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2016 DIGILAW 282 (RAJ)

Aladdin v. State of Rajasthan

2016-02-19

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2016
JUDGMENT: 1. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellants Aladdin and Gopal being aggrieved of the judgment dated 19.10.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge (NDPS Act Cases) No.2, Chittorgarh in Sessions Case No.92/2014 (8/2004) whereby, they were convicted for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act and were sentenced to undergo 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of 2. Succinctly stated, facts necessary and germane for disposal of the instant appeal are noted herein below:- 3. Shri Ram Ratan, who was posted as the SHO Police Station Shambhupura, District Chittorgarh received a source information on 3.8.2003 that gunny bags full of illicit poppy straw were lying concealed on govt. forest land near the village Gilund and that the drug smugglers would take them away for illicit trade in narcotics at the earliest opportunity. The information was taken down into writing and a copy thereof was forwarded to the superior officers alongwith H.C. Constable Sh.Chhagan Lal. 4. The SHO, acting in furtherance of the source information collected a team of Police personnel and proceeded to the place where the contraband was reportedly concealed. The search party reached at a clearing in the forest and saw that some hessian and plastic bags with their mouths tied by twine were lying there. No person was seen near or around the bags. The Police party proceeded to open and search the suspicious packages which were 22 in number. Each bag was containing poppy straw. The follow up procedure of sampling and seizure was conducted. On weighment, total weight of the contraband came to be 580 Kgs. Two samples of 500 Gms. each were taken out from every bag and were packed and sealed. The remaining contraband was repacked and sealed in the same bags. The seizure memo was prepared at the spot and after returning back, an FIR No.172/2003 was registered at the Police Station Shambhupura against unknown persons for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act. 5. Under directions of the superior Officers, further investigation was handed over to Sh. Suresh Kumar, SHO PS Kanera. The Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the Patwari concerned and procured the revenue record of the place of seizure, which was recorded as government pasture land standing in the name of village Gilund. 5. Under directions of the superior Officers, further investigation was handed over to Sh. Suresh Kumar, SHO PS Kanera. The Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the Patwari concerned and procured the revenue record of the place of seizure, which was recorded as government pasture land standing in the name of village Gilund. During the course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer claims to have received information to the effect that the seized poppy straw had been concealed by Gopi Lal Meena of village Medikheda in connivance with Aladdin. Both were arrested. It is alleged that Aladdin gave an information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officer revealing that 8 gunny bags of poppy straw were picked up from his house and 14 bags of poppy straw were collected from the house of Gopal and after being loaded on to the tractor of Gopi Lal, were taken to and concealed in the forest from where the recovery was effected later on. A search was made for locating Gopal but he was not found at his residence. The Investigating Officer also claims to have collected evidence to the effect that the tractor No.RJ09-R-5460 was used to transport the poppy straw and it was in the possession and control of the accused Gopi Lal. After initial investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused Gopi Lal and Aladdin. Thereafter, the accused Gopal was also arrested and a subsequent charge-sheet was filed against him as well for the offence under Sections 8/15 of the NDPS Act. 6. Charges were framed against the accused for the offences under Sections 8/15 and 8/25 of the NDPS Act. The prosecution examined as many as 32 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 39 documents. The accused, in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution allegations. After the statements of the accused had been recorded, the prosecution recalled and re-examined the witnesses PW28 Bharat Kumar, PW29 Bheru Lal, PW30 Nirbhay Ram, PW31 Gopi Lal and PW32 Satyaveer Singh. Thereafter, the accused were again questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied the allegations levelled by the prosecution but did not lead any evidence in defence. At the stage of the final arguments, the accused Gopi Lal absented from trial on 6.10.2015 on which his bail bonds were forfeited and he was declared to be absconding. Thereafter, the accused were again questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied the allegations levelled by the prosecution but did not lead any evidence in defence. At the stage of the final arguments, the accused Gopi Lal absented from trial on 6.10.2015 on which his bail bonds were forfeited and he was declared to be absconding. The learned trial Judge, vide judgment dated 19.10.2015 proceeded to convict the accused appellants for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them as stated above. Being aggrieved of the impugned judgment of conviction, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants moved an application for suspension of sentences on behalf of the accused appellants but rather than pursuing the same, he prayed that as there is no evidence worth the name on the entire record so as to connect the accused appellants with the alleged crime and since they are in custody, the appeal itself be heard at this stage. Learned Public Prosecutor agreed to the said prayer. 8. Upon this, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, final arguments have been heard for disposal of the appeal. 9. Shri ML Bishnoi, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that the recovery of the poppy straw was effected lying in an abandoned condition on government pasture land. Nobody was found near or around the contraband poppy straw. As per him, there is no evidence worth the name on the entire record so as to connect the accused with the recovered poppy straw. As such, he contended that the learned trial Judge committed serious error in facts as well as law in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act. He contended that the learned trial Judge relied upon the informations given by the accused to the Investigating Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in order to connect them with the recovered contraband Rs.1,50,000/-each, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one year’s additional rigorous imprisonment holding that the informations given by the accused and their consequent pointing out of the place of seizure to the Investigating Officer established beyond all manner of doubt that the contraband had been concealed by none other than the accused. He urged that a confessional information given by an accused to a Police Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act which does not lead to the discovery of any incriminating fact is totally inadmissible in evidence as the same would be hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. He contended that as the place of recovery was already known to the Investigating Officer, any information given by the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the effect that they had concealed the poppy straw at that place and the subsequent pointing out of the place of recovery was inconsequential and cannot be treated to be a piece of admissible evidence. 