JUDGMENT : Ravindra Nath Kakkar, J. Heard Sri Dileep Kumar assisted by Shri Chandan Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Imran Ullah, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Shri P.S. Yadav, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 15.02.2016 by which sanction for criminal prosecution has been accorded against the petitioner under Section 13(1)(e) and under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short “the Act 1988”). The petitioner has also sought quashing of the communication dated 4.3.2016 by which the Special Secretary, Government of U.P. Lucknow forwarded the sanction order dated 15.2.2016 to the Director, U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Lucknow. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner firstly contended that the petitioner has not been given opportunity of hearing during investigation. He submitted that the Government Order dated 11.7.2005 lays down the procedure that has to be followed while conducting an investigation. Clause 19 of the Government Order stipulates that the charged officer (delinquent) should be provided opportunity to explain his case and his statement should be recorded at three stages, i.e. (a) immediately after search, (b) during investigation; and (c) after completion of investigation. Clause 19(c) thereof provides that on completion of investigation, charged officer shall be interrogated with regard to his disproportionate properties and his statement shall be recorded in detail so as to explain each and every aspect of the enquiry and if any inconsistency is noticed in his explanation/statements, it should be pointed out in appraisal of evidence enclosing a final report concerning such statements. In the present case, neither any explanation was called for nor statement of the petitioner recorded as provided under clause 19(c) of aforesaid Government Order and as such the entire investigation conducted against the petitioner is vitiated. Since no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner to explain his case nor provided with any document or material to enable him to explain and account for the alleged disproportionate properties, there is complete denial of opportunity of hearing as provided in the guidelines under clause 19(c) of the Government Order dated 11.7.2005, and is in defiance of the principles of natural justice. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has not been followed in conducting the enquiry. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has not been followed in conducting the enquiry. Section 17 provides that investigation shall be conducted by a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank. In the present case, the investigation has been conducted by an Inspector who is much lower in rank to Deputy Superintendent of Police, which is in violation of Section 17 (c) of the Act, 1988. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the Investigating Officer while conducting investigation has altogether ignored the directions given by Lucknow Bench of this Court in the judgment and order 21.6.2013 passed in Misc. Bench No.5161 of 2013 (Dr. Rakesh Dhar Tripathi vs. State of U.P. and others) and as such the investigation cannot be said to be complete in any manner. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the impugned order granting sanction is without jurisdiction as the power to grant sanction vests with the State Government. He also pointed out that the sanction order has been passed without application of mind based on incomplete material collected during investigation. Learned counsel for the petitioner therefore submits that the sanction order is illegal, without jurisdiction and is not sustainable in law. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Veerendra Kumar Dubey v. Chief of Army Staff and others, (2016) 2 SCC 627 , wherein administrative instructions have not been followed in a departmental proceedings. The facts of this case are entirely different because in the present case, sanction order is in breach of the guidelines contemplated under clause 19 (c) of the Government Order dated 11.7.2005. The Investigating Officer has not adhered to the said guidelines nor any opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner on closure/completion of investigation. The case cited by the learned counsel does not apply to the facts of the case and is of no help to the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment and order of this Court in Bhartendu Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and another, reported in 2011 (4) ADJ 466 , wherein it was held that the court shall not issue summons to the party (accused) if charge sheet itself is incomplete. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment and order of this Court in Bhartendu Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and another, reported in 2011 (4) ADJ 466 , wherein it was held that the court shall not issue summons to the party (accused) if charge sheet itself is incomplete. In this case, charge sheet and the summoning order was under challenge on ground that charge sheet was tainted with mala fide action of the Investigating Officer and the charge sheet itself was incomplete but that is not so in the present case. In the present case, charge sheet and summoning order has not been challenged and it is the order granting sanction for initiating criminal prosecution, which is under challenge. The factual matrix in the case relied upon by the petitioner's counsel is different and, therefore, not applicable in the present case. 8. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of Karnataka High Court in B.S. Yeddyurappa vs. The Principal Secretary, and others, (Writ Petition No.25915 & 26236-40 of 2011), decided on 24.11.2015, wherein legality of sanction order dated 21.1.2011 passed by His Excellency the Governor of Karnataka was assailed on the ground that His Excellency the Governor of Karnataka has not given reasons to disagree with the advice of the Council of Minister regarding grant of sanction coupled with the reason that there was no relevant material for granting permission, whereas in the present case there was sufficient material, oral and documentary, together with representation of petitioner before the sanctioning authority and being subjectively satisfied, permission was accorded for launching criminal prosecution against the petitioner. Thus the facts of this case are entirely different and are of no help to the petitioner. 9. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State of U.P. denying the allegations made in the writ petition. Sri Imran Ullah, learned Additional Advocate General urged that the impugned order dated 15.2.2016 passed by His Excellency Governor of U.P. is absolutely legal and justified based on the preliminary vigilance enquiry report submitted after proper enquiry and collection of evidence in an open enquiry. Sri Imran Ullah, learned Additional Advocate General urged that the impugned order dated 15.2.2016 passed by His Excellency Governor of U.P. is absolutely legal and justified based on the preliminary vigilance enquiry report submitted after proper enquiry and collection of evidence in an open enquiry. He further submitted that the inquiry officer personally gave notice to the petitioner through registered post and fax and when the petitioner did not respond, he along with his entire enquiry team visited the residence of the petitioner and requested him to furnish information and cooperate with the enquiry/investigation but neither any information was provided nor any kind of cooperation was extended by him. Consequently, the open enquiry was completed and report submitted to the Government and after approval the first information report was lodged on 18.6.2013 against the petitioner by the Inspector, Vigilance Establishment, Allahabad at Muthiganj Police Station, district Allahabad under section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of Act 1988. He further submitted that at the time of lodging of the FIR, it was found that the petitioner during the check period 1.5.2007 to 31.12.2011 had a valid income of Rs.49,49,928/-and total expenditure incurred by him during that period was to the tune of Rs.2,67,08,605/-. Thus a sum of Rs.2,17,58,677/-was spent in excess of his valid source of income and was disproportionate income collected by him during the check period. 10. Shri Imran Ullah vehemently submitted that while according sanction for prosecuting the petitioner, not only the material collected during investigation was considered but the representation of the petitioner dated 6.1.2016 has also been taken into consideration and His Excellency the Governor of U.P. has accorded sanction for criminal prosecution against the petitioner. He urged that the impugned sanction order dated 15.2.2016 is based on evidence collected during investigation and there is no illegality or infirmity in the sanction order. 11. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that after registration of FIR and during investigation on 1.10.2013 the Investigating Officer has given ample notice to the petitioner giving details of each and every property relied on by the Investigating Officer against the petitioner till that date and asked to submit explanation and account for the said property. The notice dated 1.10.2013 is annexed along with counter affidavit as Annexure CA-2. The notice dated 1.10.2013 is annexed along with counter affidavit as Annexure CA-2. He went on to argue that the Investigating Officer, after collecting the entire evidence, again tendered notice dated 14.3.2015 (Annexure 10 to the writ petition) to the petitioner strictly in terms of the provisions of Section 19(c) of Guidelines to enable him to give his reply and explanation and on 19.3.2015 the petitioner's reply was received and after giving thoughtful consideration to his reply, the draft final report was prepared and submitted to the State Government. He vehemently submitted that progress report of the enquiry in a sealed cover was produced before the Court in Writ Petition No.14587 of 2014, which is Annexure CA-3 to the counter affidavit. According to the learned Additional Advocate General at every stage the petitioner was given opportunity to submit his defence/reply, i.e., after institution of the open enquiry, after investigation and registration of the FIR and replies submitted by the petitioner were duly considered therefore, the sanction order is absolutely valid and legal and is not without jurisdiction. