JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Since common questions of law and facts are involved in all these appeals, same were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of vide this common judgment. 2. These Letters Patent Appeals are directed against judgment dated 17.4.2015 rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in a batch of petitions i.e. lead case being CWP No. 4615 of 2012 titled Satish Chand v. Dr. Y.S. Parmar University, whereby the petitions have been partly allowed and appellant University has been directed to pay to the respondents pay scale of Hostel Assistants from the time they were designated as Hostel Attendants. Appellant has also been directed to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum till the date of payment. 3. Facts in brief emerging from the record are that the respondents after joining the services of the appellant-University were regularized as Hostel Attendants vide different office orders. The respondents claimed in the petition that though their services were regularized as Hostel Attendants but ever since they were performing duties of higher post of Hostel Assistants. It is the case of the respondents in the writ petition that there are only four posts of regular Hostel Assistants against eleven hostels and therefore, in the absence of regular Hostel Assistants, it is the respondents, who are discharging the duties of Hostel Assistants. Respondents thus claimed equal pay for equal work. The writ petition was filed mainly with the following main reliefs: "(a) The writ of mandamus be issued against respondent, directing them to remove the anomaly in the pay scale of petitioner and respondent may further be directed to release the pay scale of Rs.3120-5160 w.e.f. 1996 and subsequently revised to Rs. 5910-20200 w.e.f. January, 2006 to the petitioner being Hostel Attendant as his counter part in the departments of State Govt. and H.P. University are being paid the pay scale of Rs.5910-20200 w.e.f. January, 2006 onwards along with consequential benefits. (b) The respondents deserves to be directed to upgrade the post of Hostel Attendant to Hostel Assistant from class 1V to 111 as has been upgraded by the State Govt., CSKHPKV Palampur and H.P. University. and H.P. University are being paid the pay scale of Rs.5910-20200 w.e.f. January, 2006 onwards along with consequential benefits. (b) The respondents deserves to be directed to upgrade the post of Hostel Attendant to Hostel Assistant from class 1V to 111 as has been upgraded by the State Govt., CSKHPKV Palampur and H.P. University. b-a) The respondent may be directed to follow the principles of equal pay for equal work, further direct them to pay the scales of Hostel Assistant to the applicant because the applicant is performing the duties of Hostel Assistant. (c) The respondents may be directed to release the arrears of pay to the petitioner w.e.f. Oct. 1999 till date along with 18% interest P.A." 4. During the course of hearing before the learned Single Judge, the respondents restricted their claim to relief (b-a) only. 5. Appellant University filed its reply and claimed that the Hostel Attendant is feeder category for promotion to the post of Hostel Assistant and case of up gradation of Hostel Attendants to that of Hostel Assistants in the revised pay scale of Rs. 5910- 20200+1900 GP was sent to the Comptroller for being placed before the Finance Committee. However, the Comptroller returned the case with the observation that the case may be re-examined in light of approved core cadre strength and existing working strength. University further stated that the management vide item No. 8 of the proceedings of the meeting held on 30.3.2011 had approved the core strength of different categories of posts vide notification dated 8.4.2011 and the surplus post of different categories were abolished vide office order dated 25.4.2011 but the core strength was not approved by the State Government and as such fresh core cadre strength proposal was sent to the State Government vide letter dated 30.1.2014 and approval of same was stated to be awaited. 6. The learned Single Judge after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that as the respondents were discharging duties of the post of Hostel Assistant and it was the University itself, which proposed up gradation of posts of Hostel Attendants to that of Hostel Assistants, therefore, it strengthens the claim put forth by the respondents that in fact they are discharging and performing duties of Hostel Assistants in the absence of regular Hostel Assistants. The learned Single Judge thus partly allowed the petitions as noticed above. 7. The learned Single Judge thus partly allowed the petitions as noticed above. 7. The University being aggrieved, challenged the judgment passed by learned Single Judge by filing the present appeal. 8. Mr. Balwant Singh Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-University vehemently argued that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is not based on correct appreciation of facts available on record as well as Rules governing the field, as such, same is not sustainable, in the eyes of law. He further contended that the findings returned by the learned Single Judge that the respondents though designated as Hostel Attendants are in fact working as Hostel Assistants, are solely based upon certificate (Annexure PA) issued by the Warden of the Hostel, who was not competent to issue such certificate and as such same could not be taken into consideration while recording aforesaid findings. Mr. Thakur further argued that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the post of Hostel Assistant is promotional post for feeder post of Hostel Attendants and same can not be equated as claimed by the respondents. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Thakur strenuously argued that the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to pay to the respondents pay scale of the post of Hostel Assistants from the time they were designated as Hostel Attendants, is also against law laid down by the Apex Court as well this Court, whereby financial benefits, if any, have been restricted only to three years prior to the date of approaching the Court for redressal of their grievances. 