ORDER : C.R.P(MD)No.525 of 2007 is filed challenging the order made in I.A.No.142 of 2005 in A.S(SR)No.1398 of 2005 dated 29.01.2007 on the file of District Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, wherein and whereby, the delay of 539 days in filing the appeal was condoned. The said appeal was filed with such delay against the Judgment and Decree passed in O.S.No. 1208 of 1993 dated 15.12.2003 on the file of II Additional District Munsif Court, Nagercoil. The said suit was filed seeking for the relief of a declaration, declaring that the Kottar Chettu Samudayam Vagai Nainar Desika Vinayagar Temple and its properties in Vadiveeswaram Village, Agasteeswaram Taluk, a constituted religious denominational institution, is entitled to protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India and that the H.R. & C.E., Department has no manner of right to interfere with the affairs of management and administration of the temple and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any proceedings in pursuant to the notice dated 29.11.1993. The trial Court by its Judgment and Decree dated 15.02.2003 decreed the suit as prayed for. Therefore, the above appeal was preferred by the H.R. & C.E., department, however with the delay, which was condoned by the appellate Court as stated supra. 2. C.R.P(MD)No.526 of 2007 is filed against the order made in I.A.No.141 of 2005 in A.S(SR)No.1392 of 2005 dated 29.01.2007 on the file of District Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, in condoning delay of 403 days in filing an appeal against the Judgment and Decree made in O.S.No.139 of 1997 dated 15.12.2003 on the file of the II Additional District Munsif Court, Nagercoil. The said suit was filed seeking for a decree of declaration, declaring that the Madams described in the plaint schedule are charitable endowments and so they are outside the purview/provisions of the H.R. & C.E Act in the absence of any Notification issued under Section 3 of the said Act and for permanent injunction restraining the H.R & C.E., department from claiming account of the plaint madams or claiming any amounts regarding the same and interfering with the administration of the plaint madams by its trustees. The trial Court by its Judgment and Decree dated 15.02.2003 decreed the suit as prayed for. Challenging the said Judgment and Decree, the H.R. & C.E., department preferred the above appeal, however with the delay, which was condoned by the appellate Court as stated supra. The trial Court by its Judgment and Decree dated 15.02.2003 decreed the suit as prayed for. Challenging the said Judgment and Decree, the H.R. & C.E., department preferred the above appeal, however with the delay, which was condoned by the appellate Court as stated supra. 3. It is to be noted that the trial Court decreed both the suits by a common Judgment. Thus, the above two civil revision petitions are filed by the plaintiffs aggrieved against the order of the lower appellate Court in condoning the delay in filing the appeals. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both these civil revision petitions submitted that the H.R & C.E., department, which filed the appeals before the lower appellate Court, has not explained the delay properly and therefore, the appellate Court is not justified in condoning the delay. It is further argued that the administrative reasons in getting legal opinion, cannot be considered as a sufficient cause in condoning the delay. In support of such contention, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Apex Court reported in (2012)3 SCC 563 (Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.,). 5. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 4 in C.R.P(MD)No.525 of 2007 and respondents 1 and 5 in C.R.P(MD)No.526 of 2007 representing the H.R. & C.E., department, submitted that the department has explained the delay and such explanation was accepted by the lower appellate Court and consequently, by exercising its discretionary power, the lower appellate Court condoned the delay. Therefore, it is argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that such an order passed by the lower appellate Court exercising its discretionary power, need not be interfered with, as the rights of the parties are not going to be affected in any manner by condoning such delay as the same are to be finally decided only in the main appeals. In support of his submission, the learned Additional Advocate General relied on the following decisions:- (i) (1996)3 SCC 132 (State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and others); (ii) (1996)9 SCC 309 (State of U.P vs. Harish Chandra); (iii) (2005)3 SCC 752 (State of Nagaland vs. Lipok and others) and (iv) (2013)12 SCC 649 (Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others). Heard both sides. 6. Heard both sides. 6. Brief facts and the history of the litigation between the parties, though not necessary for deciding the crux of the present issue, are however essential only for the purpose of deciding as to whether an interference is called for against the discretionary order passed by the lower appellate Court in condoning the delay of 539 and 406 days respectively in filing the appeals. They are as follows:- (a) Arulmighu Nainar Desiya Vinayagar Thirukovil, Kottar, Nagercoil, Agastheeswaram Taluk, is a temple, which according to the H.R & C.E., department is a public temple and therefore, it will have control over the same. On the other hand, it is the contention of the plaintiffs in both the suits that the suit temple and its properties constitute a denominational one exclusively belonging to the Chettu community of Kottar and thus it is not a public temple belonging to the Hindu Community. (b) The