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2016 DIGILAW 2720 (HP)

Titu Ram v. Vidya Devi

2016-12-23

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2016
JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant Regular Second Appeal stands directed by the plaintiffs/appellants herein against the impugned rendition recorded by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, whereby he dismissed the appeal preferred there before by the plaintiffs/appellants herein and affirmed the judgment and decree rendered by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Barsar Hamirpur, H.P., whereby the latter dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs/appellants herein standing aggrieved by the judgment and decree rendered by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, they prefer the instant appeal before this Court for seeking from this Court an order reversing the findings recorded therein. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that Smt. Tulsi Devi widow of Shri Daroga was stated to be owner in possession of ½ share in land described in Khata No.33, Khatoni No.34, Khasra Nos. 86, 87, 124, 126, 128, 129, 161, 162, 165, 180, 187, 228, 421, 422, 460, 499, 528, 547, 548, 549 and 551 measuring 44 K-18M and 1/6 share in Khata No.34, Khatoni No.35, Khasra No. 131 measuring 0K-13 M, total land measuring 22 K- 11M, in revenue estate Sakroh, Tappa Dhatwal, Tehsil Barsar, Ditrict Hamirpur, H.P. Smt. Tulsi Devi was also stated to be share holder as per her share in village Shamlat land. The suit land was ancestral with Smt. Tulsi Devi qua the plaintiffs. Smt. Tulsi Devi had died on 3.4.2000. After the death of Smt. Tulsi Devi, the plaintiffs had inherited the suit land and had been owners in possession thereof. Plaintiff No.1 Titu Ram is grand son of Smt. Tulsi Devi. Plaintiff No.2 Kamla Devi is daughter in-law of Smt. Tulsi Devi. The defendants had no right, title or interest in the suit land. The defendants had started interfering with the ownership and possession of the plaintiff of the suit land w.e.f. April, 2000. The defendants had threatened to alienate the suit land, as also the valuable trees situate therein. The defendants had proclaimed the ownership and possession of defendant No.1 over the suit land on the strength of sale deed dated 4.1.2000 executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 It had been alleged that Smt. Tulsi Devi had not executed any general power of attorney on 13.9.1999 in favour of defendant No.2. The defendants had proclaimed the ownership and possession of defendant No.1 over the suit land on the strength of sale deed dated 4.1.2000 executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 It had been alleged that Smt. Tulsi Devi had not executed any general power of attorney on 13.9.1999 in favour of defendant No.2. The General power of attorney dated 13.9.1999 purportedly have been executed by Smt. Tulsi Devi in favour of defendant No.2 was wrong, illegal, void, ineffective and inoperative against the rights of the plaintiffs. The defendant No.2 was stated to have sold the suit land in favour of defendant No.1 on 4.1.2000 on the strength of General Power of attorney dated 13.9.1999. It is stated that Smt. Tulsi Devi was old, illiterate, pardanashin rustic village woman. After the death of her husband, she had been left alone and had turned weak. Defendants No.1 and 2 did not pay the sale consideration to Smt. Tulsi Devi. The sale deed dated 4.1.2000 qua the suit land executed by defendant No.2 in favour of in his wife defendant No.1 was wrong, illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs,. Also the plaintiffs on 21.5.1996 had instituted Civil Suit for maintenance against Sh. Daroga. The plaintiff had sought temporary injunction against Sh. Daroga and the learned Sub Judge, Hamirpur, vide order dated 22.5.1996 had restrained Shri Daroga from alienating the suit land. The restraint order passed against Shri Dargoa stood incorporated in the remarks column of the relevant jamabandi of the suit land. As such, the sale deed dated 4.1.2000 of the suit land by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1, in violation of the restraint order of the court, was liable to be treated illegal, void and invalid. The defendants were sought to be restrained from interfering with the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs of the suit land by issuance of a decree of perpetual injunction. Alternatively, the plaintiffs had sought relief of possession in case the defendants were successful in taking forcible possession of the suit land or had been otherwise treated in possession. With these allegations, on 3.5.2000, the plaintiffs had instituted suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession against the defendants before the learned trial Court. 