9. Mr. B.S. Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Mr. Munish Thakur, Advocate, appearing for the respondents-petitioners supported the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. Mr. Chauhan, vehemently argued that there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by learned Single Judge and same is based upon proper appreciation of facts as well as Rules occupying the field and as such there is no scope of interference, whatsoever, for this Court, especially in view of the fact that learned Single Judge has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously. Mr. Mr. Chauhan, forcefully contended that a bare perusal of impugned judgment as well as pleadings available on record clearly suggests that the respondents though were appointed as Hostel Attendants but since their appointment, they have been regularly performing the duties of Hostel Assistants and as such impugned judgment having been passed by learned Single Judge being correct in law, deserves to be upheld. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case. 11. Perusal of the pleadings as well as impugned judgment clearly suggests that the respondents though were regularized as Hostel Attendants vide different orders but ever since their regularization, they have been discharging and performing duties of higher post of Hostel Assistants. It is also undisputed that there are eleven hostels in the appellant-University and only four persons are occupying posts of regular Hostel Assistants, meaning thereby that learned Single Judge has rightly concluded that in the absence of adequate staff of regular Hostel Assistants, respondents are discharging and performing duties of Hostel Assistants. Perusal of Annexure PA placed on record i.e. certificate issued by Warden of the Hostel clearly suggests that respondents though appointed as Hostel Attendants in the Hostels, are looking after works like maintaining stock/store items, giving complaints of the hostel regarding electricity, maintenance etc. If aforesaid certificate having been issued by the Warden is perused juxtaposing Annexure R-3, wherein duties of Hostel Assistants have been defined, clearly suggests that for all intents and purposes, respondents have been discharging duties of Hostel Assistants. Annexure R-3 suggests that Hostel Assistants are supposed to distribute mess bills for collection of money, collection of telephone charges from students, to make reports to the concerned warden regarding complaints of water/electricity etc., to maintain register of incoming and outgoing calls of hostel. 12. Hence, this Court, after careful perusal of Annexure PA vis-a-vis Annexure R-3, sees no illegality or infirmity in the findings returned by the learned Single Judge that the respondents are performing duties of Hostel Assistants. Similarly, pleadings available on record nowhere suggest that the appellant-University placed on record material, if any, to demonstrate that respondents are actually not performing duties of Hostel Assistants. Similarly, pleadings available on record nowhere suggest that the appellant-University placed on record material, if any, to demonstrate that respondents are actually not performing duties of Hostel Assistants. Moreover, University specifically pleaded before the writ Court that it had proposed up gradation of Hostel Attendants to the post of Hostel Assistants in the revised pay scale, which did not find favour at the level of the Government. Aforesaid admission having been made on behalf of the appellant-University clearly strengthens the claim of the respondents that for all intents and purposes, they are discharging duties of Hostel Assistants, rather, attempt on the part of the appellant to send the proposal to appropriate authority for up gradation of seven posts of Hostel Attendants to that of Hostel Assistants clearly suggests that the University had acknowledged the claim of the respondents that they have actually been discharging duties of Hostel Assistants. It also emerges from the record that there is no dispute qua the duties and responsibilities as well as work being performed by them as the same is being performed by the Hostel Assistants and as such, learned Single Judge rightly concluded that the appellant can not deny the legitimate claim of the respondents and their action in denying the pays scale of Hostel Assistants to the respondents is ex facie arbitrary, irrational and unjust. 13. Careful perusal of impugned judgment passed by learned Single Judge suggests that the same is based upon correct appreciation of law having been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of judgments. Hon'ble Apex Court has repeatedly observed that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not a mere slogan but a fundamental right which can be enforced through constitutional remedies prescribed therein. Hence, learned Single Judge rightly concluded that determining of grant of pay scale is not the sole prerogative of the executive, rather an aggrieved employee has every right to knock the doors of justice for the redressal of his grievances. 14. Hence this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, in as much as, respondents have been held entitled to the pay scale of Hostel Assistants. 14. Hence this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, in as much as, respondents have been held entitled to the pay scale of Hostel Assistants. However, we see substantial force in the contentions having been raised by the learned counsel representing the appellant-University that the arrears, if any, in terms of judgment passed by learned Single Judge, were required to be restricted only for the period of three years prior to the filing of writ petition. 15. The Limitation Act, 1963, for short "the Act" provides for some mechanism or period within which an aggrieved person can seek the redressal of his grievances. 16. The question arose for the first time before the apex Court in case Jai Dev Gupta v. State of Himachal Pradesh and another, AIR 1998 SC 2819 , whether the arrears can be restricted only for three years prior to the filing of the writ petition, in terms of the mandate of Limitation Act. The question was answered in affirmative by the apex Court. It is apposite to reproduce paras 2 and 3 of the said judgment herein: "2. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that before approaching the Tribunal the appellant was making number of representations to the appropriate authorities claiming the relief and that was the reason for not approaching the Tribunal earlier than May, 1989. We do not think that such an excuse can be advanced to claim the difference in back wages from the year 1971. In Administrator of Union Territory of Daman and Diu v. R.D. Valand, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 593, this Court while setting aside an order of Central Administrative Tribunal has observed that the Tribunal was not justified in putting the clock back by more than 15 years and the Tribunal fell into patent error in brushing aside the question of limitation by observing that the respondent has been making representations from time to time and as such the limitation would not come in his way. In the light of the above decision, we cannot entertain the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the difference in back wages should be paid right from the year 1971. In the light of the above decision, we cannot entertain the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the difference in back wages should be paid right from the year 1971. At the same time we do not think that the Tribunal was right in invoking Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act for restricting the difference in back wages by one year. 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the appellant is entitled to get the difference in back wages from May, 1986. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs." [Emphasis supplied] 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in another judgment delivered in case Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 , has laid down the same propositions of law and held that arrears should be restricted to three years prior to filing of writ petition. It is apt to reproduce paras 4 to 8 of the said judgment herein: "4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A continuing wrong refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. Recurring/successive wrongs are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of Section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963) : It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. 5. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. 5. In M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held : "5. The appellant s grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant s claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant s claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred.... 6. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred.... 6. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India, 2007 9 SCC 274 , this Court held: "8..The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. 8. In this case, the delay of 16 years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances." 18. The apex Court in a latest judgment delivered in case Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, JT 2015 (9) SC 329 has also laid down the same principles of law. It is profitable to reproduce paras 4, 4.1 and 16 of the said judgment herein: "4. As regards the issue of delay in matters pertaining to claims of pension, it has already been opined by this Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 that in cases of continuing or successive wrongs, delay and laches or limitation will not thwart the claim so long as the claim, if allowed, does not have any adverse repercussions on the settled third party rights. This Court held: 7. This Court held: 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. [Emphasis is ours] 4.1. We respectfully concur with these observations which if extrapolated or applied to the factual matrix of the present case would have the effect of restricting the claim for pension, if otherwise sustainable in law, to three years previous to when it was raised in a judicial forum. Such claims recur month to month and would not stand extinguished on the application of the laws of prescription, merely because the legal remedy pertaining to the time barred part of it has become unavailable. This is too well entrenched in our jurisprudence, foreclosing any fresh consideration. 5 to 15. 16. We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant, in essence, was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995. This is too well entrenched in our jurisprudence, foreclosing any fresh consideration. 5 to 15. 16. We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant, in essence, was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of 1995. The Appellant is entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of refunding of the entire amount of the Corporation's contribution to the Provident Fund along with interest accrued thereon as provided in the Pension Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not explained by proper reasons, on part of the Appellant in approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears of pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the date of the petition filed before the High Court. These arrears of pension should be paid to the Appellant in one instalment within four weeks from the date of refund of the entire amount payable by the Appellant in accordance of the Pension Rules of 1995. In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund adjusted against the arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the amount of arrear is more than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount shall be paid within two weeks from the date of such request made by the Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than the amount of refund required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly basis after the date on which the amount of refund is entirely adjusted." [Emphasis supplied] 19. Having said so, it is held that the writ petitioners are entitled to the arrears for the period of three years prior to the filing of writ petitions. The impugned judgment is modified accordingly and the appeals are disposed of, along with pending applications, if any.