JUDGMENT Hon’ble Attau Rahman Masoodi, J.—Heard. The revisionist who is a driver being aggrieved by the orders dated 1.11.2014 and 30.5.2016 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 9, Lucknow in claim petition No. 587 of 2013 has questioned the legality of the impugned orders in the instant civil revision. By order dated 1.11.2014 an amendment application filed by the claimant seeking to change the number of offending tractor stated as UP 41 Q 3987 to UP 41 Q 3907 under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 C.P.C. was allowed. The revisionist filed an application for recall of order dated 1.11.2014 alleging therein that he was neither served a copy of the amendment application nor afforded any opportunity before passing the order and as such the order may be recalled. The application for recall of order was rejected on 30.5.2016 by the Tribunal on the ground that the applicant had all the opportunity to defend and no prejudice would be caused even if the amendment was allowed without notice. Thus, the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 CPC has been invoked to assail both the orders passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 2. The maintainability of the civil revision became questionable on account of a direct conflict between two judgements; one rendered on Aug. 07, 1997 by a Full Bench of this Court reported in the case of Kamla Yadav v. Smt. Sushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD 40 and a later judgement rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Manju and others, 2007(4) ADJ 101 (DB), which relies upon a five Judge Bench decision rendered by Karnataka High Court in the case of Union of India v. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. and others, AIR 2004 Kant. 1. It may be noted that at the time when Full Bench judgement was rendered; U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 were not framed which came into force on 7.9.1998 and the Full Bench decision also went unnoticed by the Division Bench of this Court at the relevant time when the question of maintainability of appeal/revision against interlocutory orders passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was once again decided. 3. 3. The Division Bench judgement referred to above related to a dispute which arose in the background of a Motor Accident claim decided on 23.11.2006 wherein an application filed by the Insurance Company claiming benefit under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 prior to the final decision of claim was rejected on 15.11.2006. A question as to maintainability of appeal/revision against the interlocutory order dated 15.11.2006 passed on an application filed under Section 170 of the Act had cropped up and the Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the matter in the context of relevant statutory provisions as well as decisions and relying upon the five-Judges judgement (supra) rejected the appeal /revision and has recorded a clear opinion on the maintainability of revision under Section 115 as not maintainable. The relevant para of the Division Bench judgement reads : “8. According to us, an appeal or review or revision from the original order cannot be held to be an inherent right but statutory right. Unless the statute prescribes, no such right can be available for any person to proceed accordingly. In the instant case, a cryptic application was moved by the insurance company before the Tribunal making reference of collusion between the claimants and the insured without any supporting materials. The same was dismissed on such ground on 15.11.2006. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order, which can call upon any Court to interfere. Possibly the insurance company has understood the position having well equipped legal infrastructure unlike a rustic villager. It waited till the award was passed and when found responsible on behalf of the owner by the award, preferred the appeal from both the order and the award being forgetful that in case of rejection under Section 170 of the Act, the appeal lies, provided the order of rejection establishes cause under Section 149(2) of the Act. No such case has been made out in the appeal, excepting the ground of illegal and arbitrary refusal in passing the order. Therefore, it cannot take the recourse of remedy of appeal under Section 173 of the Act.” 4. The Division Bench heavily relying upon paragraph No. 21 of the five-Judges Bench judgement of Karnataka High Court, reproduced hereinunder, proceeded to hold that even the revisional jurisdiction of this Court would not be available against an interlocutory order: “21. Therefore, it cannot take the recourse of remedy of appeal under Section 173 of the Act.” 4. The Division Bench heavily relying upon paragraph No. 21 of the five-Judges Bench judgement of Karnataka High Court, reproduced hereinunder, proceeded to hold that even the revisional jurisdiction of this Court would not be available against an interlocutory order: “21. Section 173 of the M.V. Act provides for appeal to High Court by any person aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribunal and appeal is barred only where the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees and intention of the legislature is to avoid any further appeal or revision so as to give finality to the award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the above said decisions would not be helpful to contend that an order passed by M.A.C.T., is revisable under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. The Full Bench decision in Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar, is also based on the said decisions and as such it is not helpful. Accordingly, we hold that M.A.C.T. is not a Court subordinate to High Court so as to maintain a revision petition under Section 115, Civil procedure Code. All the decisions of this Court taking the contrary view are consequently overruled.” Contrary to the view taken by the Division Bench which relies upon the five Judges Karnataka High Court decision holding a revision not to be maintainable, attention of this Court was drawn to the Full Bench judgement reported in 2004 (22) LCD 40 as mentioned above wherein this Court after a detailed discussion on various aspects of the matter has firstly held the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to be a ‘Court’ for the purpose of adjudicating upon civil disputes cognizable under the Motor Vehicles Act and the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC