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2016 DIGILAW 2590 (MAD)

T. Krishna Pandian v. K. S. Bharath Kumar

2016-07-29

M.DURAISWAMY

body2016
ORDER : The Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P. (NPD). No. 4781 of 2014 arises against the judgment and decree passed in R.C.A. No. 451 of 2010 on the file of the IX Judge, Court of Small Causes (Rent Control Appellate Authority), Chennai, confirming the order of eviction made in R.C.O.P. No. 488 of 2009 on the file of the XIV Judge, Court of Small Causes (Rent Controller), Chennai. The tenant is the petitioner and the respondent is the landlord. 2. The Civil Revision Petitions in C.R.P. (NPD). Nos. 2007 & 2008 of 2015 arises against the fair and decreetal order passed in M.P. Nos. 463 & 465 of 2012 in R.C.A. No. 451 of 2010 on the file of the IX Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai. These Civil Revision Petitions have also been filed by the tenant. 3. The brief case of the landlord is as follows: According to the landlord, the petitioner is a tenant under him in respect of the entire ground floor, excepting the common staircase portion leading to the upstairs of the petition premises on a monthly rent of Rs.9,500/-. The landlord purchased the petition premises in the month of January 2008 and the tenant had attorned tenancy in his favour and paid the monthly rent till December 2008. The tenant is carrying on Transport Business and also Commission Agency under the name and style of M/s. Shree Sai and Company and goods carriage permit stands in the name of the landlord. The landlord is doing the said business in the nearby premises bearing Door No. 502/2, Thiruvotriyur High Road, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 21, which is a rented premises. The tenancy in respect of the said premises stands in the name of the landlord's mother and he has been temporarily using the portion of the said rented premises for running the business. The landlord's mother is also carrying on her own business in the said rented premises and the respondent/landlord was asked to vacate the said rented premises. Therefore, the respondent had purchased the petition premises, which is situated at No.503, Thiruvotriyur High Road, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 21. After the purchase of the petition premises, the landlord has been requesting the tenant to vacate the premises for his own use and occupation. However, the tenant has been evading the same. Therefore, the respondent had purchased the petition premises, which is situated at No.503, Thiruvotriyur High Road, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 21. After the purchase of the petition premises, the landlord has been requesting the tenant to vacate the premises for his own use and occupation. However, the tenant has been evading the same. The landlord also offered the tenant to take the 1st floor of the premises, which is remaining vacant. However, the tenant did not agree for the same. According to the landlord, he is not occupying any other non-residential building of his own anywhere in the City of Chennai. In these circumstances, the landlord has filed the Original Petition in R.C.O.P. No. 488 of 2009 for eviction on the ground of own use and occupation. 4. The brief case of the tenant is as follows: According to the tenant, the landlord is not carrying on any business in Door No.502/2, Thiruvotriyur High Road, Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 21 and also denied that the landlord is doing Transport Business and Commission Agency in the name of M/s. Shree Sai and Co. Further, the tenant has stated that there is no possibility of any Transport Business being carried on in the petition premises, since the premises is situated in a narrow part of Thiruvottiyur High Road. There is no possibility of parking vehicle and do the loading and unloading of the transported goods. The tenant has stated that if the landlord had decided to have his office for the purpose of any Agency, he could utilize the 1st floor and 2nd floor of the premises, which is kept vacant after his purchase. According to the tenant, there is no bona fide requirement of the petitioner for his own use and occupation. 5. Before the Rent Controller, on the side of the landlord, P.W.1 was examined and 12 documents, Exs.P1 to P12 were marked. On the side of the tenant, R.W.1 was examined, however, no document was marked. 6. The Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the case of both parties, ordered eviction. Aggrieved over the same, the tenant filed an appeal in R.C.A. No. 451 of 2010. In the said Rent Control Appeal, the tenant filed a petition in M.P. No. 463 of 2012 to take note of the subsequent event and permit the tenant to let in further oral and documentary evidence. Aggrieved over the same, the tenant filed an appeal in R.C.A. No. 451 of 2010. In the said Rent Control Appeal, the tenant filed a petition in M.P. No. 463 of 2012 to take note of the subsequent event and permit the tenant to let in further oral and documentary evidence. The tenant also filed a petition in M.P. No. 465 of 2012 to issue subpoena to the Regional Transport Officer, Chennai (North), Tamil Nadu directing them to produce complete records pertaining to vehicle No. TN 55 F 6624 from the date of registration. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, after taking into consideration the materials available on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, dismissed the Appeal in R.C.A. No. 451 of 2010 and also the Miscellaneous Petitions in M.P. Nos. 463 & 465 of 2012 by a common judgment. Aggrieved over the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the tenant has filed the above Civil Revision Petitions. 7. Heard R. Thiagarajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. K.P. Ashok, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 8. Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant submitted that there is no bona fide requirement for the landlord for his own use and occupation and that the Courts below ought not to have ordered eviction. That apart, the learned counsel also submitted that the Rent Control Appellate Authority erroneously dismissed the Miscellaneous Petitions filed by the petitioner seeking to let in further oral and documentary evidence and to issue subpoena to the Regional Transport Officer. Further, the learned counsel submitted that in the absence of bona fide requirement, the Courts below should not have ordered eviction of the tenant from the petition premises. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the landlord had entered into an Agreement of Sale with a prospective buyer, therefore, after entering into an Agreement of Sale with a buyer, he cannot get an order of eviction on the ground of own use and occupation. 9. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, relied upon the following judgments: (i) (1969) 1 MLJ 629 [R.M. Solai Nadar Vs. A.T.A.V. Guruswami Nadar and Co. represented by A.V. Guruswami Nadar] wherein this Court held as follows: “7. 9. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, relied upon the following judgments: (i) (1969) 1 MLJ 629 [R.M. Solai Nadar Vs. A.T.A.V. Guruswami Nadar and Co. represented by A.V. Guruswami Nadar] wherein this Court held as follows: “7. Before referring to the abundant case law available on the subject under consideration, it is convenient to notice the salient ingredients of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. They are: (1) the landlord requires the premises; (2) that such requirement is for purposes of a business which the landlord or his son is carrying on; (3) that such a requirement is bona fide; and (4) he is not occupying another building of his own in the same city, town or village in which the suit premises is situate. The word 'requirement' is not equitable to a mere wish, convenience or liking on the part of the landlord. An element of must have is inhered in it. A mere unbridled or arbitrary agency is called upon to express an opinion whether the landlord needs or requires the premises, it should return, a verdict that having regard to the circumstances of a given case and bearing certain objective standards in view, the need is genuine, honest and not prompted by a collateral purpose. It should however be borne in mind that the landlord is the sole arbiter of his requirements. Ultimately the opinion of a well-instructed Judge on the subject has to rest on the sincerity of the desire, the genuineness of the wish and the reality of the situation as established in evidence. Closely allied with the element of genuine requirement is proof of bona fides on the part of the landlord. Bona fides of an individual is reflected in his conduct and his request and invairably of the requirement is found to be genuine, honest and not tainted with an oblique purpose, then bona fides normally spring from it. The other element constituting Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is that the premises is required for a business which the landlord or his son is 'carrying on'. There is no measure to reckon the activities covered by the expression “carrying on business”. The very term comprehends an act or mercantile pursuit. The other element constituting Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is that the premises is required for a business which the landlord or his son is 'carrying on'. There is no measure to reckon the activities covered by the expression “carrying on business”. The very term comprehends an act or mercantile pursuit. The Legislature having not indicated the range of such pursuit or the nature of such acts, it is for the Courts to judge from the facts of each case: (a) whether they could be fairly and normally characterised as a present intendment on the part of the landlord to carry on a trading pursue it after having made a bona fides preparations for the same, though it is not necessary to establish that he has enough capital to enter into the business; (b) that he has started in right earnest a trade, and (c) that his intentions are not obscure and motivated. If the landlord or his son is already carrying on a business, then the problem becomes easier, for in such a case, the question is whether the need is genuine.” (ii) (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 103 [Hasmat