Research › Search › Judgment

J&K High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 275 (JK)

Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. State of J&K

2016-05-17

ALI MOHD.MAGREY, N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR

body2016
JUDGMENT : Ali Mohd. Magrey, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 04.11.2015 passed by the learned Writ Court in appellants' writ petition, OWP No. 266/2009, dismissing the same as being without any merit, and providing that in the event any damage will be caused to the property of the appellants-petitioners by Tower Location No. 50-A, they shall be paid appropriate compensation as permissible under Section 18 of the Jammu and Kashmir Electricity Act, Svt. 1997 (corresponding to 1940 CE) and in accordance with the scheme of the Act governing payment of compensation. The appellants had filed the aforesaid writ petition for issuance of a writ of Prohibition or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, to direct the respondents not to lay the electric transmission line through their land situated at Sozeth, Tehsil Beerwah, and not Goripora to cause any damage to their land and structures standing thereon. The appellants also prayed for a Mandamus to direct the respondents to change the alignment of the transmission line from the one under contemplation. 2. Their case before the learned Writ Court was that they own land covered under Survey Nos. 1057/818/754/114, 819, 113, 873, 860, 113/min, 114/min, 818/min, 7G2, 112, 116, 61 and 71 situated at Sozeth Goripora, Tehsil Beerwah. Thereon they have constructed 18, three-storey, residential flats after obtaining building permission from the Building Operations Controlling Authority (Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation) (BOCA). The said building permission was granted in their favour after the Executive Engineer, Electric Inspection Division, Srinagar, and Srinagar Development Authority reported no objection to the BOCA to the aforesaid constructions. In this regard, it was stated that the Executive Engineer, Electric Inspection Division, Srinagar, vide his Letter No. EIDS/906, dated 23.06.2008 conveyed his no objection to the BOCA, stating that no power line was passing over or adjacent to the existing proposed construction at an unsafe distance. Similarly, the Senior Town Planner, Srinagar Development Authority, vide his Letter No. SDA/STP/254, dated 21.08.2008 stated its no objection to the grant of permission to the petitioners for raising the construction. 3. Their further case was that while the aforesaid constructions were near completion, the respondents, without their consent, started laying a transmission line over their land which would cross over their above structures. 3. Their further case was that while the aforesaid constructions were near completion, the respondents, without their consent, started laying a transmission line over their land which would cross over their above structures. They requested the respondents not to lay transmission line over their land and structures in light of the fact that they were raising the structures after having obtained due permission there for and after the Executive Engineer, Electric Inspection Division, Srinagar, had issued no objection thereto, but the respondents refused to listen to them or to change the alignment of the transmission line. 4. In their writ petition, the appellants principally took the following three grounds: (i) that in terms of the Jammu and Kashmir Electricity Act, Svt. 1997 (1940 CE), the respondents did not have any right to lay or place electric supply line through or against any building, or on, over or under any land without the consent of the owner and occupier concerned; (ii) that the respondents having failed to seek consent from the appellants-owners, cannot lay any tower foundation on their land or carry the transmission line overhead their properties; (iii) that the appellants after obtaining valid building permission for raising 18 residential structures over the land have altered their position by investing huge sums of money; therefore, the action of the respondents in aligning the transmission line through their land and over their structures without their consent is violative of the safeguards enshrined in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 5. The respondents' stand before the learned Writ Court was that the proposal for laying of the 220 KV Double Circuit Transmission Line from Zainakote to Mirbazar via Alusteng was approved in the year 2004-2005 by Government of India under the Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan. Accordingly, after completion of the preliminaries, the work on laying of tower foundations was taken up in hand strictly as per the route profile/tower schedule duly approved by the competent authority. In Zainakote-Alusteng section of the said transmission line, out of 158 towers, foundations of 140 towers, including the Tower Location Nos. 49C and 51A falling on either side of the appellants' land had already been laid. The tower Location No. 50A fell in the appellants land and it was stated that it will in no way interfere or damage their property. 