JUDGMENT : MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, J. 1. Challenge in this Letters Patent Appeal is to judgment and order, dated 29th April, 2016, made by the learned Single Judge/Writ Court in CWP No. 2648 of 2015, titled as Lalita Devi versus State of H.P. and another, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant-writ petitioner came to be dismissed (for short “the impugned judgment”). 2. In order to determine this appeal, it is necessary to give a brief resume of the facts of the case, the womb of which has given birth to the appeal in hand. 3. The appellant-writ petitioner appeared in the Teacher Eligibility Test conducted by respondent No. 2, i.e. Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education, Dharamshala (for short “Board”) on 30th November, 2014. The answer key was circulated vide press note, dated 9th December, 2014 and time was given for submitting objections, if any, till 18th December, 2014. 4. It appears that objections were filed qua questions No. 30, 73 and 123, were considered by respondent No. 2-Board by referring the matter to the subject experts, the result was prepared after taking note of the expert's opinion and thereafter, the result was declared by respondent No. 2-Board, in terms of which the appellant-writ petitioner was declared to be unsuccessful. 5. Being aggrieved, the appellant-writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Writ Court by the medium of CWP No. 2648 of 2015 and sought writ of mandamus directing respondent No. 2-Board to award full marks to her in respect of Questions No. 30, 73 and 123 and declare her to have qualified the Teacher Eligibility Test-2014, on the grounds taken in the memo of the writ petition. 6. Respondent No. 2-Board filed reply to the writ petition and has specifically stated that the final answer key was prepared on the basis of the report of the subject experts. It is apt to reproduce paras 3 and 4 of the preliminary submissions in the reply filed by respondent No. 2- Board herein: “3. That the respondent Board had also received the objections on question No. 30, 73 and 123 printed in the booklet series D. These questions were printed at serial No. 17, 75 and 145 in booklet series A. It is pertinent to mention here that there were four booklet series that is A, B, C and D, wherein the questions were similar but jumbled. Hence, the respondent Board had sought the opinion from the subject experts on the questions printed in booklet series A. 4. That the respondent Board had prepared the final answer key on the basis of the report of the subject experts and result was prepared on the basis of the final result. The copy of final answer key of booklet series A is annexed as Annexure R 2/2. Hence, the present writ petition may kindly be dismissed in the interest of justice.” 7. The Courts are not experts, thus, cannot substitute the expert opinion. If the Commission or any Body conducting the examination has to do the needful as per the Rules, after receiving compliant (s), the decision, if any made, cannot be interfered by the Courts. 8. The Apex Court in a case titled as Pankaj Sharma versus State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, reported in (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 273, has held that the decision of the Public Service Commission in deleting the defective/wrong questions and to allot those marks on pro-rata basis and to call the persons for interview if a candidate gets in after getting additional marks on pro-rata basis was legal one. It is apt to reproduce para 50 of the judgment herein: “50. But there is an additional factor also which supports this view. It is clear from the fact that after the receipt of the complaints, the Commission had issued Press Note on 6-7-2005 and assured the candidates that the Commission would look into the matter and no injustice would be caused to them. The Commission also obtained expert advice and thereafter suo motu decided to delete certain questions by allotting those marks pro-rata to remaining questions. It is, therefore, clear that even according to the Commission, some action was necessary, after the examination was over.” 9. The Apex Court in other cases titled as Kanpur University, through Vice- Chancellor and others versus Samir Gupta and others, reported in (1983) 4 Supreme Court Cases 309, and Abhijit Sen and others versus State of U.P. and others, reported in (1984) 2 Supreme Court Cases 319, has held that the Courts can pass appropriate directions in appropriate cases in order to avoid delay and recurrence of such lapses. 10. 10. The same view has been taken by one of us (Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice) while sitting in Single Bench as a Judge of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, in a case titled as Showkat Ahmad Dar & Ors. versus State & Anr., reported in 2012 (4) JKJ 141 [HC]. 11. It would also be profitable to reproduce paras 6 to 9 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in a case titled as The Secretary, West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education versus Ayan Das & Ors., reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5976, herein: “6. The permissibility of re-assessment in the absence of statutory provision has been dealt with by this Court in several cases. The first of such cases is Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education & Anr. v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth & Ors. reported in ( 1984 (4) SCC 27 ). It was observed in the said case that finality has to be the result of public examination and, in the absence of statutory provision, Court cannot direct re-assessment/reexamination of answer scripts. 