JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed claiming therein the following substantive reliefs:- "(c) the question at S. No. 33 in Paper-I (Objective) for the written examination held on 30.06.2016 in pursuance of notice Annexure P-1 inviting applications from various eligible candidates for the post of Addl. District & Sessions Judge in H.P. Judicial Service being wrong and incorrect is ordered to be deleted from the question paper and 0.5 marks against said question be ordered to be granted to all the candidates who appeared in the written examination; (d) the key answer as contained in the answer key of the Paper-I with regard to questions No. 23 & 199 are incorrect as such the answer key is ordered/directed to be corrected; (e) all the candidates including petitioner who have given correct answer to questions No. 23 & 199 be granted or given 0.5 marks for each correct answers; (f) the result of written examination as put on website by the Hon’ble High Court is set aside and fresh result be directed to be declared on the basis of deletion of incorrect answer No. 33 and correct answers of questions No. 23 and 199; (g) in case after fresh results the petitioner is held to be eligible or the person who has qualified the written examination, in that eventuality the respondents may be directed that petitioner be called for interview for the above mentioned post; (h) the rejection letter dated 4th/5th October, 2016 Annexure P-19 and rejection letter dated 6th/7th September, 2016 whereby representations of the petitioner has been rejected may be ordered to be quashed, by issuance of appropriate writ or directions." 2. The brief facts are that the petitioner participated in the selection process for the post of Additional District and Sessions Judges pursuant to notice dated 12.4.2016 and in the written examination declared on 30.8.2016 secured 54.5% marks in Paper-I and 65.5% marks in Paper-II i.e. 120 marks out of total 200 marks. The brief facts are that the petitioner participated in the selection process for the post of Additional District and Sessions Judges pursuant to notice dated 12.4.2016 and in the written examination declared on 30.8.2016 secured 54.5% marks in Paper-I and 65.5% marks in Paper-II i.e. 120 marks out of total 200 marks. The petitioner has though obtained 60% in all papers put together, however, on account of having obtained 54.5% marks in Paper-I was declared not qualified as he has required to obtain 55% marks in each paper in terms of Regulation 10 (iv), which reads thus: “10(iv) No candidate shall be considered to have qualified the written examination unless he obtained a minimum of 55% marks in each individual paper and minimum aggregate of 60% marks in all papers put together. Provided that the schedule caste/schedule tribe candidate who obtained 55% marks or more marks of corresponding grade in the written examination will be eligible for viva voce examination.” 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that the key answers to the questions No. 23, 33 and 199 are not correct and despite his having represented to respondent No. 1 vide his representation dated 26.9.2016, the same have not been rectified and rather the representation has been illegally rejected vide letter dated 4th/5th October, 2016, constraining him to file the instant writ petition for the reliefs as has already been set out in para 1 (supra). 4. The respondent No. 1-High Court in its reply has opposed the petition mainly on the ground that in absence of any specific regulations the prayer of the petitioner which virtually seeks re-checking or re-evaluation of the papers cannot be entertained in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission vs. Mukesh Thakur and Another, (2010) 6 SCC 759 . We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 5. At the outset, it needs to be emphasized that the examination in question was an objective test in which one of the four options were required to be marked by the candidates as correct answer. Thus, the answer would either be correct or wrong. It was not a subjective test where different examiners may award different marks for the same answer. 6. Thus, the answer would either be correct or wrong. It was not a subjective test where different examiners may award different marks for the same answer. 6. It is settled law that the key-answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to be wrong by inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalization. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable body of men well-versed in the particular subject would regard as correct. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the prescribed text books from which students derive their knowledge on the subjects. If it is beyond doubt that the key answer is incorrect, it would be unfair to penalize the students for not giving an answer which accords with such wrong key answer. (Refer: Kanpur University, through Vice Chancellor and Others vs. Samir Gupta and Others, 1983 (4) SCC 309 ). 7. However, before proceeding any further, it would be necessary to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding the maintainability of this petition on the strength of Mukesh Thakur’s case (supra). 8. It would be noticed that in Mukesh Thakur’s case (supra), the dispute was with regard to revaluation of the answer-sheets. It was as a result of revaluation that the candidate secured 119 marks and, therefore, was found eligible to be called for interview. Therefore, this decision would be of no assistance to the respondents as the questions forming subject matter of the document therein were not objective but subjective in nature. It was in this context that the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it was not permissible for the High Court to re-examine the question paper and the answer sheet itself. 