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2016 DIGILAW 2745 (HP)

MOHINDER PAL v. BALDEV SINGH

2016-12-27

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) against the judgment and decree dated 12.9.2006, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Una, District Una, H.P. affirming the judgment and decree dated 10.2.1998, passed by learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Court No.II, Amb, District Una, H.P., whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs-appellants has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record, are that the plaintiff Oma Devi (predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants) filed a suit against the defendants-respondents for permanent prohibitory injunction alleging that the suit land is owned and possessed by her along with one Jaimal Singh. It is averred by the plaintiff that she is having 3/13 share in the suit land and the remaining land is owned by Jaimal Singh, who is residing away. The suit land is a most valuable land which is abutting to main Gohar and residential site. It is further averred by the plaintiff that the defendants are strangers to the suit land having no right, title or interest in it, but they are threatening to interfere in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff by changing its nature by raising construction and forcibly ousting her. She requested the defendants to admit her claim and not to indulge in illegal activities, but the defendants are adamant. It is further averred by the plaintiff that they are in hot haste to achieve their ulterior motive and have collected the construction material and employed the labour to dig the foundations and also to cut the mango tree from the suit land as such the plaintiff had to file this suit against the defendants to restrain them from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land in any manner. The plaintiff also made a prayer that in case the defendants succeed in raising any sort of construction over the suit land, during the pendency of the suit, then decree for mandatory injunction by demolition and removal of the structure situated over the suit land or in the alternative a decree for possession may be passed. 3. Defendants, by way of filing written statement, refuted the claim of the plaintiff on the ground of maintainability and estoppel and limitation. On merits, it is alleged by the defendants that the suit land is in possession of the defendants. 3. Defendants, by way of filing written statement, refuted the claim of the plaintiff on the ground of maintainability and estoppel and limitation. On merits, it is alleged by the defendants that the suit land is in possession of the defendants. It is further alleged that in fact the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants had purchased two houses i.e. house No.440 and 441 from the Rehabilitation Department as the same was custodian of the property and prior to the partition of the country, Mohammedans used to live in those houses. Both these houses were constructed opposite to each other and in between both these houses there was a courtyard of about one kanal. At the time of this purchase by the father of the defendants he entered into possession of both these houses along with courtyard and the land around, in front and rear sides of each house was being used by the defendants since the time of their predecessor as courtyard and kitchen garden etc. However, due to over sight and negligence on the part of Revenue Department, the name of predecessor-in-interest of defendants could not be incorporated in the revenue record. Thereafter, in the year 1978 the aforesaid houses were burnt and reconstructed by the defendants with the aid of Government and by taking loan. The plaintiff or anybody else never raised any objection at any point of time qua the possession of the defendants over the suit land. It is alleged by the defendants that their Abadi is in existence over the suit land since the time of their ancestor, as their possession over the suit land is open, in continuity, hostile and to the knowledge of the plaintiff and other inhabitants of the village, but under the garb of present suit, the plaintiff is trying to demolish the construction raised by the defendants and to dispossess them forcibly from the suit land. It is further alleged that the plaintiff has suppressed the true facts from the Court and he has not come to the Court with clean hands because neither the plaintiff nor Jaimal Singh or anybody else entered into the possession of the suit land. It is further alleged that the plaintiff has suppressed the true facts from the Court and he has not come to the Court with clean hands because neither the plaintiff nor Jaimal Singh or anybody else entered into the possession of the suit land. It is further alleged that the village is recently under settlement and the Settlement Authorities have also prepared the missal of Kabiz after finding the possession of the defendants at the spot and that question is still pending adjudication before Settlement Naib Tehsildar. It is alleged that the plaintiff has filed the present suit after her service in that case. It is also alleged by the defendants that previously the land in question was owned by Balwant Devi etc., and prior to the consolidation, it was in possession of Tufali Mohammad and Noor Deen etc. who are the occupancy tenant of the same and during consolidation it was allotted to one Durga Dass, who sold the same to Jaimal Singh from whom the plaintiff purchased the same, but neither Durga Dass nor Jaimal Singh obtained the possession thereof. Even otherwise also Union of India has become full owner of the suit land being custodian of the property vested in Union of India free from all encumbrances and the Consolidation Authorities had no jurisdiction to allot this land to any one under Consolidation Act. Since Durga Dass and after him Jaimal Singh and thereafter the plaintiff failed to obtain the possession of the suit land, as such no title vested in them and being so the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the present suit, whereas the defendants being in possession of the same have every right to retain the same. In the aforesaid background the defendants sought dismissal of the suit. 4. By way of replication, the plaintiff, while denying the allegations made in the written statement, reaffirmed the averments made in the plaint and controverted the contrary averments made in the written statement. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- "1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction? OPP. 2. Whether defendants are in adverse possession of the suit land and become owner? OPD. 3. Whether plaintiff is estopped by her act and conduct? OPD. 4. Relief." 6. The learned trial Court also framed the following additional issues:- 3A. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction? OPP. 2. Whether defendants are in adverse possession of the suit land and become owner? OPD. 3. Whether plaintiff is estopped by her act and conduct? OPD. 4. Relief." 6. The learned trial Court also framed the following additional issues:- 3A. Whether title has not been vested with the plaintiff qua the suit land as alleged? OPD. 3B. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alternative relief of possession of suit land? OPP" 7. Subsequently, vide judgment and decree dated 20.2.1998 learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 8. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Una, but fact remains that appeal preferred by the plaintiffs was dismissed as a result of which judgment and decree passed by the trial Court came to be upheld. Hence, present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs praying therein for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below. 9. This Court vide order dated 05.12.2007 admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- "1. Whether the learned courts below have misread and mis-appreciated the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence on record and findings as such are bad in law? 2. Whether the findings in another suit pertaining to the adjacent land which have attained finality was binding upon the courts below, and whether observations to the contrary could have been made for deciding another case contrary to the decision in the case which had attained finality and the impugned findings as such are bad in law? 3. Whether the threat of encroachment being proved and the interference having been shown on the basis of the orders passed by the revenue officials, it was necessary to have granted relief permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction and whether denial of such relief was contrary to law and the pleadings? 4. 3. Whether the threat of encroachment being proved and the interference having been shown on the basis of the orders passed by the revenue officials, it was necessary to have granted relief permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction and whether denial of such relief was contrary to law and the pleadings? 4. Whether the learned courts below while entertaining a doubt about the extent of encroachment could have exercised its jurisdiction in ordering a court commissioner to inspect the site and submit the report under Order 26 CPC or inspected the site under Order 18, Rule 18 CPC to d determine the lis inter se the parties and whether non exercise of such jurisdiction is bad in law? 10. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel representing the plaintiffs vehemently argued that the judgments passed by both the Courts below are not based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties and as such same deserve to be set aside. While referring to the judgments passed by the Courts below, Mr. Kuthiala, contended that both the learned Courts below misread and mis-appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, especially statements of DW-1 and DW-2, Exts. P1 to P4, D1, D18, D19 and D20, and as such findings on such ground deserve to be set aside being contrary to the records. Mr. Kuthiala further contended that bare perusal of judgments passed by the Courts below clearly suggests that the Courts below have made ambiguous and self-contradictory observations and have returned findings contrary to the record. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid argument, Mr. Kuthiala stated that on one hand, the Courts below observed that plaintiff is out of possession and house of the defendants is situate on portion of Khasra No. 2194 and as such dis entitled the plaintiff to the relief of injunction, whereas, on the other hand, Courts observed that there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that house of the defendants is over the suit land and also that in the absence of any Tatima, decree for possession cannot be passed with respect to mandatory injunction. As per Mr. As per Mr. Kuthiala, when plaintiffs successfully proved on record that defendants intended to interfere on the portion of suit land, Court below ought to have granted relief of mandatory injunction and as such judgments and decrees passed by Courts below deserve to be set aside. Mr. Kuthiala, further contended that since there was a boundary dispute between the parties, it was incumbent upon the Court below to have appointed a court commissioner by exercising inherent powers as envisaged under law. In the alternative, Court could always exercise power under Order 18, Rule 18 CPC to determine the dispute inter se parties by way of inspection of the property and by making a memorandum of relevant facts on the basis of such inspection and further on the basis of such memorandum of relevant facts, learned Court below could have arrived at a finding but aforesaid omission on the part of the Court below either to appoint local commissioner under Order 26, Rule 9 CPC or to inspect property under Order 18, Rule 18 CPC has vitiated the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below and as such same deserve to be set aside. Mr. Kuthiala, while referring to Exts. D18 and D19 i.e. report of Patwari and Kanungo dated 30.8.1990 and 31.8.1991, respectively and orders of Assistant Collector 2nd Grade dated 9.12.1991, strenuously argued that documentary evidence referred to herein above was sufficient for the Courts below to conclude that defendants were causing interference in the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs and as such plaintiffs were entitled to relief of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction as prayed for. Plaintiffs specifically alleged the defendants are making threats to the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs, which fact was further corroborated by the aforesaid report submitted by the revenue officials and, in light of aforesaid report(s) having been rendered in evidence by the plaintiffs, Court below did not have any other option than to grant relief of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. While concluding his arguments, Mr. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Kuthiala forcefully contended that the evidence led on record by respective parties if read in its entirety, clearly suggests that both the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which great prejudice has been caused to the plaintiffs, who successfully proved that they are in possession of the suit land and defendants are threatening to dispossess them from their lawful possession. 11. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Ms. Jamuna, Advocate, supported the judgments and decrees by the learned Courts below. Mr. Thakur, while referring to the judgments passed by both the Courts below, vehemently argued that same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties and as such there is no scope of interference especially in view of concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts below. With a view to refute the contentions having been put forth on behalf of the learned counsel representing the plaintiffs, Mr. Thakur stated that each and every aspect of the matter has been dealt with meticulously by the Court below and there is no force in the contentions and arguments having been made on behalf of the plaintiffs that the Courts below have misread and misconstrued the evidence available on record. While referring to the cross-examination conducted on plaintiff (PW-1), Mr. Thakur forcefully contended that the plaintiff herself admitted that the defendants were in possession of the suit land as such there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgments passed by the Courts below, whereby relief of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction was denied to the plaintiffs. Mr. Thakur further contended that since there was no boundary dispute as such between the parties, there was no occasion for the Courts below to appoint local commissioner in terms of Order 26, Rule 9 CPC or Order 18, Rule 18 CPC, as such, judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below deserve to be upheld as the same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties as well as law on the point. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Thakur contended that this Court has very limited jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC to re-appreciate evidence adduced by the respective parties, especially when both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Thakur contended that this Court has very limited jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC to re-appreciate evidence adduced by the respective parties, especially when both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings. In this regard, he placed reliance upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others v. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 . 12. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to deal with the specific objection raised by the learned counsel representing the respondents with regard to maintainability and jurisdiction of this Court, while examining the concurrent findings returned by both the Courts below. Shri Ramakant Sharma had invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others v. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held: "16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained." (p.269) 13. Perusal of the judgment, referred herein above, suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. Perusal of the judgment, referred herein above, suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. There can be no quarrel (dispute) with regard to aforesaid observation made by the Court and true it is that in normal circumstances High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, are restrained from re-appreciating the evidence available on record, but as emerges from the case referred above, there is no complete bar for this Court to upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below, if the same appears to be perverse. 14. In this regard reliance is placed upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs. and Others v. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2013) 15 SCC 161 wherein the Court held: "35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below: (SCC pp.555-556) "24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same." (pp.174-175) 15. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records of the case. 16. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected, as such same are taken up together for discussion to avoid repetition of evidence. 17. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records of the case. 16. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected, as such same are taken up together for discussion to avoid repetition of evidence. 17. This Court, solely with a view to explore answer to the substantial questions of law, perused the pleadings as well as evidence, be it ocular or documentary, adduced on record by the parties, perusal whereof nowhere suggests that the Courts below while dismissing the suit for possession having been filed by the plaintiffs, misread and misappreciated the pleadings available on record, rather this Court, after close scrutiny of the evidence available on record, has no hesitation to conclude that the Courts below have dealt the evidence available on record in right perspective and by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that courts below misread and mis-appreciated the pleadings. In the instant case, plaintiffs claiming themselves to be owner-in-possession of the land comprising Khewat No. 743 min Khatauni No. 1010 min, Khasra No. 2194 measuring 0-13 M as per Jamabandi for the year 1980-81 situate in Village Amb, Tehsil Amb, District Una (HP), filed suit seeking possession of the suit land denoted by letters A to E shown in red ink in the site plan, Ext. PW-2/A by averring therein that suit land was previously owned and possessed by Jaimal Singh son of Ghana and thereafter was gifted in favour of the plaintiff and thereafter same is owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. As per plaintiffs, defendants have encroached upon the suit land from Portion A to E, as reflected in red colour in the site plan, Ext. PW-2/A by raising Kachha rooms over the same. As per plaintiffs, since defendants have no right to retain possession and were requested to deliver the possession but defendants refused and as such plaintiff was compelled to file suit, whereas defendants, while refuting claim having been put forth on behalf of the plaintiff in the plaint, specifically alleged that their predecessor-in-interest had come in the village Amb before Consolidation of Land Holding proceedings and purchased houses No. 440 and 441 and entered possession of suit land along with above houses. As per defendants, after consolidation proceedings, possession of predecessor-in-interest of the defendants continued over the suit land but suit land was allotted to one Durga, which entry was not proper. Defendants specifically claimed that Durga failed to take possession of suit land after consolidation, as a result of which no title passed to Durga and thereafter Jaimal purchased land, who subsequently sold same to the plaintiff. As per defendants, Durga, Jaimal and plaintiff had been continuously asked to admit title and interest of the defendants and as such they are estopped to file suit by their own act and conduct. Defendants have claimed that in the year 1978, houses of defendants were burnt and same were reconstructed on the same foundation with the assistance of the Government and during that period, plaintiff never raised any objection to the construction of house and as such in the alternative, defendants claimed to have become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession. 18. Plaintiff with a view to prove her case examined herself as PW-1. PW-1 before the Court below stated that suit land measuring 13 Marla is owned and possessed by her and one Jaimal Singh. She further stated that defendant Baldev never remained in possession over the suit land. However, in her cross-examination, plaintiff admitted the suggestion that over the said land, there was no Abadi belonging to her. She also admitted that she had filed another case, which was pending in the Court of Sub Judge, First Class, Amb, but plaintiff voluntarily stated that same was regarding another Khasra number. Cross-examination of aforesaid witness further reveals that the suggestion put to her by the defendants that there are three rooms of defendants, was also admitted by the plaintiff. Similarly, plaintiff denied the suggestion put to her by the defendants that the suit land never remained in possession of Durga Dass nor in possession of Jaimal Singh. She also denied the suggestion that the defendants are living in the house since 1950. However, she stated that in the year 1982, she had purchased the land and thereafter, defendants constructed house. Similarly, in her cross-examination, plaintiff stated that house constructed by the defendants is situate on Khasra No. 2194 i.e. suit land. Careful perusal of examination-in-chief as well as cross-examination conducted upon the plaintiff clearly suggests that the plaintiff admitted the possession of the defendants over the suit land. Similarly, in her cross-examination, plaintiff stated that house constructed by the defendants is situate on Khasra No. 2194 i.e. suit land. Careful perusal of examination-in-chief as well as cross-examination conducted upon the plaintiff clearly suggests that the plaintiff admitted the possession of the defendants over the suit land. In her cross-examination, she specifically admitted the suggestion put to her that there are three rooms of the defendants, which clearly suggests that the factum with regard to possession of the defendants over the suit land was admitted by the plaintiff herself as such she was rightly not held entitled to the relief of injunction, which could only be granted to the plaintiff if she had successfully proved her possession over the suit land. 19. DW-2 Sukh Dev Singh while proving the contents of written statement categorically stated that defendants are owner-in-possession of the suit land. He further stated that possession of defendants over the suit land is open, hostile and to the knowledge of the plaintiff and other inhabitants of village and Abadi of the defendants is existing over suit land since the time of their ancestors and at no point of time, objection was raised by anybody regarding the same. DW-2 Sukh Dev, further stated that there are two houses situate in front of each other and same were purchased by his father in 1982 from Custodian Department and there was 01 Kanal land in the middle of two houses. DW-2 further stated that he has no knowledge regarding Khasra number of the courtyard and place is known as 'Baru'. DW-2 further stated that the houses were burnt in the year 1978 and thereafter he reconstructed the same with the help of the Government after obtaining loan. Cross-examination conducted on this witness nowhere suggests that the plaintiff was able to extract anything contrary to what he stated in his examination-in-chief, rather defendant Sukhdev stated that he has no knowledge whether Jaimal has given 3 Marla land to plaintiff Oma Devi. He further admitted the suggestion that at the time of preparation of Jamabandi, Tehsildar concerned read over the same and heard the objections if any. He further stated that he has no knowledge if the suit land is coming in possession of plaintiff and Jaimal Singh. DW-2 in his cross-examination also admitted that Tehsildar concerned read over Jamabandi entries at the time of preparation of same. 20. He further stated that he has no knowledge if the suit land is coming in possession of plaintiff and Jaimal Singh. DW-2 in his cross-examination also admitted that Tehsildar concerned read over Jamabandi entries at the time of preparation of same. 20. DW-3 Milkhi Ram also stated that there was one house on the suit land, where Gujjars were living and thereafter father of the defendants Pritam started living in the same and court yard of the house was being used by the father of the defendants and thereafter said land is coming in possession of the defendants. In his cross-examination, DW-3 admitted that adjoining to the suit land houses of Muslims were situate and there was also land of other owners but he had no knowledge regarding Khasra numbers of the same. He further deposed that there was no demarcation of aforesaid land and as such he had no knowledge of the dimensions of the said land. 21. DW-4 Gorakh Nath supported the versions put forth by DW-1, DW-2 and DW-3 by stating that he has seen the suit land, over which, courtyard and house are situate and same is in possession of the defendant Sukh Dev Singh and he has never seen possession of any other person over the court yard and house since 1947. In his cross-examination, he specifically stated that the deposition was made by him with regard to land, which was of Custodian Department. He also feigned ignorance with regard to dimensions of the suit land. His cross-examination further reveals that he admitted the suggestion that he has no knowledge with regard to the suit land and what is the dispute between the parties. 22. If cross-examination conducted on PW-1 is seen carefully, it clearly suggests that the factum with regard to possession over the suit land of the defendants was admitted by the plaintiff. Plaintiff in her cross-examination admitted that on the suit land, her Abadi never existed, rather it has come in the cross-examination that Sukh Dev and Baldev i.e. defendants are having three rooms of their house over the suit land but the same are Kachha and same have been raised by the defendants, after the plaintiff purchased the land. Similarly, plaintiff, in her cross-examination has admitted that defendants are having house on Khasra No. 2194 i.e. suit land. Similarly, plaintiff, in her cross-examination has admitted that defendants are having house on Khasra No. 2194 i.e. suit land. She further stated that when she purchased this land in 1982, it was vacant land and no Abadi was there. It is ample clear from the perusal of the statement of the plaintiff that Abadi was there on the suit land since long and it is further corroborated and supported by documentary evidence adduced no record by the defendants. Perusal of Ext. DC i.e. copy of Jamabandi for the year 1956-57, clearly suggests that Gurbax Singh and others were in possession of the land bearing Khasra No. 4731/1906, 1998 and 1999 as Gair Mairussi tenants. Similarly, aforesaid documents suggest that Khasra No. 1909 is measuring 0-13 Marla, out of which there is Abadi over 0-10 Marla and 0-3 Marla is Barani. Documents Exts. D4 and D5, copies of Field Book and Misal Hakiyat, further suggests that Durga Dass was owner-in-possession of Khasra Nos. 2154, 2155, 2156, 2193 and 2194 (1909 old). Perusal of Ext. P2 also suggests that in the year 1990-91, there was Abadi over 0-10 Marla, which was shown to be in the ownership and possession of Jaimal Singh but as has been noticed by the Courts below, that it was none of the case of the plaintiff that Jaimal Singh raised Abadi over the suit land because plaintiff herself stated before the Court that when she purchased suit land, then land on the spot was vacant and defendants raised construction, during her absence. Aforesaid assertion having been made by plaintiff was rightly rejected by the Courts below because bare perusal of the revenue record right from the year 1956-57 clearly suggests that there was Abadi over the suit land to the extent of 10 Marla. Moreover, plaintiff herself admitted possession of the defendants over the suit land. Similarly, perusal of the documents Exts. D18 and D19 i.e. report by the Patwari and Kanungo dated 30.8.1990 and 31.8.1991 and copy of order passed by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade whereby he ordered to keep nature and possession intact till the decision of litigation between the parties, with regard to alleged encroachment/ possession of the defendants over the suit land, clearly suggests that defendants were in possession of the suit land since long and they never took forcible possession of the same from the plaintiff or her predecessors. Perusal of statement having been made by the plaintiff clearly suggests that factum with regard to possession of the defendants over the suit land was very much in the knowledge of the plaintiff but she purposely concealed the same in the plaint. Plaintiff in her examination-in-chief further stated that except house situated on suit land, defendants have no other house, which further corroborates version put forth by the defendants that since the time of their ancestors they have been living in the house i.e. House Nos. 440 and 441, which was purchased by their predecessor-in-interest prior to consolidation proceedings. Perusal of Ext. D15, Sale Certificate dated 16.10.1963, clearly suggests that Houses No. 440 and 441 were duly purchased by the predecessor of the defendants. 23. Hence, this Court, after carefully examining entire evidence, be it ocular or documentary, led on record by the respective parties, has no reason to disagree with the findings returned by the Courts below, which appear to be based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties. Similarly, this Court sees no force in the contentions having been raised on behalf of the plaintiffs that Ext. D18 and Ext. D19, i.e. orders having been passed by Assistant Collector 1st Grade and Patwari were sufficient to conclude that there was threat of encroachment by the defendants and Courts below ought to have granted relief of permanent prohibitory injunction. True, it is that perusal of Ext. D19 i.e. orders made by Patwari and Kanungo dated 30.8.1990 and 31.8.1991 suggest that the same were with regard to encroachment and possession of defendants over the suit land and similarly, vide Ext. D18 Assistant Collector 2nd Grade had ordered the parties to maintain status quo qua possession till the decision of the litigation between the parties, but certainly same could not be made basis by the Courts below to infer that there is threat of encroachment/possession over the suit land by the defendants, rather, aforesaid documents having been tendered in evidence by the defendants were sufficient for the Courts below to conclude that at the relevant time, defendant were in possession of the suit land and accordingly, Courts below rightly declined relief of permanent prohibitory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs, who failed to prove possession, if any, over the suit land. With a view to find answer to the arguments having been raised by the learned counsel representing the plaintiffs that Courts below keeping in view boundary dispute, ought to have appointed local commissioner in terms of Order 26, Rule 9 CPC or should have got the spot inspected in terms of Order 18, Rule 18 CPC, this Court carefully examined the plaint having been filed by the plaintiff, perusal where nowhere suggests that there was boundary dispute, if any, between the parties. To the contrary, by way of suit for possession having been filed by the plaintiff, plaintiff claimed herself to be owner of the suit land, on the basis of gift deed made in her favour by one Jaimal. Similarly, there is no averment in the plaint suggestive of the fact that defendants had some other land abutting to the suit land. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant have encroached upon the suit land over portion A to E, as is reflected in red colour in the site plan, Ext. PW-2/A by raising Kachha rooms, over the same and as such defendants have no right to retain possession over the same. But, as has been noticed above, plaint filed by the plaintiff nowhere reveals that there was a boundary dispute between the parties, rather defendants while refuting claim of the plaintiff set up a plea that there predecessor-in-interest purchased House Nos. 440 and 441 before Consolidation proceedings in Village Amb and since then they are in possession of the suit land along with houses. 24. In view of above, this Court sees no force in the contentions of the plaintiffs that Courts below ought to have appointed local commissioner in terms of Order 26, Rule 9 CPC to get the land demarcated to resolve boundary dispute between the parties. Though this Court is of definite view after perusal of pleadings on record, that there was no requirement, if any, of appointment of local commissioner as claimed by the plaintiffs, but otherwise also, there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that application, if any, was ever moved by the plaintiffs praying therein for appointment of local commissioner either in terms of Order 26, Rule 9 CPC or under Order 18, Rule 18 CPC. It was always open for the plaintiffs to place on record demarcation report, if any, in evidence to prove their case. It was always open for the plaintiffs to place on record demarcation report, if any, in evidence to prove their case. Plaintiff herself, failed to take steps for getting the suit land demarcated either herself or with the intervention of the Courts below by moving appropriate application thus she can not be allowed