JUDGMENT By the Court.—This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been filed by the New India Assurance Company Limited challenging the judgment and award dated 13.5.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge (Court No. 6)/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Allahabad awarding a sum of Rs. 7,18,500/- alongwith 7% simple interest as compensation on account of death of predecessor-in-interest of the claimant-respondents in a motor accident. 2. Facts are that an application under Section 166 read with Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was filed by the claimants seeking compensation to the tune of Rs. 25.00 lacs on the allegations that on 19.3.2014 Lal Chand while returning home from clinic of Dr. S. K. Katiyar was hit by offending Truck No. UP 92T/3842 which was being driven rashly and negligently at 07:15 AM on Hallet Bridge which resulted in grievous injuries. He was taken to Hallet hospital, Kanpur where he died during treatment. It was further pleaded that deceased was aged 34 years and was earning about Rs. 20,000/- per month from dairy business and Rs. 1,00,000/- per annum from agriculture. Proceedings were contested by the owner and driver of the offending vehicle and the New India Assurance Company by filing written statement denying the allegations. 3. Tribunal on the basis of the pleadings and after analysing the evidence brought on record by the parties both oral and documentary held that accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the offending truck. Tribunal recorded the said finding on the basis of the oral testimony of eye-witness Pappu Yadav, P. W. ‘2’, who proved the manner and mode of accident. It was stated by him that he was coming from behind on his motor cycle and saw the accident with his own eyes. He also stated that he took injured to the hospital alongwith help of public and police. The testimony of P. W. ‘2’ was unshakable in cross-examination. Tribunal also took into account the testimony of driver of offending vehicle who though denied the accident but admitted that truck was apprehended by the police at the site of the accident and was later on released from the Court. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that tribunal has wrongly and illegally applied the multiplier of 17 and the tribunal ought to have applied multiplier prescribed in second schedule to Motor Vehicles Act. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that tribunal has wrongly and illegally applied the multiplier of 17 and the tribunal ought to have applied multiplier prescribed in second schedule to Motor Vehicles Act. It is also submitted that compensation awarded is highly excessive. 5. On the question of quantum, tribunal finding that claimants failed to lead any evidence to establish the averments that deceased was earning Rs. 20,000/- per month from dairy business and Rs. 1,00,000/- per annum from agriculture presumed his notional income as Rs. 3000/- per month. Tribunal added 50% of notional income towards future prospects and deducted 1/4th towards personal expenses and after applying multiplier of 17 determined the compensation to the tune of Rs. 6,88,500/-. Tribunal further awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of love and affection, Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 5,000/- towards funeral expenses. In this manner, a total sum of Rs. 7,18,500/- was determined as compensation payable to the claimants. 6. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 7. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , has held that multiplier to be used should be as provided in column 4 of the judgment. Multiplier prescribed for the age group of 31 to 34 years in the said judgment is 17. It may be relevant to quote para 42 of the said judgment, which reads as under : “We, therefore, hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlier) which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.” 8. In view of dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Supra), we do not find any illegality committed by the tribunal in applying the multiplier of 17. 9. The next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that income of Rs. 100/- per day presumed by the tribunal is extremely on higher side is without any force and not liable to be accepted. Tribunal in recording the said claim has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Devi and another v. Mohammad Tabbar and others, 2008 (2) TAC 394 SC, wherein notional income to unskilled labour was presumed to be Rs. 100/- per day. Much water has flown since 2008. It is a matter of common knowledge that with the rise in price index, there has been considerable increase in the wages of salaried as well as self employed person. The average income of even a daily labour in 2014 when the accident took place cannot be presumed to be less than Rs. 200/- per day. In our considered opinion, the tribunal committed a manifest error of law in presuming the notional income of the deceased to be Rs. 100/- per day 10. In the case of Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited and others, (2012) 6 SCC 421 in paragraph 17 of the reports has observed as under : “17. Although the wages/income of those employed in organised sectors has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries of the Government employees and those employed in private sectors, but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self-employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis of even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this contest, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching clothes. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. In this contest, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching clothes. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason, etc. 11. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. Obviously award of damages would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case but the element of fairness in the amount of compensation so determined is the ultimate guiding factor. In such view of the matter, presumption of Rs. 100/- per day as notional income even for a unskilled labour in the year 2014 appears to us to be frugal and by no stretch of imagination to be just even the minimum wages fixed by the State Government is much higher than that looking to the rise in cost index. We are of the considered upon that notional income of an unskilled labour could not be less than Rs. 200/- per day. 12. We also find from a perusal of the impugned award that non-pecuniary damages awarded by the tribunal is also extremely on the lower side. 13. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh and others v. Rajbir Singh and others, (2013) 9 SCC 54 and Kalpanaraj and others v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, 2014(3) TAC 707(SC), held that guiding principle for determining compensation is that it must be just and reasonable and the Court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters while considering the issue of award of compensation under non-pecuniary damages such as loss of consortium, loss of love, care and guidance to children and funeral expenses. It has been observed in paragraph 17 as under: “17. The ratio of a decision of this Court, on a legal issue is a precedent. But an observation made by this Court, mainly to achieve uniformity and consistency on a socio-economic issue, as contrasted from a legal principle, though a precedent, can be, and in fact ought to be periodically revisited, as observed in Santosh Devi. The ratio of a decision of this Court, on a legal issue is a precedent. But an observation made by this Court, mainly to achieve uniformity and consistency on a socio-economic issue, as contrasted from a legal principle, though a precedent, can be, and in fact ought to be periodically revisited, as observed in Santosh Devi. We may therefore, revisit the practise of awarding compensation under conventional heads: loss of consortium to thee spouse, loss of love, care and guidance to children and funeral