10. He further urged that during trial, the prosecution failed to exhibit the seized Muddamal in the self same condition in which it was seized and therefore, no primary evidence of the seizure was given before the trial court. He, therefore, urged that the conviction of the appellants in this case is totally illegal and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and they are entitled to be acquitted. 11. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor vehemently contended that during the course of the investigation, the accused gave informations under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officers PW27 Suresh Kumar Davariya and PW28 Bharat Kumar revealing that they had concealed the contraband poppy straw at the place of the seizure. The place where the contraband was secreted was deep inside the jungle and was not accessible to all and sundry. As a follow up of the informations given to the Investigating Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the accused led the Investigating Officers and pointed out the place of seizure. Thus, he contended that the exclusive knowledge regarding the place of concealment of the poppy straw can safely be presumed to be of the accused appellants. He urged that non-production of the Muddamal in the self same condition is not fatal to the prosecution case as no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused thereby. He contended that the learned trial Judge committed no error whatsoever in holding the appellants guilty of the charge under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act and sentencing them as above and therefore, the appeal should be rejected. 12. He contended that the learned trial Judge committed no error whatsoever in holding the appellants guilty of the charge under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act and sentencing them as above and therefore, the appeal should be rejected. 12. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material available on record. 13. It is an admitted case of the prosecution that the recovery of the contraband poppy straw was effected by PW24 Ram Ratan, the SHO Police Station Shambhupura on 3.8.2003 while the same was lying in an unattended condition on govt. forest land. Significantly, the Seizure Officer did not prepare any site inspection plan at the time of the seizure. In this background, for fixing the liability on the head of the appellants accused, the prosecution was under an obligation to lead positive clinching evidence to the effect that the appellants accused had concealed the contraband at the place of seizure. As per the seizure memo, the bags of poppy straw were strewn around on the ground and were visible to the naked eye. The SHO PW24 Ram Ratan seized the contraband poppy straw vide seizure memo Ex.P9 prepared on 3.8.2003 at 5.45 PM. The identity of the accused is not disclosed in the recovery memo for the obvious reason that nobody was found near the contraband. It is also relevant to note here that the source information Ex.P8 also does not speak about the identity of the accused. 14. The substratum of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is noted hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:- PW-1 Mehboob Khan He was posted as a Head Constable at the Police Station Shambhupura on the relevant date and was a part of the raid party. He was also the Malkhana Incharge of the Police Station Shambhupura. He stated about the recovery of the poppy straw and also that the SHO handed him the seized contraband and the samples for being placed in safe custody in the Malkhana. He handed over the samples to the Head Constable Kailash on 28.8.2003, who deposited them at the FSL and furnished the receipt thereof to him on 30.8.2003. This witness did not state anything against the accused. He handed over the samples to the Head Constable Kailash on 28.8.2003, who deposited them at the FSL and furnished the receipt thereof to him on 30.8.2003. This witness did not state anything against the accused. PW-2 GangaRam He was a Motbir of the site inspection plan prepared in presence of the Patwari and the SHO Ram Ratan on 6.8.2003 but he denied that the site inspection memo Ex.P3 had been prepared in his presence. He denied knowing the accused. PW-3 Ramesh He was also a Motbir of the site plan Ex.P3. He too resiled from the prosecution story and was declared hostile. PW-4 Shanti Lal He was examined in order to prove the alleged spot verification conducted by the Investigating Officer (SHO Suresh Kumar PW-27) at the instance of the accused Gopi Lal. The witness denied the verification proceedings conducted vide memo Ex.P4 and turned hostile at the trial. PW-5 Bhajja He was also a witness of the document Ex.P4 and he too turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case regarding the alleged spot verification carried out at the instance of the accused Gopi Lal. PW-6 Gheesu Khan He was a witness of the document Ex.P6, the site plan prepared for proving that the accused appellant Aladdin got verified his own house as being the place from where 8 bags of poppy straw were loaded on to the tractor of Gopi Lal. The witness turned hostile and did not support the prosecution story. PW-7 Shanti Lal He was a witness of the document Ex.P7 being the spot verification memo prepared by the Investigating Officer at the instance of the accused Gopi Lal and Aladdin. The witness did not support the prosecution story and was declared hostile. PW-8 Narayan Lal He was also a witness of document Ex.P7. He too turned hostile and did not support the prosecution story. PW-9 Chhagan Lal He was a witness to the document Ex.P6 and did not support the prosecution story and turned hostile. PW-10 Chhagan Lal He was posted as a Head Constable at the Police Station Shambhupura and was examined to prove that the source information was sent to the superior officers under Section 42 of the Act. PW-11 Madan He was examined as being the Motbir witness of the seizure proceedings. He did not support the prosecution story and turned hostile. PW-10 Chhagan Lal He was posted as a Head Constable at the Police Station Shambhupura and was examined to prove that the source information was sent to the superior officers under Section 42 of the Act. PW-11 Madan He was examined as being the Motbir witness of the seizure proceedings. He did not support the prosecution story and turned hostile. PW-12 Bheru Lal He was also a Motbir witness of the seizure proceedings. He did not support the prosecution story at the trial and turned hostile. PW-13 Dalichand He was a witness of the document Ex.P14 pertaining to the spot verification got conducted by the SHO Suresh Kumar at the instance of Gopi Lal of his own Bara which was allegedly used to park the tractor trolley allegedly used to transport the