JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 2. Through this petition the petitioner has challenged the dismissal order dated 2.11.2012 communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 8.11.2012 by means of which the petitioner has been dismissed from service while he was working on the post of Executive Engineer as well as corrigendum issued on 12.11.2012. 3. The facts in short giving rise to the present dispute are that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Engineer (Civil) in PWD department on 5.12.1983. Thereafter, he was promoted on the post of Executive Engineer on 26.9.2006 and continued to work as Executive Engineer in PWD department at Jaunpur from 26.9.2006 to 23.11.2008. vide order dated 21.11.2008, the petitioner was placed under suspension and thereafter he was served with a charge-sheet on 3.8.2009. When the documents demanded by the petitioner were not supplied, he submitted interim reply. The enquiry officer conducted enquiry and submitted report on 23.3.2010 wherein it was found that no charge was established against the petitioner, but the enquiry officer further advised that a fresh charge-sheet may be issued framing the charges in the correct manner. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 1426 (SB) of 2009, Anil Kumar Garg v. State of U.P. and others, challenging the validity of the suspension orders dated 21.11.2008 and 13.7.2009. Said writ petition was finally disposed of vide order dated 12.10.2009 with a direction to the Disciplinary Authority to take a decision in the matter within a period of one month. It was also directed by this Court that in respect of second suspension order dated 13.7.2009, enquiry should be concluded within three months and decision shall be communicated to the petitioner within six weeks from the date of receipt of the report of the enquiry officer. The petitioner served certified copy of the order dated 12.10.2009 within the stipulated time but the enquiry was not concluded within a period of of three months. When nothing was done, the petitioner again filed Writ Petition No. 94 (SB) of 2010 and again challenged the suspension orders dated 21.11.2008 and 13.7.2009. The State Government passed order on 19.2.2010 exonerating the petitioner from all the charges relating to the first suspension order dated 21.11.2008. When nothing was done, the petitioner again filed Writ Petition No. 94 (SB) of 2010 and again challenged the suspension orders dated 21.11.2008 and 13.7.2009. The State Government passed order on 19.2.2010 exonerating the petitioner from all the charges relating to the first suspension order dated 21.11.2008. Enquiry report dated 23.3.2010 was also submitted exonerating the petitioner from all the charges in the matter pertaining to the second suspension order dated 13.7.2009 but with an advise to issue amended charges sheet. Writ petition No. 94 (SB) of 2010 was finally decided by this Court on 27.4.2010. Certain clarification was also sought as there was typing error in the order dated 27.4.2010 and this Court passed order dated 7.7.2010 quashing the second suspension order dated 13.7.2009 and directed that the opposite party shall issue a charge-sheet within a period of four weeks and complete the enquiry within three months thereafter. The petitioner informed the State Government about the order dated 27.4.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 94 (SB) of 2010. The petitioner served certified copy of the aforesaid orders dated 27.4.2010 and 7.7.2010 immediately after the orders were passed. The State Government passed order on 7.6.2010 that decision has been taken for amending the charge-sheet and the petitioner was served with the amended charge-sheet dated 8.6.2010 on 21.6.2010. The petitioner raised objection to the issuance of the amended charge-sheet by means of letter dated 25.6.2010. The State Government passed order on 17.8.2010 stating that the enquiry shall continue against the petitioner as the earlier enquiry report was erroneous. The petitioner thereafter filed Contempt Petition No. 2006 of 2010 in which notices were issued and then the State Government passed order reinstating the petitioner by cancelling the second suspension order dated 13.7.2010. The petitioner thereafter moved a representation demanding 26 documents after receiving the amended charge-sheet dated 8.6.2010 on 21.6.2010. The enquiry officer fixed first date of enquiry in pursuance to the amended charge-sheet as 7.8.2010. As the photostat documents attached with the amended charge-sheet were denied to the petitioner and they were also alleged to be fabricated documents, the petitioner made a request for summoning the original documents and for verification of the photostat copies of the documents attached with the charge-sheet. As the photostat documents attached with the amended charge-sheet were denied to the petitioner and they were also alleged to be fabricated documents, the petitioner made a request for summoning the original documents and for verification of the photostat copies of the documents attached with the charge-sheet. In the enquiry proceedings dated 7.8.2010, as the objection made by the petitioner was not very clear that the relied upon documents were fictitious, fabricated and manipulated, the petitioner moved a fresh