Rai and another Vs. Raghunath Prasad] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the burden is on the plaintiff/landlord to make specific pleadings and to establish that essential statutory requirements are satisfied. There upon, the trial Court has to frame issues accordingly. (iii) 1987 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 630 [Sheikh Jehangir Vs. Smt. S. Kaushilyabai and others] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “In this case, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are unable to sustain the judgment of the High Court. The finding reached by the Sub-Court as to the bona fide requirement of the previous landlord who was the plaintiff under Section 10(iii)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 could not survive after the plaintiff had transferred his right, title and interest in the demised premises by executing a registered sale deed dated May 11, 1973 in favour of the present purchaser. The High Court treated this as a subsequent event necessitating a remand of the suit for a fresh disposal and the present purchaser on remand was impleaded as a party respondent. The High Court treated this as a subsequent event necessitating a remand of the suit for a fresh disposal and the present purchaser on remand was impleaded as a party respondent. There is clear inhibition contained in Section 10(3)(iii) against institution of a suit by a purchaser on the ground of bona fide personal necessity for a period of 3 months from the date of purchase and therefore a suit could not be brought by the purchaser till the expiry of the said period calculated from the date of sale deed. After the suit was remanded, the only remedy to the plaintiff was to seek liberty to withdraw it. The purchaser was to institute a separate suit for his own personal requirement which he never did. In view of the decision of this Court in Shantilal Thkordas V. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala [ (1977) 1 SCR 341 : (1976) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1976 SC 2358 ], the judgment and decree passed by the High Court as well as the Courts below will stand vacated and the suit for eviction will stand dismissed. But the dismissal of the suit will not preclude the purchaser from bringing a fresh suit on the ground of his bona fide requirement. The appeal is accordingly allowed but with order as to costs.” (iv) (1993) 1 Supreme Court Cases 499 [Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs. Kallyani Amma Sulochana and others] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second Court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report (Exts. C-1 and C-2 Mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word “propriety” it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional Court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Even by the presence of the word “propriety” it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional Court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.” (v) 1999 (3) CTC 180 [B.A. Rajan @ B. Antony Raj Vs. Rajapalayam Bhoopalapatti Vishwabramha Kulathavarkalin Uravinmurai Pothunala Fund rep. by its Nattanmai, Bhoopalapatti St., Rajapalayam] wherein this Court held as follows: “18. As was argued before the Appellate Authority, learned counsel also argued before this Court that the suit in O.S. No. 14 of 1996 is only a suit for injunction, as character of possession is not relevant point to be decided and, therefore, the findings therein cannot be said as res judicata. I do not find any force in the said contention. Even though the suit was only for injunction, when the parties have joined in issue and wanted a decision as to the character of their possession, the finding therein cannot be brushed aside as unnecessary. Both the parties have consciously adduced evidence and a finding was entered against the petitioner.” (vi) An unreported judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 15.09.1998 in C.R. No. 397 of 1992 wherein the Delhi High Court held that where material considerations have been overlooked by the Courts below, the same can be termed as material irregularity warranting interference in the revision. (vii) (2000) 1 MLJ 25 (SC) [T. Sivasubramaniam & Ors., Vs. Kasinath Pujari & Ors.] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “6. So far as the second submission is concerned, the language employed in Section 25 of the Act, which confers revisional jurisdiction to the High Court, is very wide. Under Section 25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. Under Section 25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. The words 'to satisfy itself' employed in Section 25 of the Act no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of the fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the Courts below. That power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the Courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the Courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the Courts below. In the present case what we find is that, neither has the landlord set out his need or requirement for the premises for his