7. The courts normally should not direct the production of answer scripts to be inspected by the writ petitioners unless a case is made out to show that either some question has not been evaluated or that the evaluation has been done contrary to the norms fixed by the examining body. For example, in certain cases examining body can provide model answers to the questions. In such cases the examinees satisfy the court that model answer is different from what has been adopted by the Board. Then only the court can ask the production of answer scripts to allow inspection of the answer scripts by the examinee. In Kanpur University and Ors. v. Samir Gupta and Ors. ( AIR 1983 SC 1230 ) it was held as follows: "16. Shri Kacker, who appears on behalf of the University, contended that no challenge should be allowed to be made to the correctness of a key answer unless, on the face of it, it is wrong. We agree that the key answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it would not be held to be wrong by an inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalization. We agree that the key answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it would not be held to be wrong by an inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalization. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable body of men well versed in the particular subject would regard as correct. The contention of the University is falsified in this case by a large number of acknowledged textbooks, which are commonly read by students in U.P. Those text books leave no room for doubt that the answer given by the students is correct and the key answer is incorrect. 17. Students who have passed their Intermediate Board Examination are eligible to appear for the entrance Test for admission to the Medical Colleges in U.P. Certain books are prescribed for the Intermediate Board Examination and such knowledge of the subjects as the students have is derived from what is contained in those text-books. Those text books support the case of the students fully. If this were a case of doubt, we would have unquestionably preferred the key answer. But if the matter is beyond the realm of doubt, it would be unfair to penalize the students for not giving an answer which accords with the key answer, that is to say, with an answer which is demonstrated to be wrong". 8. Same would be a rarity and it can only be done in exceptional cases. The principles set out in Maharashtra Board' case (supra) has been followed subsequently in Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Chairman Bihar Public Service Commission, Patna & Ors. ( 2004 (6) SCC 714 ), Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda & Anr. (2004 (13) 714) and President, Board of Secondary Education, Orissa and Anr. v. D. Suvankar and Anr. ( 2007 (1) SCC 603 ). 9. In view of the settled position in law, the orders of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench cannot be sustained and stand quashed.” 12. This Court in a case titled as Mukesh Thakur and another versus Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, reported in 2006 (1) Shim. v. D. Suvankar and Anr. ( 2007 (1) SCC 603 ). 9. In view of the settled position in law, the orders of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench cannot be sustained and stand quashed.” 12. This Court in a case titled as Mukesh Thakur and another versus Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, reported in 2006 (1) Shim. LC 134, interfered and quashed the result made by the Commission, was subject matter of Civil Appeals No. 907 and 897 of 2006 before the Apex Court, titled as Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission versus Mukesh Thakur and another, reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 759. It is apt to reproduce paras 23 to 26 of the judgment herein: “23. The situation will be entirely different where the court deals with the issue of admission in mid-academic session. This Court has time and again said that it is not permissible for the courts to issue direction for admission in mid-academic session. The reason for it has been that admission to a student at a belated stage disturbs other students, who have already been pursuing the course and such a student would not be able to complete the required attendance in theory as well as in practical classes. Quality of education cannot be compromised. The students taking admission at a belated stage may not be able to complete the courses in the limited period. In this connection reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Pramod Kumar Joshi (Dr.) v. Medical Council of India, (1991) 2 SCC 179 ; State of U.P. v. Dr. Anupam Gupta, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 594 : AIR 1992 SC 932 ; State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla, (1994) 1 SCC 175 : AIR 1994 SC 932, Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh, (2002) 7 SCC 258 ; and Mridul Dhar v. Union of India, (2005) 2 SCC 65 . 24. The issue of revaluation of answer book is no more res integra. This issue was considered at length by this Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkurmar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543 , wherein this Court rejected the contention that in the absence of the provision for revaluation, a direction to this effect can be issued by the Court. This issue was considered at length by this Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkurmar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543 , wherein this Court rejected the contention that in the absence of the provision for revaluation, a direction to this effect can be issued by the Court. The Court further held that even the policy decision incorporated in the Rules/ Regulations not providing for rechecking/verification/revaluation cannot be challenged unless there are grounds to show that the policy itself is in violation of some statutory provision. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 39-40 & 42, paras 14 & 16) "14. .........It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the Statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act... * * * 16. .......The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act." 25. This view has been approved and relied upon and re-iterated by this Court in Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 , observing as under: (SCC pp. 717-18, para 7) "7. … Under the relevant rules of the Commission, there is no provision wherein a candidate may be entitled to ask for revaluation of his answer book. 717-18, para 7) "7. … Under the relevant rules of the Commission, there is no provision wherein a candidate may be entitled to ask for revaluation of his answer book. There is a provision for scrutiny only wherein the answer books are seen for the purpose of checking whether all the answers given by a candidate have been examined and whether there has been any mistake in the totalling of marks of each question and noting them correctly on the first cover page of the answer book. There is no dispute that after scrutiny no mistake was found in the marks awarded to the appellant in the General Science paper. In the absence of any provision for revaluation of answer books in the relevant rules, no candidate in an examination has got any right whatsoever to claim or ask for revaluation of his marks." (Emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated in Muneeb-Ul-Rehman Haroon (Dr.) v. Govt. of J&K State , (1984) 4 SCC 24 : AIR 1984 SC 1585 ; Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda, (2004) 13 SCC 383 ; Board of Secondary Education v. D. Suvankar, (2007) 1 SCC 603 ; W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das, (2007) 8 SCC 242 : AIR 2007 SC 3098 ; and Sahiti v. Dr. N.T.R. University of Health Sciences, (2009) 1 SCC 599 . 26. Thus, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that in the absence of any provision under the statute or statutory rules/regulations, the Court should not generally direct revaluation.” 13. The Apex Court, after discussing the law and judgments, which were governing the field till the date of the decision, has laid down the tests. 14. Coming to the merits of the case in hand, it appears that the purpose of inviting objections from the candidates before the examiner examines the papers and declares the result is just to examine those objections before declaring the result. 15. In the instant case, it has specifically been averred by respondent No. 2-Board, as discussed hereinabove, that they have invited the objections, asked the subject experts to examine the objections, objections were examined, some mistakes were found, were rectified and thereafter, the result was declared. Thus, no case for interference is made out. 16. 15. In the instant case, it has specifically been averred by respondent No. 2-Board, as discussed hereinabove, that they have invited the objections, asked the subject experts to examine the objections, objections were examined, some mistakes were found, were rectified and thereafter, the result was declared. Thus, no case for interference is made out. 16. Had respondent No. 2-Board not invited the objections or had failed to take into account the said objections and the expert's opinion, in that eventuality, the judicial review was permissible. 17. Respondent No. 2-Board has specifically pleaded that the candidates have filed objections to the answer key. It has also furnished opinion of subject experts on the objected questions alongwith the reply. 18. At the costs of repetition, it is beaten law of land that the Courts are not experts, have to respect the opinion of the experts and cannot substitute the same. In the instant case, the experts have examined the questions and given their opinion. Thus, the objections raised by the candidates have been considered and judicial review is not permissible. Therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable on this count. 19. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a batch of writ petitions, CWP No. 9169 of 2013, titled as Vivek Kaushal & others versus Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, being the lead case, decided on 17th July, 2014; CWP No. 6812 of 2014, titled as Arvind Kumar & others versus Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, and other connected matters, decided on 16th October, 2014; CWP No. 3866 of 2015, titled as Lalit Mohan versus H.P. Public Service Commission, decided on 2nd November, 2015; and CWP No. 699 of 2016, titled as Rustam Garg and others versus Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, decided on 29th March, 2016. 20. It is pertinent to record herein that the judgment rendered by this Court in Vivek Kaushal's case (supra) stands upheld by the Apex Court vide order, dated 7th August, 2014, rendered in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 20992 to 20995 of 2014. 21. Having glance of the above discussions, the Writ Court has rightly appreciated the controversy after applying the tests laid down by the Apex Court and this Court. 22. Viewed thus, the impugned judgment is well reasoned and legal one, needs no interference. 23. 20992 to 20995 of 2014. 21. Having glance of the above discussions, the Writ Court has rightly appreciated the controversy after applying the tests laid down by the Apex Court and this Court. 22. Viewed thus, the impugned judgment is well reasoned and legal one, needs no interference. 23. Having said so, the impugned judgment is upheld and the appeal is dismissed alongwith all pending applications.