JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is award, dated 29th May, 2012, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chamba Division, Chamba (HP) (for short “the Tribunal”) in M.A.C. Petition No. 16 of 2011, titled as Krishna Kumari and others versus Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and others, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs. 34,00,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its realization came to be awarded in favour of the claimants and the insurer was saddled with liability (for short “the impugned award”). 2. In order to determine this appeal, it is necessary to give a brief resume of the facts of the case, the womb of which has given birth to the appeal in hand. 3. The claimants invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”) for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs. 40,00,000/-, as per the breakups given in the claim petition on the ground that they became the victims of the vehicular accident, which was caused by the motorcyclist, namely Shri Subhash Kumar, on 29th May, 2011, at about 1.30 P.M., at place Rath near Ballu, Tehsil and District Chamba, while riding motorcycle No. HP486520, in a rash and negligent manner, in which deceased Bensu Ram, who was the pillion rider, sustained injuries and succumbed to the said injuries. 4. The respondents in the claim petition resisted the same on the grounds taken in the respective memo of objections. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal on 20th October, 2011: “1. Whether deceased Bensu Ram died because of rash or negligent driving of vehicle bearing registration No. HP486520 by respondent No. 3 Subhash Kumar on 29th May, 2011 at place Rath as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation. If so, how much and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR 4. Whether the driver of the vehicle in question was not holding a valid and effective driving licence to drive the vehicle in question, if so, its effect? OPR1 5. Whether the vehicle in question was being driven against the terms and conditions of Insurance Policy, if so, its effect? OPR1 6. Relief.” 6. OPR 4. Whether the driver of the vehicle in question was not holding a valid and effective driving licence to drive the vehicle in question, if so, its effect? OPR1 5. Whether the vehicle in question was being driven against the terms and conditions of Insurance Policy, if so, its effect? OPR1 6. Relief.” 6. In support of their claim, the claimants examined Dr. Dushyant Thakur as PW1, MHC Pawan Kumar as PW-2, Sh. Somesh Kumar as PW-3, Shri Khem Raj as PW-5 and one of the claimants, namely Smt. Krishna Kumari, stepped into the witness box as PW-4. The motorcyclist has examined HC Ashok Kumar as RW-1. The owner insured and the insurer of the offending vehicle have not led any evidence. 7. The Tribunal, after scanning the evidence, oral as well as documentary, awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 34,00,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its realization in favour of the claimants and saddled the insurer with liability in terms of the impugned award. 8. The claimants, motorcyclist and owner insured of the offending vehicle have not questioned the impugned award on any ground, thus, has attained finality so far it relates to them. 9. The appellant insurer has questioned the impugned award on the grounds taken in the memo of the appeal. 10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant insurer argued that the accident had not occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the motorcyclist, was due to falling of the stones from hillside, thus, the Tribunal has fallen in an error in saddling the insurer with liability. 11. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel is not tenable for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. Issue No. 1: 12. The claimants have specifically pleaded in para 24 of the claim petition that the motorcyclist was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, could not keep control over the vehicle while negotiating the curve due to which the vehicle skidded and deceased Bensu Ram was thrown into River Ravi. 13. The owner insured of the offending vehicle has evasively denied the averments contained in para 24 of the claim petition. 13. The owner insured of the offending vehicle has evasively denied the averments contained in para 24 of the claim petition. But, the motorcyclist, while filing reply to para 24 of the claim petition, has admitted the factum of the accident and has averred that he was not driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. 14. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the reply filed by the motorcyclist, i.e. respondent No. 3 in the claim petition, herein: “24. That para No. 24 of the petition is incorrect hence denied. It is incorrect that driver was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. It is submitted that driver of the vehicle was driving the vehicle very cautiously and in a safe manner and all of sudden stones fell from uphill which hit the deceased and as a result of which deceased fell in the Ravi River.” 15. The owner insured of the offending vehicle has not led any evidence. The motorcyclist has denied the rash and negligent driving on his part and has examined HC Ashok Kumar as RW-1, to prove the said factum. He himself has not stepped into the witness box to prove the said factum, thus, adverse inference has to be drawn against him. Viewed thus, the Tribunal, while deciding issue No. 1, has rightly held that the motorcyclist was driving the offending vehicle rashly and negligently at the relevant point of time and caused the accident in which deceased Bensu Ram lost his life. 16. It was for the motorcyclist to question the said findings, has not questioned the same, meaning thereby, has accepted the findings returned by the Tribunal. Thus, it cannot lie in the mouth of the insurer that the accident was not outcome of the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the motorcyclist. 