occupation in his petition nor he led any evidence to show that his need is bona-fide. In the absence of such evidence, the Rent Controller and the First Appellate Authority acted contrary to law in allowing the petition of the landlord by directing the eviction of the tenants. In such circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the findings of the courts below. We, therefore, reject the second submission of learned counsel.” (viii) 2011 (2) MWN (Civil) 380 [Sri Annapurna Sri Gowrishankar Hotels Pvt. Ltd., rep by its Joint Managing Director, R. Venkatesh, No. 70, East Arokiyasami Road, R.S. Puram, Coimbatore-2] wherein this Court held that when eviction is sought on the ground of demolition or re-construction or on the ground of own use and occupation or other grounds, which are personal to that landlord, subsequent purchaser cannot continue the said eviction proceedings. (ix) 2011 (5) CTC 486 [1.Alaudin, 2.Safya Kader Moideen Vs. A. Sathar] wherein this Court held that in the absence of any specific assignment of arrears of rent, transferee landlord is not entitled to continue the proceedings invoking Section 10(2)(i) or maintain an eviction petition for willful default pertaining to period prior to transfer. 10. (ix) 2011 (5) CTC 486 [1.Alaudin, 2.Safya Kader Moideen Vs. A. Sathar] wherein this Court held that in the absence of any specific assignment of arrears of rent, transferee landlord is not entitled to continue the proceedings invoking Section 10(2)(i) or maintain an eviction petition for willful default pertaining to period prior to transfer. 10. Countering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant, Mr. K.P. Ashok, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord submitted that the Courts below have concurrently held that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and ordered eviction on the ground of own use and occupation. Further, the learned counsel submitted that when the landlord is occupying a rented building very near to the petition premises, the tenant cannot be allowed to say that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. The learned counsel submitted that mere execution of Sale Agreement shall not transfer the title of the property and further submitted that the Agreement of Sale entered into by the landlord with his own sister was also cancelled. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected. 11. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, relied upon the following judgments: (i) 1997 - 1 - L.W. 323 [Sherwood Educational Society, No. 3, XIII Avenue, Harrington Road, Chetpet, Madras - 31 Vs. Abid Namazie and two others] wherein this Court held that Agreement of Sale and pendency of Civil Suit are not reasons to disallow the requirement of landlord. Even assuming the event of entering into an Agreement of Sale may be due to delay in law procedures, the bona fide cannot be doubted. (ii) Vol (100) 1987 L.W. 577 [B. Kuppulal Vs. D. Sagunthala & anr.] wherein this Court held that mere Agreement of Sale will not terminate the landlord-tenant relationship and the liability of the tenant to continue to pay the rent, unless there are specific recitals to the contrary in the Agreement of Sale. (iii) 1999 - 1 - L.W. 336 [Padmavathy and another Vs. N. Narayanan] wherein this Court held that even assuming that the petitioner is entitled to claim benefits of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the agreement should specifically and expressly state the waiver of rent. (iv) (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 252 [Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd., Vs. N. Narayanan] wherein this Court held that even assuming that the petitioner is entitled to claim benefits of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the agreement should specifically and expressly state the waiver of rent. (iv) (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 252 [Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd., Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal and others] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “7. In the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani V. Uttam Chand [ (2004) 8 SCC 490 it was held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord has to be seen on the date of the petition and the subsequent events intervening due to protracted litigation will not be relevant. It was held that the crucial date is the date of petition. Their Lordships further observed that the normal rule is that the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined on the date of the petition and that subsequent events can be taken into consideration for moulding the reliefs provided such events had a material impact on those rights and obligations. It was further observed by their Lordships that it is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. Therefore, the courts have to take a pragmatic approach of the matter. It is common experience in our country that specially landlord-tenant litigation prolongs for a long period. It is true that neither can the person who has started the litigation sit idle nor can the development of the events be stopped by him. Therefore, the crucial event should be taken as on the date when the suit for eviction was filed unless the subsequent event materially changed the ground of relief. 