JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is award, dated 30th April, 2012, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Una, Himachal Pradesh (for short “the Tribunal”) in M.A.C. Case No. 50 of 2009, titled as Shakuntla Devi and another versus Bhupinder Kaur and others, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.16,98,040/- with interest @ 8% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its realization came to be awarded in favour of the claimants and the insurer was saddled with liability (for short “the impugned award”). 2. In order to determine this appeal, it is necessary to give a brief resume of the facts of the case, the womb of which has given birth to the appeal in hand. 3. The claimants invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”) for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.25,00,000/-, as per the break-ups given in the claim petition, on the ground that they became the victims of the vehicular accident, which was caused by the driver, namely Shri Jai Gopal, while driving tipper, bearing registration No. HP-69-0723, rashly and negligently on 8th March, 2009, at about 5.15 P.M., at Village Nandpur, in which deceased-Pardeep Singh @ Ajay Sandu sustained injuries, was taken to Regional Hospital, Una, wherefrom was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, where he succumbed to the said injuries. 4. The respondents in the claim petition resisted the same on the grounds taken in the respective memo of objections. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal on 8th June, 2011: “1. Whether Sandeep Singh died as a result of injuries sustained in accident due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 2 Jai Gopal while driving vehicle No. HP-69-0723? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved, to what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled to and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR 4. Whether petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. the owner and insurer of motorcycle No. HP-20 B-0155 as alleged? OPR-3 5. Whether respondent No. 2-driver of vehicle No. HP-69-0723 was not holding valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident? OPR-3 6. OPP 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR 4. Whether petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. the owner and insurer of motorcycle No. HP-20 B-0155 as alleged? OPR-3 5. Whether respondent No. 2-driver of vehicle No. HP-69-0723 was not holding valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident? OPR-3 6. Whether vehicle was being plied without valid and effective route permit, registration certificate and fitness certificate in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy as alleged? OPR-3 7. Relief.” 6. The claimants have examined three witnesses and one of the claimants, namely Smt. Shakuntla Devi, herself stepped into the witness box as PW-3 to substantiate their claim. The owner-insured of the offending vehicle has examined two witnesses in support of his defence and the driver, namely Shri Jai Gopal, himself stepped into the witness box as RW-3. The insurer has not led any evidence. 7. The Tribunal, after scanning the evidence, oral as well as documentary, awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 16,98,040/- with interest @ 8% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its realization in favour of the claimants and saddled the insurer with liability in terms of the impugned award. 8. The claimants, owner-insured and driver of the offending vehicle have not questioned the impugned award on any ground, thus, has attained finality so far it relates to them. 9. The appellant-insurer has questioned the impugned award on the grounds taken in the memo of the appeal. Issue No. 1: 10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-insurer argued that the accident was not caused by the driver of the offending vehicle, but was caused by the deceased himself while driving the motorcycle. The owner-insured and the driver of the offending vehicle have not questioned the said findings. Thus, the insurer has no locus to question the same. 11. It is not the case of the appellant-insurer that there was collusion between the owner-insured and driver of the offending vehicle and the claimants. Had it taken the said defence and led evidence, question would have been different. Neither it has taken such defence nor has led any evidence. However, I have gone through the discussion made by the Tribunal in paras 11 to 17 of the impugned award, are legally and factually correct, need no interference. Had it taken the said defence and led evidence, question would have been different. Neither it has taken such defence nor has led any evidence. However, I have gone through the discussion made by the Tribunal in paras 11 to 17 of the impugned award, are legally and factually correct, need no interference. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 1 are upheld. 12. Before dealing with issue No. 2, I deem it proper to determine issues No. 3 to 6. Issues No. 3 to 6: 13. The appellant-insurer has not questioned the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 3 to 6. However, I have gone through the record and am of the view that the Tribunal has rightly made the discussion in paras 23 to 25 of the impugned award. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 3 to 6 are upheld. Issue No. 2: 14. Admittedly, the insurer has not sought permission in terms of Section 170 of the MV Act, thus, is precluded from questioning the adequacy of the compensation. 