9. It would further be noticed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mukesh Thakur’s case (supra) has only observed that the Court should not generally direct revaluation, but has not prohibited the High Courts from intervening where some mistake is apparent on the face of the record. 9. It would further be noticed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mukesh Thakur’s case (supra) has only observed that the Court should not generally direct revaluation, but has not prohibited the High Courts from intervening where some mistake is apparent on the face of the record. This aspect of the matter has been repeatedly considered by this Court and by way of reference we may refer to one such decision in CWP No. 9169 of 2013 titled Vivek Kaushal and Others vs. Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission decided on 17.07.2014 wherein it was observed as under: “15. This Court in a case titled as Mukesh Thakur and Another vs. Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, reported in 2006 (1) Shim. LC 134, interfered and quashed the result made by the Commission, was subject matter of Civil Appeals No. 907 and 897 of 2006 before the Apex Court, titled as Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission vs. Mukesh Thakur and Another, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 759 . It is apt to reproduce paras 23 to 26 of the judgment herein: “23. The situation will be entirely different where the court deals with the issue of admission in mid-academic session. This Court has time and again said that it is not permissible for the courts to issue direction for admission in mid-academic session. The reason for it has been that admission to a student at a belated stage disturbs other students, who have already been pursuing the course and such a student would not be able to complete the required attendance in theory as well as in practical classes. Quality of education cannot be compromised. The students taking admission at a belated stage may not be able to complete the courses in the limited period. In this connection reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Dr. Pramod Kumar Joshi vs. Medical Council of India, (1991) 2 SCC 179 ; State of U.P. vs. Dr. Anupam Gupta, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 594 : AIR 1992 SC 932 ; State of Punjab vs. Renuka Singla, (1994) 1 SCC 175 : AIR 1994 SC 932, Medical Council of India vs. Madhu Singh, (2002) 7 SCC 258 and Mridul Dhar vs. Union of India, (2005) 2 SCC 65 . 24. The issue of revaluation of answer book is no more res integra. 24. The issue of revaluation of answer book is no more res integra. This issue was considered at length by this Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkurmar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543 , wherein this Court rejected the contention that in the absence of the provision for revaluation, a direction to this effect can be issued by the Court. The Court further held that even the policy decision incorporated in the Rules/Regulations not providing for rechecking/verification/revaluation cannot be challenged unless there are grounds to show that the policy itself is in violation of some statutory provision. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 39-40 & 42, paras 14 & 16) "14.......... It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the Statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act... * * * 16........ The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act." 25. This view has been approved and relied upon and re-iterated by this Court in Pramod Kumar Srivastava vs. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 , observing as under: (SCC pp. 717-18, para 7) "7.... Under the relevant rules of the Commission, there is no provision wherein a candidate may be entitled to ask for revaluation of his answer book. 717-18, para 7) "7.... Under the relevant rules of the Commission, there is no provision wherein a candidate may be entitled to ask for revaluation of his answer book. There is a provision for scrutiny only wherein the answer books are seen for the purpose of checking whether all the answers given by a candidate have been examined and whether there has been any mistake in the totalling of marks of each question and noting them correctly on the first cover page of the answer book. There is no dispute that after scrutiny no mistake was found in the marks awarded to the appellant in the General Science paper. In the absence of any provision for revaluation of answer books in the relevant rules, no candidate in an examination has got any right whatsoever to claim or ask for revaluation of his marks." (Emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated in Dr. Muneeb-Ul-Rehman Haroon vs. Govt. of J&K State, (1984) 4 SCC 24 : AIR 1984 SC 1585 ; Board of Secondary Education vs. Pravas Ranjan Panda, (2004) 13 SCC 383 ; Board of Secondary Education vs. D. Suvankar, (2007) 1 SCC 603 ; W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education vs. Ayan Das, (2007) 8 SCC 242 : AIR 2007 SC 3098 and Sahiti vs. Dr. N.T.R. University of Health Sciences, (2009) 1 SCC 599 . 26. Thus, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that in the absence of any provision under the statute or statutory rules/regulations, the Court should not generally direct revaluation.” 16. The Apex Court, after discussing the authorities, which were governing the field till the date of the decision in the case, has used the words: “......the Court should not generally direct revaluation” Meaning thereby, it suggests that if there is some mistake apparent on the face of it, the Court may interfere and may direct for revaluation.” 10. The ratio of the aforesaid judgment was followed by the decision in CWP No. 1118 of 2014 titled Ashutosh Parmar vs. State of H.P. and Others, decided on 1.10.2015 and CWP No. 699 of 2016 titled Rustam Garg and Others vs. H.P. Public Service Commission, decided on 29.3.2016. 11. The ratio of the aforesaid judgment was followed by the decision in CWP No. 1118 of 2014 titled Ashutosh Parmar vs. State of H.P. and Others, decided on 1.10.2015 and CWP No. 699 of 2016 titled Rustam Garg and Others vs. H.P. Public Service Commission, decided on 29.3.2016. 