Deputy Commissioner, H.R & C.E., department, Madurai, through his order dated 31.10.1961 made in O.A.No.46/13 declared the temple as a public temple, after rejecting the claim of the then administrators that the same is a family temple. (c) The appeal preferred against the said order in A.P.No.24 of 1968 before the Commissioner, H.R & C.E., department came to be dismissed on 07.05.1970. Challenging the said order of the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., department, a statutory suit was filed in O.S.No.6 of 1971 before the Sub-Court, Nagercoil seeking for declaration that the said temple and its properties constitute a private family trust of the plaintiffs and that the other endowments like, Thiru Neelakanta Moopanar Madam etc. are outside the purview of the H.R & C.E Act, 1959 and for setting aside the order of the Commissioner dated 07.05.1970. The said suit, after contest, came to be dismissed on 30.04.1974. (d) An appeal preferred in A.S.No.606 of 1974 before the High Court of Madras, challenging the said Judgment and Decree made in O.S.No.6 of 1971, also came to be dismissed on 20.02.1979. The plaintiffs preferred further appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.A. No. 1511 of 1979 and the said appeal also came to be dismissed on 08.09.1993. (d) An appeal preferred in A.S.No.606 of 1974 before the High Court of Madras, challenging the said Judgment and Decree made in O.S.No.6 of 1971, also came to be dismissed on 20.02.1979. The plaintiffs preferred further appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.A. No. 1511 of 1979 and the said appeal also came to be dismissed on 08.09.1993. (e) The above Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court confirmed upto Supreme Court rejecting the claim of the then administrators of the temple that the temple, its properties and madams belong to their family and not a public one, have become final, conclusive and binding on the parties. However, the present suits were filed by contending that earlier civil proceedings gone up to Supreme Court are not a bar to institute the present suits, since the plaintiffs constitute a denomination as a section of the Hindu Community and therefore, the subject matter temple is the denominational one and consequently, protected under Article 26 of the Constitution of India and under Section 107 of the H.R & C.E. Act. (f) The present suits filed by the plaintiffs seeking for the declaration and decree as stated supra, are decreed by the trial Court as prayed for. Thus, the temple and its properties including madam etc., which were previously found to be a public in character, are now declared by the trial Court to be a denominational one protected under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. 7. From the abovestated facts and circumstances, it is therefore, evident that the issue between the parties regarding the character of the temple etc., which attained finality earlier by conferring the public character on the temple and its properties, is re-agitated once again now, however, by claiming the denominational status. The trial Court has accepted the contention of the petitioners and granted the decree as prayed for. Whether the trial Court is justified in granting such decree or not, is not for this Court, at this stage, to consider and give any finding, as it is for the appellate Court to consider the same and decide on merits and in accordance with law. Needless to say that any finding rendered herein on merits of such claim, may influence the mind of the appellate Court and affect the just and fair decision of the appeal. 8. Needless to say that any finding rendered herein on merits of such claim, may influence the mind of the appellate Court and affect the just and fair decision of the appeal. 8. Further, some more facts, which have driven the temple and its trustee to file other writ petitions, are also essential to arrive at a just and proper conclusion as to whether an interference is warranted against the discretionary order of the lower appellate Court in condoning the delay. Those facts are as follows:- The H.R & C.E., Department initiated proceedings against the trustees by alleging that the temple is not administered as per the provisions of the H.R & C.E Act; that valuable properties of the temple have been alienated and encumbered; that no action has been taken by the trustees to safeguard the temple properties; that no income and expenditure account for every fasli year was forwarded; that no accounts and ledgers were subjected to audit and budget and that the trustees are acting against the interest of the institution. Based on those allegations, charges were framed against the trustees and pending enquiry, the trustees were suspended and a fit person was appointed. Such appointment was challenged before this Court by filing writ petitions in W.P.(MD) Nos. 3790 of 2013, 5495 of 2013 and 5606 of 2013. It is seen that by way of an interim order made in those writ petitions, the trustees were permitted to receive the rent and deposit the same in an account to meet the expenses for poojas and salaries. Subsequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 53 of the H.R and C.E, Act ended up in passing a final order on 31.07.2015 by the Commissioner, H.R & C.E., removing four trustees, namely, Manickavasakam, AKC.Kumarasamy, V.Nagarajan and A.R. Ramachandran. The Commissioner also issued a direction to the Assistance Commissioner of H.R & C.E., to appoint the trustees through the department. The said proceedings of the Commissioner dated 31.07.2015 is challenged in other two writ petitions in W.P.