to state at this stage that the Courts below ought to have appointed local commissioner under Order 26, Rule 9 CPC. 25. As far as substantial question of law No.2 is concerned, perusal of record suggests that during the pendency of the appeal, appellant-plaintiff moved an application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, praying therein to allow the appellants to file certified copies of judgments passed by first appellate Court and trial Court dated 30.9.2005 in Appeal No. 1 of 2005 and 30.11.2004 in Suit No. 5/92 filed by the LR's of plaintiff Oma Devi against defendants Sukh Dev and Baldev Singh to demonstrate that original plaintiff Oma Devi was held to be in possession of the suit land. Perusal of order dated 5.12.2007 passed by this Court suggest that aforesaid CMP No. 996 of 2006, was dismissed as, 'not pressed' on the statement having been made by the learned counsel representing the appellants, that he does not want to press the application since documents are already on record. Perusal of documents, Ext. PX and PY i.e. judgment and decree dated 20.3.1997 as detailed herein above, suggests that plaintiff namely Oma Devi had filed suit for possession of land measuring 2 Kanal 5 Marla baring Khewat No. 743 min Khatauni No. 1010 Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155 situate at village Amb, Tehsil Amb, as per Jamabandi for the year 1980-81. Aforesaid suit was decreed whereby plaintiff was held to be owner-in-possession of the suit land. Defendants filed an appeal which was registered an Appeal No. 95/97, but same was disposed of by framing additional issues and matter was remanded to the trial Court for rendering findings on the additional issues. The trial Court vide another judgment dated 30.11.2004, decreed the suit. Defendant filed yet another appeal which was registered as appeal No. 1 of 2005, which was also dismissed on 30.9.2005. As such judgment and decree dated 30.11.2004 attained finality. The trial Court vide another judgment dated 30.11.2004, decreed the suit. Defendant filed yet another appeal which was registered as appeal No. 1 of 2005, which was also dismissed on 30.9.2005. As such judgment and decree dated 30.11.2004 attained finality. By way of instant suit, which is subject matter of present appeal, appellant-plaintiff filed suit for permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the land measuring 0-13 M having Khewat No. 743, Khatauni No. 1010 and Khasra No. 2194 as entered in Jamabandi for the year 1980-81 situate in Village and Tehsil Amb, District Una, as such by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that controversy involved in the present suit is squarely covered by judgment rendered by the Courts below vide Exts. PX and PY. While coming to the conclusion that the defendants are in possession of the suit land, since long and learned first appellate Court, while referring to the Ext. PX and Ext. PY, stated that judgment contained in Ext. PX pertained to other suit filed by the plaintiff for possession against defendants pertaining to Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155. Learned first appellate Court further concluded that from the perusal of revenue record and oral evidence led by the defendants, it can be inferred that land comprised in Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155 as well as suit land is a compact block and all this land is coming in possession of the defendants since long. There can not be any quarrel that finding returned by the Courts below in other suit pertaining to adjacent land was binding upon the Courts below but perusal of judgment passed by the Courts below especially the first appellate Court nowhere suggests that it made any observations contrary to the decision rendered by the Courts below in suit No. 5/92, having been filed by the original plaintiff Oma Devi, which admittedly pertained to Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155, whereas present suit pertains to Khasra No. 2194. Learned first appellate Court while referring to the documents Exts. PX and PY, has observed that from bare perusal of revenue record as well as oral evidence led on record by the defendants, it can be inferred that land bearing Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155, as well as suit land is a compact block and all this land is coming in possession of the defendants. PX and PY, has observed that from bare perusal of revenue record as well as oral evidence led on record by the defendants, it can be inferred that land bearing Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155, as well as suit land is a compact block and all this land is coming in possession of the defendants. Needless to say that issue with regard to possession over Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155 already stood settled in Civil Suit No. 5/92 decided by Civil Court vide Ext. PX and Ext. PY, wherein original plaintiff namely Oma Devi was held to be in possession over the suit land in Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155. However, appeal filed by the defendants against judgment and decree dated 30.9.2005 was dismissed and as such judgment and decree dated 30.11.2004 has attained finality but even then as has been discussed above, suit No. 5/92 pertained to Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155 and suit land under controversy in present appeal is Khasra No. 2194, as such, decisions in civil suit and appeal pertaining to Khasra Nos. 2154 and 2155 have no bearing on present appeal. 26. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 27. In view of above, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending applications are disposed of. Interim orders, if any, are vacated.