11. Similar issue had earlier come up before this Court in Suneel Kumar vs. H.P. State Public Service Commission, Latest HLJ 2011 (1) HP 172, wherein again heavy reliance had been placed on the judgment of Mukesh Thakur’s case, but this Court has chosen to adopt and follow the reasoning of Kanpur University case (supra), as would be evident from the following observations: “10. As held by the Apex Court in Kanpur University Case (supra) “It is fair to publish the key answers of the questions along with the result of the test.” Therefore, the Commission will publish revised key so as to ensure fairness and transparency, within a week. The Public Service Commission may proceed to conduct the final examination as per the revised exercise undertaken by them by permitting 691 candidates. “12. Similar reiteration of law is found in the judgment rendered in CWP No. 11734 of 2011 titled Subhash Chauhan and Others vs. State of H.P. and Another, decided on 1.3.2012, CWP No. 1952 of 2012 titled Satish Kumar vs. State of H.P. and Another, decided on 4.5.2012. 13. Even otherwise it is more than settled that relief of revaluation is better than holding of fresh examination in case of wrong answer keys as was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manish Ujwal & Others vs. Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati University & Others, reported in 2006 AIR SCW 4703 and Rajesh Kumar and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, reported in 2013 AIR SCW 4309. 14. Having elucidated and reflected on the legal position and the scope and ambit of judicial review when a multiple choice question paper and answer key are questioned, we now proceed to determine the factual matrix of the case. 15. Question No. 23 reads thus: “23. In which city did representatives from the countries of the world met and create the 1st International Agreement on Global Warming? 15. Question No. 23 reads thus: “23. In which city did representatives from the countries of the world met and create the 1st International Agreement on Global Warming? The options given under this question are as under: (a) Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; (b) Paris, France; (c) Kyoto, Japan; (d) Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; According to the key answer, the correct answer is option (a) i.e. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. However, the petitioner would submit that the Governments of various countries first actively addressed the issue of global environmental needs in Stockholm in 1972 in the UN Conference on Human Environment. Thereafter, the next UN Conference known as “Earth Summit” which is also known as frame work convention on climate change took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where declaration on Environment and Development was adopted which reaffirmed declaration of United National Conference adopted at Stockholm in 1972. However, it was Kyoto, Japan where representatives from the countries of the world met and created the 1st International Agreement on Global Warming. 16. In support of this submission, the petitioner has placed reliance not only on the official website of United Nation and information with regard to Kyoto Protocol as available on Wikipedia but also on the website generated printout of such information annexed with the petition as Annexures P-13 to P-15, respectively. In addition thereto, the petitioner also relied upon the information with regard to Kyoto Protocol to United Nations frame work convention on climate change i.e. the international treaty which has been annexed as Annexure P-16 with the petition. 17. A careful perusal of the website coupled with the documents placed on record does prima-facie indicate that the first treaty signed by the representative of International Community came into existence at Kyoto Japan, which is option (c) and not option (a) Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 18. As regards the question no. 33, the same reads thus: “33. The 1st Muslim President of INC was? The option given under this question are as under: (a) Ajmal Khan; (b) M.A. Jinnah; (c) Abul Kalam Azad; (d) Rahimulla Sayani; The option given in the answer key is option (d), whereas the petitioner would contend that the first Muslim President of INC was late Sh. Badruddin Tyabji and would rely upon not only the official website of Indian National Congress which specifically states that late Sh. Badruddin Tyabji and would rely upon not only the official website of Indian National Congress which specifically states that late Sh. Badruddin Tyabji, retired Chief Justice of Bombay High Court was a Muslim and was elected as President of INC in the year 1887 in INC Session held at Madras. In addition to that, he would rely upon the information derived from the Wikipedia printed out from the website. 19. Apart from the above, he has also placed heavy reliance on the book ‘Badruddin Tyabji’ written by A.G. Noorani, published by the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Patiala House, New Delhi and printed by the Manager, Government of India Press, Faridabad, more particularly Chapter VII page 67 to 71 and has also relied upon the extract from the book ‘Indian National Congress Fights for Freedom’ authored by ‘Satya Pal and Prabodh Chandra’ and more particularly pages 128-129. The text relied upon by the petitioner does prima-facie indicate that it was not Rahimulla Sayani, but Badruddin Tyebji who was the first Muslim President of Indian National Congress and surprisingly his name does not even find mention in any of the options offered against this question. 