representation on 11.8.2010 bringing his objection on record. The presenting officer filed a reply on 26.8.2010 before the enquiry officer dealing with the representation of the petitioner dated 5.7.2010 and 11.8.2010. In response to the reply of the presenting officer dated 26.8.2010, the petitioner made a representation stating the relevancy of the documents demanded by him. The enquiry officer wrote a letter dated 31.12.2010 to 18 defence witnesses. The enquiry officer on the 5th date of enquiry i.e. 4.1.2011, accepted statements of 14 persons including the presenting officer Sri S.K. Goel, but the same were not recorded and neither any examination in chief was made nor the petitioner was afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. On the next date of enquiry i.e. 6.1.2011, the presenting officer Sri S.K. Goel was examined. The petitioner raised objection that Junior Engineer, who had allegedly received 33 Tankers was the material witness to accept or deny the charges. Similarly, the transport agency or the transporter was also a material witness to indicate as if the said 33 Tankers were ever transported from the refinery but the same was not received. The enquiry officer summoned Sri R.K. Prasad, Deputy Manager, Consumer Cell, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., who appeared before the enquiry officer on 11.1.2011 and he clearly stated that the Indian Oil Corporation has not made any verification regarding signatures of the Junior Engineer who allegedly received supply. The next date of enquiry was fixed as 14.1.2011, on which date no enquiry was made but the enquiry officer and the presenting officer wrote proceedings discussing the evidence relied upon by the petitioner. The petitioner was asked to submit his defence in writing by means of letter dated 17.1.2011. The enquiry officer and the presenting officer concluded the proceedings and discussed the extraneous charges not shown in the charge-sheet. The petitioner was asked to submit his defence in writing by means of letter dated 17.1.2011. The enquiry officer and the presenting officer concluded the proceedings and discussed the extraneous charges not shown in the charge-sheet. The enquiry officer submitted enquiry report on 25.1.2011, which was served on the petitioner vide letter dated 28.2.2011. The petitioner was required to submit his representation within fifteen days. As the enclosures attached with the enquiry report were not supplied to the petitioner, therefore, he made a representation on 23.3.2011 for supplying the same. The petitioner was thereafter supplied the enclosures of the enquiry report on the instructions of the State Government on 25.4.2011. On 2.5.2011, the petitioner submitted representation to the enquiry report supplied through show-cause notice. Thereafter, information was sought by the State Government from the U.P. Public Service Commission. The information of the U.P. Public Service Commission was received by the State Government and thereafter dismissal order dated 2.11.2012 has been passed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the enquiry has not been held by following the principles of natural justice. Comments, which were obtained by the enquiry officer from the presenting officer, were not supplied to the petitioner and the petitioner was asked to submit reply to the same. The petitioner submitted reply to the said comments and thereafter the enquiry was concluded. No evidence was adduced to prove the charges before the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer presumed proving of the charges only on the basis of the comments of the presenting officer. Learned counsel submits that though date was fixed, but no enquiry was ever held as contemplated under law and neither the petitioner was given any opportunity to cross-examine any of the prosecution witnesses. None of the witnesses were adduced from the side of the petitioner though there was specific denial of the documents, which were annexed alongwith the charge-sheet saying they were forged and fabricated documents, but in spite of that no effort was made to get the documents proved in accordance with law. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Chamoli District Co-Operative Bank Ltd. through its Secretary/Mahaprandhak and another v. Raghunath Singh Rana and others, Civil Appeal No. 2265 of 2011 dated 17th May, 2016. 5. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Chamoli District Co-Operative Bank Ltd. through its Secretary/Mahaprandhak and another v. Raghunath Singh Rana and others, Civil Appeal No. 2265 of 2011 dated 17th May, 2016. 5. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that enquiry officer has held the enquiry in accordance with law by following the principles of natural justice. He has fixed various dates and R.K. Prasad, Deputy Manager, Consumer Cell, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. was also examined to prove the receiving by the Junior Engineer, but in the statement he made a specific statement that he does not recognize the signature of the Junior Engineer. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. What should have been the process of holding the enquiry as contemplated under law after the amended charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner has submitted reply to the amended charge-sheet. He had also denied all the documents, which were filed alongwith the charge-sheet in photostat form as being forged and fabricated. The petitioner demanded from the enquiry officer that the original documents be produced. The original documents were never produced. Comments from the presenting officer were obtained by the enquiry officer and the petitioner was asked to submit reply to the said comments. After reply submitted by the petitioner to the comments, the enquiry officer concluded the enquiry and assumed the charges to be proved against the petitioner. The petitioner in paragraph-36 of the writ petition pleaded as under : “36. That the enquiry officer did not fix any date requiring the presenting officer to prove the charges and the documents relied upon. The enquiry officer took all the charges already proved. The enquiry officer wrote a letter dated 31.12.2010 to 18 persons cited as defence witnesses. It was mentioned in the letter dated 31.12.2010 that the same is summoning letter in view of the demand of the petitioner for submitting his defence. 4.1.2011 was fixed as a next date for appearing all the 20 witnesses. A true copy of the letter dated 31.12.2010 written by the enquiry officer behind the back of the petitioner calling 20 persons from the list of defence witnesses without proving the charges and conducting any enquiry in this regard, is being filed herewith as Annexure 25 to this writ petition. 8. A true copy of the letter dated 31.12.2010 written by the enquiry officer behind the back of the petitioner calling 20 persons from the list of defence witnesses without proving the charges and conducting any enquiry in this regard, is being filed herewith as Annexure 25 to this writ petition. 8. Reply to paragraph-36 of the writ petition has been given in paragraph-69 of the counter-affidavit, which reads as under : “69. That the avertments contained in para 36 of the writ petition regarding the letter dated 31.12.2010 calling the witnesses and fixing the date 4.1.2011 are not disputed. However, the rest of averments made in para under reply are false and misleading hence, denied in view of the facts already referred hereinabove.” 9. Once the opposite party has admitted the position as stated in paragraph-36 of the writ petition, then nothing remains to be elaborated and neither the opposite party can come forward to state that enquiry was held in accordance with law. Law in regard to holding of enquiry has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Raghunath Singh Rana (supra) wherein it has been held as under : “19. The compliance of natural justice in domestic/disciplinary inquiry is necessary has long been established. This Court has held that even there are no specific statutory rule requiring observance of natural justice, the compliance of natural justice is necessary. Certain ingredients have been held to be constituting integral part of holding of an inquiry. The Apex Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR 616 , has laid down following : “... An enquiry cannot be said to have been properly held unless, (i) the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges levelled against him, (ii) the witnesses are examined - ordinarily in the presence of the employee - in respect of the charges, (iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant matter, and (v) the inquiry officer records his findings with reasons for the same in his report.” 20. The Apex Court again in State Bank of India v. R.K. Jain and others, (1972) 4 SCC 304 , held that if an inquiry is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice or if no reasonable opportunity was provided to the delinquent to place his defence, it cannot be characterized as a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. In paragraph 23, the following was laid down : “......As emphasised by this Court in Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR 601 , the termination of an employee’s service must be preceded by a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Therefore, it is evident that if the inquiry is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice or if no reasonable opportunity was provided to a delinquent to place his defence, it cannot be characterized as a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice......” 21. The Apex Court in State of Uttranchal and others v. Kharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236 , had occasion to examine various contours of natural justice which need to be specified in a departmental inquiry. The Apex Court noticed earlier judgments where principles were laid down as to how inquiry is to be conducted. It is useful to refer paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15, which are to the following effect : “.....9. Before analyzing the correctness of the above submissions, it is useful to refer various principles laid down by this Court as to how enquiry is to be conducted and which procedures are to be followed. 