JUDGMENT : V. Ramasubramanian, J. 1. The appellant challenged the proposed action of the respondent under the Revenue Recovery Act, in terms of Section 26 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1956, for the recovery of arrears of Sales Tax, on the sole ground that the appellant was declared as a Sick Industry under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. But the Writ Petition was dismissed by the learned Judge on the basis of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others, 1997 Sales Tax Cases 327, AIR 1997 SC 2027 , (1997) 10 SCC 649 , LNIND 1997 SC 449. It is against the said order of the learned Judge, in W.P (MD) No. 9612 of 2007, dated 18.08.2011, that the present appeal is filed. 2. The main and only contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the law laid down in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra) has been subsequently clarified by a Three Member Bench of the Apex Court in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others, AIR 2012 SC 1440 , (2012) 4 SCC 148 , LNIND 2012 SC 1186, (2012) 3 MLJ 280. The said view has also been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Commercial Tax officer-II v. Tvl. B.V.V. Paper Industries Ltd., in an unreported decision rendered on 04.11.2013, in Writ Appeal in W.A. (MD) No. 613 of 2009. 3. But, we find that in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), the Supreme Court did not take a different view from the one expressed in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra). This can be seen from paragraph No. 52 of the decision in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), which reads as follows:- "52. This can be seen from paragraph No. 52 of the decision in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), which reads as follows:- "52. In Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others, 1997 Sales Tax Cases 327, AIR 1997 SC 2027 , (1997) 10 SCC 649 , LNIND 1997 SC 449, the scope of Section 22 of SICA 1985 was sought to be restricted only to the items which have been reckoned or included in the scheme for rehabilitation failing which the recovery or proceedings in relation to that particular liability would continue despite the provisions of SICA 1985. In that case the Court was concerned with the recovery of sales tax dues, which the sick industrial company was enabled to collect after the date of sanction of the scheme. The revenue was due to Department and the recovery of such amount was held to be beyond the purview of SICA 1985." 4. Reliance is placed upon paragraph Nos. 55 and 56 of Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), which read as follows:- "55. Despite these judgments and with an intention to clarify the law, we would state that the matters which are connected with the sanctioning and implementation of the scheme right from the date on which it is presented or the date from which the scheme is made effective, whichever is earlier, would be the matters which squarely fall within the ambit and scope of Section 22 of SICA 1985 subject to their satisfying the ingredients stated under that provision. This would include the proceedings before the civil court, Revenue Authorities and/or any other competent forum in the form of execution or distress in relation to recovery of amount by sale or otherwise of the assets of the sick industrial company. It is difficult for us to hold that merely because a demand by a creditor had not been made a part of the scheme, pre-or post- sanctioning of the same for that reason alone, it would fall outside the ambit of protection of Section 22 of SICA 1985. 56. BIFR, being a specialised body which is required to act as per the legislative intent indicated above, has jurisdiction to examine the matter and grant or refuse its consent for institution, continuation and recovery of dues payable to a particular creditor, whatever the nature of such dues may be. 56. BIFR, being a specialised body which is required to act as per the legislative intent indicated above, has jurisdiction to examine the matter and grant or refuse its consent for institution, continuation and recovery of dues payable to a particular creditor, whatever the nature of such dues may be. If such an interpretation is not given, the very purpose of SICA 1985 may stand defeated. For instance, a scheme is sanctioned by BIFR and is at the stage of successful completion, where demand from the Revenue with regard to the sick industrial company is allowed, this can render the scheme ineffective and impossible to be executed, if permitted to be enforced against such company without approval/consent of the specialised body like BIFR." 5. But, paragraph Nos. 55 and 56 do not dilute the principles laid down in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra). The second part of paragraph No. 52 of Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), follows the view taken in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra). Moreover, the decision in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), did not arise out of the proposed action for recovery of arrears of sales tax. Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra) primarily dealt with a claim that was not part of a Scheme of Rehabilitation. But, in the case on hand, the issue relates to recovery of arrears of sales tax which the appellant has collected from its customers, but not remitted to the Department. In other words, the appellant, even after the framing of Rehabilitation Scheme by BIFR collected sales tax from its customers and did not remit it by taking advantage of Rehabilitation Scheme and approved earlier. This is not the type of a case that is covered by the ratio laid down in paragraph Nos. 55 and 56 of Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra). 6. Even in paragraph No. 73 of Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), the Supreme Court did not make any distinction. On the contrary in paragraph No. 74, the Supreme Court pointed out that the view in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra) was not adopted in the subsequent judgments. 6. Even in paragraph No. 73 of Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra), the Supreme Court did not make any distinction. On the contrary in paragraph No. 74, the Supreme Court pointed out that the view in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra) was not adopted in the subsequent judgments. In paragraph No. 76, the Court made a distinction between contractual and non-contractual liabilities. The question of statutory liability that arise out of taxing statutes was not the issue before the Supreme Court in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra). 7. Insofar as the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.(MD). No. 613 of 2009 is concerned, it appears that the Division Bench did not notice the distinction. The Division Bench of this Court extracted paragraph Nos. 55 and 56 of Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra) and closed the issue as having been finally settled on the question of law. There was no discussion in the judgment of the Division Bench, as to whether Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra) was diluted in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra). Therefore the decision of the Division Bench is not a precedent on the point. 8. Thus, we are of the considered view that the decision in Raheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and Others (supra) did not take a different view but actually affixes the seal of approval, on the view taken in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Others v. Coromandel Pharmaceuticals and Others (supra). Hence, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the Writ Petition. We see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge dated 18.08.2011 passed in W.P.(MD) No. 9612 of 2007. Accordingly, this Writ Appeal is dismissed. No costs.