15. I deem it proper to record herein that the appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act is alike the appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “CPC”). Therefore, the Court is under obligation to decide all issues arising in a case both on facts and law after appreciating the entire evidence. 16. The Apex Court in U.P.S.R.T.C. vs. Km. Mamta and others, reported in AIR 2016 SC 948 , held that Section 173 of the MV Act and the first appeal under Section 96 CPC are alike and, therefore, the High Court is equally under legal obligation to decide all issues arising in the case. It is profitable to reproduce paragraph 24 of the said judgment hereunder: “24. An appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act is essentially in the nature of first appeal alike Section 96 of the Code and, therefore, the High Court is equally under legal obligation to decide all issues arising in the case both on facts and law after appreciating the entire evidence.” 17. It is worthwhile to record herein that Part VII of the CPC provides for filing of appeals arising out of decrees and orders. Section 96 CPC provides for appeals from original decree. It is worthwhile to record herein that Part VII of the CPC provides for filing of appeals arising out of decrees and orders. Section 96 CPC provides for appeals from original decree. It is apt to reproduce Section 96 CPC hereunder: “96. Appeal from original decree.-(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Cause, when the amount or value of the Subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees.” 18. Section 107 CPC deals with the “Powers of the Appellate Court” and sub-section (2) thereof, provides specifically that the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed on the trial Court. It is apt to reproduce Section 107(2) CPC as under: “107. Powers of appellate court.- (1) ….............. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.” 19. Section 176 of the MV Act empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of implementing the provisions contained in Sections 165 to 174 of the MV Act. It is apt to reproduce Section 176 of the Act, hereunder: “176. Power of State Government to make rules. Section 176 of the MV Act empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of implementing the provisions contained in Sections 165 to 174 of the MV Act. It is apt to reproduce Section 176 of the Act, hereunder: “176. Power of State Government to make rules. A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-- a. The form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications; b. The procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter; c. The powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal; d. The form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and e. Any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.” 20. In terms of the mandate of Section 176(c) of the MV Act, the Claims Tribunals are vested with the powers of Civil Court. 21. In a Claim Petition, summary procedure is to be adopted and all provisions of CPC are not applicable, rather only some provisions have been made applicable in terms of Section 169 of the MV Act read with Rule 232 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999 (for short “MV Rules”). It is apt to reproduce Rule 232 of the MV Rules herein: “232. The Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases:- The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII; Rule 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII; Order XXI and Order XXIII, Rules 1 to 3.” 22. Now, the question is - whether the Appellate Court while hearing an appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act can pass such an order which ought to have been passed by the Tribunal, without there being any appeal/challenge or cross objections from the person against whom the order has been made? The answer is in the affirmative for the reasons given hereinabove read with the mandate of law laid down by the Apex Court and the High Courts. 23. Part VII and Order 41 CPC deals with the powers and the scope of the Appellate Court in appeal proceedings. 24. The Apex Court in Sharanamma and others vs. Managing Director, Divisional Contr., North-East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation, reported in (2013) 11 SCC 517 , has held that there are no fetters on the powers of the appellate Court to consider the entire case on facts and law, while hearing an appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the said decision hereunder: “10. When an Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the 'Act'), before the High Court, the normal Rules which apply to Appeals before the High Court are applicable to such an Appeal also. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that when an Appeal is provided for, the whole case is open before the Appellate Court and by necessary implication, it can exercise all powers incidental thereto in order to exercise that power effectively. A bare reading of Section 173 of the Act also reflects that there is no curtailment or limitations on the powers of the Appellate Court to consider the entire case on facts and law. 11. It is well settled that the right of Appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to Review by the Appellate Court. Thus, such powers and duties are necessarily to be exercised so as to make the provision of law effective. 12. Generally, finding of fact recorded by Tribunal should not be interfered with in an Appeal until and unless it is proved that glaring discrepancy or mistake has taken place. Thus, such powers and duties are necessarily to be exercised so as to make the provision of law effective. 