contraband poppy straw. PW-14 Kailash Chand He was a witness of the seizure proceedings and also was the carrier of the samples from the Police Station to FSL. His evidence is inconsequential for proving the involvement of the accused in the crime. PW-15 Prabhu He was a witness regarding the spot verification done at the instance of Gopi Lal during investigation. This witness was also declared hostile at the trial as he did not support the prosecution case. PW-16 Mangi Lal He was posted at the SP Office at Chittorgarh. He proved the factum of the transit of the samples of the case at hand to the FSL. PW-17 Bheru Lal He was a witness proposed by the prosecution in order to prove that the tractor belonging to Nand Lal was being used by the accused Gopi Lal. This witness turned hostile at the trial and did not give any statement implicating the accused. PW-18 Nand Lal He was proposed by the prosecution in order to prove that the tractor seized in this case stood in his name and that his son the accused Gopi Lal was using the same. The witness turned hostile and did not give any evidence incriminating the accused. PW-19 Dalpat Singh This witness investigated the matter for a while and seized the tractor No.RJ09-R-5460 allegedly used for transportation of the contraband. This witness too did not give any evidence whatsoever so as to prove the complicity of the accused in the crime. The witness, in his cross-examination admitted that the documents regarding the ownership of the tractor were not procured during investigation. This witness too did not give any evidence whatsoever so as to prove the complicity of the accused in the crime. The witness, in his cross-examination admitted that the documents regarding the ownership of the tractor were not procured during investigation. The tractor was registered in the name of Nand Lal. He also admitted that no documentary evidence was available to link the tractor with the accused Gopi Lal. PW-20 Raja Miyan This witness was a posted at the Transport Department. He deposed that the registration certificate of the tractor No.RJ09-R-5460 was issued in the name of Rupa Meena and Nand Lal Meena. PW-21 Balu Ram This witness was examined to prove the recovery of the tractor vide seizure memo Ex.P21 but he denied his signatures on the document and was declared hostile. PW-22 Bhanwar This witness was examined to prove the recovery Lal of the contraband poppy straw made on 3.8.2003 He did not state anything against the accused. PW-23 Suresh Chandra This witness was posted as the Patwari Halka, Gilund on the relevant date. The site inspection plan Ex.P3 was prepared in his presence on 6.8.2003. He stated that as per the revenue record, the khasra number of the place from where the recovery was effected was 3681 and the land stood in the name of village Gilund. PW-24 Ram Ratan He was the Seizure Officer. He stated that he received the source information Ex.P8 regarding concealment of poppy straw in the forest. The source information was forwarded to the superior officers. Thereafter, he formed a team and proceeded to the place where the contraband was lying and effected recovery of 22 bags (13 hessian and 9 plastic) containing poppy straw vide recovery memo Ex.P9 and after returning to the Police Station, he registered the FIR No.172/2003. It is significant to note here that the witness did not name the accused in his statement. During the course of the testimony of the witnesses, the prosecution attempted to exhibit the samples and the Muddamal in the Court. It is significant to note here that the witness did not name the accused in his statement. During the course of the testimony of the witnesses, the prosecution attempted to exhibit the samples and the Muddamal in the Court. The relevant portion of the testimony of the witness in this regard has a material bearing on the fate of the instant appeal and is thus, quoted hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference: uksV% ,p-lh-cyoarflag dkfu-u-425 tks U;k;ky; es mifLFkr gS mUgksus Fkkuk ‘kEHkwiqjk ls eky[kkuk mifLFkr fd;kA dUVªksy lsEiy ch&2 vkfVZdy &1 gS] ftl ij , ls ch esjs] lh ls M+h xokg enuyky ds gLrk{kj gS rFkk ,Dl LFkku ij uewuk lhy gSA okbZ LFkku ij nwljs ekSrohj ds vxwaBk fu’kkuh gSA dUVªksy lsEiy vk&2 vkfVZdy &2 gS] ftl ij , ls ch ls esjs] lh ls Mh xokg enuyky ds gLrk{kj gS] ,Dl ds LFkku ij PW-25 Raees He was also a witness of the seizure proceedings Mohd. but did not give any incriminating evidence against the accused. PW-26 Kailash He was also a witness of the seizure proceedings Chand He did not state anything against the accused and in cross-examination, admitted that the recovery was made from an open place accessible to all and sundry. PW-27 Suresh Kumar Dawariya This witness was the most material witness examined by the prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused. He was posted at the Police Station Kanera at the relevant time. The investigation of the FIR No.172/2003 dated 3.8.2003 was handed over to him on 6.8.2003.The Officer prepared the site inspection plan Ex.P3 with the aid of the Seizure Officer SHO Ram Ratan and the Patwari Suresh Chandra. Thus, evidently, Shri Suresh Kumar came to know of the place of recovery on that very day. He claims to have received source information that the appellant Aladdin and the co-accused Gopi Lal were the perpetrators of the crime. Thereupon, he arrested these two accused on 7.8.2003. He recorded the informations alleged to have been voluntarily given by these two accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and as a follow up, prepared the spot inspection memos of the places pointed out by the accused. Thereupon, he arrested these two accused on 7.8.2003. He recorded the informations alleged to have been voluntarily given by these two accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and as a follow up, prepared the spot inspection memos of the places pointed out by the accused. Information Ex.P33 under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was recorded at the behest of Gopi Lal wherein he stated that he collected 8 bags of poppy straw from the Bara (courtyard) of Aladdin and 14 bags of poppy straw from the Bara of Gopal Gujar, loaded the same on to his tractor trolley took them to the Jungle near the village PW-28 Bharat Kumar The witness claims to have arrested the appellant Gopal vide arrest memo Ex.P36 dated 25.7.2004. The accused Gopal then allegedly gave an information Ex.P37 dated 26.7.2004 to him revealing that he could point out the place where, he alongwith Gopi Lal and Aladdin had unloaded the poppy straw. The spot memo Ex.P38 dated 27.7.2004 of the place of recovery was allegedly prepared on the pointing out by the accused Gopal. This witness in his examination in chief did not give out the exact details of the information given by the accused. He simply exhibited the documents. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that he could not collect any independent evidence to link the appellant Gopal with the accused Gopi Lal and Aladdin. PW-29 Bheru Lal He was a witness in the arrest memo of the accused Gopal. PW-30 NirbhayRam He was examined to prove the spot memo Ex.P38 prepared at the instance of the accused Gopal. PW-31 Gopi Lal He submitted the subsequent charge-sheet against the accused Gopal. PW-32 Satyaveer Singh He gave evidence regarding issuance of a poppy cultivation licence to Aladdin S/o Ali Mohd. in the year 2002-03. 