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that since on completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted to the learned Sessions Judge who after applying his judicial mind has already taken cognizance, the present petition has lost its efficacy and is liable to be dismissed as infructuous. He vehemently submitted that the sanction order is wholly a reasoned order having been passed after considering reply/objection of the petitioner raised in the writ petition. 13. It is also submitted on behalf of the State that various writ petitions assailing the validity of the enquiry/investigation, including Writ Petition No.8072 of 2013 earlier filed by the petitioner were dismissed. In W.P. No.8072 a detailed order dated 8.5.2013 was passed holding that petitioner's grievances were sufficiently redressed. He further submitted that directions contained in the guidelines as to the manner of enquiry is entirely an internal arrangement to make enquiry more fair, effective and impartial. The enquiry officer has personally given notice to the petitioner and visited his residence on 24.4.2013 along with the entire enquiry team but he did not cooperate with the enquiry nor provided any information. Therefore, the enquiry officer by letters dated 27.4.2013 and 28.4.2013 again requested the petitioner to get relevant information concerning enquiry but the petitioner chose not to respond. Consequently, open enquiry was concluded on 2.5.2013. Therefore, the enquiry officer by letters dated 27.4.2013 and 28.4.2013 again requested the petitioner to get relevant information concerning enquiry but the petitioner chose not to respond. Consequently, open enquiry was concluded on 2.5.2013. All these facts go to show that the petitioner was given numerous opportunities to get information collected by Investigating Officer and to inspect documents relied on by the enquiry officer to explain his case and account for the properties but the petitioner did not accede to the request of the enquiry officer. It is further submitted that the Investigating Officer after collection of evidence and preparation of draft final report on 14.3.2015 had again given a notice to the petitioner whereby details of each and every property as well as his income was brought to his notice and all possible efforts were made by the Investigating Officer to get reply/explanation, if any, from the petitioner and ultimately his reply was received only on 30.3.2015 which was duly considered by the Investigating Officer. 14. Learned Additional Advocate General lastly submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has a statutory alternative remedy against the orders impugned. There is no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition lacks merit and not sustainable in law and is liable to be dismissed. 15. In support of his contentions learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri and others, 1996 Cri.L.J. 1127, wherein in paragraph 15, the Apex Court has observed as under :- “.....It is, no doubt, true that a satisfactory explanation was required to be given by the delinquent officer. But this opportunity is only to be given during the course of the trial.” The Court further observed that “...there is no provision in law or otherwise which makes it obligatory of an opportunity of being heard to be given to a person against whom the report is to be lodged.” The Apex Court in paragraph 16 further observed as under :- “That the aforesaid passage leaves no manner of doubt that the opportunity which is to be afforded to the delinquent officer under Section 5(1) (e) of the Act of satisfactorily explaining about his assets and resources is before the Court when the trial commences and not at an earlier stage....” 16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Virender Kumar Tripathi, (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 667, the Apex Court in paragraph 9 observed as under : “9.Further the High Court has failed to consider the effect of Section 19 (3) of the Act. The said provision makes it clear that no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal on the ground of absence of/or any error, omission or irregularity in sanction required under sub-section (1) of Section 19 unless in the opinion of the court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.” The Apex Court in paragraph 10 further observed as under: “10. In the instant case there was not even a whisper or pleading about any failure of justice. The stage when this failure is to be established is yet to be reached since the case is at the stage of framing of charge whether or not failure has in fact been occasioned was to be determined once the trial commenced and evidence was led.” 17. In Balakrishnan Ravi Menon vs. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 45 , the Apex Court in paragraph 7 observed as under :- “7. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) specifically provide that in case of a person who is employed and is not removable from his office by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, sanction to prosecute is required to be obtained either from the Central Government or the State Government. The emphasis is on the words “who is employed” in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State Government. The emphasis is on the words “who is employed” in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State Government. If he is not employed then Section 19 nowhere provides for obtaining such sanction. Further, under sub-section (2), the question of obtaining sanction is relatable to the time of holding the office when the offence was alleged to have been committed. In case the person is not holding the said office as he might have retired, superannuated, be discharged or dismissed then the question of removing would not arise. Admittedly, when the alleged offence was committed, the petitioner was appointed by the Central Government. He demitted his office after completion of five years tenure. Therefore, at the relevant time when the charge sheet was filed, the petitioner was not holding the office of the Chairman, Goa Shipyaard Limited. Hence, there is no question of obtaining any previous sanction of the Central Government.” 18. In Onkar Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. And others, (Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.1418 of 1998), decided on 7.9.2015, reported in 2015 (10) ADJ 254 , a Division Bench this Court in paragraph 15 observed as under: “15. That the petitioner if he is questioning the correctness of the sanction order, in our opinion, has a remedy of assailing the validity of such order on grounds that are available in law before the trial Court itself....” In paragraph 16 this Court observed as under: “16. Then comes the question as to whether this Court should interfere with the sanction order at this stage on the strength of the facts which have been alleged before us...….Further with regard to miscalculation the question is whether this issue of fact which has been orally raised, can be a ground to interfere with the order of sanction. We are of the opinion that even though a factual matter is not entirely prohibited to be pleaded in a writ petition yet such an issue can be raised by questioning the sanction order by the petitioner either by claiming discharge in the trial or if the trial proceeds then by clearly confronting the prosecution on this issue. An issue of fact involving perversity, as pointed out by Sri Sharma in this case, can be gone into and assessed on the material before the trial court itself. An issue of fact involving perversity, as pointed out by Sri Sharma in this case, can be gone into and assessed on the material before the trial court itself. The adjudication therefore need not be assumed in a writ jurisdiction where a dispute on facts is ordinarily to be avoided. The petitioner, therefore, does not stand to any prejudice on the alleged miscalculation as noted above nor failure of justice is occasioned. His liberty is subject to law and can claim protection before the trial Court itself” In paragraph 18 the Bench of this Court further observed as under :- “18.....Even if any perversity is alleged, the same would be dependent on the facts on the basis whereof such allegations are made and is which is always subject to any inquiry and trial before the concerned Court. Interfering in a writ jurisdiction would therefore be interfering with the procedure of law which has been laid down through a valid piece of legislation. The writ jurisdiction being an extraordinary remedy, the same should not be invoked unless there are compelling reasons to do so.” And in paragraph 20 this Court lastly held as under:- “20. In the instant case the petitioner still has the remedy open and available to establish that the sanction, order suffers from the invalidities as pointed out hereinabove and take up his defence which cannot be examined in the writ jurisdiction on affidavits more so when the factual averment of miscalculation is missing.” 19. Learned Additional Advocate General also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mahesh G. Jain, (2013) 8 SCC 119 , wherein in paragraph 14 their Lordships have held as under :- “14. From the aforesaid authorities the following principles can be culled out: 14.1. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out. 14.2. The sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before it and, after consideration of the circumstances, has granted sanction for prosecution. 14.3. The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before it. 14.4. 14.3. The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before it. 14.4. Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence. 14.5. The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order. 14.6. If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before it and some of them have not been proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction. 14.7. The order of sanction is a prerequisite as it is intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but simultaneously an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner and there should not be a hyper technical approach to test its validity.” 20. Before appreciating the controversy raised in the writ petition, we would like to deal with the relevant legal propositions as laid down by the Apex Court and different High Courts. 21. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ram Singh 2000 (5) SCC 89, the Apex Court held that “Prevention of Corruption Act is a social legislation defined to curb illegal activities of public servants and should be liberally construed so as to advance its object and not liberally in favour of the accused.” Section 19 of the Act, 1988 is quoted hereunder.