3. With these allegations, on 3.5.2000, the plaintiffs had instituted suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession against the defendants before the learned trial Court. 3. The defendants contested the suit and filed written statement, wherein, they have taken preliminary objections qua cause of action and valuation. On merits, defendants admitted the ownership and possession of Smt. Tulsi Devi over the suit land. However, it is pleaded that the suit land was not ancestral with Smt. Tulsi Devi. They admitted the relationship of the plaintiffs with Smt. Tulsi Devi. It had been pleaded that the plaintiffs had instituted Civil Suit No. 309/98/96 against Sh. Daroga and Sh. Balak Ram in the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Hamirpur on 21.5.1996. The plaintiff had claimed maintenance from Sh. Daroga. The Sub Judge 1st Class, vide order dated 22.5.1996 had restrained Sh. Daroga from alienating the suit land. Sh. Daroga had died in the year 1998. After the death of Sh. Daroga Smt. Tulsi Devi had been brought on record as his legal heir. Smt. Tulsi Devi had contested Civil Suit No. 309/98/96 instituted by the plaintiffs. The civil suit of the plaintiffs against Sh. Daroga and Smt. Tulsi Devi had been dismissed in default under order 9, Rule 8 CP on 27.3.2000. Smt. Tulsi Devi stated to be in sound disposing state of mind and on 13.9.1999, she had executed General power of attorney Ex.DW3/A in favour of defendant No.2. Smt. Tulsi Devi had authorized defendant NO.2 to alienate the suit land. Defendant No.2 was related to Smt. Tulsi Devi. Defendant No.2 on the strength of General Power of attorney Ex.DW3/A had sold the suit land in favour of defendant No.1 on 4.1.2000 through registered sale deed Ex.DW4/A for Rs.3,17,500/- It had been stated that defendants No.1 and 2 had been in possession of the suit land during the life time of Smt. Tulsi Devi. Defendants NO.1 and 2 had been looking after and maintaining Smt. Tulsi Devi and her husband. Smt. Tulsi Devi and her husband required funds for their maintenance and medical treatment. Defendants No.1 and 2 had been paying for maintenance and medical treatment of Smt. Tulsi Devi and her husband. The amount paid by defendants No.1 and 2 to Smt. Tulsi Devi had swelled to Rs.2,67,500/-. Smt. Tulsi Devi and her husband required funds for their maintenance and medical treatment. Defendants No.1 and 2 had been paying for maintenance and medical treatment of Smt. Tulsi Devi and her husband. The amount paid by defendants No.1 and 2 to Smt. Tulsi Devi had swelled to Rs.2,67,500/-. It had also been stated that Shri Daroga in his life time had agreed to sell his property in favour of Sh. Parkash Chand for Rs.1,50,000/-. Sh. Daroga had been paid Rs.70,000/- by Sh. Parkash Chand. After the death of Sh. Daroga, the amount of Rs.70,000/- had been paid to Sh. Parkash Chand by Smt. Tulsi Devi. On 4.1.2000, defendant No.1 had paid Rs. 50,000/- to Smt. Tulsi Devi through defendant No.2. Smt. Tulsi Devi had died on 3.4.2000. DefendantNo.1 had been owner in possession of the suit land w.e.f. 4.1.2000. Defendants No.1 and 2 had denied the charge of fraud, mis-representation and undue influence leveled against them by the plaintiff for wriggling out of the general power of attorney dated 13.9.1999 and sale deed dated 4.1.2000. They prayed that the suit of the plaintiffs be dismissed. 4. The plaintiffs/ appellants herein filed replication to the written statement of the defendants/respondents herein, wherein, they denied the contents of the written statement and re-affirmed and re-asserted the averments, made in the plaint. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck the following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the sale deed dated 4.1.2000 is sham, fake, null and void etc., as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction prayed for? OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession as claimed? OPP. 5. Whether the suit had not been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD. 6. Whether the suit land is ancestral as alleged. IF so, its effect? OPP. 7. Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action? OPP. 8. Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs under Sec. 35-A, CPC as claimed, if so, their quantum? OPD. 9. Whether the power of attorney executed by late Smt. Tulsi Devi was a result of fraud etc., as alleged. If so its effect? OPP. 10. Relief. 6. OPP. 7. Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action? OPP. 8. Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs under Sec. 35-A, CPC as claimed, if so, their quantum? OPD. 9. Whether the power of attorney executed by late Smt. Tulsi Devi was a result of fraud etc., as alleged. If so its effect? OPP. 10. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the appellants herein/plaintiffs. In an appeal, preferred there from by the appellants/plaintiffs before the learned first Appellate Court, the latter Court dismissed the appeal. 7. Now the plaintiffs/appellants herein have instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court assailing the findings recorded in its impugned judgment and decree by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission on 9.5.2006, this Court, admitted the appeal instituted here before by the plaintiffs/appellants herein against the judgment and decree of the learned first Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial question of law:- 1. Whether the sale of the property of late Smt. Tulsi, made by respondent Birbal under the alleged instrument of general power of attorney, in favour of Vidya Devi respondent No.1, his wife is vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation, as alleged? Substantial Question of Law No.1: 8. Under EX.DW3/A, a registered general power of attorney executed by Tulsi Devi, she constituted therein one Birbal as her attorney for all the relevant purposes enumerated therein some of which were qua his standing authorized to sell, mortgage or gift her property divulged therein. In sequel to a bestowment under Ex.DW3/A upon Birbal an authorization to sell the property of its executant, he under a registered deed of conveyance constituted in Ex.DW4/A alienated the suit property vis-a-vis his wife. In sequel to a bestowment under Ex.DW3/A upon Birbal an authorization to sell the property of its executant, he under a registered deed of conveyance constituted in Ex.DW4/A alienated the suit property vis-a-vis his wife. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant has contended qua the apposite authorization bestowed upon Birbal under Ex.DW3/A besides in pursuance thereto the execution of a registered deed of conveyance embodied in Ex.DW4/A by Birbal vis-a-vis his wife standing stained besides standing ingrained with a vice of pervasive fraud also with a vice of misrepresentation arising from the factum qua with the Civil Court concerned, during the pendency of a suit for mandatory injunction reflected in Ex.P-1 instituted by the plaintiff along with his mother against their common predecessor-in-interest besides of Tulsi Devi, the executant of general power of attorney borne on Ex.DW3/A, under its orders pronounced on 22.05.2006 restraining the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff besides one Balak Ram to during the pendency of the apposite aforesaid suit alienate the suit property, thereupon, rendered the execution of Ex.DW3/A to beget an infraction therewith also concomitantly rendered sale deed borne on Ex.DW4/A to beget an alike infraction therewith. Moreover, it stands espoused qua the pronouncement aforesaid rendered upon one Daroga a predecessor-in-interest common to all the legal combatants here at, was also binding upon Tulsi Devi significantly when on his demise occurring during the pendency of the aforesaid civil suit whereupon she stood substituted in his place in the apposite array of defendants whereupon with evidently both the afore stated exhibits standing executed during the currency of the aforesaid suit, rendered the execution by Tulsi Devi of the afore referred GPA borne on Ex.PW3/A besides also rendered the execution by her attorney a sale deed borne on Ex.DW4/A vis-a-vis his wife to stand hit by the doctrine of lis pendens whereupon the transfer of the suit property is amenable to a construction of it being nonest in the eyes of law. In making the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants herein relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court reported in Amesh Akre and others versus Mangalbai Pralhad Akre and others, AIR 2002 Bombay 487, the relevant paragraphs Nos.21 to 23 read as under:- “21. Similarly, it is also not necessary that suit should be disposed of only on merits in order to bring an end to interim order. Similarly, it is also not necessary that suit should be disposed of only on merits in order to bring an end to interim order. What is contemplated in law is that such interim order would continue to operate till suit is disposed of one way or the other and would come to an end on the day suit is disposed of. Whether suit is disposed of for want of prosecution or on merits is not the criteria to decide existence of interim orders. These orders by their very nature are temporary and remain in force only during the pendency of the suit and come to an end when the suit is disposed of one way or the other. 22. Another aspect which requires consideration is whether provisions of S.36 of Code of Civil Procedure are attracted ini the case of orders which are passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of S. 36 relate to execution of decree and are also deemed to apply to execution of orders. However, considering the controversy in the present case and as already discussed hereinabove, the order dated 5.4.1993 being an interlocutory order of a temporary nature has come to an end or merged in the order by which suit is disposed of. Once having held that the said order has come to an end. It loses its force and effectiveness and same is not executable vis S.36 since the same is not in existence. The contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the non-applicants in this regard is misconceived and devoid of substance. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the provisions of S. 36 of Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted and, therefore, application which is filed by the non-applicants for issuance of warrant of possession under S.36 is not maintainable. Similarly contingency contemplated under Order XX1, Rule 32(1) of Code of Civil Procedure are entirely different and operated in a different are altogether and cannot be equated with the issue in question and, therefore, same also cannot be said to be attracted in the present case. Consequently, the impugned order dated 15.3.1995 cannot be sustained. 23. Similarly contingency contemplated under Order XX1, Rule 32(1) of Code of Civil Procedure are entirely different and operated in a different are altogether and cannot be equated with the issue in question and, therefore, same also cannot be said to be attracted in the present case. Consequently, the impugned order dated 15.3.1995 cannot be sustained. 23. This Court in the case of Bank of Maharashtra v. M.V. River Oqbese, a Vessel registered outside India, 1989 Mh LJ 1037; ( AIR 1990 Bom 107 ) while dealing with Rule 941 of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on the original Side had an occasion to consider the concept of interim order/interim relief in para 10 of its judgment, this Court observed thus (at page 110 of AIR); “the word “interim” when used as a noun means “intervening” and when used as adjective, it means “temporary” or “provisional” (Pocket Oxford Dictionary). Interim reliefs are granted to serve the temporary purpose of protecting the plaintiff/s interest so that the suit is not frustrated. By their very nature, interim relief last as long as the suit lasts. They are “interim” because they operate during the interval between the institution of the suit and its disposal. The words “interim reliefs” mean relief granted to last during such intermediate time, interval, interlude or meantime, as exists during the pendency of the suit. Such reliefs whether granted ex parte or upon hearing the defendant have a common character which is marked by their temporary, provisional, intermediate nature. The argument of counsel stems from the erroneous assumption that ex parte relief are interim and those granted after hearing the defendants are not. In many opinion, all reliefs ex parte or otherwise, granted during the pendency of the suit, the interim in their nature.” 10. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants also places reliance upon a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami and others, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 569, the relevant paragraph No.50 whereof reads as under:- “50. It is evident that the doctrine as stated in Section 52. applies not merely to actual transfers of right which are subject matter to litigation but to other dealings with it “by any party to the suit or proceeding, so as to affect the right of any other party thereto”. It is evident that the doctrine as stated in Section 52. applies not merely to actual transfers of right which are subject matter to litigation but to other dealings with it “by any party to the suit or proceeding, so as to affect the right of any other party thereto”. Hence, it could be urged that where it is not a party to the litigation but an outside agency such as the tax Collecting authorities of the Government, which proceeds against the subject matter of litigation, without anything done by a litigating party, the resulting transaction will not be hit by Section 52. Again where all the parties which could be affected by a pending litigation are themselves parties to a transfer or dealings with property in such a way that they cannot resile from or disown the transaction impugned before the Court dealing with the litigation, the Court may bind them to their own acts. All these are matters which the Court could have property considered. The purpose of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to defeat any just and equitable claim but only to subject them to the authority of the Court which is dealing with the property to which claims are put forward.” ...