15. A specific argument was raised before the trial Court that the Muddamal (case property) was not proved by exhibiting the same in the original form in which it was seized and thus, the prosecution failed to lead primary evidence of the seizure in order to establish that contraband poppy straw weighing 580 Kgs. was actually recovered in the case at hand. The trial Court rejected the said argument by relying on the Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Gian Chand Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013)14 SCC 420 . 16. was actually recovered in the case at hand. The trial Court rejected the said argument by relying on the Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Gian Chand Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013)14 SCC 420 . 16. Another argument was raised before the learned trial Judge that there is no evidence worth the name on the entire record so as to connect the accused with the recovered contraband. The learned trial Judge, while dealing with this argument placed reliance on the informations given by the accused to the Investigating Officers under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the consequent spot verification memos allegedly prepared at their instance and proceeded to hold that such a discovery was only possible if the place of concealment was exclusively in the knowledge of the accused and taking aid of the presumption available under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, proceeded to convict and sentence the accused for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act. 17. Firstly coming to the argument that the Muddamal was not proved by the prosecution and the effect thereof on the finding of guilt recorded by the trial Court against the accused. Indisputably, the accused are charged with the allegation of dealing in contraband poppy straw and thus, in order to bring home the charge, the prosecution would be under a burden to prove the alleged recovery by leading cogent convincing evidence of the seizure. Primary evidence of the seizure would be the seized contraband itself. 18. Leading primary evidence of the seized Muddamal by producing and exhibiting it in the court in the self same condition it was seized is essential to prove the factum of recovery as conclusively held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Noor Agha VS. State of Punjab & Ors. reported in 2008 CrLR (SC) 655 and Jitendra & Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2003-04 (Supp) CrLR (SC) 699, Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal v. State of M.P. reported in AIR 2011 Supreme Court 1335 and Vijay Jain Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2013(14) SCC 527 as well this Court’s judgments in the cases of Thakra Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan being S.B.Cr. Appeal No.311/2009 decided on 4.10.2013 and Bhagirath Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2014(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.)-117. State of M.P. reported in 2013(14) SCC 527 as well this Court’s judgments in the cases of Thakra Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan being S.B.Cr. Appeal No.311/2009 decided on 4.10.2013 and Bhagirath Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2014(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.)-117. Needless to say that in cases involving huge recovery of narcotics, the prosecution would be faced with a great practical difficulty of leading primary evidence of the seized goods by producing and exhibiting them in the court because owing to passage of time and by exposure to elements, the packets of contraband could possibly deteriorate to a state beyond identification. It is common knowledge that Police Stations in the State do not have proper storage facilities for the safekeeping of narcotics drugs particularly when the volume of the seized contraband is extremely large. It is to avoid this unsavory situation and to save the prosecution from the burden of firstly, arranging for a huge storage space for keeping the seized contraband secure and secondly, the cumbersome task of producing and exhibiting it in the court, that the legislature introduced Section 52A in the NDPS Act providing for a precise failsafe procedure to ensure that these eventualities can be avoided. The provision reads as under: “52A. Disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. (1) The Central Government may, having regard to the hazardous nature of any narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, their vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraints of proper storage space or anyother relevant considerations, by notification published in the Official Gazette, specify such narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or class of narcotic drugs or class of psychotropic substances which shall, as soon as may be after their seizure, be disposed of by such officer and in such manner as that Government may from time to time, determine after following the procedure hereinafter specified. (2) Where any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance has been seized and forwarded to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station or to the officer empowered under section 53, the officer referred to in sub-section (1) shall prepare an inventory of such narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances containing such details relating to their description, quality, quantity, mode of packing, marks, numbers or such other identifying particulars of the narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or the packing in which they are packed, country of origin and other particulars as the officer referred to in sub-section (1) may consider relevant to the identity of the narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances in any proceedings under this Act and make an application, to any Magistrate for the purpose of- (a) certifying the correctness of the inventory so prepared; or (b) taking, in the presence of such Magistrate, photographs of such drugs or substances and certifying such photographs as true; or (c) allowing to draw representative samples of such drugs or substances, in the presence of such Magistrate and certifying the correctness of any list of samples so drawn. (3) Where an application is made under sub-section (2), the Magistrate shall, as soon as may be, allow the application. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every court trying an offence under this Act, shall treat the inventory, the photographs of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances and any list of samples drawn under subsection (2) and certified by the Magistrate, as primary evidence in respect of such offence.” 19. As per this provision, soon after the recovery, the Officer in charge of the Police Station concerned or the empowered officer is under a legal obligation to draw representative samples, prepare inventory and have photography done of the seized contraband in the presence of the concerned Magistrate. Thereafter, there would remain no need to produce and exhibit the Muddamal in the Court during the course of the trial if any. Exhibiting and proving the inventory, the representative samples and the photographs prepared under Section 52A would be treated as primary evidence of the seized contraband. 20. In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge should have comedown heavily upon the concerned Police Officers for their failure to comply with the requirement of Section 52A. Exhibiting and proving the inventory, the representative samples and the photographs prepared under Section 52A would be treated as primary evidence of the seized contraband. 20. In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge should have comedown heavily upon the concerned Police Officers for their failure to comply with the requirement of Section 52A. The learned trial Judge observed at para No.44A of the impugned judgment that the Seizure Officer PW.24 Ramratan proved 10 control samples in a sealed condition. The remaining control samples were not identifiable. The court simply washed its hands off during testimony of the witness noting that the seized Muddamal being excessive in quantity, was kept outside the court and presumed that the prosecution led primary evidence of the seized goods. On going through the above quoted portion of the testimony of the witness Ramratan, it is evident that the trial Court, while reaching to this conclusion, adverted to pure conjectures and surmises in order to give redemption to the prosecution which miserably failed in its obligation to lead primary evidence of the alleged seizure. The witness, Ram Ratan PW.24 in his cross-examination clearly admitted that the Muddamal, which was produced by him during evidence was packed in bags different from the ones in which it was originally seized. The Muddamal produced during evidence was not having any identifiable marks, seals, chits etc. The Muddamal was originally seized in 22 bags whereas, only 15 bags were produced during evidence. It is obvious that the trial Court appears to have been swayed by its own perception regarding the guilt of the accused and totally overlooked and ignored these material admissions appearing in the cross-examination of the Seizure Officer. 21. As a matter of fact, in this Court’s opinion, when the case property was produced for being exhibited by way of primary evidence, the trial Judge was under an obligation to take note of condition and to record it in the Court’s language. However, the learned trial Judge failed to do so. This omission on the part of the learned trial Judge is manifest from the circumstance that even article numbers were not appended on the Muddamal produced during evidence of the witness Ram Ratan PW.24. However, the learned trial Judge failed to do so. This omission on the part of the learned trial Judge is manifest from the circumstance that even article numbers were not appended on the Muddamal produced during evidence of the witness Ram Ratan PW.24. Rather than performing its pious duty, the trial Court adopted a measure of conjectures and surmises and absolved the prosecution of its duty to lead primary evidence of the seizure by observing that the Muddamal was lying outside the court. Taking primary evidence would definitely require the court to take judicial notice of the goods produced before it. By not doing so, the learned trial Judge failed in his duty. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal v. State of M.P. reported in AIR 2011 Supreme Court 1335 considered a similar controversy and held as below:- “12. Last but not the least, the alleged narcotic powder seized from the possession of the accused, including the appellant was never produced before the trial court as a material exhibit and once again there is no explanation for its non-production. There is, thus, no evidence to connect the forensic report with the substance that was seized from the possession of the appellant or the other accused. 13. It may be noted here that in Jitendra and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 562 : ( AIR 2003 SC 4236 ), on similar facts this Court held that the material placed on record by the prosecution did not bring home the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and it would be unsafe to maintain their conviction on that basis. In Jitendra (supra), the Court observed and held as under:- "The evidence to prove that charas and ganja were recovered from the possession of the accused consisted of the evidence of the police officers and the panch witnesses. The panchwitnesses turned hostile. Thus, we find that apart from the testimony of Rajendra Pathak (PW 7), Angad Singh (PW 8) and Sub-Inspector D.J. Rai (PW 6), there is no independent witness as to the recovery of the drugs from the possession of the accused. The charas and ganja alleged to have been seized from the possession of the accused were not even produced before the trial court, so as to connect them with the samples sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The charas and ganja alleged to have been seized from the possession of the accused were not even produced before the trial court, so as to connect them with the samples sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. There is no material produced in the trial, apart from the interested testimony of the police officers, to show that the charas and ganja were seized from the possession of the accused or that the samples sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory were taken from the drugs seized from the possession of the accused. Although the High Court noticed the fact that the charas and ganja alleged to have been seized from the custody of the accused had neither been produced in the court, nor marked as articles, which ought to have been done, the High Court brushed aside the contention byobserving that it would not vitiate the conviction as it had been proved that the samples were sent to the Chemical Examiner in a properly sealed condition and those were found to be charas and ganja. The High Court observed, "non-production of these commodities before the court is not fatal to the prosecution. The defence also did not insist during the trial that these commodities should be produced". The High Court relied on Section 465, Cr. P.C. to hold that non-production of the material object was a mere procedural irregularity and did not cause prejudice to the accused. 6. In our view, the view taken by the High Court is unsustainable. In the trial it was necessary for the prosecution to establish by cogent evidence that the alleged quantities of charas and ganja were seized from the possession of the accused. The best evidence would have been the seized materials which ought to have been produced during the trial and marked as material objects. There is no explanation for this failure to produce them. Mere oral evidence as to their features and production of panchnama does not discharge the heavy burden which lies on the prosecution, particularly where the offence is punishable with a stringent sentence as under the NDPS Act. In this case, we notice that panchas have turned hostile so the panchnama is nothing but a document written by the police officer concerned. The suggestion made by the defence in the cross-examination is worthy of notice. In this case, we notice that panchas have turned hostile so the panchnama is nothing but a document written by the police officer concerned. The suggestion made by the defence in the cross-examination is worthy of notice. It was suggested to the prosecution witnesses that the landlady of the house in collusion with the police had lodged a false case only for evicting the accused from the house in which they were living. Finally, we notice that the investigating officer was also not examined. Against this background, to say that, despite the panch witnesses having turned hostile, the non-examination of the investigating officer and non-production of the seized drugs, the conviction under the NDPS Act can still be sustained, is far-fetched." 