. 17. The Apex Court in Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh and others versus Manju Mathur and another, reported in (2011) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, held that similarity of designation or nature or quantum of work is not determinative of entitlement to equality in pay scales. 18. The Apex Court in Hukum Chand Gupta versus Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research and others, reported in (2012) 12 Supreme Court Cases 666, held as to how parity can be claimed or granted. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 20 of the judgment herein: 20. …............. There cannot be straitjacket formula for holding that two posts having the same nomenclature would have to be given the same pay scale. Prescription of pay scales on particular posts is a very complex exercise. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 20 of the judgment herein: 20. …............. There cannot be straitjacket formula for holding that two posts having the same nomenclature would have to be given the same pay scale. Prescription of pay scales on particular posts is a very complex exercise. It requires assessment of the nature and quality of the duties performed and the responsibilities shouldered by the incumbents on different posts. Even though, the two posts may be referred to by the same name, it would not lead to the necessary inference that the posts are identical in every manner. These are matters to be assessed by expert bodies like the employer or the Pay Commission. Neither the Central Administrative Tribunal nor a writ court would normally venture to substitute its own opinion for the opinions rendered by the experts. The Tribunal or the writ court would lack the necessary expertise to undertake the complex exercise of equation of posts or the pay scales.? 19. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Roshan Lal versus Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh and another, being CWP No. 873 of 1993, decided on 27th October, 1994, held that even if a post of one cadre is created in two departments and different pay scales are granted, that cannot be a ground to claim parity. In order to claim parity, the writ petitioners have to indicate that their jobs, duties, responsibilities and functions are similar. In this case, the Court has examined whether the post of Book Binder sanctioned in the High Court and Secretariat of the State Government and in other departments are entitled to same pay scale? No doubt, the post of Book Binder was created in all these departments, but it was held that it is for the writ petitioner to plead and prove that he was performing the same type of work and responsibilities and other factors are similar. This Court, after discussing all facts and factors, rejected the plea for grant of parity and the writ petition was dismissed. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the judgment herein: ?Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find no justification in the submission. This Court, after discussing all facts and factors, rejected the plea for grant of parity and the writ petition was dismissed. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the judgment herein: ?Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find no justification in the submission. It is too much of the employee of the High Court to claim that the High Court should be equated with the Printing and Stationery Department of the State Government. Even on the basis of job, there would be no similarity. The Printing and Stationery Department would have continuous and different varieties of work needing a different type of Book-Binder than the Book-Binder in the High Court.? 20. A similar view has been taken by this Court in case titled as Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board versus Rajinder Upadhaya & others, being LPA No. 51 of 2009, decided on 11th September, 2014, LPA No. 11 of 2012, titled as The Principal Secretary (Personnel) & another versus Pratap Thakur, decided on 22nd September, 2014 and CWP No. 4184 of 2010 decided on 17.10.2014 titled Beli Ram versus Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh and another. 21. A similar view has also been taken by the apex Court while setting aside the judgment made by this Court in a latest judgment reported in 2014 AIR SCW 6581 titled State of Himachal Pradesh and another versus Tilak Raj. It is apt to reproduce para 22 of the said judgment herein. ?22. It is also clear that disputed question of facts were involved in the petitions because according to the respondents, who were petitioners before the High Court, nature of work done by them was similar to that of the work of other Laboratory Attendants or Laboratory Assistants. Without looking at the nature of work done by persons working in different cadres in different departments, one cannot jump to a conclusion that all these persons were doing similar type of work simply because in a civil suit, one particular person had succeeded after adducing evidence. There is nothing on record to show that the High Court had examined the nature of work done by the respondents and other persons who were getting higher pay scale. The High Court had also not considered the fact that qualifications required for appointment to both the posts were different. There is nothing on record to show that the High Court had examined the nature of work done by the respondents and other persons who were getting higher pay scale. The High Court had also not considered the fact that qualifications required for appointment to both the posts were different. In our opinion, the High Court should not have entertained all these petitions where disputed questions of fact were required to be examined. Without examining relevant evidence regarding exact nature of work, working conditions and other relevant factors, it is not possible to come to a conclusion with regard to similarity in the nature of work done by persons belonging to different cadres and normally such exercise should not be carried out by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction. It is settled law that the work of fixing pay scale is left to an expert body like Pay Commission or other similar body, as held by this Court in several cases, including the case of S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, 2007 8 SCC 279 . Moreover, qualifications, experience, etc. are also required to be examined before fixing pay scales. Such an exercise was not carried out in this case by the High Court.? 