8. In the case of Gaya Prasad V. Pradeep Srivastava [ (2001) 2 SCC 604 ] Their Lordships observed that the landlord should not be penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial date for deciding the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. Their Lordships also observed that the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord relief while litigation at least reaches the final stages. Their Lordships also observed that the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord relief while litigation at least reaches the final stages. However, their Lordships further added that subsequent events may in some situations be considered to have overshadowed the genuineness of the landlord's need but only if they are of such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it lose significance altogether. (v) 1997 - 2 - L.W. 607 [Thirunavukkarasu Vs. Vasantha Ammal] wherein this Court held that the rights of the parties have to be decided as on the date of petition. (vi) 1997 - 3 - L.W. 141 [S. Mariappan Vs. Kadar Beevi] wherein this Court held that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act though a beneficial legislation to the tenant, has to be construed as enabling the landlady to get possession if the specified grounds are made out and putting further restrictions on the landlord is not permissible. (vii) 2005 - 1 - L.W. 98 [Pratap Rai Tanwani and another Vs. Uttam Chand and another] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord, the crucial date is the date of petition. 12. So far as the revisions in C.R.P. (NPD). Nos. 2007 & 2008 of 2015 are concerned, those Civil Revision Petitions are directed against the order passed in M.P. Nos. 463 & 465 of 2012. M.P. No. 463 of 2012 was filed by the revision petitioner to take note of the subsequent event and permit him to let in further oral and documentary evidence. M.P. No. 465 of 2012 was filed to issue subpoena to the Regional Transport Officer, Chennai (North) directing him to produce complete records pertaining to vehicle No. TN 55 F 6624 from the date of its registration. 13. It is settled position that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord, the crucial date is the date of petition and the subsequent events cannot be taken into consideration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 2005-1-L.W. 98 [Pratap Rai Tanwani and another Vs. Uttam Chand and another], cited supra, has also held that the crucial date is the date of petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 2005-1-L.W. 98 [Pratap Rai Tanwani and another Vs. Uttam Chand and another], cited supra, has also held that the crucial date is the date of petition. Therefore, the petition filed by the tenant before the Rent Control Appellate Authority to take note of the subsequent event and permit him to let in further oral and documentary evidence was rightly rejected by the Lower Appellate Court. 14. So far as M.P. No. 465 of 2012 is concerned, when the tenant had every opportunity to file such an application before the Rent Controller to issue subpoena to the Regional Transport Officer, the tenant has chosen not to file an application before the Rent Controller and the said application was filed when the Rent Control Appeal was posted for arguments. The tenant has not explained the reasons for not filing an application before the Rent Controller. In the absence of any reasons given by the tenant for not filing an application at the earliest point of time, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has rightly dismissed this petition. 15. I do not find any error or irregularity in the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in M.P. Nos. 463 & 465 of 2012. 16. Coming to the issue of bona fide requirement of the landlord, in order to prove that he is carrying on Transport Business at the premises adjacent to the petition premises, the landlord had marked Ex.P1 Partnership Deed dated 03.09.1994. On a perusal of Ex.P1 Partnership Deed, it is clear that the landlord is carrying on Transport Business Company along with his relative namely Shiva in the name and style of Shree Sai and Co. Ex.P2 is the Registration Certificate of the Partnership Business. Ex.P3 is the Registration Certificate issued in the name of Shree Sai & Co. Ex.P4 would establish that the goods permit was issued by the Transport Department in respect of the goods carriage at Shree Sai & Co., in the said premises. The Registration Certificate of the vehicle standing in the name of the landlord was marked as Ex.P5 and the Insurance Certificate of the vehicle was marked as Ex.P6. Ex.P7 would establish that the goods carriage permit stands in the name of the landlord mentioning his residential address. The summons issued by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in M.C.O.P. Nos. The Registration Certificate of the vehicle standing in the name of the landlord was marked as Ex.P5 and the Insurance Certificate of the vehicle was marked as Ex.P6. Ex.P7 would establish that the goods carriage permit stands in the name of the landlord mentioning his residential address. The summons issued by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in M.C.O.P. Nos. 925 & 926 of 2009 to Shree Sai & Co., were marked as Exs.P8 & P9. All these documents would establish that the landlord is carrying on Transport Business in the name and style of M/s. Shree Sai & Co., in the rented premises. 