(MD) Nos. 16423 of 2015 and 16424 of 2015 by two trustees, namely, P. Nagarajan and Manickavasam. It appears that other two trustees, namely, AKC Kumarasamy and A.R. Ramachandran, who were also removed have not challenged the order of the Commissioner. 9. The said proceedings of the Commissioner dated 31.07.2015 is challenged in other two writ petitions in W.P.(MD) Nos. 16423 of 2015 and 16424 of 2015 by two trustees, namely, P. Nagarajan and Manickavasam. It appears that other two trustees, namely, AKC Kumarasamy and A.R. Ramachandran, who were also removed have not challenged the order of the Commissioner. 9. With these factual background of the entire case, let me now consider as to whether an interference is called for against the order passed by the lower appellate Court in condoning the delay of 539 and 406 days in filing the appeals, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 10. Perusal of the affidavit filed before the lower appellate Court seeking for condonation of delay indicates that the department has explained the reasons for delay, of course not in so many words. It was stated therein that the matter was referred to H.R & C.E., department top officials for their consideration for filing an appeal and that it was carefully scrutinized by the department and legal opinions were obtained for filing necessary appeal and that during the course of the official transaction, the said unavoidable delay had occurred. The lower appellate Court considered the above said reasons given by the department and condoned the delay, by exercising its discretionary power, by specifically pointing out that for such lapses, the valuable right as claimed that too decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the earlier proceedings as alleged, should not be lost and that the department/appellant should be given a chance to substantiate their rights in the appeals. The lower appellate Court also found that no serious prejudice would be caused to the contesting respondents and thus by holding so while condoning the delay, the lower appellate Court has also imposed a cost of Rs.500/-on the Department payable to the contesting respondents. 11. I do not find any justifiable ground or reason warranting interference with the above discretionary order passed by the lower appellate Court, taking into the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand as narrated supra. 11. I do not find any justifiable ground or reason warranting interference with the above discretionary order passed by the lower appellate Court, taking into the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand as narrated supra. No doubt, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2012)3 SCC 563 (stated supra) to contend that law of limitation binds everybody equally including the Government and the delay cannot be condoned mechanically, merely because the Government or a Wing of the Government is a party before this Court. Paragraph Nos. 27 to 29 of the above decision read as follows:- ''27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Perusal of the said decision no doubt shows that the delay cannot be condoned mechanically, merely because the Government is seeking to condone such delay. However, the finding rendered by the Apex Court at paragraph 28 as extracted supra, would also indicate that liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice and however, such concession was not adopted in that particular case depending upon the facts and circumstances of that case. 13. On the other hand, though the learned Additional Advocate General relied on various decisions commencing from (1996)3 SCC 132 (stated supra), it would suffice, if some of the decisions, out of which one is a recent one of the Apex Court, are referred to in order to avoid multiplicity. While considering the scope of sufficient cause for condoning the delay, the Apex Court in (2013)12 SCC 649 (stated supra) after considering the various decisions rendered earlier, enunciated the principles applicable to an application for condonation of delay, as follows:- “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1.(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2.(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3.(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4.(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.4.(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6.(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7.(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8.(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11.(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12.(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13.(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” (emphasis supplied) 14. From the above principles laid down by the Apex Court, it is clear that in order to render substantial justice, technical consideration should not be given undue importance and that adherence to strict proof should not affect the public justice and cause public mischief resulting in failure of justice. From the above principles laid down by the Apex Court, it is clear that in order to render substantial justice, technical consideration should not be given undue importance and that adherence to strict proof should not affect the public justice and cause public mischief resulting in failure of justice. It is the categorical finding of the Apex Court that there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay and the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice, but are obliged to remove injustice. It is the specific finding of the Apex Court that State or a Public body or an Entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 15. While considering the appeal filed by the Government or Governmental bodies with delay, the Apex Court observed in a decision reported in (2005)3 SCC 752 (stated supra) at paragraph 15 as follows:- “15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay -intentional or otherwise -is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.” 