22. The petitioners/appellants have specifically pleaded that they were engaged on daily wage basis as Field Assistant-cum-Operator and were paid salary as such. It is also the case of the parties that no post was sanctioned in the cadre of Field Assistant-cum-Operator in the year 1987 when they came to be engaged as daily wage basis. In terms of office memorandum referred to supra, their services were regularized in terms of the policy made by the Government to the effect that the daily wagers who had completed 10 years of service are to be regularized. It is apt to reproduce para 6 (i) of the Original Application filed by Inderjeet Singh, subject matter of LPA No. 391 of 2011 herein. ? (i) That the services of the applicant were engaged as Field Assistant-cum-Operator by the respondent in the year 1987. It is submitted that initially the services were engaged on daily wage basis. Be it stated here that applicant worked to the entire satisfaction of the respondent and further diligently and efficiently and there is no complaint of any kind whatsoever against the applicant. A certificate to this extent is annexed as Annexure A-1.? 23. It is submitted that initially the services were engaged on daily wage basis. Be it stated here that applicant worked to the entire satisfaction of the respondent and further diligently and efficiently and there is no complaint of any kind whatsoever against the applicant. A certificate to this extent is annexed as Annexure A-1.? 23. After considering the grievance of the petitioners/appellant, office memorandum was prepared and it was decided to appoint them on regular basis as Class-IV employees. The petitioners/appellants accepted the said office memorandum without any murmur, enjoyed the benefits at least for three years and in the year 2000, after three years, came to the Administrative Tribunal by the medium of Original Applications. They are caught by waiver, estoppel, and acquiescence, except otherwise, their petitions were barred by time also. 24. The Apex Court in a case titled as R & M Trust versus Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others, reported in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 91, held that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; delay defeats equity and it cannot be brushed aside without any plausible explanation. 25. The Apex Court in cases titled as S.D.O. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. And others versus Timudu Oram, reported in 2005 AIR SCW 3715, and Srinivasa Bhat (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. versus A. Sarvothama Kini (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2106, has also discussed the same principle. It is profitable to reproduce para 9 of the judgment in Timudu Oram's case (supra) herein: ?9. In the present case, the appellants had disputed the negligence attributed to it and no finding has been recorded by the High Court that the GRIDCO was in any way negligent in the performance of its duty. The present case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others (supra), 1999 AIR SCW 3383 : AIR 1999 SC 3412 . The High Court has also erred in awarding compensation in Civil Appeal No. …........... of 2005 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 9788 of 1998). The subsequent suit or writ petition would not be maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit. The writ petition was filed after a lapse of 10 years. No reasons have been given for such an inordinate delay. of 2005 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 9788 of 1998). The subsequent suit or writ petition would not be maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit. The writ petition was filed after a lapse of 10 years. No reasons have been given for such an inordinate delay. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of 10 years. In such a case, awarding of compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be justified.? 26. Similar principles of law have been laid down by the apex Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board versus Kirshan Kumar Vij & Anr., reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 3342. 27. The Apex Court in the case titled as State of Jammu & Kashmir versus R.K. Zalpuri and others, reported in JT 2015 (9) SC 214, held that a Writ Court while deciding a writ petition, is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. It is apt to reproduce paras 26 to 28 of the judgment herein: ?26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias" - 'thanks to God'. 28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless noninterference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.? 28. This Court also in LPA No. 48 of 2011 titled Shri Satija Rajesh N. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others decided on 26.8.2014, LPA No. 150 of 2014 titled Mr. Inderjit Kumar Dhir versus State of H.P. and others, decided on 17th September, 2014, batch of LPAs lead case of which is LPA No. 107 of 2014 titled Amit Attri and others versus Anil Verma and others decided on 3rd December, 2014 and LPA 270 of 2010 titled Bhim Sen Sharma versus HP University and another decided on 2nd May, 2016, has laid down the similar principles of law. 29. The Apex Court in a latest judgment in the case titled as Madras Institute of Development Studies and another versus K. Sivasubramaniyan and others, reported in (2016) 1 Supreme Court Cases 454, has discussed how a person can be said to be caught by estoppel, acquiescence and waiver. 30. It appears that respondents have constituted a Committee, perhaps in terms of the order passed by this Court, the report of which has been reproduced in para 4 of the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge whereby and where under, the claim of the petitioners was rejected and we deem it proper not to reproduce the same in this judgment. 31. The petitioners have not questioned the said report/consideration order. It is specifically mentioned in the said report that the petitioners were rightly placed in Class-IV category on account of their initial engagement against Class-IV category in view of Govt. HP policy mentioned above instead of the claimed Class-III category. Further, the petitioners already have two types of promotional avenues as per R& P Rules of Class-III category, i.e., of clerk and Lab. Assistants. 32. HP policy mentioned above instead of the claimed Class-III category. Further, the petitioners already have two types of promotional avenues as per R& P Rules of Class-III category, i.e., of clerk and Lab. Assistants. 32. At the time of regularization of the petitioners, there was no such policy in vogue whereby and where under they could have been appointed against the posts of Class-III. The report referred to supra does contain that the petitioners have two avenues of promotion, i.e., Clerk and Lab. Assistant. 33. The Writ Court has noticed and discussed all aspects and has rightly made the conclusion. 34. Having said so, no interference is called for. 35. Viewed thus, the LPAs are dismissed and the impugned judgment is upheld. 36. Accordingly, the appeals are disposed of along with pending applications, if any.