JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Heard, Shri Amarn Parth Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Rupinder Singh, Additional Advocate General. Though the case was listed for admission, however, with the consent of the parties, it is taken up for final hearing. 2. The petitioner is arraigned as an accused for the offence punishable under Sections 376 and 417 of IPC (for short ‘Code’). It transpires that second respondent herein is complainant and it is an admitted fact that the petitioner and the second respondent, while pursuing MBA were training together and were having a live-in relationship. It further transpires that there was some discord in the relationship. 3. It is the specific case of second respondent that she had established physical contact/relationship with the petitioner only because he had promised to marry her but later on he solemnized his marriage elsewhere, compelling the prosecutrix to register the aforesaid case against the petitioner. Quashing of the FIR has been prayed on the ground that no offence is made out and it is averred that when a man and woman are mature and know the consequences of the act then mere promise to marry on future date does not attract punishment. 4. In Amit Kapoor versus Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 SCC 460 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has evolved the principal for proper exercise of jurisdiction with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings either under Section 379 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or together, as the case may be, and the same is summarized as follow:- “1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. [ AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [ AIR 1988 SC 709 ]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [ AIR 1993 SC 892 ]; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors. [ AIR 1996 SC 309 ; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 754 ]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ AIR 2003 SC 1069 ]; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors. [ AIR 1996 SC 309 ; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 754 ]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ AIR 2003 SC 1069 ]; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 ]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. s. Bangarappa & Ors. [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 ]; Zundu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors. [ AIR 2005 SC 9 ]; M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr. [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 ]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 ]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr. [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 ]; Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 877 ]; State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. [ AIR 1991 SC 1260 ]; Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 ]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr. [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 ]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 ]; And S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 ]}. 16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the requirements of the offence.” 5. It is evident from the material produced on record that there was close relationship between the petitioner and second respondent. It is evident from the material produced on record that there was close relationship between the petitioner and second respondent. Therefore, if the allegations that the petitioner had committed breach of promise to marry, in normal circumstances would alone not be a crime and complainant can only claim damage and would hardly constitute a case to be prosecuted for cheating on that ground alone. However, if the allegations of the complainant of cheating are coupled with the allegations that the petitioner had continued sexual relationship with her on the promise of marry and thereafter resiled then things would definitely be different. More particularly, if it is also established that the petitioner right from inception did not have the intention to marry, then obviously in such cases both the provisions of Section 417 coupled with Section 376 would be attracted. 6. If it that be the test, then there is sufficient material available on record, which does indicate that second respondent had surrendered not only her mind but body and soul to the petitioner only because of solemn promise that he would eventually marry her. 7. After having won the confidence of second respondent and after having sexually used and abused the second respondent, the petitioner cannot now turn out and claim that no offence is made out, more particularly, when it has already come on record that he has solemnized his marriage elsewhere. 8. Whether physical contact established by the petitioner with the second respondent was consensual and without commitment of marriage as is sought to be canvassed by the petitioner is essentially a matter which has to be seen and determined during the course of the trial? Therefore, no case for quashing of FIR at this stage is made out. 9. Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed.