JUDGMENT : DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. 1. The petitioner, a member of the respondent Bank, has a grievance that the second respondent secured his admission despite he being a minor. It was on 26.08.1986. 2. Initially, the petitioner submitted Exhibit P4 representation before the Joint Registrar, who did not act on it. Later, questioning the Joint Registrar's inaction, the petitioner filed W.P. (C) No.31269/2014 and invited Exhibit P6 judgment. Based on the direction issued by this Court, the Joint Registrar eventually passed Exhibit P8 order. Dissatisfied with the said order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the second respondent was born on 01.10.1970, and by 26.08.1986, when he became a member, the second respondent was admittedly sixteen years old. To establish that the second respondent was a minor at the time of his securing the membership, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Exhibits P2 and P3, the School Leaving Certificate and Aadhar Card respectively. 4. Drawing my attention to Exhibit P8 order of the Joint Registrar, the learned counsel would strenuously contend that since the second respondent's ineligibility goes to the root of the matter, subsequently his attaining the age of eighteen would not cure the defect. 5. The learned counsel has also contended that Section 16(3) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act ('the Act') mandates that no person shall be admitted as a member before he attains the age of eighteen years. 6. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned counsel would contend that the second respondent, now the President of the respondent Bank, despite his ineligibility, has been handling public money worth lakhs of rupees. Once it is to be held that the second respondent has ceased to be a member since inception, all the steps taken by him as the President would be nullified. Accordingly, he has urged this Court to set aside Exhibit P8 and declare that the second respondent is ineligible to be a member of the respondent Bank. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the second respondent has submitted that there is little dispute concerning the second respondent's age. At any rate, he has strenuously contended that soon after his admission as a member, the second respondent did attain majority: eighteen years. Thereafter, he has continued to be a member for the past thirty years. 8. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the second respondent has submitted that there is little dispute concerning the second respondent's age. At any rate, he has strenuously contended that soon after his admission as a member, the second respondent did attain majority: eighteen years. Thereafter, he has continued to be a member for the past thirty years. 8. The petitioner, according to the learned counsel, has never chosen to challenge the second respondent's alleged ineligibility until he became the President. In elaboration, he has submitted that the petitioner himself was the previous President and thus was in custody of all the documents. He could have at the earliest point in time raised the issue when he was at the helm of the affairs. Only when he lost power and the second respondent became the President, to settle the personal scores, has the petitioner raised the issue. 9. In other words, it is one of the principal contentions of the learned counsel for the second respondent that the petitioner lacks bona fides and the writ petition is vindictive. To support his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Porinchu T.K. v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 2009 (4) KHC 39. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the second respondent, as well as the learned Government Pleader, apart from perusing the record. 11. The issues to be determined are these: (I) Does the second respondent's admission as a member three decades ago while he was a minor still haunts him, making him ineligible to be a member, even now? (II) Is the Joint Registrar competent to rule on the second respondent's disqualification? Issue No. II: 12. Indeed, even absent Exhibits P2 and P3, indisputably, the second respondent was a minor when he secured his admission into the respondent Bank. Two years since his becoming a member, the second respondent has completed eighteen years and thereafter continued to be a member, for the past thirty years. 13. As per Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act, couched in mandatory terms, no person shall be admitted as a member until he attains the age of eighteen years. Further, Rules 16 (3) and 16(4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules ('the Rules') provide for the remedial mechanism as regards the ineligibility of a member. 13. As per Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act, couched in mandatory terms, no person shall be admitted as a member until he attains the age of eighteen years. Further, Rules 16 (3) and 16(4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules ('the Rules') provide for the remedial mechanism as regards the ineligibility of a member. Both the sub-rules, which are relevant for our purpose, read as follows:- “(3) Where a person already admitted to membership is seen to have been ineligible for membership at the time he was so admitted as a member or if he subsequently becomes ineligible for membership the Committee of the Society may remove the person from membership- after giving him an opportunity for making his representation if any, and the person concerned shall thereupon cease to be a member of the society. (4) Where a member of a society becomes ineligible to continue as such, the Registrar may of his own motion or on a representation made to him by any member of the society or by the financing Bank, by an order in writing declare that he has ceased to be a member of the society from the date of his order. The Registrar shall give such person an opportunity to state his objection, if any, to the proposed action and if the person wishes to be heard, he shall be given an opportunity to be heard before passing an order as aforesaid.” 