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2016 DIGILAW 2811 (DEL)

NAUSHAD v. STATE

2016-07-29

P.S.TEJI

body2016
JUDGMENT : P.S. TEJI, J. 1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioners, namely, Sh. Naushad, Sh. Mohd Kadir and Sh. Shahzad for quashing of FIR No. 146/2012 dated 02.06.2012, under Sections 452/323/325/427/34 IPC registered at Police Station Jahangir Puri on the basis of the Compromise deed executed between the petitioners and respondent nos. 2 to 5, namely, Sh. Mukesh Pal, Sh. Rohit Pal, Sh. Deepak Pal on 24.12.2015. 2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State submitted that the respondent no. 2, present in the Court has been identified to be the complainant/first informant and respondent nos. 3 & 5 have been identified to be the victims in the FIR in question by SI Jasmer Singh. 3. The factual matrix of the present case is that the FIR in question was lodged by the complainant on the allegation that on 02.06.2012 at around 11.30 am when the complainant/respondent no. 2 was sitting at his shop, petitioner nos. 1 and 3 came to him and on being asked by the complainant about abusing his son then they became aggressive and started abusing him. Thereafter they left. Then again at around 1.10 pm the petitioner nos. 1 and 3 along with two other boys came to the complainant’s shop and started abusing and beating the complainant and his son. Petitioner no. 3 and the other two boys were carrying a stick/danda with them. On hearing the cries of the complainant and his son, complainant’s nephew/respondent no. 5 came to their rescue. However, petitioner no. 3 also hit him with that stick. When the petitioners tried to chase respondent no. 5, then in that course they entered the shop of complainant’s other nephew namely Rohit Pal/respondent no. 4 and started beating him and gave him fists and blows. Petitioners also caused damage to the goods lying in the shop. Thereafter, the complaint was lodged by the complainant at the instance of which, the FIR in question was registered against the accused persons. During the pendency of the trial, the parties entered into a settlement. 4. Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 present in the Court submitted that the dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the compromise deed, the parties have agreed that the petitioners shall pay a fixed amount of Rs. 50,000 to respondent nos. During the pendency of the trial, the parties entered into a settlement. 4. Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 present in the Court submitted that the dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the compromise deed, the parties have agreed that the petitioners shall pay a fixed amount of Rs. 50,000 to respondent nos. 2 to 5, in lieu of the loss occurred to them. It is agreed that the respondent nos. 2 to 5 shall cooperate in quashing of the FIR in question against the petitioners. Respondent nos. 2 to 5 affirmed the contents of the aforesaid settlement. All the disputes and differences have been resolved through mutual consent. Now no dispute with petitioners survives and so, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end. Statements of the Respondent nos. 2 to 5 have been recorded in this regard in which they have stated that they have entered into a compromise with the petitioners and have settled all the disputes with them. They further stated that they have no objection if the FIR in question is quashed. 5. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases like the instant one, by observing as under:- “61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings.” 6. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 . The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh (Supra) are as under:- “29. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 . The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh (Supra) are as under:- “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 7.