expenses. It may be noted that the sum of Rs. 2500 to Rs. 10,000 in those heads was fixed several decades ago and having regard to inflation factor, the same needs to be increased. In Sarla Verma case, it was held that compensation for loss of consortium should be in the range of Rs. 5000 to 10,000. In legal parlance. “consortium” is the right of the spouse to the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, society, solace, affection and sexual relations with his or her mate. That non-pecuniary head of damages has not been properly understood by our Courts. The loss of companionship, love, care and protection. etc., the spouse is entitled to get, has to be compensated appropriately. The concept of non-pecuniary damage for loss of consortium is one of the major heads of award of compensation in other parts of the world more particularly in the United State of America, Australia, etc. English Courts have also recognized the right of a spouse to get compensation even during the period of temporary disablement. By loss of consortium, the Courts have made an attempt to compensate the loss of spouse’s affection, comfort, solace, companionship, society, assistance, protection, care and sexual relations during the future years. Unlike the compensation awarded in other countries and other jurisdictions, since the legal heirs are otherwise adequately compensated for the pecuniary loss, it would not be proper to award a major amount under this head. Hence, we are of the view that it would only be just and reasonable that the Courts awards at least rupees one lakh for loss of consortium.” 14. Again in the case of Kalpanaraj and others (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court raised compensation of Rs. 30,000/- awarded towards loss of consortium and Rs. 20,000/- towards loss of love and affection of the minor children to Rs. Again in the case of Kalpanaraj and others (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court raised compensation of Rs. 30,000/- awarded towards loss of consortium and Rs. 20,000/- towards loss of love and affection of the minor children to Rs. 1,00,000/- each under the said heads finding the sum awarded to be on the lower side in the light of principles laid down in the case of Rajesh (supra). 15. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we feel that the claimants are entitled to be awarded a sum of Rs. 25000/- towards funeral expenses, a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the respondent-wife towards loss of consortium and Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of estate. 16. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that non-pecuniary damages have rightly been awarded in accordance with the Rule 220A of the Motor Vehicle Rules and the two judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Rajesh (Supra) and Kalpanaraj (Supra) are clearly distinguishable on the ground that they do not deal with a situation where Rule has been framed by the State for determination of compensation. It is also submitted that in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company, no order can be passed adverse to the appellant by increasing the amount of compensation without there being any cross-appeal by the claimants. 17. In so far as the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant in respect of Rule 220A of the Motor Vehicles Rules is concerned, we do not find any reason to distinguish the aforesaid two judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court on the ground that they do not deal with a situation where Rule was framed by the State for determination of compensation. Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly ruled that main guiding principle for determining the compensation is that it must be just and reasonable and the Court and tribunal are not required to frugal with regard to award compensation towards funeral expenses and other non-pecuniary damages. 18. The other argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that amount of compensation cannot be increased in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company in the absence of cross-appeal by the claimant, is also without any force. 19. 18. The other argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that amount of compensation cannot be increased in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company in the absence of cross-appeal by the claimant, is also without any force. 19. Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribing the power of Court of appeal clearly provides that the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made as the case may require, and this power may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties though they may not file any appeal or objection. Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code reads as under : “33. Power of Court of Appeal—The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection [any may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees] [Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.] 20. The provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. was explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mahant Dhangir v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1988 SC 54 in following words : “The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate Court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate Court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words “as the case may require” used in Rule 33 Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate Court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint ? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these : That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower Court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate Court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The Court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities.” 21. The same view has again been reiterated in a later decision by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi, AIR 2000 SC 43 . 22. We are of the considered view that the conditions as laid down in provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 are satisfied in the present case. In Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (Supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that when circumstances exist which necessitate the exercise of discretion conferred by Rule 33, the Court cannot be found wanting when it comes to exercise its powers. 23. Thus the argument in this regard made by the learned counsel for the appellant has no legs to stand and is not liable to be sustained. 24. In view of above facts and discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the compensation to be paid to the claimant-respondents has to be reassessed as under:- S. No. Heads Calculation (i) Income Rs. 6000/- per month (ii) 50% of (I) above to be added as future prospects (Rs. 24. In view of above facts and discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the compensation to be paid to the claimant-respondents has to be reassessed as under:- S. No. Heads Calculation (i) Income Rs. 6000/- per month (ii) 50% of (I) above to be added as future prospects (Rs. 6000 + 3000) = Rs. 9000/- per month (iii) 1/4th of (ii) deducted as personal expenses of deceased (Rs. 9000 - 2250) = Rs. 6750/- per month (iv) Compensation after multiplier of 17 (Rs. 6750 x 12 x 17) = Rs. 13,77,000/- (v) Loss of consortium Rs. 1,00,000/- (vi) Loss of care and guidance for minor children Rs. 1,00,000/- (vii) Funeral Expenses Rs. 25,000/- Total compensation awarded Rs. 16,02,000/- 25. The claimant shall also be entitled to 7% simple interest as awarded by the tribunal on the amount from the date of filing of petition till the date of actual payment. 26. Accordingly, though the appeal filed by the appellant Insurance Company stands dismissed but the award stands modified to the extent directed above and the claimants shall be entitled for payment of Rs. 16,02,000/- determined above. 27. In the facts and circumstances, we do not make any order as to costs.