Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 2751 (HP)

Kashetar Pal Singh alias Kripal Singh v. Harpal Singh

2016-12-28

AJAY MOHAN GOEL

body2016
JUDGMENT : AJAY MOHAN GOEL, J. 1. By way of this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has prayed for quashing of judgment dated 20.12.2013 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Una, Camp at Amb, in Criminal Revision No. 1/2012 RBT No. 2/2013/2012, vide which learned Court below while dismissing revision petition so filed by the present petitioner upheld the order passed by learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Amb, District Una, in case No. 74/CR/07 titled State Vs. Harpal Singh instituted under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. dated 03.09.2010. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this petition are that petitioner Kashetar Pal Singh filed an application before Gram Panchayat, Lower Bhanjal dated 08.04.2007 to the effect that respondent No. 1 Harpal Singh had blocked the flow of rainy and domestic water of the petitioner as well as other local residents near the house of the petitioner which had caused damage to the house of the petitioner. On these bases, a Kalandra was filed by the police, Police Station Amb, under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. against respondent No. 1 Harpal Singh in the Court of learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Amb, on the ground that Harpal Singh had blocked the flow of water forcibly causing danger to the house of petitioner and that on 03.07.2007 police visited the spot and associated petitioner as well as respondent No. 1 with the inquiry which revealed that the houses of petitioner, Satya Devi and Pushpa Devi, were adjacent to each other and respondent No. 1 Harpal Singh had constructed his house later on and had made Nallah for free flow of rain water underneath his house and rain water was also going through the same and Harpal thereafter had blocked the free flow of water by putting cement, concrete etc. on the drain as a result of which water was not going through the drain and was seepaging in the house of Kashetar Pal Singh endangering the house ofKashetar Pal Singh. It was on the basis of this inquiry that police submitted Kalandra before learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Amb. 3. Respondent No. 1 in his response submitted before learned Sub Divisional Magistrate stated that he had not blocked any rainy water as alleged. According to him, petitioner had constructed septic tank adjacent to the drain behind his abadi and at the back side of abadi of petitioner. 3. Respondent No. 1 in his response submitted before learned Sub Divisional Magistrate stated that he had not blocked any rainy water as alleged. According to him, petitioner had constructed septic tank adjacent to the drain behind his abadi and at the back side of abadi of petitioner. As per respondent No. 1, he had not blocked/obstructed any water and in fact, police had prepared a false Kalandra against the respondent. It was also mentioned in his response that there was civil litigation going on between the parties on the same subject matter in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court No. 1, Amb i.e. case No. 121/07 and parallel proceedings were not maintainable on the same cause in the Court of learned Sub Divisional Magistrate. 4. Learned Sub Divisional Magistrate vide order dated 03.09.2010 dismissed Kalandra by holding that there was no nuisance and further the matter in issue was not of public interest and general public was not involved in the said dispute. 5. This decision of learned Sub Divisional Magistrate was challenged by way of a revision petition which was dismissed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Una, Camp at Amb on 20.12.2013. 6. While dismissing the revision petition, it was held by learned Court below that under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. Sub Divisional Magistrate on taking such evidence as he thinks fit could remove nuisance or unlawful obstruction from any public place or from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public. Learned Revisional Court held that the report submitted by police did not mention that path was a public path. It further held that as per report there was dispute of drain between the parties and Executive Magistrate could not take cognizance of private disputes of the parties under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. Learned Court further held that object of Section 133 of Cr.P.C. was to enable an Executive Magistrate to pass quick orders and deal speedily with the cases of public nuisance or where obstruction was caused to the right of public at large. It was further held by learned Revisional Court that there was no evidence to hold that drain on the spot was used by general public. It was further held by learned Revisional Court that there was no evidence to hold that drain on the spot was used by general public. It also held that it was also a matter of record that on the same cause of action there was a civil case pending between the parties in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court No. 1, Amb. Learned Appellate Court also held that in the said civil suit petitioner Kashetar Pal had sought relief of prohibitory injunction restraining Harpal from raising any sort of construction, blocking the rainy as well as domestic flow of water over the portion ABCDEFGH as shown yellow in colour in the site plan which was being used as drain being part of land measuring 0-35-38 hectares, Khata No. 187 min, Khatauni No. 417 min, Khasra No. 1090. Learned Revisional Court also held that perusal of the pleadings of the parties before Civil Court demonstrated that there was no dispute of public nuisance on the spot and Section 133 of Cr.P.C. did not apply to private nuisance. It further held that as there was a civil dispute between the parties and the dispute in issue did not involve public nuisance, therefore, the order of learned Sub Divisional Magistrate could not be said to be illegal and that revision petition was without any substance as there was nothing on record to prove that drain was used by public at large. It was further held by learned Revisional Court that there was neither any illegality nor perversity in the order passed by learned Sub Divisional Magistrate and that the same did not warrant any interference. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment passed by learned Revisional Court, petitioner has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. Before proceeding any further, it is necessary to deal with the scope of this Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon it under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. A three-Judge bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam and another Vs. Chhabi Nath and others, (2015) 5 Supreme Court Cases 423, has held that all the courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. 