before this Court on that basis has also been opined favourably. The relevant paras of the Full Bench judgement are extracted below : “(30).................................Thus an adjudicating body which is composed of or consists of experienced judicial functionaries and it is under obligation to act judicially can hardly be said to be a body which is not a judicial adjudicating body. Appointment of any member of executive or non-judicial authority is not envisaged, rather it stands excluded under the provisions of the Act. Appointment of any member of executive or non-judicial authority is not envisaged, rather it stands excluded under the provisions of the Act. It has rightly not been disputed before us that the nature of dispute arising in the claim petitions is a dispute of civil nature. It has also not been disputed that prior to constitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals such disputes of claims on account of Motor Accidents were being tried by the Civil Court. It is, thus, clear that it is trial of dispute of civil nature by a Tribunal having a judicial functionary as its member. There is no escape from the conclusion that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has all the trappings of a Civil Court. Additional District Judge is also undoubtedly a Civil Court. The only ingredient which has to be seen is that as to whether it is the State’s judicial power which is being exercised by the tribunal or not. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has been constituted by the State. Its members are appointed by State. It deals with disputes of civil nature which were being earlier dealt with by the regular Civil Courts. There is no dispute that the Civil Courts discharge the “States’ judicial functions” part of jurisdiction of which stands transferred to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, composition, character as well as functioning of which, have already been indicated above. There can (not) also be any dispute that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court in view of the fact that appeal against an award lies to the High Court which fact has been held to be conclusive on the point. (31) In view of the discussions held above, we are of the view that the orders of the District Judge/Additional District Judge passed as Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal will be amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. (32) Our answer to question No. 1 is in affirmative, that a revision lies against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Our answer to question No. 2 is that the Courts mentioned in Section 3 C.P.C. are not the only Civil Courts, other Courts and Tribunals can also be Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court, for the purposes of Section 115 C.P.C. Our answer to question No. 3 is that the judgment rendered in the case of Mussamat Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire & General Assurance Company, 1979 ALJ 1168, has been rightly decided and is approved. Hence, the question of invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise.” 5. Since Full Bench judgement has clearly held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals discharge judicial functions and are a ‘Court’ for the purpose of adjudication of disputes which are civil in nature and against which an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is also provided for before this Court, therefore the interlocutory orders passed by the Tribunal are very well within the domain of revisional jurisdiction of this Court provided under Section 115 of the C.P.C. and at the same time it is observed that such orders would not be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. In a situation of conflict between Division Bench judgement and Full Bench judgement, suffice it to say that the Full Bench decision would normally hold the field and more so when the Full Bench judgement which goes unnoticed, specifically has held the revisional jurisdiction of this Court to be available against the interlocutory orders passed by the Claims Tribunal. The position is different when subordination of Tribunal, not being a Court within the meaning of CPC, is questioned in absence of an enabling provision under the Special Act and the rules framed thereunder. The question is whether by virtue of providing for an appeal against the judgement of Tribunal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the other civil remedies under CPC before this Court become automatically applicable. 7. The question is whether by virtue of providing for an appeal against the judgement of Tribunal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the other civil remedies under CPC before this Court become automatically applicable. 7. There are other issues like the applicability of Section 24 of the C.P.C. which have come to the notice of this Court and in relation whereto an authoritative pronouncement may be called for but for the present in so far as the jurisdiction of this Court against the interlocutory orders passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and application of Section 24 C.P.C. is concerned, the issue deserves to be considered and decided so that the pending proceedings are not totally faced with an uncertainty. 8. Before coming to the provisions of the Act, it is necessary to have a birds view of the legal provisions and the mechanism devised under our Constitution for the discharge of sovereign judicial function read with the relevant statutes. 9. Separation of powers is a distinguishing feature of our constitution and independence of each organ of the State to achieve the constitutional goals needs to have a re-look. Legislation once notified by following due process is final, executive decisions under laws taken by following due process in the name of State are final and judicial decisions likewise. Finality attached to a decision legislative, executive or judicial, arrived at independently is the essence of Rule of law. This independence of all the three organs jointly or severally is subject to Part-III of the Constitution of India for the reason that a sovereign decision of the State is law and by virtue of Article 13 of the Constitution of India, law inconsistent with Part-III of the Constitution is void. 10. Now coming to the judiciary as an organ of the State, it is to be noted that the Supreme Court, as an institution, works at the apex level and enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the High Courts of the State insofar as prerogative writ jurisdiction is concerned. Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court enjoys powers to test the validity of judicial/quasi judicial decisions rendered by a Court or Tribunal in the territory of India except any law relating to the armed forces. Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court enjoys powers to test the validity of judicial/quasi judicial decisions rendered by a Court or Tribunal in the territory of India except any law relating to the armed forces. This jurisdiction of the Apex Court travels from top to bottom with the only exception carved out and respecting the rule of independence which each organ of the State enjoys under our unitary structure. Likewise a High Court under Article 228 enjoys an authority to decide substantial questions of law involved in pending cases before a subordinate Court. 11. The existence of Tribunals can be traced even prior to the enforcement of our Constitution but Chapter XIV-A came to be inserted under Forty Second Constitutional Amendment and a parallel mechanism to reduce work load on the permanent judiciary was evolved. Adoption of a summary procedure or less rigorous procedure for adjudication was introduced and recognised in consonance with the principles of natural justice. Tribunals in this chapter are classified broadly in two categories viz. the Tribunals which are excluded from the jurisdiction except the jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136; and the Tribunals which are subject to Article 226/227 of the Constitution and appellate/revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the special statute of which the Tribunal is a creation. 12. There does not seem to be a requirement of law for conferment of power under the special statute creating a Tribunal to subject the Tribunal to supervisory jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 227 but for the purposes of other jurisdictions, namely, appellate/revision/review, the conferment of power in the special statute is a condition precedent. Likewise, the power of transfer of proceedings from one State to another and within the State from one district to another has to be vested in the High Court, under the statute creating a Tribunal. Here I hasten to add that power of transferring judicial proceedings is vested in the Apex Court not only under Section 25 CPC but also under Article 139-A of the Constitution of India. The former applies to the civil disputes under CPC and the later applies to the disputes pending before one or more High Courts only. Whether proceedings before the Tribunal can be transferred from one State to another or from one district to another, the Constitution is silent on this issue. The former applies to the civil disputes under CPC and the later applies to the disputes pending before one or more High Courts only. Whether proceedings before the Tribunal can be transferred from one State to another or from one district to another, the Constitution is silent on this issue. It may not be wrong to note that there is no provision enabling either under the Constitution or the Motor Vehicles Act, yet under the general powers, the judicial precedents show that such a power has been exercised by the Apex Court and High Courts. This situation definitely deserves to be noticed by the law makers. Lack of an enabling provision in the relevant statute certainly goes to cause a prejudice and impedes the process of justice. 13. The judiciary has adopted a conflicting approach. One line of thought espouses the cause of justice and the other finds it difficult for want of jurisdiction. This uncertainty invites criticism against the very functioning of organs of State who are expected to address and remedy the public grievances. The judiciary is the worst victim of this situation and moreso when fine distinctions which do not withstand the challenges and tests for all times to come, are brought to focus. Judicial adventurism is a centre of criticism and the voice of delayed justice is loud and clear. This situation needs to be dealt with jointly and severally but finality of law on the questions of public grievances has to keep pace with the changing times. 14. The safest course for the law Courts and the tribunals is to administer justice as per law but where the legislature or executive neglects to enable the judiciary to discharge its sovereign judicial functions by contemplating complete remedies and procedure, the cause of justice to be served independently is made to suffer. I wish to add that there may be tribunals which may not be Courts within its strict sense looking to the provisions of Chapter XIV-A of the Constitution but functions of a Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act, its object and purpose are no less than a forum of permanent nature looking to the dependence of public on surface transport and particularly when this jurisdiction is segregated from Section 9 of CPC. The independence of people to move speedily and to balance speed with the natural capability of human beings cannot be left unattended due to lack of law to effectuate justice. The object of law is to win faith in our Constitution but defective laws are a curse which the sovereign welfare State cannot afford to adventure of which judiciary is a part. 15. In the light of above discussion it would be safe to adopt a course which promotes the cause of justice independently than to follow a path that may impede the process for lack of statutory sanction which expressly does not bar a remedy. The evolution of a remedy, however, must serve the object of alternative mechanism which seeks to reduce the rigour of procedure and technicalities of evidence so as to unburden the regular Courts from work load. But majesty of law, at the same time, as a matter of fundamental duty, is bound to be upheld by all Courts and tribunals is equally true. The decision of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, 2015(3) ADJ 210 (SC), has posed another difficulty when we see that any order passed by a Court cannot be subjected to scrutiny under Article 226. Moreover, Section 141 CPC clearly bars application of CPC to the proceedings under Article 226. The remedies under Article 136 read with 227 are the only remedies wide enough to check miscarriage of justice in the judicial/quasi-judicial process. 