JUDGMENT : H.G. Ramesh, J. Whether the law laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in M/s. A. V. Kowdi & Co. v. R. V. Laxshmidevamma [ILR 1990 Kar 4355) is impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian [ (2001)7 SCC 549 ): ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ). This is the question that falls for determination in this case, and the question is answered in the affirmative. 2. Disobedience of the order dated 11.10. 2012 made in W.P. Nos. 65373-378 of 2012 is complained of in this contempt of court petition. The entire order reads as follows : "Recording the submission of Sri. Sharanabasava, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that demolition of petitioners' buildings, if any, would not be done otherwise than in accordance with law, nothing further survives for consideration in these petitions and are, accordingly disposed of." 3. On 09.03.2016, this Court had passed the following order: "Accused No. 2 is present in court. Prima facie, we find that this contempt of court petition is barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, learned counsel for the complainant prays for a week's time. Accordingly, list on 17.03.2016." 4. Learned counsel for the complainant, by referring to the communication dated 13.12.2013 issued to the complainant by the Public Information Officer of City Municipal Council, Koppal, submitted that the accused has committed contempt of court on 17.11.2012 when the accused demolished the complainant's building for the purpose of widening of public road. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant, in support of his contention that Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ('the Act' for short) has no application in cases of contempt of High Court, relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in M/s. A. V. Kowdi & Co. v. R. V. Laxshmidevamma [ILR 1990 Kar 4355). He also brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian [ (2001) 7 SCC 549 ]: ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ). 6. As stated above, the contempt of court is alleged to have been committed by the accused on 17.11.2012. This contempt of court petition was presented to this Court on 01.06.2015. 7. 6. As stated above, the contempt of court is alleged to have been committed by the accused on 17.11.2012. This contempt of court petition was presented to this Court on 01.06.2015. 7. In the context of the question raised, it is relevant to refer to Section 20 of the Act which reads as follows : "20. Limitation for actions for contempt. - No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." It is also relevant to refer to Article 215 of the Constitution of India : "215. High Courts to be courts of record.-Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself." 8. In A.V. Kowdi & Co. LILR 1990 Kar 4355], the following question fell for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court: "Whether the period of one year prescribed in Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act is applicable to contempt proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution, in respect of contempt of High Court?" The Full Bench answered the question as follows: "15.......................................Therefore our conclusion is that the period of one year in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable only in respect of contempt of subordinate Courts. It has no application in cases of contempt of High Court; the power conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is absolute and unfettered. It may be that in a given case Court may decline to take action due to delay but that is in exercise of its jurisdiction and 'just' discretion." The Supreme Court, in Pallav Sheth [ (2001)7 SCC 549 ]: ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ) has interpreted Section 20 of the Act as follows: "30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts are Courts of Record and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute, can there be any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised? The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute, can there be any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution. 31. This Court has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature, it would stand to reason that the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously. 32. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 inter alia provides for what is not to be regarded as contempt; it specifies in Section 12 the maximum punishment which can be imposed; procedure to be followed where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or in the High Court or cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases is provided by Sections 14 and 15; the procedure to be followed after taking cognizance is provided by Section 17; Section 18 provides that in every case of criminal contempt under Section 15 the same shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges; Section 19 gives the right of appeal from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. There is no challenge to the validity of any of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as being violative or in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution. Barring observations of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. There is no challenge to the validity of any of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as being violative or in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution. Barring observations of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case ( AIR 1998 SC 1895 ) where it did not express any opinion on the question whether maximum punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was binding on the Court, no doubt has been expressed about the validity of any provision of the 1971 Act. In exercise of its constitutional power, this Court has, on the other hand, applied the provisions of the Act while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 129 or 215 of the Constitution. In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi case ( AIR 1954 SC 186 ) it recognised that the 1926 Act placed a limitation on the amount of punishment which could be imposed. Baradakanta Mishra case ( AIR 1974 SC 2255 ) was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the 1971 Act, namely, there was no right of appeal if the Court did not take action or initiate contempt proceedings. In the case of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar case ( AIR 1989 SC 2285 ) the Court did not hold that Section 20 of the 1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to the conclusion that the application for initiating contempt proceedings was within time and limitation had to be calculated as or the purpose of limitation date of filing was relevant and furthermore that was a case of continuing wrong. In Kartick Chandra Das case ( AIR 1996 SC 2437 ) the provisions of the Limitation Act were held to be applicable in dealing with application under Section 5 in connection with an appeal filed under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. Athree-Judge Bench in Dr. L.P. Misracase ( AIR 1998 SC 3337 ) observed that the procedure provided by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided. 33. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided. 33. The question which squarely arises is as to what is the meaning to be given to the expression "no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt..." occurring in Section 20 of the 1971 Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies not only to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court but would also be applicable in the case of contempt of the subordinate court. The procedure which is to be followed in each of these cases is different. 44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must he initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu. within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." (Underlining supplied) 9. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth [ (2001)7 SCC 549 ]: ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ) which is extracted above, the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in M/s. A.V. Kowdi & Co. (ILR 1990 Kar 4355) is impliedly overruled. Accordingly, we are of the view that action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or/and under Article 215 of the Constitution of India must be initiated within one year from the date on which the contempt of court is alleged to have been committed. Section 20 of the Act is applicable to proceedings in respect of contempt of High Court and also of subordinate Courts. Section 20 of the Act is applicable to proceedings in respect of contempt of High Court and also of subordinate Courts. As this contempt of court petition was presented after expiry of one year from the date on which the contempt of this Court is alleged to have been committed, it is barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and, hence, it is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the petition, L.A. No. 1/2016 also stands dismissed. Petition dismissed.