-- “19, Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.- (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.” 22. In Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P. Venku Reddy (2002) 7 SCC 63, the Apex Court held that “while construing the definition of “public servant” in clause (c) Section 2 of the Act, 1988, the court should adopt a purposive approach as would give effect to the intention of the legislature.” 23. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties. So far as the requirement of sanction under Section 19 of Act, 1988 is at issue, the first question is that if accused ceases to be a public servant, can he be said to lose his protective cover of sanction which is mandatory requirement for taking cognizance under the Act, 1988. In this context, it would be appropriate to go through the following decisions of the Apex Court as well as of different High Courts. 24. In State of West Bengal v. Shyam Das Banerjee, (2008) 9 SCC 45 , the Apex Court observed that “It is no doubt true that the policy under Section 6 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of public servant. But if the accused ceases to be a public servant and loses his protective cover under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure and is open to the prosecution without sanction having to be obtained, it would also necessarily mean that the Special Judge under the Special Courts Act, 1949, would cease to have jurisdiction over the accused in terms of Section 4 of the Special Courts Act, 1949.” 25. The analysis of the Act, 1947 and Act, 1988 will reveal that Section 19 of Act 1988 is analogous to Section 6 of Act, 1947 except clause 19 (3) which provides that on the ground of irregularity of sanction, no finding of the court can be reversed. The analysis of the Act, 1947 and Act, 1988 will reveal that Section 19 of Act 1988 is analogous to Section 6 of Act, 1947 except clause 19 (3) which provides that on the ground of irregularity of sanction, no finding of the court can be reversed. The Court further observed that no court can stay the proceedings in such cases because of irregularity in sanction or any other ground. 26. In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, (1998) 6 SCC 411 , the Supreme Court observed that “a public servant who committed an offence mentioned in the Act, while he was a public servant, can be prosecuted with the sanction as contemplated in Section 19 of the Act, 1988 if he continues to be a public servant when the court takes cognizance of the offence. But if he ceases to be a public servant by that time, the court can take cognizance of the offence without any such sanction.” 27. In M.P. Police Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2004) 8 SCC 788 , the Apex Court, following its earlier decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.P. Gupta, (2004) 2 SCC 349 , held that sanction for prosecution of a minister after resignation for offences committed during tenure as minister is not required. 28. The petitioner is not a public servant now as he had already demitted the office of Ministry of Higher Education. The question which merits consideration is whether sanction under Section 19 of Act, 1988 is mandatory for prosecuting a public servant or not. According to Section 19, sanction is mandatory for criminal prosecution if at the time of filing of charge sheet for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the public servant is in office. 29. Section 19(1) (a) and (b) of the Act, 1988 specifically provides that if a person is employed by the Union or the State Government and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government, sanction to prosecute such employee is to be obtained from the Central or State Government, as the case may be. 30. From the above decisions it is crystal clear that the check period of investigation into disproportionate assets of the petitioner was from 1.5.2007 to 31.12.2011. 30. From the above decisions it is crystal clear that the check period of investigation into disproportionate assets of the petitioner was from 1.5.2007 to 31.12.2011. It also transpires from the affidavits that the petitioner was elected an M.L.A. in U.P. State Legislative Assembly from Handia constituency in 2007 and was appointed as Minister, Higher Education, Government of U.P. and continued to hold the office from 13.5.2007 to 5.10.2011 and the complaint was lodged by one Ashok Kumar Shukla on 6.7.2012. After collection of preliminary objection on the complaint, a report dated 13.9.2012 was sent by the U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Head Quarters at Lucknow. Thereafter, an open enquiry by the Vigilance Establishment was ordered against the petitioner and the period covered under the vigilance enquiry against the petitioner was 1.5.2007 to 31.12.2011 and based on the aforesaid vigilance enquiry report, an FIR was lodged on 18.6.2013 by the Inspector, Vigilance Establishment of Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad Sector with police station Muthiganj, Allahabad against the petitioner for commission of offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Act, 1988. It also transpires that the Chief Minister of U.P. vide letter dated 18.12.2015, requested to His Excellency Governor of U.P. to grant sanction under Section 19 of 1988 Act for prosecution of the petitioner and on consideration of the material contained in the case diary and representation of the petitioner, sanction was accorded by His Excellency the Governor on 15.02.2016 which was communicated vide letter dated 4.3.2016 by the Special Secretary, Government of U.P., Lucknow to the Director, U.P. Vigilance Establishment Lucknow for initiation of criminal prosecution against the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, a charge sheet along with relevant documents was submitted before the competent court which took cognizance thereon on 12.4.2016 and summoned the petitioner. 