10. The following observations and principles laid down by this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and another, [1964] 3 SCR 652, are relevant: “... ... In the present case, the first serious infirmity from which the enquiry suffers proceeds from the fact that the three enquiry officers claimed that they themselves had witnessed the alleged misconduct of Malak Ram. Mr. Kolah contends that if the Manager and the other officers saw Malak Ram committing the act of misconduct, that itself would not disqualify them from holding the domestic enquiry. We are not prepared to accept this argument. Mr. Kolah contends that if the Manager and the other officers saw Malak Ram committing the act of misconduct, that itself would not disqualify them from holding the domestic enquiry. We are not prepared to accept this argument. If an officer himself sees the misconduct of a workman, it is desirable that the enquiry should be left to be held by some other person who does not claim to be an eye- witness of the impugned incident. As we have repeatedly emphasised, domestic enquiries must be conducted honestly and bona fide with a view to determine whether the charge framed against a particular employee is proved or not, and so, care must be taken to see that these enquiries do not become empty formalities. If an officer claims that he had himself seen the misconduct alleged against an employee, in fairness steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. How the knowledge claimed by the enquiry officer can vitiate the entire proceedings of the enquiry is illustrated by the present enquiry itself. ... ..... ..... It is necessary to emphasise that in domestic enquiries, the employer should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman charged, give an opportunity to the workman to cross-examine the said evidence and then should the workman be asked whether he wants to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross- examined even before any other evidence is led against him. In dealing with domestic enquiries held in such industrial matters, we cannot overlook the fact that in a large majority of cases, employees are likely to be ignorant, and so, it is necessary not to expose them to the risk of cross-examination in the manner adopted in the present enquiry proceedings. Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Sule is right in contending that the course adopted in the present enquiry proceedings by which Malak Ram was elaborately cross-examined at the outset constitutes another infirmity in this enquiry.” 11) In ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 , it was held: “(1) Where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show-cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show-cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer’s report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges. * * * Article 311 (2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The proviso to Article 311(2) in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee’s right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.” 12) In Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State 1Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another, (1999) 2 SCC 2, it was held: “34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee’s conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee — even though such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases.” (13) In Syndicate Bank and others v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, (2006) 3 SCC 150 , the following conclusion is relevant: “18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the enquiry officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. It is only those documents, which are relied upon by the enquiry officer to arrive at his conclusion, the non-supply of which would cause prejudice, being violative of principles of natural justice. Even then, the non-supply of those documents prejudice the case of the delinquent officer must be established by the delinquent officer. It is well-settled law that the doctrine of principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice.” 15. From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject-matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. (iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any.” 10. After considering the dictum laid down by the Apex Court and also considering the facts on record, we are of the definite opinion that the enquiry was not held in accordance with law by following the principles of natural justice. The charges were never proved by the department before the enquiry officer as required under law. The petitioner was also not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses though he has specifically denied the documents and has also made a specific endorsement on the documents themselves being fabricated. 11. In the aforesaid fact, the writ petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the dismissal order dated 2.11.2012 as well as corrigendum issued on 12.11.2012 and the opposite party is directed to hold enquiry from the stage of filing of reply to the charge-sheet by fixing date, time and place after giving opportunity to the petitioner to participate in the enquiry and conclude the enquiry within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. It is further provided that the disciplinary authority may take a decision in respect of reinstatement of the petitioner as contemplated under law. 12. The petitioner is directed to co-operate in the enquiry. —————