9. A three-Judge bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam and another Vs. Chhabi Nath and others, (2015) 5 Supreme Court Cases 423, has held that all the courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that control of working of the subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or Revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that while appellate or Revisional jurisdiction is regulated by the statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. 10. It is settled law that power under Article 227 is intended to be used most sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ouseph Mathai and others Vs. M. Abdul Khadir, (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 319, has held that no doubt Article 227 confers a right of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said Article as a matter of right. In fact power under this Article casts a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such courts and tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such courts and tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this Article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party. 12. A five-Judge bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this Article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party. 12. A five-Judge bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 215, has held that this power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. V. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) (B), is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. 13. Coming to the facts of this case, learned counsel for the petitioner could not deny the fact that the issue with regard to which Kalandra was filed before learned Sub Divisional Magistrate was already subject matter of civil suit which had been instituted by him against respondent No. 1. 14. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner neither could point out as to what was the jurisdictional error committed by the learned Court below while deciding the revision petition or what was the perversity with the findings arrived at by learned Revisional Court and by the Court of learned Sub Divisional Magistrate to the effect that the issue raised in Kalandra was in fact a private dispute inter se the present petitioner and respondent No. 1 and there was no element of public nuisance involved in the same. In fact, it is evident from a perusal of the judgment passed by learned Revisional Court as well as other material placed on record by the parties that the issue which was raised by the petitioner by way of filing a complaint before Gram Panchayat was in fact a private dispute existing between him and respondent No. 1 qua which he had already instituted a civil suit in the Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Revisional Court erred while coming to the conclusion that the findings retuned by learned Sub Divisional Magistrate that the issue raised in the Kalandra was not a matter of public interest, was the correct decision. 15. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Revisional Court erred while coming to the conclusion that the findings retuned by learned Sub Divisional Magistrate that the issue raised in the Kalandra was not a matter of public interest, was the correct decision. 15. In my considered view, it was correctly held by learned Revisional Court that the dispute did not involve public nuisance and there was no illegality with the order passed by learned Sub Divisional Magistrate. Learned Revisional Court also correctly held that there was nothing on record to demonstrate that the drain was used by the public at large and that it was a matter of record that there was a civil dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 on the same cause and the dispute in fact did not involve public nuisance. 16. In fact, taking into consideration that the petitioner had already filed a suit on the same cause against respondent Harpasl Singh, his act of moving an application before Gram Panchayat and on the basis of the same of getting a Kalandra submitted under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. before learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Amb, was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Learned Sub Divisional Magistrate by correctly concluding that there was no element of public interest/public nuisance involved in the complaint/ Kalandra so filed, rightly dismissed the same. Similarly learned Revisional Court after appreciation of material on record correctly held that the issue raised by the petitioner did not fall within the ambit of Section 133 of Cr.P.C. 17. Proceedings under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. are not intended to settle private dispute between two members of the public. It is settled law that if a dispute is of civil nature then dispute cannot be entertained by Magistrate under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. The provisions of the said section can be used only for settlement of dispute in relation to a public right in the general interest of public at large. 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd. and others, (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 389, has held that to bring in application of Section 133 of Cr.P.C., there must be imminent danger to the property and consequential nuisance to the public. 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd. and others, (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 389, has held that to bring in application of Section 133 of Cr.P.C., there must be imminent danger to the property and consequential nuisance to the public. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the object and purpose behind Section 133 of the Code was essentially to prevent public nuisance and it involves a sense of urgency in the sense that if the Magistrate fails to take recourse immediately irreparable damage would be caused to the public. 19. In view of my findings returned above and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I do not find any merit in the present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with cost, assessed at Rs.10,000/-, which shall be deposited by the petitioner in the Registry of this Court within a period of six weeks from today and thereafter, paid to respondent No. 1 by the Registry of this Court as per procedure. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stand disposed of. Interim order, if any, also stands vacated. 20. For the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether the cost so imposed upon the petitioner is deposited by him in the Registry or not, the case shall be listed on 01.03.2017.