16. In (1998)7 SCC 123 (N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy), the Honourable Supreme Court has observed at paragraph 9 as follows:- “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the Superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But is is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the Superior Court would free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such Superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the Lower Court.” (emphasis supplied) 17. But is is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the Superior Court would free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such Superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the Lower Court.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, from the above decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that once the appellate Court accepts the reasons stated as sufficient cause and condoned the delay by exercising its discretion, this Court normally should not disturb such finding, unless such exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or in an arbitrary or perverse manner. In fact, the role of the revisional or appellate Court is very limited, while considering such revision or appeal filed against the order condoning delay, since the lower judicial forum, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, has accepted the reasons, exercised its discretionary power and condoned the delay. Unless such order exhibits any perversity on the face of it, interference against that order is not at all warranted. After all, by condoning the delay, rights of the parties on the merits of the case are not finally decided or adjudicated upon. On the other hand, if the Court below refuses to condone the delay and such an order is challenged, certainly the role of the revisional or appellate Court is not limited to ascertain as to whether such order exhibits any perversity alone. On the other hand, such revisional or appellate Court has to necessarily go into the totality of facts and circumstances of the case and find out as to whether such refusal to condone the delay has resulted in miscarriage injustice. It is to be borne in mind that if an application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is dismissed, rights of the parties on the merits decided by the trial Court become final and conclusive without allowing the appellate Court to decide on merits the correctness or otherwise of the Judgment and the Decree passed by the trial Court. Therefore, refusal to condone the delay would seriously affect the parties whereas it is not so in the case where the delay is condoned. Moreover, the appellate Court, undoubtedly, is also a fact finding Court. Therefore, refusal to condone the delay would seriously affect the parties whereas it is not so in the case where the delay is condoned. Moreover, the appellate Court, undoubtedly, is also a fact finding Court. Therefore, it is all the more necessary for the appellate Court to go into the totality of the facts and circumstances of a particular case, while considering the application for condoning the delay, in order to find out as to whether certain facts or question of law decided by the trial Court are required to be considered on merits once again, so as to see that failure of justice, does not result in, merely on the technical ground of delay in filing the appeal. At this juncture, I would like to rely on a decision of the Apex Court reported in (2013)4 SCC 97 (Laxmibai vs. Bhagwantbuva), wherein the Apex Court has observed at paragraph 49 as follows:- “49.......When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred and the courts may in the larger interests of administration of justice may execute or overlook a mere irregularity or a trivial breach of law for doing real and substantial justice to the parties and pass orders will serve the interest of justice best.” 18. In this case, I do not find the discretion exercised by the lower appellate Court in condoning the delay was not on any untenable ground. Likewise I do not find that such exercise made was either with perversity or in an arbitrary manner. 19. I find that the above referred three decisions of the Apex Court are squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, rather than the one cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Postmaster General and others. Therefore, I find that the orders of the lower appellate Court passed to render substantial justice between the parties do not call for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, both the civil revision petitions fail and thus, they are dismissed. Therefore, I find that the orders of the lower appellate Court passed to render substantial justice between the parties do not call for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, both the civil revision petitions fail and thus, they are dismissed. Since the suits are of the year 1993 and 1997 respectively, the lower appellate Court is directed to take up both the appeals and dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law, after hearing both the parties, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and report the same to this Court. It is made clear that both parties must cooperate for the hearing and disposal of the appeals without seeking any adjournment and filing unnecessary and unwarranted interim applications to delay the disposal. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.