(p.581) 11. Further, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants herein has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Kerala High Court reported in Kattil Raman Kunhi's sons Chathu and others versus Vadakke Poduvath Devaki Amma's daughter Janki Amma, AIR 1969 Kerala 121, the relevant portion whereof occurring in paragraph No. 6 thereof reads as under:- “6..........This is met by counsel for the appellant by urging that the provisions in Sections 7 and 13 would include the law enunciated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and notwithstanding therefore the rule of lis pendens there should be fixity of tenure in favour of the 10th defendant. This Court, has consistently taken the view that the provisions contained in a statute where similar wording is used, will not have the effect of abrogating the rule of lis pendens. The earliest decision of this Court is in Sankaran Nambiar v. Pilliathiri Amma. 1961 Ker LT 639 where Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair has expressed this view. A Division Bench of this Court in Kochappu v. Mani and Company Ltd., 1963 Kr. The earliest decision of this Court is in Sankaran Nambiar v. Pilliathiri Amma. 1961 Ker LT 639 where Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair has expressed this view. A Division Bench of this Court in Kochappu v. Mani and Company Ltd., 1963 Kr. Lt 709 has accepted this decision and has ruled that the provision in Sec. 64 of the Civil Procedure Code is not abrogated by the provision in the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act. Recently Justice Raman Nayar has taken the same view in PI. Indicula v. Padmanabhan Nair, 1967 Ker LT 1060 with reference to Section 106 of the Act 1 of 1964. The wording in Section 106 is very similar, if not identical, to that contained in Section 13. Our attention has not been invited to nay decision wherein it has been held that the rule of lis pendens is aborgated by the provisions in Sections 7 & 13. The rule of lis pendens is based on public policy. It is difficult to accept the argument that that rule is entirely wiped out by the provisions of the Act which deals with fixity of tenure.” ….(p-123-124) 12. The exposition of law which stands propounded in the aforesaid judgments, the relevant paragraphs whereof stand extracted hereinabove, does impute conclusivity to the apposite order pronounced by the learned Civil Court concerned, whereupon it, during the pendency of a previous Civil Suit No.309/98/96 instituted by the co-plaintiffs herein against their predecessor in interest besides also the predecessor-in-interest of Tulsi Devi, who executed a general power of attorney vis-a-vis Birbal under an apposite document borne on Ex.DW3/A, restrained the common predecessor-in-interest of the legal combatants here at, to during the pedency of the aforesaid civil suit alienate the suit property. Also the fiat of the Civil Court concerned held in its apposite order of its restraining Daroga, held rigidity of clout whereupon he stood barred to except with the permission of the Civil Court concerned alienate the suit property, also the subject matter of contest in Civil Suit bearing No. 309/98/96. Also the fiat of the Civil Court concerned held in its apposite order of its restraining Daroga, held rigidity of clout whereupon he stood barred to except with the permission of the Civil Court concerned alienate the suit property, also the subject matter of contest in Civil Suit bearing No. 309/98/96. However, though the rigidity of the apposite fiat of the Civil Court concerned rendered upon Daroga held absolute sway upon him, yet, Tulsi Devi was not a party in the said previous suit, thereupon, the peremptoriness of the rendition of the learned Civil Court concerned restraining Dargoa to during the pedency of the suit alienate the suit property obviously was not binding upon Tulsi Devi, the executant of GPA borne on Ex.DW3/A. However, Daroga had died during the pendency of civil suit bearing No. 309/97/96 instituted against him by the co-plaintiffs herein. His demise as manifested by Ex. D-3 occurred in the year 1998 whereat as apparent from Ex. P-5, embodying an order recorded on his demise by the learned trial Court whereupon he stood substituted by his legal heirs amongst whom, as apparent from a reading of Ex. P-3, embodying therein an order attesting on his demise the mutation of inheritance qua his estate vis-a-vis Tulsi Devi also vis-a-vis co-plaintiff Titu Ram herein, who also was a co-plaintiff in the earlier suit bearing No. 309/98/96, were hence both the aforesaid, wherefrom both held the capacity to on his demise represent his estate being his apposite