49C and 51A falling on either side of the appellants' land had already been laid. The tower Location No. 50A fell in the appellants land and it was stated that it will in no way interfere or damage their property. It was pleaded that since the route of the transmission line had been identified and adopted strictly as per the profile approved by the competent authority keeping in view all the technical aspects, any type of change or realignment therein after the tower foundations on both ends, viz. Tower Location Nos. 49C and 51A, had been laid, was not possible. It was further pleaded that deviations in the already approved route profile of the prestigious centrally sponsored scheme could neither be entertained nor accepted by the Department during the course of execution as the same was beyond the competence of the answering respondents. It was stated that, therefore, the appellants' request for shifting the tower position of Tower Location No. 50A out of their land was not genuine/justified as the transmission line was being laid exclusively for public purpose and that public interest at large was to be preferred over the individual interests. It was also pleaded that the alignment of the transmission line was under expert advice of competent person over which no appeal or assessment could be claimed. As regards the no objection certificate issued by the Executive Engineer, Electric Inspection Division, Srinagar, it was averred that the Inspection Division was meant for according clearance to the new Grid Sub-stations and transmission lines after their completion by the respective Divisions and that the said Division had no role in identifying the site/route for construction of any new project. They further pleaded that the appellants knew about the construction of the said transmission line and they deliberately did not seek the no objection certificate from Respondent No. 3, the Executive Engineer, Transmission Line, Division II, Bemina, Srinagar. The respondents specifically pleaded that the appellants had not raised any construction near or under the proposed 220 KV Transmission Line and, therefore, the construction of the foundation at Tower Location No. 50-A would in no way interfere or damage their property. 6. The respondents specifically pleaded that the appellants had not raised any construction near or under the proposed 220 KV Transmission Line and, therefore, the construction of the foundation at Tower Location No. 50-A would in no way interfere or damage their property. 6. The learned Writ Court dismissed the writ petition, as being without any merit, holding: firstly, that the contention of the appellants-writ-petitioners, that they raised the constructions after obtaining building permission from the competent authority and after the Executive Engineer Electric Inspection Division, Srinagar, had conveyed his no objection thereto, and that the respondents could not backtrack, looses relevance because Executive Engineer Electric Inspection Division, Srinagar, is meant for according clearance for new Grid Sub-stations and that the role of identifying site for construction of new projects for laying transmission lines was the domain of respondents, more particularly Respondent No. 3, from whom they (the appellants-petitioners) did not seek any no objection; secondly, that Section 11(2) of the J&K Electricity Act, Svt. 1997 (1940 CE) (hereinafter, the 1940 Act) carves out an exception that where a project of this nature is dedicated to public use, consent of the owner pales into insignificance and is not required and that the Jammu and Kashmir Electricity Act, 2010 which repealed the 1940 Act also does not provide for any such consent when the project is dedicated to public use; thirdly, that any type of change or re-alignment in the route of the transmission line at this stage, when tower foundations of 140 out of 158 towers, including those of 49C and 51A, have already been laid, is impossible. The learned Writ Court in its judgment, however, provided that in the event any damage will be caused to the property of the appellants-petitioners by tower Location No. 50-A, they shall be paid appropriate compensation as permissible under Section 18 of the 1940 Act and in accordance with the scheme of the Act governing payment of compensation. 7. The writ petitioners, as mentioned above, feeling aggrieved of the aforesaid judgment, have come up with this appeal. 8. We heard Mr. M.A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellants, and Mr. D.C. Raina, the learned Advocate General, for the respondents, perused the records and considered the matter. 9. Mr. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellants, raised the following three points/arguments before us in this appeal. 8. We heard Mr. M.A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellants, and Mr. D.C. Raina, the learned Advocate General, for the respondents, perused the records and considered the matter. 9. Mr. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellants, raised the following three points/arguments before us in this appeal. (i) that since at the time of filing of the writ petition the provisions of the 1940 Act were applicable, the appellants by reference to Section 11(2) thereof had raised the plea that the respondents could not lay the transmission line over their land and buildings without their consent. However, during the pendency of the writ petition, the 1940 Act was repealed by the Jammu and Kashmir Electricity Act, 2010 (hereinafter, the 2010 Act). Section 61(2) of the 2010 Act provided that the Government may by rules made by it in this behalf specify the cases and circumstances in which the consent in writing of the local authority, owner or occupier, as the case may be, shall be required for carrying out of the work, and the matters allied and incidental thereto as enumerated in the provision of law. The learned counsel argued that he also submitted written arguments wherein he invited the attention of the learned Writ Court to Section 61 of the 2010 Act, stating that in view of the said provision of the law, the respondents could not lay the transmission line or execute any work on any land unless the Government by rules would specify the cases and circumstances in which the consent in writing shall be required for carrying out the works and specify other allied and incidental things in terms of the provision in question. But the learned Writ Court cursorily stated that the 2010 Act, which repealed the 1940 Act, does not provide for any such consent when the project is dedicated to public use. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel is that the argument advanced by him before the learned Writ Court concerning Section 61 of the 2010 Act was not considered. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel is that the argument advanced by him before the learned Writ Court concerning Section 61 of the 2010 Act was not considered. Therefore, the impugned judgment deserved to be set aside; (ii) that since the 1940 Act stood repealed by the 2010 Act, the direction to the respondents by the learned Writ Court to compensate the appellants for any damage caused to their property by tower location No. 50-A as admissible under Section 18 of 1940 Act was uncalled for and, therefore, also the judgment is legally invalid; (iii) that construction of Tower Location No. 50-A on the land of the appellants would mean that the respondents would transmit 220 KV current over the 18 structures constructed by the appellants, rendering them of no use to the appellants. This aspect, though duly highlighted by the appellants has not been considered by the learned Writ Court. 10. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General submitted that the Project proposal for laying of the 220 KV Double Circuit Transmission Line in question was approved in the year 2004-2005 by Government of India under the Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan, and, after completion of the preliminary works, the work on laying of tower foundations was commenced and executed as per the route profile/tower schedule duly approved by the competent authority and, in fact, foundations of 140 towers out of 158 in the relevant section of the route had already been laid prior to the year 2009. These included the Tower Location Nos. 49C and 51A falling on either side of Tower Location No. 50A falling on the appellants' land. He submitted that work on Tower Location No. 50A could not be completed on account of the restraint order passed by the Court. In that view of the matter, submitted the learned Advocate General, it is the 1940 Act which would be applicable in the present case and not the 2010 Act. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the writ petition itself was filed in 2009 invoking the provisions of the 1940 Act. Therefore, it was not open to the appellants to base any of their arguments on the provisions of the 2010 Act, and that the finding of the learned Writ Court on that score cannot be faulted. He submitted that the 2010 Act did not prescribe seeking of consent. Therefore, it was not open to the appellants to base any of their arguments on the provisions of the 2010 Act, and that the finding of the learned Writ Court on that score cannot be faulted. He submitted that the 2010 Act did not prescribe seeking of consent. Further, citing and relying on a Division Bench judgment of the Court in LPA(W) No. 131/2001, titled Ranvijay Chand v. State of J&K 2005 (1) JKJ 236 [HC] : JKJ Soft JKJ/13187 decided on 16.12.2004, the learned Advocate General submitted that the appellants would, at best, be entitled to claim compensation for any damage, detriment or inconvenience under Section 18 of the 1940 Act. 11. The first question that arises for determination is whether it is the 1940 Act or the 2010 Act which would be applicable to the present case. Mr. Qayoom submitted that it is settled legal proposition that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed and that the object of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory books. To buttress his submission, Mr. Qayoom cited and relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court: one in D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India, 1994 Legal Eagle (SC) 959 : (1995) 1 SCC 104 , particularly paragraphs 52 and 53 thereof, and the other in State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh, 2010 Legal Eagle (SC) 981: (2011) 5 SCC 305 , particularly paragraph 19 thereof. 12. In D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India (supra), the Delhi Rent Control Act, as amended by Act No. 52 of 1988, came into effect from 01.12.1988. Section 3(c) of the amended Act provided that the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act will not apply to any premises whose monthly rent exceeded Rs. 3,500.00/-. The appellant before the Supreme Court thereupon filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court challenging the validity of the newly inserted Section 3(c) of the Act. That writ petition was heard along with a batch of other writ petitions. By judgment dated 11.02.1991, the Delhi High Court held that Section 3(c) was a valid piece of legislation and did not contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution. That writ petition was heard along with a batch of other writ petitions. By judgment dated 11.02.1991, the Delhi High Court held that Section 3(c) was a valid piece of legislation and did not contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution. Following its earlier judgment in Civil Revision No. 470 of 1981, in Nirmaljit Arora v. Bharat Steel Tubes, it also held that Section 3(c) was prospective and did not affect the cases that were pending on the date it came into operation. That judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court. 13. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment noticed the background facts in which the Delhi Rent Control Act was amended which divided premises into two categories: one, in respect of which rent payable per month was more than Rs. 3,500.00/-; and the other, in respect of which rent was Rs. 3,500.00/- or less per month. Section 3(c) of the amending Act excluded the second category premises from the purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act. This Section of the amending Act was under challenge. It is reiterated here that the High Court of Delhi held two things: first that Section 3(c) was prospective; and second, that it did not affect the cases that were pending on the date it came into operation. An argument was raised before the Supreme Court that the amendment of the Delhi Rent Control Act would not apply to those tenancies which were created prior to 01.12.1988, the date the amending Act came into force, and that it could not affect the rights acquired by the tenants under the Rent Control Act before its amendment in 1988 under which the tenants had acquired valuable property rights and the landlord could not evict the tenant or enhance the rent at will, etc. It is in that context that in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed and laid down as under: "52. We are unable to uphold this contention for a number of reasons. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Control Act by the various State Legislatures, the legal relationship between the landlord and tenant was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Delhi Rent Control Act provided protection to the tenants from drastic enhancement of rent by the landlord as well as eviction, except on certain specific grounds. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Control Act by the various State Legislatures, the legal relationship between the landlord and tenant was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Delhi Rent Control Act provided protection to the tenants from drastic enhancement of rent by the landlord as well as eviction, except on certain specific grounds. The legislature by the Amendment Act No. 57 of 1988, has partially repealed the Delhi Rent Control Act. This is a case of express repeal. By Amending Act the legislature has withdrawn the protection hitherto enjoyed by the tenants who were paying Rs. 3,500.00/- or above as monthly rent. If the tenants were sought to be evicted prior to the amendment of the Act, they could have taken advantage of the provisions of the Act to resist such eviction by the landlord. But this was nothing more than a right to take advantage of the enactment. The tenant enjoyed statutory protection as long as the statute remained in force and was applicable to him. If the statute ceases to be operative, the tenant cannot claim to continue to have the old statutory protection. It was observed by Tindal, C.J., in the case of Kay v. Goodwin: 'The effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it as completely from the records of the parliament as if it had never been passed; and, it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted, and concluded whilst it was an existing law.' 53. The provisions of a repealed statute cannot be relied upon after it has been repealed. But, what has been acquired under the Repealed Act cannot be disturbed. But, if any new or further step is needed to be taken under the Act, that cannot be taken even after the Act is repealed." (emphasis & underlining supplied) 14. In the instant case, it is not any new or further step that is needed to be taken by the respondents. As mentioned above, the project has been going on since 2004 and they had laid foundations of 140 out of 158 towers. The work on the tower that fell on the land of the appellants was halted by the Court pursuant to interim orders; otherwise the work on either side of this particular tower has been complete. As mentioned above, the project has been going on since 2004 and they had laid foundations of 140 out of 158 towers. The work on the tower that fell on the land of the appellants was halted by the Court pursuant to interim orders; otherwise the work on either side of this particular tower has been complete. Apart from that fact, as regards the real issue that is involved herein, i.e., whether the repeal would cover the pending case in which regard the Delhi High Court had held that it would not, the Supreme Court in D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India (supra) at page 62 observed as under: "62. In the judgment under appeal, it has been held that the provisions of Section 3(c) will not be applicable to the cases which were pending before the Court. No argument was advanced on this point by any of the parties. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on this controversy." So, the law enunciated by the Delhi High Court in that context was left intact. In view of the facts and circumstances attendant to the instant case, we do not see any reason, justification or scope for a contrary view. 15. Coming to the judgment in State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh (supra), in paragraph 19 thereof the Supreme Court observed as under: "19. It is a settled legal proposition that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. The object of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory books, except for certain purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of substance. Therefore, on repeal, the earlier provisions stand obliterated/abrogated/wiped out wholly, i.e., protanto repeal (vide: Dagi Ram Pindi Lall & Anr. v. Trilok Chand Jain & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 990 ; Gajraj Singh etc. v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors. etc., AIR 1997 SC 412 ; Property Owners' Association & Ors. etc. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1668 ; and Mohan Raj v. Dimbeswari Saikia & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 232 )." 16. The relevant facts of the aforesaid case in context of which the above law was laid down by the Supreme Court were entirely different than attendant to the instant case. etc. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1668 ; and Mohan Raj v. Dimbeswari Saikia & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 232 )." 16. The relevant facts of the aforesaid case in context of which the above law was laid down by the Supreme Court were entirely different than attendant to the instant case. Therein the LR Manual prescribed 62 years as the maximum age upto which a District Government Counsel could continue in engagement. The Respondent No. 1 therein had been working on an interim order of the Court passed in 1998 till 2008 when the provisions of the LR Manual were amended with effect from 13.08.2008 reducing the age of District Government Counsel from 62 to 60 years. As respondent No. 1 therein had already completed the age of 60 years, he was disengaged. He filed another writ petition wherein the High Court passed an interim order dated 30.11.2009 directing the State authorities to consider his application for extension of service upto 62 years under the unamended provisions of the LR Manual. Similarly, another order was passed by the High Court in the writ petition filed by the Association of District Government Counsel in representative capacity challenging the amendment dated 13.08.2008 in the LR Manual reducing the age from 62 years to 60 years, staying the operation of the amended provisions and directing the authorities to consider applications of the District Government Counsel for renewal in accordance with unamended provisions of the LR Manual. Naturally, there was no saving clause in the amending provision. It was in that context that the Supreme Court laid down the aforesaid law. Even then, the Supreme Court made an exception therein vis-à-vis. the purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the judgment is of no help to the appellants. 17. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the 1940 Act was repealed by the 2010 Act which came into effect with effect from 28.04.2010. The effect of repeal of an Act is defined in Section 6 under the General Rules of Construction contained in the General Clauses Act, Svt. 1977 (1920 CE) applicable in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It would be appropriate to quote Section 6 of the General Clauses Act hereunder. It reads thus: "6. The effect of repeal of an Act is defined in Section 6 under the General Rules of Construction contained in the General Clauses Act, Svt. 1977 (1920 CE) applicable in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It would be appropriate to quote Section 6 of the General Clauses Act hereunder. It reads thus: "6. Effect of repeal Where this Act, or any Act made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not.- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there under; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." 18. A plain reading of the above provision of the General Clauses Act makes it clear that when an enactment is repealed, the consequences envisaged by the said provision of law would follow unless, as the Section itself says, a different intention appears (See also Hotel President, Srinagar v. State, 2001 SLJ 124 : JKJ Soft JKJ/7070). The question and point is squarely covered by the consequences of repeal as enumerated at clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as quoted hereinabove. 19. Apart from the above clear position of law, since the respondents had undertaken the survey of the huge project of great public importance, the sanctioning process thereof and execution of the work in question with reference to and during the applicability of the repealed 1940 Act, with all obligations, liabilities, privileges and rights there under, and their work vis-à-vis. 19. Apart from the above clear position of law, since the respondents had undertaken the survey of the huge project of great public importance, the sanctioning process thereof and execution of the work in question with reference to and during the applicability of the repealed 1940 Act, with all obligations, liabilities, privileges and rights there under, and their work vis-à-vis. a single tower base had been stalled in reference to the question of interpretation of the Section 11(2) of the 1940 Act at the instance of the appellants, the repeal shall be inconsequential for completion of the project work in question. Since under the 1940 Act the respondents were not obliged to obtain consent from the appellants for laying of the transmission line through their land or erecting a tower thereon, they would continue to enjoy such immunity and privilege. Correspondingly, if they have suffered any liability or obligation there under, that would continue even after the repeal of the Act. 20. It may also be mentioned here that the repealing Act, i.e., the 2010 Act also contains a Saving clause in Section 141 thereof. It would be advantageous to quote the said provision hereunder. It reads as under: "141. Repeal and savings (1) Save as otherwise provided in the Act, the Jammu and Kashmir Electricity Act, 1940 and the Jammu and Kashmir State Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 2000 are hereby repealed. It would be advantageous to quote the said provision hereunder. It reads as under: "141. Repeal and savings (1) Save as otherwise provided in the Act, the Jammu and Kashmir Electricity Act, 1940 and the Jammu and Kashmir State Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 2000 are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken including any rule, notification, inspection, order or notice made or issued or any appointment, confirmation or declaration made or any licence, permission authorization or exemption granted or any document or instrument executed or any direction given under the repealed laws shall, insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act; Provided that the rules or regulations made under the repealed laws shall, in so far as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been made under this Act, and shall remain in force until repealed or modified expressly or by implications by the Government or the Commission, as the case may be." The above provision of the 2010 Act unambiguously saves all that had been done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken, or declaration made or any licence, permission, authorization or exemption granted under or in terms of the 1940 Act. Consequently, the exemption from seeking consent of the land owner which was available to the respondents under Section 11(2) of the 1940 Act would continue to govern the instant matter. Even otherwise, a legislative enactment would not be effective from a retrospective date unless it is expressly mentioned therein or the enactment is remedial in nature. That being the position of law, the contention raised by the learned counsel is wholly untenable. 21. Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and/or the Saving Clause in Section 141 of the 2010 Act were not there and that, in any case, the 2010 Act would apply, even then the language of Section 61(2) of the 2010 Act, heavily relied upon by Mr. 21. Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and/or the Saving Clause in Section 141 of the 2010 Act were not there and that, in any case, the 2010 Act would apply, even then the language of Section 61(2) of the 2010 Act, heavily relied upon by Mr. Qayoom to canvass that the respondents were obliged to obtain prior consent from the appellants, only says that the Government may, by rules made by it in this behalf, specify the cases and circumstances in which the consent in writing of the local authority, owner or occupier, as the case may be, shall be required for carrying out works. A plain reading thereof makes it unambiguously clear that the same is only an enabling provision and it does not by itself prescribe obtaining of a consent as a requirement, more so in every case and in every circumstance. It is self evident from the provision of law that apart from an enabling provision, it leaves a discretion with the Government to decide in what cases and in what circumstances the consent in writing would be required. In any case, the provision does not expressly say that consent would be required, that too, in every case and in every circumstance. Essentially, the argument raised tantamount to saying that the work on laying of the transmission line should wait until a law favourable to the appellant's interests is not made by the State. 22. The above discussion answers the first argument raised by Mr. Qayoom. 23. Now, let us deal with the second argument of the learned counsel. As mentioned above, the second argument raised by the learned counsel before us was that since the 1940 Act stood repealed by the 2010 Act, the direction to the respondents by the learned Writ Court to compensate the appellants for any damage caused to their property by Tower Location No. 50-A as admissible under Section 18 of 1940 Act was uncalled for and, therefore, also the judgment is legally invalid. Answer to this argument lies in the very judgment in D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India (supra) cited by none other than Mr. Qayoom himself. To reiterate, therein the Delhi High Court held that the amended provision did not affect the cases that were pending on the date it had come into operation. Answer to this argument lies in the very judgment in D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India (supra) cited by none other than Mr. Qayoom himself. To reiterate, therein the Delhi High Court held that the amended provision did not affect the cases that were pending on the date it had come into operation. That part of the judgment was not reversed by the Supreme Court and it was left open. Apart from that, we have substantially dealt with this argument while discussing the first argument of the learned counsel. In reiteration and adding, we may observe that since the respondents have already completed the tower foundation laying work in the concerned section at a considerable cost and time, except the one which they could not complete because of interim orders of the Court, saying that the provisions of 2010 Act would apply, in effect and in essence, would mean giving retrospective effect thereto which cannot be done in any case. 24. Mr. Qayoom also cited and referred to a judgment of the Patna High Court in Power Grid corporation of India Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Singh, AIR 2011 Patna 83 wherein the High Court has held that installation of transmission towers on private lands without consent is bad in law. We have minutely perused the judgment. There is a huge difference in the language of the relevant provisions of law as applicable in the State of Bihar and the State of J&K. There Rule 3 of the Rules framed under Section 176 of the Electricity Act, 2003 did not contain the words "not dedicated to public use" as are contained in sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the 1940 Act applicable in the instant case. Therefore, the judgment is wholly distinguish able and not applicable. 