17. In order to establish that the respondent/landlord is in occupation of a rented premises for running his Transport Business, he had produced Exs.P10 to P12 documents. Even when the tenant was examined as R.W.1, he was not in a position to dispute that the respondent has been doing Transport Business. R.W.1 also admitted that the respondent is doing business only in a rented premises. He also admitted that ABT Parcel Services are having their office about 50 buildings away from the petition premises. When a specific question was put to R.W.1 that the goods lorries used to come to the petition premises for unloading the goods to the tenant, he remained silent without answering the question. Taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidences let in by both the parties, the Courts below rightly came to the conclusion that the respondent had proved his case that his mother and mother's sister are doing business in the rented premises. 18. Since the respondent is in occupation of a rented premises doing Transport Business, he wanted to shift his business to his own premise (i.e.) the petition property and required the same for his own use and occupation by producing the oral and documentary evidence the petitioner has categorically proved his bona fide requirement. Though the tenant had contended that the locality is not suitable for carrying on Transport Business, the same has been disproved by the evidence of R.W.1 himself for the reason that he himself had stated that ABT Parcel Service is having their office about 50 buildings away from the petition premises. The suggestion made by the landlord to R.W1 that lorries used to come to the petition premises was also not denied by R.W1. The suggestion made by the landlord to R.W1 that lorries used to come to the petition premises was also not denied by R.W1. Since the respondent/landlord had proved his bona fide requirement of the petition premises for his own use and occupation, the Courts below have concurrently ordered eviction. 19. Though, there is no dispute with regard to the ratios laid down in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, since the facts and circumstances are different, they are not applicable to the present case. 20. The order of eviction was passed by the Courts below, after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidences of both sides. I do not find any error or irregularity in the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. 21. The revision petitioner filed a petition in C.M.P. No. 11017 of 2016 under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code to produce additional documents. 22. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, in paragraph-5, the petitioner has stated that by inadvertence and oversight, the documents were not produced before the Rent Controller. The petitioner seeks to produce the certified copies of two Sale Deeds dated 20.02.2007 and 21.01.2011 as additional documents. 23. Though these documents are subsequent to the filing of the Rent Control Original Petition, which was filed in the year 2009, the petitioner had obtained the certified copies of the Sale Deeds only on 19.12.2014 (i.e.) during the pendency of the Civil Revision Petition. The reasoning given by the petitioner for not producing the documents cannot be accepted at this point of time. That apart, the documents sought to be produced by the petitioner as additional documents have no relevancy for the case on hand. The petitioner was not diligent in producing the documents before the Rent Controller. Therefore, I am of the view that the petition is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be rejected. 24. In these circumstances, all the three Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs. C.M.P. No. 11017 of 2016 is also dismissed. M.P. No. 1 of 2014 is closed. 25. After the pronouncement of the orders, Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant sought nine months time for vacating the premises. 26. Mr. K.P. Ashok, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has no objection for granting nine months time. 27. No costs. C.M.P. No. 11017 of 2016 is also dismissed. M.P. No. 1 of 2014 is closed. 25. After the pronouncement of the orders, Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant sought nine months time for vacating the premises. 26. Mr. K.P. Ashok, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has no objection for granting nine months time. 27. In view of the same, the petitioner is directed to file an affidavit of undertaking, before the Registry of this Court within one week, to the effect that he would vacate the premises within nine months from today without driving the respondent/landlord to initiate execution proceedings.