JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 07.01.2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.1, Shimla, whereby the objections filed by the petitioner under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure came to be dismissed. 2. It is not in dispute that the suit filed by the decree holders was dismissed by the learned trial Court, however, the said judgment and decree was reversed by the learned first appellate Court and the operative portion of the judgment reads thus:- “34. ……The defendant No.1 is directed to execute and register a sale deed of the disputed premises i.e. one room, one kitchen, another room between kitchen and bath/WC towards Eastern side Ashok Sharma building in the ground floor of a house built on 4/59 shares, measuring 0-4 biswa, out of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No.14/14, 15, Khasra No.214/202 and 201/52, kitas 2, measuring 2 bighas 19 biswas, situated at Village Shakral, Pargana Chabrogti, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. in favour of the legal representatives of original plaintiff Badri Singh (present appellants) within a period of three months from today itself. The stamp duty and other expenses of execution and registration of sale deed shall be borne by the appellants (legal representatives of the original plaintiff). The parties are left to bear their own costs.” 3. The respondents on the basis of the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court filed execution petition under Order 21 Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code for execution of decree of specific performance. On receiving notice from the learned executing Court, the petitioner filed objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the decree in question is unexecutable against the petitioner as she is not in possession of the flat in question. It was also averred that husband of the petitioner had procured loan to run his company known as ‘M/s N.R. and Company’ and mortgaged the entire building with Banker i.e. UCO Bank. The husband of the petitioner could not liquidate the loan amount, therefore, the Banker took possession of the building under SARFESI ACT and auctioned the same to one Shri Naresh Chauhan for an amount of Rs.24.50 lacs. The husband of the petitioner could not liquidate the loan amount, therefore, the Banker took possession of the building under SARFESI ACT and auctioned the same to one Shri Naresh Chauhan for an amount of Rs.24.50 lacs. The petitioner was intimated by the Banker through letter dated 14.02.2008 informing that the premises in question had been auctioned in a private bid to Shri Naresh Chauhan for total amount of Rs.24.50 lacs. The petitioner tried to liquidate the loan amount, but she could not do so and as per her information, the same has been confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser. The husband of the petitioner faced great losses in the business and went in depression due to which he left the petitioner and minor daughter and his whereabouts are not known. 4. The objections preferred by the petitioner were dismissed by the learned Executing Court vide its order dated 07.01.2013 (for short ‘impugned order’). It is against this order that the petitioner has approached this Court by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the learned executing Court are totally perverse as it has failed to take into consideration that the petitioner is neither in possession nor owner of the premises in question and, therefore, not in a position to execute the sale deed in compliance to the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2009. It is further stated that once the premises in dispute have been sold in an open auction to one Shri Naresh Chauhan, who has become the registered owner thereof, the petitioner cannot be asked to perform, that what is impossible and deliver the premises which is not in his possession. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 6. As regards the possession of the disputed premises, I find that in para-1 of the objections, the petitioner has categorically stated that the possession of the premises is already with the respondents and the said averments read thus:- “1. That the judgment and decree under execution is unexcitable decree as the same can not be executed as the JD/Objector is not in possession of the flat/set regarding which decree has been passed. That the judgment and decree under execution is unexcitable decree as the same can not be executed as the JD/Objector is not in possession of the flat/set regarding which decree has been passed. It is submitted that the husband of JD/objector had procured loan to run his company namely N.R. & Company and the JD/objector stood as surety in favour of the company of her husband and mortgaged the building in dispute which had been purchased from the predecessor of DH/plaintiffs long back and due to losses in the company, the husband of the JD/objector could not liquidate the said loan in time and the banker under SARFESI Act took the possession of the entire building and auction the same to one Sh. Naresh Chauhan for an amount of Rs.24.50 lacs as is clear from the perusal of letter issued by banker i.e. Uco Bank, annexed herewith. The JD/objector is not in physical possession of the same and the DH/plaintiffs are in illegal occupation of the flat and their status can not be held more than that of tenant. It is further submitted that the objector/JD is trying her level best to liquidate the loan amount and take back the possession of the building from the bank or any other person to whom the same has been handed over. As per information of the objector/JD, the auction sale has not been confirmed in the name of auctioneer so far as no intimation in that regard has not been given to her. It is worthwhile to mention here that the JD/objector is not in possession of any documents presently as all the documents with respect to building in dispute had been handed over to Bank. At the cost of repetition, JD/objector is trying her level best to deposit the loan amount and take back the possession of the building. It is further submitted that the where about of husband of the JD/objector is not known for the last more than four years. It is further submitted that the husband of JD/objector faced big losses in the business and was under great depression due to which he left the JD/objector and one daughter in the year 2007. Since then the where about of husband of JD/objector are not known. It was only for this reason that the JD/objector could not liquidate the loan amount.” 