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2016 DIGILAW 2609 (ALL)

Santokh Singh v. State of U. P.

2016-07-28

KARUNA NAND BAJPAYEE

body2016
JUDGMENT Karuna Nand Bajpayee,J. This second application has been filed seeking the release of the applicant on bail in Case Crime No. 538 of 2015 under Sections 395 & 412 I.P.C., Police Station Shikohabad District Firozabad. The first bail application was rejected by this Court on 14.9.2015. 2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned AGA for the State and perused the record. 3. Submission of learned counsel for the applicant is that subsequently after rejection of first bail application of the applicant, some co-accused has been granted bail and, therefore, the applicant should also be enlarged on bail. It has also been pointed out that after rejection of the first bail application on 14.9.2015 the trial has not made any substantial progress. Learned counsel for the applicant has also tried to reiterate the submissions with regard to the merit of the case. 4. Learned AGA has opposed the prayer for bail. 5. A perusal of the earlier order rejecting the first bail application passed by this Court reveals that all the submissions with regard to the merit of the case have been thoroughly gone into and the order has been passed on the merit. There is no justification to re-look into the same and reinvent merits in the case when they have not been found on the earlier occasion. A perusal of the bail orders passed by another Benches of this Court with regard to co-accused, namely, Sonu Thakur, Ranki alias Amit Kumar and Raju alias Rajeev dated 16.5.2016, 9.12.2015 and 21.7.2016 also reveal that the fact of the rejection of first bail application of the applicant was not even mentioned before the Court on behalf of the co-accused. It is not known and is difficult to assess as to what view would have been adopted by another Bench or Benches, had the bail rejection order passed by this Court been placed, in all fairness, before the Bench considering the bail of co-accused. Had this been the first bail of applicant and had the orders granting bail to co-accused been passed prior in point of time and had been placed before this Court, this Court would have kept them in perspective while passing the order with regard to the applicant. But that is not the case here. Had this been the first bail of applicant and had the orders granting bail to co-accused been passed prior in point of time and had been placed before this Court, this Court would have kept them in perspective while passing the order with regard to the applicant. But that is not the case here. Bail of applicant has been rejected by this Court earlier and subsequently bail of some other co-accused has been obtained from another Bench without even showing the fairness of bringing the order of this Court regarding the applicant to the notice of another Bench. Now, this Court is being asked to virtually recall its order and change its view on the same set of facts to which it has already adverted its judicial mind and pronounced its view. Ordinarily, the Courts try to give due weight to the orders passed by Coordinate Benches on similar facts to maintain harmony in judicial verdicts and adopt the principle of parity as far as it is possible to do so. But the principle of parity is not an absolute rule of law nor is it any binding law of precedent. Facts may always differ from case to case and the individual circumstances and evidence with regard to different accused may differ often. Even the antecedents of an accused may carve out the distinction even though other facts may be similar. To fit the case of one accused exactly into another like a square peg in a square hole is often very difficult. It is also not unknown to judicial experience that sometimes the order passed by another Bench on similar matter is such which reveals that some crucially relevant material has been left out of consideration or was not brought before that Court, which could have possibly turned the view of the Court. Sometimes it may also happen though rarely that the facts of a case are such that granting bail to the accused may revolt against the judicial conscience of a Court. In all such eventualities the Courts may beg to differ with the view taken by another Bench. Sometimes it may also happen though rarely that the facts of a case are such that granting bail to the accused may revolt against the judicial conscience of a Court. In all such eventualities the Courts may beg to differ with the view taken by another Bench. But so far as this second bail application is concerned, as has already been observed herein before, it has been moved primarily on the strength of bail orders passed by another Bench of this Court in favour of co-accused, which have been obtained subsequently after applicant's bail was rejected on merits by this Court without even disclosing the aforesaid fact. In any view of the matter, the facts of the case are such that in the considered opinion of this Court, the applicant had no case for bail then, and has no case for bail even now. The pleas raised on behalf of applicant about the ownership of money in the nature of his defence can more appropriately be gone into only by the trial Court after proper trial. Prima facie, there is strongly incriminating circumstances available against the applicant on record, as have been discussed in the earlier bail rejection order and need not be gone into once again, which dis-entitle the applicant from the relief of bail. Moreover, this is a case of extreme gravity in which the government money to a tune of more than Ninteen lacs while being carried to the treasury was looted at the gun point and a huge looted amount has also been recovered from applicant's possession. These are social crimes committed out the rapacious greed for easy money and in fact those who indulge in such anti-social criminal behaviour give a derisive slap of humiliation to those poor teeming millions who unceasingly toil day in and day out just to make both their ends meet, but prefer to live with their honourable poverty rather than to lead the life of a robber and commit dacoities. There is no reason to take a liberal view in such matters or to soft peddal such debased and audacious crimes. This Court, therefore, does not see any good ground to re-assess the merits of the case in favour of the accused-applicant. 6. There is no reason to take a liberal view in such matters or to soft peddal such debased and audacious crimes. This Court, therefore, does not see any good ground to re-assess the merits of the case in favour of the accused-applicant. 6. In a case of this gravity along with the nature of evidence which is available on record against applicant, the detention of the applicant can also not be said to be so long drawn out which may constitute a legitimate ground enough to set him at liberty or may persuade the Court to grant him bail on that basis alone. 7. The bail application is, therefore, rejected.