23. This very issue was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Jain Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2013(14) SCC 527 and the Court held as below: “These are appeals by way of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgment and order dated 21-2-2011 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Vijay Jain v. State of M.P.1 2. The facts very briefly are that on 5-5-2004, R.C. Pathak, Thanedar Incharge (TI) of Police Station Annapura conducted raid at 1515 hrs at Kshitij Apartment, Usha Nagar Square and apprehended Nilesh Suryakant Shah, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 484 of 2013 outside Flat No. 305 of the apartment as he was alleged to have been carrying brown sugar in a suitcase. After seizing the alleged brown sugar from Nilesh, R.C. Pathak entered Flat No. 305 and apprehended the appellant, Vijay Jain as it was alleged that he also had brown sugar in his clothes. R.C. Pathak also seized the alleged brown sugar from Vijay. Thereafter he handed over investigation to his successor, R.D. Bhardwaj, Thanedar Incharge of Raj Nagar Police Station and after investigation charge-sheet was filed against Nilesh and Vijay for the offence under Sections 8/21 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “the NDPS Act”). 3. The two appellants denied the charges and trial was conducted by the Special Judge (NDPS), Indore. At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses. Shirish Babu Tiwari and Manoj Dubey who witnessed the seizure were examined as PWs 2 and 3. 3. The two appellants denied the charges and trial was conducted by the Special Judge (NDPS), Indore. At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses. Shirish Babu Tiwari and Manoj Dubey who witnessed the seizure were examined as PWs 2 and 3. R.C. Pathak was examined as PW 11 and Lokendra Singh Yadav who was incharge of the malkhana in which the brown sugar was said to have been stored was examined as PW 5. The learned Special Judge (NDPS), Indore by judgment dated 17-8-2007, convicted the appellants and sentenced them both to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs 1 lakh on each. Aggrieved, the appellants filed Criminal Appeals Nos. 1048 and 1172 of 2007 before the High Court, but by the impugned common judgment, the High Court maintained the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeals. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed these appeals. 4. Mr Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants raised several contentions to assail the conviction of both the appellants. For deciding these appeals, we will only consider the contention of Mr Jain that the contraband goods have not been produced before the trial court. He submitted that this Court has held in Jitendra v. State of M.P.2 that where there is non-production of the contraband goods alleged to have been seized from the accused, the conviction for the offence under Section 20(b)of the NDPS Act cannot be sustained. He also cited the decision of this Court in Ashok v. State of M.P.3 in which a similar view has been taken that where the narcotic drug or the psychotropic substance alleged to have been seized from the possession of the accused is not produced before the trial court as a material exhibit and there is no explanation for its non-production, there is no evidence to connect the forensic expert report with the drug or the substance that was seized from the possession of the accused and in such a case the conviction is not maintainable. 5. Mr Jain further submitted that although the contention that the contraband goods were not produced before the court was raised, the trial court recorded a finding that on 24-2-2005, the seized materials were deposited in the court and this finding was arrived at by referring to Item 4 in the order-sheet of the court dated 24-2-2005. 5. Mr Jain further submitted that although the contention that the contraband goods were not produced before the court was raised, the trial court recorded a finding that on 24-2-2005, the seized materials were deposited in the court and this finding was arrived at by referring to Item 4 in the order-sheet of the court dated 24-2-2005. He submitted that the trial court has held that a suitcase had been produced before the court and the seized articles were kept in the suitcase. He submitted that the evidence of PW 11 on the contrary is that a big suitcase from the store of materials was produced before the trial court and when the lock of the suitcase was broken and the suitcase was opened, a big packet wrapped in cloth was found and a blue-coloured polythene was seen in which clothes were there. He submitted that the finding of the trial court, therefore, that the contraband goods were produced in the court was perverse as there was no evidence whatsoever to support the said finding. He argued that though a submission was also made before the High Court on behalf of the appellants that the contraband was not produced in the court, the High court brushed aside the submission by recording a bald finding that the contraband has been produced before the court without delay. He submitted that the finding of the High Court that the contraband has been produced in court is, therefore, contrary to the evidence recorded. 6. Mr Jain submitted that the prosecution had also taken a stand in the alternative before the trial court that the contraband goods were destroyed and, produced before the trial court only the samples of the contraband goods. He referred to the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act to submit that in a case of destruction of contraband goods the procedure as laid down in sub-section (2) of Section 52-A of the Act has to be followed and in case of destruction, the inventory prepared at the time before destruction and the photographs of the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the list of samples drawn under sub-section (2) of Section 52-A of the Act as certified by the Magistrate are treated as primary evidence in respect of the offence. He vehemently argued that since no such procedure has been followed, the alternative plea taken by the prosecution that the contraband goods have been destroyed and could not be produced before the court cannot be accepted. 7. Mr Jain also submitted that PW 3 in his evidence before the court has admitted that the police personnel did not take search of anyone in front of him and there was no action in front of him regarding seizure of the brown sugar from any person nor any action was done regarding preparation of samples and sealing nor was any action taken in front of him with regard to affixing chits and seizing the materials nor with regard to arrest of any person. He submitted that PW 3 also stated in his evidence that his signatures were only taken on A to A part of Exhibits P-5 to P-6 and B to B part of Exhibits P-3 and P-4 and from A to A part of Exhibits P-7 to 26 in the panchnama. He vehemently argued that prosecution has thus not been able to prove through PW 3 that the contraband goods were actually seized from the possession of the appellants. He pointed out that PW 3 in fact has been declared hostile. He submitted that similarly PW 2 has stated in his evidence that no panch was taken to the site and that would show that the signatures were taken in the panchnama by the police without taking the seizure witnesses to the place where the materials were alleged to have been seized from the possession of the appellants. He submitted that the facts in this case, therefore, are similar to the case in Jitendra2 in which this Court found that the panch witnesses had turned hostile and held that in the absence of non-production of the seized drugs the conviction under the NDPS Act was not maintainable. 3. 8. Ms Ayesha Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh, on the other hand, relied on the judgments of the trial court as well as the High Court for the findings recorded therein that the contraband goods were produced before the court. 3. 8. Ms Ayesha Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh, on the other hand, relied on the judgments of the trial court as well as the High Court for the findings recorded therein that the contraband goods were produced before the court. In the alternative, she submitted that it has been held by this Court in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab4 that even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments that the bulk quantity of heroin was destroyed, the samples were essentially to be produced and proved as primary evidence for the purpose of establishing the fact of recovery of heroin as envisaged under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act. She submitted that since the samples of the contraband goods in this case which were seized from the two appellants were produced and marked as Exhibits A-1, A-2 and B-1, B-2, the prosecution has been able to establish the fact of recovery of the contraband goods from the two appellants. 9. Para 96 of the judgment of this Court in Noor Aga case4 on which the learned counsel for the State very strongly relies is quoted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 464) “96. Last but not the least, physical evidence relating to three samples taken from the bulk amount of heroin was also not produced. Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the bulk quantity was destroyed, the samples were essential to be produced and proved as primary evidence for the purpose of establishing the fact of recovery of heroin as envisaged under Section 52-A of the Act.” Thus in para 96 of the judgment in Noor Aga case4 this Court has held that the prosecution must in any case produce the samples even where the bulk quantity is said to have been destroyed. The observations of this Court in the aforesaid paragraph of the judgment do not say anything about the consequence of non-production of the contraband goods before the court in a prosecution under the NDPS Act. 10. The observations of this Court in the aforesaid paragraph of the judgment do not say anything about the consequence of non-production of the contraband goods before the court in a prosecution under the NDPS Act. 10. On the other hand, on a reading of this Court’s judgment in Jitendra case2, we find that this Court has taken a view that in the trial for an offence under the NDPS Act, it was necessary for the prosecution to establish by cogent evidence that the alleged quantities of the contraband goods were seized from the possession of the accused and the best evidence to prove this fact is to produce during the trial, the seized materials as material objects and where the contraband materials alleged to have been seized are not produced and there is no explanation for the failure to produce the contraband materials by the prosecution, mere oral evidence that the materials were seized from the accused would not be sufficient to make out an offence under the NDPS Act particularly when the panch witnesses have turned hostile. Again, in Ashok3 this Court found that the alleged narcotic powder seized from the possession of the accused was not produced before the trial court as material exhibit and there was no explanation for its non-production and this Court held that there was therefore no evidence to connect the forensic report with the substance that was seized from the possession of the appellant. 11. In the present case, finding of the trial court that the in a suitcase is lowing “81. Note.—A big suitcase from the store materials on which No. 466/05 is written has been received in a white cloth along with seal of the sealing material. In this the lock is of numbers and the lock is not getting open because of this AGP is directed to call some technical person for opening the lock, on this AGP had called Shri Shakoor who expressed that the lock is of numbers and cannot be opened, it can be broken. In the case, the evidence material is important and therefore it was directed to break the lock, the lock was opened. In the suitcase on the opening a big packet wrapped in cloth was found but the cloth is torn and blue colour polythene is being seen in which clothes are there. In the case, the evidence material is important and therefore it was directed to break the lock, the lock was opened. In the suitcase on the opening a big packet wrapped in cloth was found but the cloth is torn and blue colour polythene is being seen in which clothes are there. The cloth which is rolled on blue colour polythene there is no seal visible on it, nor any description is being seen, because the cloth is damp and has been in contaminated condition and is torn and no note is marked on it. In the polythene there are 5 pants and 5 shirts which are in wet condition. *** 111. Today I cannot say that in what colour bag the rest of the substance was packed in the bag. The material which was seized from Vijay Jain, out of it two samples 25-25 gm were made and marked B-1 and B-2 which were shown to the witness when he said that they were taken out from the material found with Vijay Jain on site. No other packet except the two samples and rest of material were made on the site. The said both packets which have been submitted in the court are sealed and on them the seizure chit is not affixed showed the B-1 and B-2 packet and asked that the seal of police station is affixed then the witness said the seal of police station is affixed then the witness said that it is the seal of the Tahsildar, Indore. Leaving aside rest of the substance and mobile the other seized material from Vijay is submitted in the court. This is true that I had not given the mobile for sealing to the Incharge of stores. Today I cannot say where that mobile is.” Thus the only evidence before the court was that in the suitcase in which the contraband goods were allegedly kept when opened, there was only a big packet wrapped in cloth and the cloth was torn and there was a blue-coloured polythene in which there were clothes. There is no mention in the evidence of PW 11 of any brown sugar having been found in the suitcase. There is no mention in the evidence of PW 11 of any brown sugar having been found in the suitcase. There is, however, evidence that samples were prepared of 25-25 gm which were shown to the witnesses and were marked B-1 and B-2 but we find that PW 3 has stated before the court in his examination that these samples were not prepared in his presence and PW 2 has stated before the court that the witnesses were not taken to the site where the materials were seized. 