7. Since then the where about of husband of JD/objector are not known. It was only for this reason that the JD/objector could not liquidate the loan amount.” 7. Once this is the admitted position, it is not understood as to how the petitioner claims that the physical possession of the premises has been taken over by the UCO Bank and how the said premises were further sold to any other person. In addition to what has been observed aforesaid, it would be noticed that the respondents in reply to the objections have categorically claimed themselves in physical possession of the premises even prior to the execution of the agreement and, therefore, any right created during the pendency of the suit would obviously not hamper their rights in view of the doctrine of lis pendens which applies to a transfer pendente lite and would prevent the rights of any third party from being fructified or getting matured. 8. It is more than settled that the doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike at the attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a Court, in which a dispute of rights or interests of a immovable property was pending by a private dealings which might remove the subject matter of the litigation from the ambit of Court’s power to decide a pending dispute or frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any immovable property during a litigation over it are bound, by the application of the aforesaid doctrine, by the decree passed in the suit even though they may not have been impleaded in it. 9. In Jayaram Mudaliar versus Ayyaswami and others AIR 1973 SC 569 in the Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. LIV. 570) defines the lis pendens in the following terms:- “Lis pendens literally means a pending suit; and the doctrine of lis pendens has been defined as the jurisdiction, power, or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment therein”.” 10. The doctrine of lis pendens is available to the purchaser at the execution of sale and the doctrine further applies to the Court sales also. 11. The doctrine of lis pendens is available to the purchaser at the execution of sale and the doctrine further applies to the Court sales also. 11. Here, it shall be apt to reproduce the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Guruswamy Nadar versus P.Lakshmi Ammal (D) by L.R.s and others AIR 2008 SC 2560 , which read thus:- “3…….The main argument which was advanced before learned Single Judge was that Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that a decree for specific performance against a subsequent purchaser for bona fide who has paid the money in good faith without notice of the original contract can be enforced as the same is binding on the vendor as well as against the whole world. As against this, it was contended by the respondents that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act which lays down the principle of lis pendens that when a suit is pending during the pendency of such suit if a sale is made in favour of other person, then the principle of lis pendens would be attracted. In support of this proposition a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Ram Peary and others v. Gauri and others [ AIR 1978 All. 318 ] as well as a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court was pressed into service. Therefore, the question before us in this case is what is the effect of the lis pendens on the subsequent sale of the same property by the owner to the second purchaser. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly says subsequent sale can be enforced for good and sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no difficulty because the suit was filed on 3.5.1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second sale took place on 5.5.1975. Therefore, it is the admitted position that the second sale was definitely after the filing of the suit in question. Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the effect of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale of the property. Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the effect of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale of the property. Therefore, the principle of lis pendens will govern the present case and the second sale cannot have the overriding effect on the first sale. The principle of lis pendens is still settled principle of law. In this connection, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Ram Peary (supra) has considered the scope of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Full Bench has referred to a decision in Bellamy v. Sabine[(1857) 44 ER 842 at p.843)wherein it was observed as under: "It is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as affecting a purchaser through the doctrine of notice, though undoubtedly the language of the Courts often so describes its operation. It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party. Where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind required that the decision of the Court in the suit shall be finding, not only on the litigant parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end." Similarly the Privy Council in Faiyaz Husain Khan v. Munshi Prag Narain [(1907) 34 Ind App 102] where the Court lay stress on the necessity for final adjudication and observation that otherwise there would be no end to litigation and justice would be defeated. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court further referred to the work of Story on Equity IIIrd Edition,(para 406) which expounded the doctrine of lis pendens in the terms as follows: "Ordinarily, it is true that the judgment of a court binds only the parties and their privies in representations or estate. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court further referred to the work of Story on Equity IIIrd Edition,(para 406) which expounded the doctrine of lis pendens in the terms as follows: "Ordinarily, it is true that the judgment of a court binds only the parties and their privies in representations or estate. But he who purchases during the pendency of an action, is held bound by the judgment that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted from taking any notice of the title so acquired; and such purchaser need not be made a party to the action. Where there is a real and fair purchase without any notice, the rule may operate very hardly. But it is a rule founded upon a great public policy; for otherwise, alienations made during an action might defeat its whole purpose, and there would be no end to litigation. And hence arises the maxim pendent elite, nihil innovetur; the effect of which is not to annul the conveyance but only to refer it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. As to the rights of these parties, the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does not vary them." Normally, as a public policy once a suit has been filed pertaining to any subject matter of the property, in order to put an end to such kind of litigation, the principle of lis pendens has been evolved so that the litigation may finally terminate without intervention of a third party. This is because of public policy otherwise no litigation will come to an end. Therefore, in order to discourage that same subject matter of property being subjected to subsequent sale to a third person, this kind of transaction is to be checked. Otherwise, litigation will never come to an end.” 12. Another factor which is very intriguing is that there is no material placed on record by the petitioner wherefrom it can be gathered as to when exactly the husband of the petitioner took loan from the UCO Bank. The letter issued by the UCO Bank has been placed on record. Otherwise, litigation will never come to an end.” 12. Another factor which is very intriguing is that there is no material placed on record by the petitioner wherefrom it can be gathered as to when exactly the husband of the petitioner took loan from the UCO Bank. The letter issued by the UCO Bank has been placed on record. The contents of the letter (Annexure P-6) do reveal that on account of loan taken by the husband of the petitioner, the account was declared as non performing account on 01.07.2006 and it also finds mention therein that the premises has been sold through a private sale to one Shri Naresh Chauhan for a sum of Rs.24.50 lacs. However, that in itself is inconsequential as the suit out of which it gives rise to the decree sought to be executed was presented on 10.06.2003 and, therefore, any transaction entered into by the petitioner after the said date would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. 13. As regards other objections regarding there being no agreement between the parties etc., the same are not open to challenge as these objections have been conclusively decided by the first appellate Court which judgment and decree admittedly has attained finality. 14. However, before parting, I would now like to advert to another aspect of the case which relates to the all out endeavours made by the petitioner to prolong these proceedings. 15. A perusal of the order sheet indicates that further proceedings in the execution petition have been ordered to be stayed vide an ex parte order passed by this Court on 06.05.2013. Thereafter, the petitioner took no steps for getting the respondents served and eventually on 04.09.2014, this Court passed the following orders: “Steps for service of respondents, complete in all respects be positively taken within a period of four weeks. If steps are not taken within the aforesaid period, petition shall automatically stand dismissed for non prosecution without any further reference to this Court. In the event of steps being taken, notices be issued to the respondents returnable for 22nd October, 2014.” 16. If steps are not taken within the aforesaid period, petition shall automatically stand dismissed for non prosecution without any further reference to this Court. In the event of steps being taken, notices be issued to the respondents returnable for 22nd October, 2014.” 16. Later on, vide order dated 19.12.2014, the order passed earlier on 04.09.2014 was though recalled, however, even thereafter no serious endeavour was made by the petitioner to get the respondents served, as would be evident from the order sheet dated 03.06.2015 which reads thus:- “As per Registry report steps for service of co-respondents No.1 to 3 not taken. Steps be taken within two weeks. Thereafter, notices be issued to co-respondents No.1 to 3 returnable within four weeks. Be listed thereafter.” 17. Thereafter, on 03.09.2015, learned counsel representing the petitioner made out a grievance with regard to incorrect proceedings recorded by the official of this Registry and accordingly Registrar (Judicial) was directed to examine and submit his report and the matter was directed to be listed on 09.09.2015. On 09.09.2015, it was the learned counsel for the petitioner, who candidly conceded that the process fee so filed by him was lying under objection and the same escaped his attention. 18. It is eventually on 29.10.2015 that respondents No.1 and 2 came to be served, yet no steps for service of respondent No.3 were effected up till 03.06.2016. On 21.07.2016, notices issued to respondent No.3 were stated to be awaited, however, since these were actual date notices, they could not be awaited any further and, therefore, the petitioner was directed to take fresh steps for the service of respondent No.3 within two days. Despite this order, the petitioner took no steps to serve respondent No.3 up till 23.08.2016. Even on 23.08.2016, the process fee was filed only because the case was listed before this Court on 24.08.2016. Even thereafter, the petitioner took no steps and eventually on 30.11.2016, this Court after taking into consideration that the notices to respondent No.3 had been issued on 25.10.2016 and the statutory period of service had come to an end, concluded that respondent No.3 would be deemed to be served and was thereafter proceeded ex parte. 19. Even thereafter, the petitioner took no steps and eventually on 30.11.2016, this Court after taking into consideration that the notices to respondent No.3 had been issued on 25.10.2016 and the statutory period of service had come to an end, concluded that respondent No.3 would be deemed to be served and was thereafter proceeded ex parte. 19. The aforesaid narration of facts makes it evidently clear that the petitioner after having obtained ex parte order from this Court has abused the process of law and managed to keep the proceedings in a state of limbo for more than 3 ½ years. Obviously, this was done with an intent to tire out the decree holders so as to make them to succumb to the illegal and unjustified demand of the petitioner and the same is not legally permissible. 20. Having said so, there is no merit in this petition and the same is otherwise nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.30,000/- to be paid to the respondents within four weeks from today and in default thereof, the respondents shall be at liberty to have the same recovered by resorting to the process of execution. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. Interim order dated 06.05.2013 is vacated.