legal heirs. The effect of a pronouncement occurring in EX.D3 holding there within an echoing qua on the demise of Daroga, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs in Civil Suit No. 309/98/96 also likewise of the plaintiffs in the instant suit besides with the aforesaid Daroga being also the predecessor-in-interest of Tulsi Devi, an order attesting mutation of inheritance qua his estate standing recorded vis-a-vis Tulsi Devi and qua co-plaintiff Titu Ram, order whereof remaining unassailed at the instance of co-plaintiff Kamla Devi, his mother also a co-plaintiff with him in the instant suit, begets an inference qua hers acquiescing to the mandate recorded in Ex. D-3. Further more, the factum displayed by an order borne on the reverse of Ex. D-3. Further more, the factum displayed by an order borne on the reverse of Ex. P-5 qua on 27.03.2000, the suit of the plaintiff standing dismissed in default in sequel whereof there occurs no evidence in portrayal of its standing ordered to be restored to its original number on an apposite motion standing made there before by the plaintiffs, carries an imminent sequel qua a co-plaintiff in the previous suit one Titu Ram on demise of his predecessor-in-interest Dargoa against whom he and his mother instituted civil suit No. 309/98/96 evidently under an apposite order attesting mutation of inheritance comprised in Ex. D-3 receiving the estate of Dargoa, hence, both co-plaintiffs therein omitting to thereupon record their presence either in person or through their authorized counsel on 27.03.2000 before the learned trial Court, conspicuously, for avoiding the embarrassment of their impleadment occurring in the apposite array of defendants in substitution of deceased Daroga, it being an apposite sequel thereto, also theirs hence instructing their learned counsel representing them there before to do likewise, merely for obtaining the apposite order of dismissal of their suit for default significantly when under Ex. D-3, their claim for maintenance in Civil Suit No. 309/98/96 jointly instituted against Dargoa by the co-plaintiff Titu Ram along with his mother Kamla Devi hence stood satiated. 13. Preeminently also the dismissal in default of Civil Suit bearing No. 309/98/96 during course whereof an order stood pronounced upon Dargoa, the predecessor-in-interest of co-plaintiffs therein besides the predecessor-in-interest of Tusli Devi, the executant of Ex.DW3/A occurred subsequent to the recording of an apposite order of attestation of mutation of inheritance of his estate on 13.2.1998, order whereof stands reflected in EX.D-3. Since, co-plaintiff Titu Ram was alike Tulsi Devi, the executant of a General Power of Attorney borne on Ex.DW3/A, as manifested by Ex. Since, co-plaintiff Titu Ram was alike Tulsi Devi, the executant of a General Power of Attorney borne on Ex.DW3/A, as manifested by Ex. D-3, the legal heir of deceased Daroga against whom a previous suit No. 309/98/96 for maintenance stood instituted by Titu Ram along with his mother also when both were enjoined to be replaced in his place in the apposite array of defendants, hence visibly for saving the embarrassment thereof both his mother and co-plaintiff Titu Ram connived to get the previous civil suit No. 309/98/96 dismissed in default also for escaping the befalment upon co-plaintiff Titu Ram the consequence(s) of infraction by him of the mandate of the interim order aforesaid arising from his along with Tulsi Devi on demise of Daroga under Ex. D-3 inheriting his estate. Furthermore, the effect of both co-plaintiff Titu Ram along with Tulsi Devi on demise of Daroga respectively obtaining an affirmative apposite order attesting mutation of inheritance qua his estate, order whereof remained unassailed by his mother co-plaintiff Kamla Devi whereupon she is to be construed to acquiesce vis-a-vis the mandate of the order comprised in Ex. D-3, is qua thereupon the vigour besides the effect qua with the evident execution of GPA by Smt. Tulsi Devi occurring during the pendencny of the previous civil suit, its hence attracting thereupon the doctrine of lis pendens standing dwindled besides the onslaught constituted by the counsel for the plaintiff qua the apposite alienation made by Birbal Singh, attorney holder of Tulsi Devi vis-a-vis his wife warranting it to also face the consequence(s) of its standing hit by the doctrine of lis pendens also stands blunted. With the aforesaid discussion unfolding a loud acquiescence of co-plaintiff Kamla Devi qua the finality of the order comprised in Ex. D-3 where under on demise of Daroga an apposite order attesting mutation of inheritance qua his estate stood recorded vis-a-vis co-plaintiff Titu Ram besides qua Tulsi Devi, the executant of GPA, thereupon a concomitant inference