17. Even otherwise, the factum of accident is not in dispute. It was for the motorcyclist to take all precautions and exercise due care and caution while riding the offending vehicle, which he has not done. FIR was also lodged against the motorcyclist. Thus, the Tribunal has rightly made the discussions in paras 19 to 21 of the impugned award, need no interference. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 1 are upheld. 18. FIR was also lodged against the motorcyclist. Thus, the Tribunal has rightly made the discussions in paras 19 to 21 of the impugned award, need no interference. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 1 are upheld. 18. Before dealing with issue No. 2, I deem it proper to determine issues No. 3 to 5. Issue No. 3: 19. It was for the respondents to prove how the claim petition was not maintainable, have not led any evidence to this effect, thus, have failed to discharge the onus. Even otherwise, the claimants are the victims of the vehicular accident in which they lost their sole bread earner, thus, were well within their rights to maintain the claim petition and the claim petition was maintainable. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 3 are upheld. Issues No. 4 and 5: 20. It was for the insurer to prove that the motorcyclist was not having a valid and effective driving licence to drive the offending vehicle and the same was being driven in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, has not led any evidence, thus, has failed to discharge the onus. 21. However, I have gone through the record. The driving licence of the motorcyclist is on the record as Ext. R3, the perusal of which does disclose that the motorcyclist was having a valid and effective driving licence. The factum of insurance is not in dispute. Thus, the Tribunal has rightly decided issues No. 4 and 5 against the insurer. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 4 and 5 are upheld. Issue No. 2: 22. Admittedly, the insurer has not sought permission in terms of Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”), thus, is precluded from questioning the adequacy of the compensation. 23. I deem it proper to record herein that the appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act is alike the appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “CPC”). Therefore, the Court is under obligation to decide all issues arising in a case both on facts and law after appreciating the entire evidence. 24. The Apex Court in U.P.S.R.T.C. vs. Km. Therefore, the Court is under obligation to decide all issues arising in a case both on facts and law after appreciating the entire evidence. 24. The Apex Court in U.P.S.R.T.C. vs. Km. Mamta and others, reported in AIR 2016 SC 948 , held that Section 173 of the MV Act and the first appeal under Section 96 CPC are alike and, therefore, the High Court is equally under legal obligation to decide all issues arising in the case. It is profitable to reproduce paragraph 24 of the said judgment hereunder: “24. An appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act is essentially in the nature of first appeal alike Section 96 of the Code and, therefore, the High Court is equally under legal obligation to decide all issues arising in the case both on facts and law after appreciating the entire evidence.” 25. It is apt to record herein that Part VII of the CPC provides for filing of appeals arising out of decrees and orders. Section 96 CPC provides for appeals from original decree. It is apt to reproduce Section 96 CPC hereunder: “96. Appeal from original decree. (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Cause, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees.” 26. Section 107 CPC deals with the “Powers of the Appellate Court” and sub-section (2) thereof, provides specifically that the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed on the trial Court. It is apt to reproduce Section 107(2) CPC as under: “107. Powers of appellate court. (1) ….............. It is apt to reproduce Section 107(2) CPC as under: “107. Powers of appellate court. (1) ….............. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.” 27. Section 176 of the MV Act empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of implementing the provisions contained in Sections 165 to 174 of the MV Act. It is apt to reproduce Section 176 of the Act, hereunder: “176. Power of State Government to make rules. A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: a. The form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications; b. The procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter; c. The powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal; d. The form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and e. Any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.” 28. In terms of the mandate of Section 176(c) of the MV Act, the Claims Tribunals are vested with the powers of Civil Court. 29. In a Claim Petition, summary procedure is to be adopted and all provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable, rather only some provisions have been made applicable in terms of Section 169 of the MV Act read with Rule 232 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999 (for short “MV Rules”). It is apt to reproduce Rule 232 of the MV Rules herein: “232. It is apt to reproduce Rule 232 of the MV Rules herein: “232. The Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases: The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII; Rule 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII; Order XXI and Order XXIII, Rules 1 to 3.” 