14. From the above extract, it is evident that sub-rule (3) of Rule 16 provides for two contingencies: (i) ineligibility ab initio; (ii) ineligibility subsequent. On the other hand, sub-rule (4) provides only for ineligibility subsequent. Both the provisions prescribe the remedial adjudicatory mechanism also. There is, to me, some overlapping between these two provisions concerning the second contingency— acquiring ineligibility after becoming a member. In so far as the first contingency is concerned, the provision admits of no ambiguity. To be more explicit, I may observe that if the disqualification predates the admission of a person as member, the managing committee is competent to rule on the dispute. Sub-rule (3) further empowers the managing committee to examine the dispute of a member becoming ineligible subsequently, too: a contingency taken care of by sub-rule (4). 15. As seen, sub-rule (4) employs the expression 'a member of a society becomes ineligible to continue as such'. Sub-rule (3) further empowers the managing committee to examine the dispute of a member becoming ineligible subsequently, too: a contingency taken care of by sub-rule (4). 15. As seen, sub-rule (4) employs the expression 'a member of a society becomes ineligible to continue as such'. Let us contra-distinguish that expression with what has been stated in the latter part of sub-rule (3): 'if he subsequently becomes ineligible for membership'. There is not much significant semantic difference between these two expressions. However, in both sub-rules, two different adjudicatory authorities have been specified. 16. Be that as it may, in the present instance, the dispute is concerning disqualification ab initio—the disqualification predates the second respondent's admission as a member. The adjudication on the dispute shall be by the managing committee of the society concerned. To that extent, there is no ambiguity in both the sub-rules (3) and (4). 17. From the facts, it emerges that the petitioner suffered ineligibility on first count: he was a minor when he was admitted into the respondent Bank as a member way back in 1986. Without fear of contradiction, I must hold that the petitioner ought to have approached the managing committee complaining of the second respondent's ineligibility. 18. Indeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner is quick to point out that the second respondent, being the President, would be at the helm of the managing committee; he could not be a part of the decision making body ruling on his own disqualification. For no person can be a judge of his own cause. 19. Attractive as the submission may be, the fact is that the managing committee comprises many other members, who could as well decide the dispute independently excluding the second respondent, the President of the committee, from the decision making process. This method of adjudication is not unknown in administrative parlance of decision making process. 20. A case in point is Rule 198 of the Rules, which provides for disciplinary proceedings in the hands of a subcommittee, the members of which are drawn from the managing committee. Later, the very managing committee becomes the appellate authority. Invariably, the managing committee acting as an appellate authority excludes the members who constituted the sub-committee and decides the issue. A case in point is Rule 198 of the Rules, which provides for disciplinary proceedings in the hands of a subcommittee, the members of which are drawn from the managing committee. Later, the very managing committee becomes the appellate authority. Invariably, the managing committee acting as an appellate authority excludes the members who constituted the sub-committee and decides the issue. In the same manner, the managing committee of the respondent Bank can as well decide the issue as regards the second respondent's eligibility to be a member of the Bank provided the petitioner approaches it. 21. Since the petitioner has approached a wrong forum, I am of the view that Exhibit P8 is ultra vires of the Joint Registrar and, therefore, inconsequential. Further, I hold that it is the managing committee in terms of Section 16(3) that is competent to adjudicate on the issue. Issue No. I: 22. Given my finding to issue No. II, it is inadvisable for me to advert to the merit of the matter. I leave it open. 23. In the facts and circumstances, apart from declaring that Exhibit P8 is ultra vires of the Joint Registrar, this Court further holds that the petitioner may make an application before the managing committee as regards the second respondent's eligibility to be a member of the Bank. On receipt of such application, the managing committee, after excluding the second respondent, the President, should take an independent decision after hearing both the petitioner and the second respondent. With the above observations, the writ petition is disposed of.