stands reared qua waiver and abandonment by co-plaintiff Kamla Devi besides by Titu Ram of all the rights, if any, qua maintenance claimed by both from Daroga in the previous civil suit also as a corollary, the derivable deduction there from is qua thereupon both standing estopped to challenge the execution of the apposite GPA by a co-beneficiary along with co-plaintiff Titu Ram of the estate of deceased Daroga. Tulsi Devi, who evidently executed the contentious GPA stood enjoined to on occurrence of demise of Daroga during the pendency of the previous civil suit be substituted in his place in the apposite array of defendants, also thereupon she stood fastened with a liability to obey the mandate of an interim order recorded during the pendency of the previous suit whereupon Daroga, the common predecessor-in-interest of the legal combatants here at stood restrained from during the pendency of the Civil Suit to alienate the suit property, in fraction whereof by them though attracts vis-a-vis Tulsi Devi besides vis-a-vis co-plaintiff Tutu Ram the doctrine of lis pendens arising from hers during the pendency of the civil suit executing the litigious GPA yet any attraction vis-a-vis both the aforesaid doctrine of lis pendens gets benumbed besides gets undermined by the apposite effect held by the mandate comprised in Ex. D-3, especially when it remained unassailed also when holding otherwise would thereupon lead to multiplicity of litigation which imperatively is to be obviated besides would render nugatory the effect of the previous suit standing dismissed for default on 27.03.2000, in sequel whereof it remained unconcerted to stand restored to its original number, whereupon an inference is erectable qua all the claims reared by the co-plaintiffs against the estate of Daroga standing waived or abandoned by the co-plaintiffs therein, whereupon they stand estopped to assail Ex.DW3/A or Ex.DW4/A. Consequently, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellant upon the aforesaid judgments for constraining this Court to apply here at the doctrine of lis pendens vis-a-vis the execution of GPA by Tulsi Devi comprised in Ex./DW3/A also qua registered deed of conveyance comprised in Ex.DW4/A warrants its standing discountenanced. Furthermore, excepting the plaintiff placing on record Ex. P5, they omitted to place on record an apposite application instituted by them before the learned trial Court also they omitted to adduce into evidence a copy of the order pronounced thereon. The omission aforesaid by the plaintiff sequels a derivative qua theirs camouflaging, the palpable factum of a co-plaintiff therein on standing under Ex. P5, they omitted to place on record an apposite application instituted by them before the learned trial Court also they omitted to adduce into evidence a copy of the order pronounced thereon. The omission aforesaid by the plaintiff sequels a derivative qua theirs camouflaging, the palpable factum of a co-plaintiff therein on standing under Ex. D-3 constituted to be the legal heir of deceased Daroga, his instituting thereat an application to beget his substitution in his place in the array of defendants also assumingly an affirmative order standing pronounced thereon, his in connivance with his mother contriving for saving the embarrassment of his contesting against his mother, getting the previous suit dismissed for default, besides the dismissal of the previous civil suit for default standing engendered for protecting Ex.D-3, its assumingly attracting thereupon the rigor of the doctrine of lis pendens. 14. Ex.DW3/A is a registered General Power of Attorney, it holds there within a sealed signatured endorsement of the Sub Registrar concerned also it holds there within the thumb impression(s) of Tulsi Devi, its executant. The sealed signatured endorsement made thereon by the officer concerned holds a presumption of truth, it standing embossed thereon by the officer concerned during the discharge of his public functions. Even though, the presumption of truth carried by the apposite sealed sigantured endorsement made by the Sub Registrar concerned on the reverse of Ex.DW3/A is a rebuttable presumption yet the plaintiffs/appellant omitted to adduce cogent evidence for belying the apposite presumption, whereupon the presumption of truth carried by the apposite sealed signatured endorsement made thereon by the Sub Registrar Concerned holds immense formidability besides with the thumb impression(s) borne/embossed thereon by its executant in the presence of the Sub Registrar concerned, also hence they acquire an aura of authenticity, especially when no concert stood assayed by the plaintiffs to contest the authenticity of the thumb impressions of Tulsi Devi occurring on Ex.DW3/A. Sequel, thereof is qua Ex.DW3/A standing concluded to be a volitionally executed GPA by its executant vis-a-vis the attorney constituted there under by her. 15. 