31. The factual matrix as stated above clearly indicates that at the time of taking cognizance and summoning the accused to face trial, the petitioner was not within the periphery of a “public servant”, therefore, the sanction under Section 19 of 1988 Act is not mandatory in the case of the petitioner. But since the check period covered the tenure of the petitioner in office as Minister of Higher Education, i.e., 1.5.2007 to 31.12.2011 and the enquiry related to the check period, the petitioner does come within the definition of a “public servant”. 32. But since the check period covered the tenure of the petitioner in office as Minister of Higher Education, i.e., 1.5.2007 to 31.12.2011 and the enquiry related to the check period, the petitioner does come within the definition of a “public servant”. 32. In K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 665, the Apex Court has observed that “all that is required is that the authority must be in a position to appreciate the material collected against the public servant to judge whether the prosecution contemplated is frivolous or speculative.” 33. It is trite that discretion to prosecute a public servant has been taken away from prosecuting agency and conferred on sanctioning authority. The sanctioning authority has to apply its mind to the material on record and form its own opinion. If the material produced before it makes out the offence, the authority is bound to accord sanction as held in K. Veeraswami case. (supra). It is a settled legal proposition that the order of sanction under Section 19 of Act, 1988 must ex facie disclose that sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and the material placed before it. The question as to whether the proper sanction has been accorded for prosecuting the accused persons or not, is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance but even if the cognizance of the offence is taken erroneously and the same comes to the court's notice at a latter stage, a finding to that effect is permissible as held in the case of State of Karnatak vs. C. Nagarajaswamy (2005) 8 SCC 370 . 34. Merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of according sanction, it does not affect the validity of the proceedings unless the court records its satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in 'failure of justice'. 35. It is also an established legal proposition that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, normally High Court will not interfere with the investigation of the case except in exceptional cases where allegations made in FIR, even if they are accepted to be true, no offence is made out against the accused. 36. There is substance in the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General that accused has no right of hearing during investigation. 36. There is substance in the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General that accused has no right of hearing during investigation. Undoubtedly, the accused has a right to be heard during trial at the stage of defence evidence and not during investigation of the case. The accused has a right to take all such defence during the trial either by challenging the cognizance order or by filing discharge application. 37. In our opinion, all the issues that have been raised in this petition can be examined by the trial court. It would thus not be appropriate for the Court to examine all these issues in writ jurisdiction. 38. So far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to Section 17 of the Act, 1988 in paragraph 53 of the writ petition is concerned, in reply to the said paragraph it is stated in the counter affidavit that by the notification dated 9.10.1995 the State Government has authorized the Inspector to investigate the offences punishable under the Act, 1988. 39. In view of above discussion, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 15.2.2016 granting sanction for prosecution by His Excellency Governor of U.P. suffers from any infirmity, illegality, jurisdictional error or non application of mind. The contention of the learned counsel that the impugned sanction was accorded in breach of principles of natural justice is also not acceptable in the facts of the present case. Since cognizance has already been taken by the Special Judge having jurisdiction on submission of the charge sheet, and summoning order has already been passed and the petitioner has been summoned in pursuance thereof, which orders are not under challenge in the present petition, we do not see any reason to interfere with the same. 40. The writ petition, therefore, lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. ———————