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2016 DIGILAW 2687 (HP)

Lalit Narain Mishra v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2016-12-20

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. By medium of this application, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: (a) “Recall the copy of answer book handed over to the respondent university vide order dated 15th November, 2016 in CMP No. 9077/2016 in Writ Petition No. 1449 of 2015 to the petitioner in the interest of justice and provide a copy of that with the seal of the court so that truth of the University can be verified in the open court in the interest of justice. OR (b) Verify the said answer book in the open court with an expert whether it bears handwriting of the petitioner or not in the interest of justice. (c) Pass any other order deems fit to this Hon’ble Court in favour of petitioner in the interest of justice.” 2. The writ petition is no longer on the dockets of this Court. The petitioner filed writ petition claiming therein four reliefs, however, at the time of hearing, only two reliefs were prayed for and the same read as under: “(i). That the respondent-University may be directed to show the answer sheets/books of the petitioner of the examination of 2nd Semester of 2nd Year M.Sc.(Horticulture), in First hourly, Mid term, Second hourly and Practical Examination for course No. FSC- 516/Course title Systematics of Fruit Crops, Academic Year 2013-2014 and the copy of notification of dates of examination for the said examination, for which grading has been reported at Annexure P-1. (ii). That the respondent–University may be directed to show or place on records the answer sheets/books of the petitioner in examination of Practical examination and final examination of M.Sc (Horticulture), academic year 2013-14, Course No. FSC-506, 2nd semester, Course Title: Breeding of Fruit Crops, Cr. Hrs: 2+1 for which grading has been shown at Annexure P-2.” 3. This Court vide judgment dated 2.9.2015 dismissed the petition after having arrived at conclusion that the same sans merit. The petitioner thereafter assailed the judgment passed by this Court by approaching the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (C) No.6203/2016. However, the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 19.9.2016, which reads thus: “Upon hearing the counsel the Court made the following ORDER The special leave petition is dismissed. Pending application is disposed of.” 4. The petitioner thereafter assailed the judgment passed by this Court by approaching the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (C) No.6203/2016. However, the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 19.9.2016, which reads thus: “Upon hearing the counsel the Court made the following ORDER The special leave petition is dismissed. Pending application is disposed of.” 4. After the dismissal of the Special Leave to Appeal, the petitioner filed CMP No. 9077 of 2016 wherein the prayer was made for providing the record kept in sealed cover as per the orders earlier passed by this Court on 2.9.2015. 5. Even though we had doubts regarding the maintainability of this application, however, vide order dated 15.11.2016, we asked the petitioner to approach the concerned authorities for obtaining the copy of requisite documents and at the same time, the Registry was directed to handover the sealed cover documents to the learned Senior Counsel of the respondent-University. This would be evident from the order passed on 15.11.2016, which reads thus: “Petitioner/applicant has moved this application in a decided CWP No. 1449 of 2015. It is moot question whether this application is maintainable? We leave this question open. It is for the petitioner to approach the concerned authorities for obtaining the copy of the requisite documents. Registry is directed to hand over the sealed covered documents filed on 27.5.2015 to Ms. Ranjana Parmar, learned Senior Advocate. Accordingly, the application is disposed of.” 6. It is thereafter that the petitioner has filed the instant application and would contend that he is not satisfied with the orders passed by the authorities concerned and prayed that the application may be decided on merit. 7. Ranjana Parmar, learned Senior Advocate. Accordingly, the application is disposed of.” 6. It is thereafter that the petitioner has filed the instant application and would contend that he is not satisfied with the orders passed by the authorities concerned and prayed that the application may be decided on merit. 7. At the outset, we may point out that we are really pained and rather taken aback by some of averments made in the application, more particularly, those contained in para No.3, which reads thus: “That this Hon’ble Court had dismissed the writ petition No.1449 of Year 2015 without hearing it on merits and the Hon’ble High Court had told in the judgment of the said writ petition that the respondent University had filed the answer-book of the petitioner in the Hon’ble High Court and the Hon’ble High Court without verifying the answer book of the petitioner by means of expert test considered blindly that the answer book filed by the University is written by the petitioner in the sealed envelop.” 8. We have already exercised great amount of restrain while adjudicating the writ petition on merit and even at that time we refrained ourselves from imposing exemplary costs only because the petitioner is a student, as would be clearly evident from para 9 of the judgment, which reads thus: “9. As the petitioner has based his claim on falsehood and has not come with clean hands, we would have normally awarded exemplary costs, but we refrain from doing so since the petitioner is only a student.” 9. However, it appears that the sympathy and consideration shown to the petitioner was totally misplaced or else he would have taken extreme care and caution, more particularly, in the use of words and language while drafting the instant petition. 10. It is evidently clear from the language used by the petitioner that the same is intemperate and contemptuous and we have no hesitation to conclude that the petitioner by deliberately using the words in the para extracted above has attempted to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings and such action could be construed to be obstructive or attending to obstruct the administration of justice. 11. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. 11. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the courts to enable them to discharge their judicial functions without fear. (Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, (1998) 7 SCC 248 ). 12. It is well settled that litigant cannot be permitted to browbeat the court or terrorize or intimidate the Judges as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash (1998) 4 SCC 577 : “16. Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to browbeat the court or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a favourable order. Judges shall not be able to perform their duties freely and fairly if such activities were permitted and in the result administration of justice would become a casualty and the rule of law would receive a setback. The Judges are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Lawyers and litigants cannot be permitted to ‘terrorise’ or ‘intimidate’ Judges with a view to ‘secure’ orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental and no civilized system of administration of justice can permit it.” 13. These observations were subsequently, reiterated in Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court (2003) 3 SCC 427 . 14. Only because a party has appeared in person does not give him a licence thereby to commit contempt of the Court by using intemperate language or innuendos against the Judges while discharging the judicial function. The safeguards are not for the protection of any Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the courts. No doubt, fair comments, even if, outspoken, but made without any malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in good faith, in proper language, do not attract any punishment for contempt of court. However, when from the criticism deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the courts must bestir themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. However, when from the criticism deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the courts must bestir themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. No system of justice can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part of a person to permit himself the liberty or scandalizing a court by casting unwarranted, uncalled for an unjustified aspersions on the integrity, ability, impartiality or fairness of a Judge in the discharge of his judicial functions as it amounts to an interference with the due course of administration of justice. (Jaswant Singh Vs. Virender Singh (1995 (supp.1) SCC 384). 15. In ordinary circumstances, we would not have hesitated to initiate proceedings against the petitioner under the Contempt of Courts Act, however, again taking into consideration that the petitioner is still a student, whose career may otherwise be spoiled by any adverse order that may be passed by this Court, we leave the matter to rest here. However, with a stern warning to the petitioner to disassociate from such kind of misadventures in future. We now proceed to consider the application on merit. 16. Indubitably, the main writ petition is not on the dockets of the Court and as observed earlier has been decided on 2.9.2015 and even the Special Leave to Appeal against the decision stands dismissed on 19.9.2015 and, therefore, it is settled law that once the writ petition has finally been decided and proceedings stand terminated the Court becomes functus officio. It is only by filing an application for review of the order passed earlier that the Court may be called upon to examine the issue raised therein. That apart, the Court would by invoking its inherent powers correct some kinds of error, which normally would be arithmetical, grammatical etc. However, such powers would be invoked only in exceptional circumstances to avoid miscarriage of justice. Fraud is genuine, albeit limited, exception to the important principle of finality of litigation upon which the doctrine of functus officio is founded. 17. “Functus officio” is a Latin term meaning having performed his or her office. However, such powers would be invoked only in exceptional circumstances to avoid miscarriage of justice. Fraud is genuine, albeit limited, exception to the important principle of finality of litigation upon which the doctrine of functus officio is founded. 17. “Functus officio” is a Latin term meaning having performed his or her office. With regard to an officer or official body, it means without further authority or legal competence because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished. 18. “Functus” means having performed and “officio” means office. Thus, the phrase functus officio means having performed his or her office, which in turn means that the public officer is without further authority or legal competence because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished. 19. Trayner’s Latin Maxims, 4th Edn. Gives the expression functus officio the following meaning: “Having discharged his official duty. This is said of any one holding a certain appointment, when the duties of his office have been discharged. Thus a Judge, who has decided a question brought before him, is functus officio and cannot review his own decision.” 20. In Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., the expression functus officio is given the meaning, “a person who has discharged his duties, or whose office or authority is at an end.” 21. P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon gives the expression the meaning, “A term applied to something which once has had a life and power, but which has become of no virtue whatsoever. Thus when an agent has completed the business which he was entrusted his agency is functus officio.” 22. In Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth Edition, meaning of functus officio is : “having performed his or her office (of an officer or official body) without further authority or legal competence because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished.” 23. In other words, the authority, which had a life and power, has lost everything on account of completion of purpose/activities/act. 24. Notably, what the petitioner is seeking is virtually a writ of mandamus in a decided case, which is legally impressible. 24. Accordingly, we found no merit in this application and the same is dismissed with the clear warning to the petitioner, as aforesaid. The Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the petitioner.