30. Now, the question is whether the Appellate Court while hearing an appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act can pass such an order which ought to have been passed by the Tribunal, without there being any appeal/challenge or cross objections from the person against whom the order has been made? The answer is in the affirmative for the reasons given hereinabove read with the mandate of law laid down by the Apex Court and the High Courts. 31. Part VII and Order 41 CPC deals with the powers and the scope of the Appellate Court in appeal proceedings. 32. The Apex Court in Sharanamma and others vs. Managing Director, Divisional Contr., North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation, reported in (2013) 11 SCC 517 , has held that there are no fetters on the powers of the appellate Court to consider the entire case on facts and law, while hearing an appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the said decision hereunder: “10. When an Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the 'Act'), before the High Court, the normal Rules which apply to Appeals before the High Court are applicable to such an Appeal also. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that when an Appeal is provided for, the whole case is open before the Appellate Court and by necessary implication, it can exercise all powers incidental thereto in order to exercise that power effectively. A bare reading of Section 173 of the Act also reflects that there is no curtailment or limitations on the powers of the Appellate Court to consider the entire case on facts and law. 11. A bare reading of Section 173 of the Act also reflects that there is no curtailment or limitations on the powers of the Appellate Court to consider the entire case on facts and law. 11. It is well settled that the right of Appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to Review by the Appellate Court. Thus, such powers and duties are necessarily to be exercised so as to make the provision of law effective. 12. Generally, finding of fact recorded by Tribunal should not be interfered with in an Appeal until and unless it is proved that glaring discrepancy or mistake has taken place. If the assessment of compensation by the Tribunal was fair and reasonable and the award of the Tribunal was neither contrary nor inconsistent with the relevant facts as per the evidence available on record then as mentioned hereinabove, the High Court would not interfere in the Appeal. In the case in hand, nothing could be pointed out to us as to what were the glaring discrepancies or mistakes in the impugned Award of the Tribunal, which necessitated the Appellate Court to take a different view in the matter.” 33. The Apex Court in the case titled as Giani Ram vs. Ramjilal, reported in 1969 (1) SCC 813 , held that Order 41 Rule 33 CPC empowers the appellate Court to pass any decree which justice may require. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment herein: “8. Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC was enacted to meet a situation of the nature arising in this case. In so far as it is material, the rule provides: “The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. The expression "which ought to have been passed" means "which ought in law to have been passed". The expression "which ought to have been passed" means "which ought in law to have been passed". If the Appellate Court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed, but was in fact not passed by the subordinate court, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. 9. If the claim of the respondents to retain any part of the property after the death of Jwala is negatived, it would, be perpetrating gave injustice to deny to the widow and the two daughters their share in the property to which they are in law entitled. In our view, the case was one in which the power under Order 41, Rule 33, CPC ought to have been exercised and the claim not only of the three sons but also of the widow and the two daughters ought to have been decreed.” 34. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Narayanarao (dead) through LRs and others vs. Sudarshan, reported in 1995 Supp.(4) SCC 463; Mahant Dhangir and another vs. Madan Mohan and others, reported in 1987 (Supp.) SCC 528, and T.N. Rajasekar vs. N. Kasiviswanathan and others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 3794 held that the High Court, in order to do complete justice to the parties, can invoke the powers under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and pass orders accordingly. 35. The Apex Court in another case titled as Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking vs. Basanti Devi and another, reported in JT 1999 (7) SC 486, while relying upon its earlier decision in Mahant Dhangir (supra), held in paragraph 19 as under: “19. Conditions as laid in provision of Order 41, Rule 33 are satisfied in the present case. When circumstances exist which necessitate the exercise of discretion conferred by Rule 33, the Court cannot be found wanting when it comes to exercise its powers.” 36. This Court in H.P. Road Transport Corporation vs. Pt. Jai Ram and etc. etc., reported in AIR 1980 Himachal Pradesh 16, held that under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, wide powers have been given to the appellate Court and once it is seized of a matter in its appellate jurisdiction, it is within its power to do complete justice between all the concerned parties. Jai Ram and etc. etc., reported in AIR 1980 Himachal Pradesh 16, held that under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, wide powers have been given to the appellate Court and once it is seized of a matter in its appellate jurisdiction, it is within its power to do complete justice between all the concerned parties. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of paras 39 and para 40 of the judgment herein: “39. …………...Moreover, theme of Order 41 and especially the wide powers given to the Court under Rule 33 of Order 41 suggests that the intention of the Legislature is to see that 'once the Court is seized of a matter in its appellate jurisdiction, it is able to do complete justice between all the concerned parties. To us, therefore, it is very clear that the provision enabling a respondent to file cross-objections made in Rule 22 is a procedural provision under which even if a respondent has not preferred any appeal, the Court is enabled to do complete justice to the parties by allowing the respondent concerned to prefer cross-objections within the period of limitation. Under these circumstances, with great respect to the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, we find ourselves unable to accept their view that provision enabling a respondent to file cross-objections is a substantive provision and not a procedural one. 40. In view of our finding that provision for filing cross-objections contemplated by Order 41, Rule 22 is a procedural provision, the ratio of the above referred two decisions of the Supreme Court would at once be attracted, and this Court being seized of an appellate jurisdiction conferred by Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, It has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner in which it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction allowing the respondents in such appeals to prefer cross-objections.” 37. Keeping in view the ratio of the judgment supra, it can safely be held that the appellate Court is competent to pass any order in the interest of justice. 38. The High Court of Rajasthan, while dilating upon the powers of the Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, in the case titled as United India Insurance Co. Keeping in view the ratio of the judgment supra, it can safely be held that the appellate Court is competent to pass any order in the interest of justice. 38. The High Court of Rajasthan, while dilating upon the powers of the Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, in the case titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dama Ram and others, reported in 1994 ACJ 692, held that the appellate Court can rectify the error invoking Order 41 Rule 33 CPC even in the absence of Cross Objections or appeal by the claimants. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 7 of the said decision hereunder: “7. The Tribunal has not passed award in any case against the owner (insured) of the vehicle. It has passed awards against the appellant insurance company only. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal has categorically held that the said accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck by its driver. As such his employer, namely, Mohd. Rafiq, owner of the said truck, was liable for his negligent act. Thus the Tribunal committed a serious error in not making liable the owner and driver of the offending truck to pay the said amounts of compensation. This error can well be corrected by this court by invoking the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, even if no cross-objection or appeal has been filed by the claimants respondents. It has been observed in Kok Singh v. Deokabai AIR 1976 SC 634 , paras 6 and 7, as follows: (6) In Giani Ram v. Ramji Lal AIR 1969 SC 1144 , the court said that in Order 41, Rule 33, the expression 'which ought to have been passed' means 'what ought in law to have been passed' and if an appellate court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed was in fact not passed by the court below, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. (7) Therefore, we hold that even if the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the trial court, that was no bar to the High Court passing a decree in favour of the respondent for the enforcement of the charge. (7) Therefore, we hold that even if the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the trial court, that was no bar to the High Court passing a decree in favour of the respondent for the enforcement of the charge. Reference of Murari Lal v. Gomati Devi 1986 ACJ 316 (Rajasthan), may also be made here. Similar view has been taken by me while deciding United India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Dhali 1992 ACJ 1057 (Rajasthan).” 39. The High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in the case titled as M. Adu Ama vs. Inja Bangaru Raja and another, reported in 1995 ACJ 670, has laid down the same principle of law. 40. This High Court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation vs. Saroj Devi and others, reported in 2002 ACJ 1146, held that appellate Court is not precluded from passing order which it considers just in the facts of the case, without there being any cross objection or cross appeal. It is profitable to reproduce paragraph 15 of the said decision hereunder: “15. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court and different High Courts including this Court, we feel that there being no prohibition in law, i.e., either under Motor Vehicles Act or under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, this Court is not precluded from passing order which it considers just in the circumstances of a case without there being either cross-objection or cross appeal. As such we are further of the view that Order 41, Rule 33 is fully applicable to the appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act.” 41. In the case titled as National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mast Ram and others, reported in 2004 ACJ 1039, the question arose before this High Court was – whether the appellate Court can modify the award in the absence of cross appeal. This High Court answered in the affirmative. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 13 of the said judgment hereunder: “13. Because of what has been held in this judgment, it is felt necessary to exercise power vested in this court under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the findings in the operative portion of the award requiring the appellant to pay the amount and then to recover it from the 'insurer' (it should have been 'insured'?). This is a direction in the impugned award that needs to be set aside. On this aspect, Mr. Sharma had argued that there is no cross appeal by the owner of the vehicle. To meet such a situation, legislature had enacted Order 41, Rule 33 in the Civil Procedure Code even in cases where an appeal is not filed by a party, like the owner in the present appeal. As such, this plea cannot be accepted.” 42. This High Court in another case titled as LAC Solan and another vs. Bhoop Ram, reported in 1997(2) Sim.L.C. 229, modified the awards in exercise of powers under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC. 43. Faced with the similar situation, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in a case titled as State Bank of India vs. M/s Sharma Provision Store and another, reported in AIR 1999 J&K 128 , held that a High Court can pass a decree which ought to have been passed by the trial Court. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of paragraph 7 of the said decision hereunder: “7. …….This is an exceptional situation which authorises this Court in the present appeal to pass such decree as ought to have been passed or as the nature of the case demands. Similarly discretion vested in this Court under the aforesaid provision of law will not be refused to be exercised simply because respondents have not either filed an appeal or cross-objections.” 44. This Court in FAO No.203 of 2010, titled as Nati Devi and another versus Maya Devi and others, decided on 20th May, 2016, FAO No. 448 of 2011, titled as Sarita Devi & others versus Ashok Kumar Nagar & others, decided on 17th June, 2016, and FAO (MVA) No. 599 of 2008, titled as Shri Raj Pal Yadav and another versus Smt. Jamna Devi and another, decided on 24th June, 2016, has taken the similar view. 45. Thus, it can easily be deduced that the mandate of Section 96, Section 107(2) and order 41 Rule 33 CPC is just to rectify the errors and achieve the aim and object of the legislation. The purpose of Order 41 CPC, as discussed hereinabove, is to enable the appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties and to pass order which ought to have been passed while keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. 46. The purpose of Order 41 CPC, as discussed hereinabove, is to enable the appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties and to pass order which ought to have been passed while keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. 46. Admittedly, the age of the deceased was 47 years at the time of the accident. The monthly income of the deceased assessed by the Tribunal at Rs. 31,510/-, as per the salary certificate, Ext. PW3/A, is also not in dispute. After making deductions towards the income tax, the Tribunal has rightly assessed the annual income of the deceased to be Rs. 3,50,000/-. 47. The claimants are seven in number. Thus, the Tribunal has also fallen in an error in deducting one-fourth towards the personal expenses of the deceased, one-fifth was to be deducted in terms of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as Sarla Verma (Smt) and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , which was upheld by a larger Bench of the Apex Court in Reshma Kumari & Ors. versus Madan Mohan & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 3120,. Thus, the claimants have lost source of income to the tune of Rs. 2,80,000/- per annum. 48. The Tribunal has wrongly applied the multiplier of 13'. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as Sarla Verma's case and Reshma Kumari's case (supra) read with the Second Schedule appended with the Motor Vehicles Act, multiplier of 11' is just and proper. 49. Viewed thus, it is held that the claimants have lost source of income/dependency to the tune of Rs. 2,80,000/- x 11 = Rs. 30,80,000/-. 50. The amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 20,000/- awarded under other heads, i.e. 'funeral expenses', 'loss of love and affection' and 'loss of consortium' is maintained. 51. Having said so, the claimants are held entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs. 30,80,000/- + Rs. 20,000/- = Rs. 31,00,000/- with interest as awarded by the Tribunal. 52. The factum of insurance is admitted, thus, the Tribunal has rightly saddled the insurer with liability. 53. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned award is modified, as indicated hereinabove, and the appeal is disposed of. 54. 30,80,000/- + Rs. 20,000/- = Rs. 31,00,000/- with interest as awarded by the Tribunal. 52. The factum of insurance is admitted, thus, the Tribunal has rightly saddled the insurer with liability. 53. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned award is modified, as indicated hereinabove, and the appeal is disposed of. 54. Registry is directed to release the awarded amount in favour of the claimants strictly as per the terms and conditions contained in the impugned award through payee's account cheque or by depositing the same in their respective bank accounts after proper identification. 55. Excess amount, if any, be refunded to the appellant insurer through payee's account cheque. 56. Send down the record after placing copy of the judgment on the Tribunal's file.