20. Finally, as regards the question no. 199, the same reads thus: “199. The H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 in its present form shall be deemed to have come into force?” And the options given under this question are as under: (a) none of the following dates in (b), (c), (d) below (b) 17.11.71. (c) 18.08.87 (d) 20.10.87 According to the answer key, the answer is option (a) i.e. none of the following dates in (b), (c) and (d) below. However, the petitioner would contend that the correct answer was (b) i.e. 17.11.1971 and this according to him is clearly evident from sub Section (3) of Section 1 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short ‘Act’) which reads thus: “(3) This Act shall and shall be deemed to have come into force on 17th day of November, 1971.” 21. The petitioner further in support of his submission has not only relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in Bhagat Ram Thakur vs. Smt. Enakshi Mahajan, 1988 (2) Sim. L.C. 137, Smt. Satya Devi and Another vs. Sh. Ravinder Kumar and Others 1989 (2) Sim. The petitioner further in support of his submission has not only relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in Bhagat Ram Thakur vs. Smt. Enakshi Mahajan, 1988 (2) Sim. L.C. 137, Smt. Satya Devi and Another vs. Sh. Ravinder Kumar and Others 1989 (2) Sim. L.C. 183 and Narinder Kumar and Another vs. Ramesh Kumar and Another, AIR 1995 HP 87 , wherein it is specifically held that the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 is deemed to have come into force on 17th day of November, 1971. 22. In addition to the aforesaid, the petitioner has also relied upon the question no. 47 that appeared in the recruitment test for the post of Civil Judge (Jr. Division) in paper of Civil Law-II, which reads as under: “47. On which date H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, came into force? The options given are as under: (a) 17th November, 1971; (b) 26th January, 1971; (c) 17th November, 1987; (d) 26th January, 1987. The key answer to this question has been annexed as Annexure P-12 and shows that the correct answer is option (a) i.e. 17.11.1971. 23. We have gone through the entire material available on record and it requires no solomon’s wisdom to arrive at a conclusion that the Rent Act, 1987 is deemed to have come into force on 17.11.1971 and is so stated in the Act itself. 24. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered view that the key answers to the questions no. 23, 33 and 199 are palpably and demonstrably erroneous and in this view of the matter the petitioner cannot be made to suffer and, therefore, these questions are required to be re-looked at the hands of expert in the field. 25. Now, as regards, the representation made by the petitioner wherein he had highlighted all these facts, we are of the considered view that this representation has been wrongly rejected, more particularly, in view of the ratio laid down in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanpur University, Manish Ujwal and Rajesh Kumar cases (supra). 26. The questions in issue are required to be re-looked by an expert on the subject and it is no excuse on the part of the respondent no. 26. The questions in issue are required to be re-looked by an expert on the subject and it is no excuse on the part of the respondent no. 1 to oppose this prayer of the petitioner by claiming that there is no provision for revaluation/rechecking, more particularly, when it is admittedly on record that neither the respondent no. 1 is the expert in the subject nor has it after submission of the representation by the petitioner got an expert opinion on these questions. 27. That apart, the petitioner has every right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and ask the Court to satisfy itself whether the key answers are correct and complete or wrong. If these answers are palpably and demonstrably wrong and the answers given by the petitioner are correct, then the petitioner has to be awarded the marks for the same. The same is equally true where the questions are vague and ambiguous admitting of more than one answer. 28. After all, the conflict in between the letter of law and spirit of justice has to be resolved to indubitably satisfy the spirit of justice. The letter of law though cannot be broken by the Court, but it certainly can be bent. This Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India is entitled to mould the relief according to the demand of situation in order to do complete justice between the parties. 29. Having said so, we allow the writ petition and direct the respondent no. 1 to appoint an expert and place before him the entire paper book alongwith the two books (supra) to have a re-look and re-examine the answers to questions no. 23, 33 and 199 as given in the key answers within a period of two weeks. The respondent no. 1 will thereafter proceed in accordance with law and in case the answers given by the petitioner are found to be correct, then he be awarded marks for the same. The respondent will inform the petitioner telephonically about the variation in his result, if any, and also publish the same on the official website of the respondent-High Court. 1 will thereafter proceed in accordance with law and in case the answers given by the petitioner are found to be correct, then he be awarded marks for the same. The respondent will inform the petitioner telephonically about the variation in his result, if any, and also publish the same on the official website of the respondent-High Court. Needless to say that in case the petitioner eventually makes a grade and qualifies for the H.P. Judicial Service, the respondents would proceed to take all consequential steps in accordance with law. It is further made clear that in case the petitioner makes a grade then the mere fact that a fresh advertisement has been issued for filing up of the post in question, the same would not affect the rights of the petitioner and it shall so be stated in the Advertisement. Accordingly, the rejection communicated vide letter dated 4th/5th October, 2016 (Annexure P-19) and rejection letter dated 6th/7th September, 2016 (Annexure P-17) are quashed. 30. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.