15. Even though, the counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs by examining the Sub Registrar concerned or the marginal witnesses to GPA comprised in Ex.DW3/A could make a tenable concert for belying the factum of its standing volitionally executed by its executant yet the plaintiff depended upon the testification of PW-3, who deposes qua Tulsi Devi nominating co-plaintiff Titu Ram for his on her demise standing entitled to the benefit(s) of the apposite nomination(s) whereupon he makes a contention of the executant of the general power of attorney holding love and affection qua co-plaintiff Titu Ram, thereupon the execution by her of a General Power of Attorney vis-a-vis a stranger standing stained with a deep cloud of suspicion. However, the aforesaid factum testified by PW-3 would not benumb the efficacy of the inference for reasons afore stated recorded by this Court qua the GPA standing volitionally executed by its executant unless evidence stood adduced qua in its execution its executant slighting co-plaintiff Titu Ram vis-a-vis a stranger for empowering the latter to effectuate the relevant purpose(s) embodied therein. However, with unrebutted hence unflinching evidence standing adduced by the defendants qua Birbal, the power of attorney constituted by Tulsi Devi under Ex.DW3/A holding a relationship with her as her nephew renders the slighting of co-plaintiff Titu Ram by Tulsi Devi vis-a-vis the constitution by her of Birbal, her nephew as her attorney holder to be wholly insignificant. 16. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants herein has contended with much force qua with DW-1 the vendee of a registered deed of conveyance embodied in Ex.DW4/A holding no financial means to defray the sale consideration to her husband, who under a power of attorney executed vis-a-vis him by Tulsi Devi conveyed the suit property vis-a-vis her hence rendered the execution of Ex.DW4/A to be colourable also he espouses qua with the apposite endorsements occurring in the registered deed of conveyance omitting to recite therein qua at the time contemporaneous to its execution any sale consideration standing transferred from the vendee to the GPA of Tulsi Devi, adding to the gravity of suspicion surrounding the execution of the apposite registered deed of conveyance. He also submits qua with the execution of sale deed comprised in Ex.DW4/A emanating from the GPA of Tulsi Devi making the apposite alienation of property disclosed therein vis-a-vis his wife also constitutes a suspicious circumstance. He also submits qua with the execution of sale deed comprised in Ex.DW4/A emanating from the GPA of Tulsi Devi making the apposite alienation of property disclosed therein vis-a-vis his wife also constitutes a suspicious circumstance. With this Court recording an invincible finding qua the execution of the apposite GPA by Tulsi Devi vis-a-vis Birbal being free from any stain of involuntariness thereupon when her attorney holder, her nephew held the fiat to convey the suit property to any person, unless, dehors the financial incapacity of his wife to pay the sale consideration to her also dehors the apposite registered deed of conveyance comprised in Ex.DW4/A omitting to hold there within an endorsement qua any sale consideration passing from Vidya Devi to Birbal, candid evidence of immense vigour stood adduced comprised in DW-1 or her husband not paying any sale consideration to Tulsi Devi. However, the aforesaid evidence is amiss. Neither the plaintiff adduced any evidence qua the sale consideration reflected in Ex.DW4/A not at the time contemporaneous to its execution standing transferred to Tulsi Devi nor subsequent thereto it standing transferred to her, nor any evidence stands adduced qua the sale consideration embodied in the sale deed standing not transferred in the account of Tulsi Devi. In aftermath, the aforesaid submission hold no force and clout. 17. The above discussion unfolds the fact that the conclusions as arrived by the learned first Appellate Court as also by the learned trial Court stand based upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first Appellate Court as well as the learned trial Court have both not excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. Consequently, substantial questions of law is answered in favour of the respondents/defendants and against the appellants herein /plaintiffs. 18. In view of above discussion, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. In sequel, the judgments and decrees rendered by both the learned Courts below are affirmed and maintained. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.