12. Generally, finding of fact recorded by Tribunal should not be interfered with in an Appeal until and unless it is proved that glaring discrepancy or mistake has taken place. If the assessment of compensation by the Tribunal was fair and reasonable and the award of the Tribunal was neither contrary nor inconsistent with the relevant facts as per the evidence available on record then as mentioned hereinabove, the High Court would not interfere in the Appeal. In the case in hand, nothing could be pointed out to us as to what were the glaring discrepancies or mistakes in the impugned Award of the Tribunal, which necessitated the Appellate Court to take a different view in the matter.” 25. The Apex Court in the case titled as Giani Ram vs. Ramjilal, reported in 1969 (1) SCC 813 , held that Order 41 Rule 33 CPC empowers the appellate Court to pass any decree which justice may require. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment herein: “8. Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC was enacted to meet a situation of the nature arising in this case. In so far as it is material, the rule provides: “The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. The expression "which ought to have been passed" means "which ought in law to have been passed". If the Appellate Court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed, but was in fact not passed by the subordinate court, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. 9. If the Appellate Court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed, but was in fact not passed by the subordinate court, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. 9. If the claim of the respondents to retain any part of the property after the death of Jwala is negatived, it would, be perpetrating gave injustice to deny to the widow and the two daughters their share in the property to which they are in law entitled. In our view, the case was one in which the power under Order 41, Rule 33, CPC ought to have been exercised and the claim not only of the three sons but also of the widow and the two daughters ought to have been decreed.” 26. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Narayanarao (dead) through LRs and others vs. Sudarshan, reported in 1995 Supp.(4) SCC 463; Mahant Dhangir and another vs. Madan Mohan and others, reported in 1987 (Supp.) SCC 528, and T.N. Rajasekar vs. N. Kasiviswanathan and others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 3794 held that the High Court, in order to do complete justice to the parties, can invoke the powers under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and pass orders accordingly. 27. The Apex Court in another case titled as Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking vs. Basanti Devi and another, reported in JT 1999 (7) SC 486, while relying upon its earlier decision in Mahant Dhangir (supra), held in paragraph 19 as under: “19. Conditions as laid in provision of Order 41, Rule 33 are satisfied in the present case. When circumstances exist which necessitate the exercise of discretion conferred by Rule 33, the Court cannot be found wanting when it comes to exercise its powers.” 28. This Court in H.P. Road Transport Corporation vs. Pt. Jai Ram and etc. etc., reported in AIR 1980 Himachal Pradesh 16, held that under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, wide powers have been given to the appellate Court and once it is seized of a matter in its appellate jurisdiction, it is within its power to do complete justice between all the concerned parties. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of paras 39 and para 40 of the judgment herein: “39. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of paras 39 and para 40 of the judgment herein: “39. …………...Moreover, theme of Order 41 and especially the wide powers given to the Court under Rule 33 of Order 41 suggests that the intention of the Legislature is to see that 'once the Court is seized of a matter in its appellate jurisdiction, it is able to do complete justice between all the concerned parties. To us, therefore, it is very clear that the provision enabling a respondent to file cross-objections made in Rule 22 is a procedural provision under which even if a respondent has not preferred any appeal, the Court is enabled to do complete justice to the parties by allowing the respondent concerned to prefer cross-objections within the period of limitation. Under these circumstances, with great respect to the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, we find ourselves unable to accept their view that provision enabling a respondent to file cross-objections is a substantive provision and not a procedural one. 40. In view of our finding that provision for filing cross-objections contemplated by Order 41, Rule 22 is a procedural provision, the ratio of the above referred two decisions of the Supreme Court would at once be attracted, and this Court being seized of an appellate jurisdiction conferred by Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, It has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner in which it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction allowing the respondents in such appeals to prefer cross-objections.” 29. Keeping in view the ratio of the judgment supra, it can safely be held that the appellate Court is competent to pass any order in the interest of justice. 