16. In the light of recent Apex Court judgement (supra), and keeping in view the Apex Court judgements relied upon in the five-Judge judgement, the Division Bench judgement leaves no scope for revisional jurisdiction to be invoked under Section 115 CPC against interlocutory orders passed by the Tribunals unless prescribed under the Special Act. The view taken seems to be a good law for more than one reason. Firstly, restricting the remedy against the judgements passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to appeal under Section 173 of the Act implies that other remedies are barred particularly when Section 169 read with Rule 221 framed thereunder narrow down the application of the provisions of CPC. The view taken seems to be a good law for more than one reason. Firstly, restricting the remedy against the judgements passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to appeal under Section 173 of the Act implies that other remedies are barred particularly when Section 169 read with Rule 221 framed thereunder narrow down the application of the provisions of CPC. Secondly, if the intention of legislation on the aspect of remedies before this Court is understood on the criteria of treating the Tribunal to be a ‘Court’ then in that event, the requirement of specifying the remedy of appeal under Section 173 of the Act would stand obliterated and the provisions of Section 96 CPC will automatically apply. Thus, the prescription of appeal clearly bars other remedies and reading something in the statute which is not prescribed would transgress the well-settled principles of legislative interpretation. The Full Bench also does not notice the statutory rules framed in the year 1998 as well as the true import of bar on the Civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction in view of Section 175 of the Act. If the Full Bench view is allowed to hold the field, then by holding the Tribunal to be a Court would automatically make the entire CPC applicable and the necessity of a provision like Section 173 would be a surplusage. In my humble view, the Division Bench judgement appears to have laid down the correct law. 17. Keeping in view the position of law as it exists and the essence of law and its purpose, I hold that interlocutory orders passed by a Tribunal unless an alternative remedy is provided for, and subject to other exceptions, shall be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is akin to revisional/appellate jurisdiction. For the exercise of such a jurisdiction the purpose of law and justice must seem to have reconciled. The orders passed under Section 24 CPC being also in the nature of interlocutory orders are also amenable to the constitutional remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution. For the exercise of such a jurisdiction the purpose of law and justice must seem to have reconciled. The orders passed under Section 24 CPC being also in the nature of interlocutory orders are also amenable to the constitutional remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution. Having held that all interlocutory issues arising before the Motor Accident Tribunal resulting into miscarriage of justice in absence of an alternative remedy under the Special Act, are amenable to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is directed that all the civil revisions pending before this Court would be treated as civil revisions read with under Article 227 and likewise the applications filed under Section 24 CPC. 18. Now proceeding with the revision, it is relevant to notice that an application filed under Order VI Rule 17 is said to have been entertained by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by-passing the impugned order dated 1.11.2014. In so far as the procedure to be adopted by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is concerned the same can be gathered from the provisions of Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with Rule 221 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998. Section 169 as well as Rule 221 being relevant are reproduced below : “Section 169 in The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 : 169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.—(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.” “Rule 221 of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 : 221. (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.” “Rule 221 of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 : 221. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases.—The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; Order IX; Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII; Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI; Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII.” 19. From a plain reading of statutory provisions, it is evident that Order VI Rule 17 is not applicable in so far as the proceedings of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are concerned but whether such a power can be read within the ambit of inherent powers under Section 166 of the Act needs to be considered and decided by the Tribunal independently. The application for recall of order was filed on the premise of notice/opportunity and this grievance certainly does call for an interference inasmuch as, the rule of notice and hearing on a cause is a fundamental principle which cannot be compromised. The finding that amendment does not change the nature of claim could not be recorded without giving notice/opportunity and the learned Tribunal has not dealt with the objection of opportunity raised by the revisionist. 20. In view of the above, challenge to the impugned order dated 30.5.2016 under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is made out and the same is hereby set aside, leaving it open to the Tribunal to consider the grievance of the revisionist afresh and decide the recall application in accordance with law within a period of not later than six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 21. It is also made clear that the claim filed before the Tribunal may itself be proceeded with and decided expeditiously without any delay to be caused in the matter. The registry shall forward a copy of this order to the Tribunal concerned forthwith and circulate the judgement to all the Tribunals through District Judge. 22. 21. It is also made clear that the claim filed before the Tribunal may itself be proceeded with and decided expeditiously without any delay to be caused in the matter. The registry shall forward a copy of this order to the Tribunal concerned forthwith and circulate the judgement to all the Tribunals through District Judge. 22. The revision is partly allowed. ——————