25. Now comes the third argument raised before us that construction of Tower Location No. 50-A on the land of the appellants would mean that the respondents would transmit 220 KV current over the 18 structures constructed by the appellants, rendering them of no use to the appellants. According to the appellants, this aspect, though duly highlighted by them has not been considered by the learned Writ Court. Here we need to refer to the prayer of the appellants made in their writ petition. According to the appellants, this aspect, though duly highlighted by them has not been considered by the learned Writ Court. Here we need to refer to the prayer of the appellants made in their writ petition. They sought a prohibition against the respondents not to lay the electric transmission line through their land and not to cause any damage to their land and structures standing thereon. They also prayed for a Mandamus to direct the respondents to change the alignment of the transmission line from the one under contemplation. It is to be borne in mind that a project of this kind and magnitude is not finalized overnight. It takes years of brain teasing of the Experts to conduct surveys, make estimates and fix the technically viable route and alignment of the transmission lines and its height at different locations. This Court does not have any expertise and, therefore, cannot interfere therewith. This is a huge project dedicated to public use. As already mentioned, foundations of 140 towers out of the total of 158 towers in the relevant section stand already completed, which include those falling on the two sides of the appellants land. Apart from that, the respondents in their reply-affidavit before the learned Writ Court specifically pleaded that the appellants were aware about the construction of the said transmission line and they deliberately did not apply for no objection certificate to Respondent No. 3. It is also stated that flats have not been raised near or under the proposed 220 KV transmission line, as such, the construction of tower foundation at Location No. 50-A will in no way interfere or damage the property of the appellants. It is also their positive case that realignment of the transmission line is not within their powers. In view of the above, there is no question of issuing any such prohibition or direction by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. However, if it is a fact that the tower location No. 50-A falling in the land of the appellants would cause any damage to the appellants property, they would be entitled to damages on that count. As already mentioned, a similar issue was involved in LPA(W) No. 131/2001, Ranvijay Chand v. State of J&K, 2005 (1) JKJ 236 [HC]: JKJ Soft JKJ/13187 decided by a Division Bench of this Court. As already mentioned, a similar issue was involved in LPA(W) No. 131/2001, Ranvijay Chand v. State of J&K, 2005 (1) JKJ 236 [HC]: JKJ Soft JKJ/13187 decided by a Division Bench of this Court. In that case, the writ petitioners had sought a prohibition against the Power Development Department of the State not to lay overhead 220 KV transmission lines in their land measuring 18 Kanals, 18 Marias situated at village Omara, Tehsil and District Udhampur with further direction to the respondents to align the same in such a manner that the same was taken overhead the adjacent available Government land without involving the land of the writ-petitioners. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Writ Court. On appeal, the learned Judges composing the Division Bench differed in their view. Consequently, the matter was referred to the Third Judge. Relying on Section 18 of the 1940 Act, the learned third Judge held that constructing concrete basis for installing high posts to draw high tension wires for supply of electricity over the land of the appellants therein was subject to their right to claim damages, and, therefore, concurred with one of the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench upholding the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. Applying the said judgment in the present case, we do not see any illegality in the direction of the learned Writ Court in that regard. 26. In view of all what has been discussed above, we do not see any ground made warranting interference with any of the findings recorded by the learned Writ Court or the judgment impugned in this appeal. This LPA is, accordingly, dismissed together with the connected MP, Interim direction, if any subsisting, shall stand vacated. 27. Before we part with this judgment, we wish to record our regrets and anguish that such a big project of general public importance has remained stalled since 2009 on account of the interim direction passed by the learned Writ Court till 2015. Unfortunately, the respondents and the State counsel concerned have been sloppy inasmuch as they have allowed the matter to linger on without taking any step to get the interim order vacated, modified or altered. Unfortunately, the respondents and the State counsel concerned have been sloppy inasmuch as they have allowed the matter to linger on without taking any step to get the interim order vacated, modified or altered. We request the learned Advocate General to ascertain if there are any further such cases pending in the Court involving huge projects of general public importance where the work thereon has been stalled on account of interim orders. If there is any such case, the learned Advocate General is requested to furnish the information to the Registrar Judicial of the Court who shall place the same before the Chief Justice for constitution of appropriate Benches, if need be, and for listing the cases before appropriate/roster Benches. However, we do not make any order as to costs herein.