30. The High Court of Rajasthan, while dilating upon the powers of the Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, in the case titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dama Ram and others, reported in 1994 ACJ 692, held that the appellate Court can rectify the error invoking Order 41 Rule 33 CPC even in the absence of Cross Objections or appeal by the claimants. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 7 of the said decision hereunder: “7. The Tribunal has not passed award in any case against the owner (insured) of the vehicle. It has passed awards against the appellant insurance company only. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 7 of the said decision hereunder: “7. The Tribunal has not passed award in any case against the owner (insured) of the vehicle. It has passed awards against the appellant insurance company only. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal has categorically held that the said accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck by its driver. As such his employer, namely, Mohd. Rafiq, owner of the said truck, was liable for his negligent act. Thus the Tribunal committed a serious error in not making liable the owner and driver of the offending truck to pay the said amounts of compensation. This error can well be corrected by this court by invoking the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, even if no cross-objection or appeal has been filed by the claimants-respondents. It has been observed in Kok Singh v. Deokabai AIR 1976 SC 634 , paras 6 and 7, as follows: (6) In Giani Ram v. Ramji Lal AIR 1969 SC 1144 , the court said that in Order 41, Rule 33, the expression 'which ought to have been passed' means 'what ought in law to have been passed' and if an appellate court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed was in fact not passed by the court below, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. (7) Therefore, we hold that even if the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the trial court, that was no bar to the High Court passing a decree in favour of the respondent for the enforcement of the charge. Reference of Murari Lal v. Gomati Devi 1986 ACJ 316 (Rajasthan), may also be made here. Similar view has been taken by me while deciding United India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Dhali 1992 ACJ 1057 (Rajasthan).” 31. The High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in the case titled as M. Adu Ama vs. Inja Bangaru Raja and another, reported in 1995 ACJ 670, has laid down the same principle of law. 32. Similar view has been taken by me while deciding United India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Dhali 1992 ACJ 1057 (Rajasthan).” 31. The High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in the case titled as M. Adu Ama vs. Inja Bangaru Raja and another, reported in 1995 ACJ 670, has laid down the same principle of law. 32. This High Court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation vs. Saroj Devi and others, reported in 2002 ACJ 1146, held that appellate Court is not precluded from passing order which it considers just in the facts of the case, without there being any cross objection or cross appeal. It is profitable to reproduce paragraph 15 of the said decision hereunder: “15. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court and different High Courts including this Court, we feel that there being no prohibition in law, i.e., either under Motor Vehicles Act or under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, this Court is not precluded from passing order which it considers just in the circumstances of a case without there being either cross-objection or cross-appeal. As such we are further of the view that Order 41, Rule 33 is fully applicable to the appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act.” 33. In the case titled as National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mast Ram and others, reported in 2004 ACJ 1039, the question arose before this High Court was – whether the appellate Court can modify the award in the absence of cross-appeal. This High Court answered in the affirmative. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 13 of the said judgment hereunder: “13. Because of what has been held in this judgment, it is felt necessary to exercise power vested in this court under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the findings in the operative portion of the award requiring the appellant to pay the amount and then to recover it from the 'insurer' (it should have been 'insured'?). This is a direction in the impugned award that needs to be set aside. On this aspect, Mr. Sharma had argued that there is no cross-appeal by the owner of the vehicle. To meet such a situation, legislature had enacted Order 41, Rule 33 in the Civil Procedure Code even in cases where an appeal is not filed by a party, like the owner in the present appeal. On this aspect, Mr. Sharma had argued that there is no cross-appeal by the owner of the vehicle. To meet such a situation, legislature had enacted Order 41, Rule 33 in the Civil Procedure Code even in cases where an appeal is not filed by a party, like the owner in the present appeal. As such, this plea cannot be accepted.” 34. This High Court in another case titled as LAC Solan and another vs. Bhoop Ram, reported in 1997(2) Sim.L.C. 229, modified the awards in exercise of powers under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC. 35. Faced with the similar situation, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in a case titled as State Bank of India vs. M/s Sharma Provision Store and another, reported in AIR 1999 J&K 128 , held that a High Court can pass a decree which ought to have been passed by the trial Court. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of paragraph 7 of the said decision hereunder: “7. …….This is an exceptional situation which authorises this Court in the present appeal to pass such decree as ought to have been passed or as the nature of the case demands. Similarly discretion vested in this Court under the aforesaid provision of law will not be refused to be exercised simply because respondents have not either filed an appeal or cross-objections.” 36. This Court in FAO No.203 of 2010, titled as Nati Devi and another versus Maya Devi and others, decided on 20th May, 2016, FAO No. 448 of 2011, titled as Sarita Devi & others versus Ashok Kumar Nagar & others, decided on 17th June, 2016, and FAO (MVA) No. 599 of 2008, titled as Shri Raj Pal Yadav and another versus Smt. Jamna Devi and another, decided on 24th June, 2016, has taken the similar view. 37. Thus, it can easily be deduced that the mandate of Section 96, Section 107(2) and order 41 Rule 33 CPC is just to rectify the errors and achieve the aim and object of the legislation. The purpose of Order 41 CPC, as discussed hereinabove, is to enable the appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties and to pass order which ought to have been passed while keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. 38. Admittedly, the age of the deceased was 23 years at the time of the accident. The purpose of Order 41 CPC, as discussed hereinabove, is to enable the appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties and to pass order which ought to have been passed while keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. 38. Admittedly, the age of the deceased was 23 years at the time of the accident. The Tribunal has rightly assessed the monthly income of the deceased to be Rs. 15,630/- in terms of the Bill/salary statement of the deceased, Ext. PW4/B. 39. The deceased was bachelor at the relevant point of time. Thus, the Tribunal has rightly deducted one half towards his personal expenses in terms of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as Sarla Verma (Smt) and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , which was upheld by a larger Bench of the Apex Court in Reshma Kumari & Ors. versus Madan Mohan & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 3120. Thus, the claimants have lost source of income to the tune of Rs. 7,800/- per month. 40. The Tribunal has wrongly applied the multiplier of 18'. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's and Reshma Kumari's cases (supra) read with the Second Schedule appended with the MV Act, multiplier of 15' is just and proper. 41. Viewed thus, it is held that the claimants have lost source of income/dependency to the tune of Rs.7,800/- x 12 x 15 = Rs.14,04,000/-. 42. The claimants are also held entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.10,000/- each under the heads 'loss of love and affection', 'loss of estate' and 'funeral expenses'. 43. Having said so, the claimants are held entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.14,04,000/- + Rs.10,000/- + Rs.10,000/- + Rs.10,000/- = Rs.14,34,000/-. 44. The Tribunal has also fallen in an error in awarding interest @ 8% per annum, which was to be awarded as per the prevailing rates. 45. It is beaten law of the land that the rate of interest should be awarded as per the prevailing rates, in view of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in cases titled as United India Insurance Co. 45. It is beaten law of the land that the rate of interest should be awarded as per the prevailing rates, in view of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in cases titled as United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others versus Patricia Jean Mahajan and others, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 281 ; Santosh Devi versus National Insurance Company Ltd. and others, reported in 2012 AIR SCW 2892; Amrit Bhanu Shali and others versus National Insurance Company Limited and others, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 738 ; Smt. Savita versus Binder Singh & others, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 2053; Kalpanaraj & others versus Tamil Nadu State Transport Corpn., reported in 2014 AIR SCW 2982; Amresh Kumari versus Niranjan Lal Jagdish Pd. Jain and others, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 433 ; and Mohinder Kaur and others versus Hira Nand Sindhi (Ghoriwala) and another, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 434 , and discussed by this Court in a batch of FAOs, FAO No. 256 of 2010, titled as Oriental Insurance Company versus Smt. Indiro and others, being the lead case, decided on 19.06.2015. 46. Having said so, I deem it proper to reduce the rate of interest from 8% per annum to 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. 47. The factum of insurance is admitted, thus, the Tribunal has rightly saddled the insurer with liability. 48. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned award is modified and the appeal is disposed of, as indicated hereinabove. 49. Registry is directed to release the awarded amount in favour of the claimants strictly as per the terms and conditions contained in the impugned award through payee's account cheque or by depositing the same in their respective bank accounts after proper verification. 50. Excess amount, if any, be released in favour of the appellant-insurer through payee's account cheque. 51. Send down the record after placing copy of the judgment on the Tribunal's file.