12. We are thus of the view that as the prosecution has not produced the brown sugar before the Court and has also not offered any explanation for non-production of the brown sugar alleged to have been seized from the appellants and as the evidence of the witnesses (PW 2 and PW 3) to the seizure of the materials does not establish the seizure of the brown sugar from the possession of the appellants, the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants and the judgment of the High Court maintaining the conviction are not sustainable.” 24.The trial Court bypassed this substantial argument which was based on the above judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which lay down a ratio decidendi on the issue by relying on the Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Gian Chand (supra). An observation was made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Chand’s case that there was nothing on record to show that the case property had been tampered with. Nevertheless, the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Chand clearly appear to be in the nature of obiter dicta whereas, the judgments in the cases of Jitendra, Ashok and Vijay Jain (supra), lay down the ratio decidendi on the issue and conclusively postulate that production of the case property in the court is essential for leading primary evidence of the seizure. 25.As per the rule of stare decisis and principles of interpretation, when there are conflicting judgments on the very same issue, the judgment rendered by a Larger Bench would have a binding force. In case, conflicting judgments are rendered on an issue by Benches constituted of same number of Judges, then it would have to be seen as to whether or not, the later judgment takes note of the earlier judgment. In case, conflicting judgments are rendered on an issue by Benches constituted of same number of Judges, then it would have to be seen as to whether or not, the later judgment takes note of the earlier judgment. If the view taken earlier is not considered in the subsequent judgment rendered by the Bench constituted of the same number of Judges, then the earlier judgment would prevail. This cardinal principle has been laid down in a catena of judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Ready reference may be had to the following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. reported in AIR 2014 SC 1745 :- “15. It cannot be over-emphasised that the discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the application of the perincuriam rule is of great importance, since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of Courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the Court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a Co-equal or Larger Bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of this Court. It must immediately be clarified that the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta. It is often encountered in High Courts that two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar. We think that the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest view as the succeeding ones would fall in the category of per incuriam.” 26. As, in the case of Gian Chand, the earlier judgments in the cases of Jitendra and Ashok (supra) dealing with the same issue, were not considered, the view taken in the earlier judgments would be binding. As, in the case of Gian Chand, the earlier judgments in the cases of Jitendra and Ashok (supra) dealing with the same issue, were not considered, the view taken in the earlier judgments would be binding. That apart, as has been noticed above, the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Chand are more in the nature of obiter dicta whereas, the view expressed in the cases of Jitendra, Ashok and Vijay (supra) is in the nature of ratio decidendi and thus, these judgments have to be accepted as laying down a binding precedent on the issue. 27. In view of the above discussion, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that during trial of cases under the NDPS Act, leading primary evidence by producing and exhibiting the Muddamal and the samples in the Court is essential to prove the seizure. The only exception by which the prosecution can avoid this burden is by following the procedure prescribed under Section 52A of the NDPS Act and by exhibiting the inventory, photographs and the representative samples prepared under the said provision during trial. In the case at hand, admittedly, the investigating agency neither prepared the inventory, photography and samples under Section 52A of the Act nor were the seized goods produced and exhibited in the court in the self same condition and thus, there is no option but to discard the prosecution evidence regarding the alleged seizure. 28. Now coming to the second argument that the prosecution failed to connect the accused with the recovered contraband. 29. On going through the impugned judgment, this Court is of the firm opinion that the learned trial Judge exhibited total ignorance with the well cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence while connecting the accused with the alleged seizure and convicting them for the offence under Section 8/15 of the Act and sentencing them to an extremely harsh punishment. The recovery of the contraband was admittedly made while the same was lying abandoned on government land. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that an information given by an accused to the Police Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is only admissible to the extent it leads to the discovery of an incriminating fact. A fact already known cannot be rediscovered. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that an information given by an accused to the Police Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is only admissible to the extent it leads to the discovery of an incriminating fact. A fact already known cannot be rediscovered. In the case at hand, the trial Judge drew much water from the fact that the accused gave informations to the SHO PW-27 Suresh Kumar and the SHO Bharat Kumar PW.28 under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and in pursuance thereof, the respective places were pointed out by the accused. The Investigating Officers prepared the spot memos in terms of the informations given by the accused. On the basis of the information given by Aladdin, the Investigating Officer prepared, the site inspection plan of his house Ex.P6 dated 10.8.2003 and so also of the place of recovery Ex.P7 dated 10.8.2003. Suffice it to say that nothing incriminating was discovered at the house of the accused. So far as the place of recovery is concerned, the same was already known to the Investigating Officer Suresh Kumar, who had already prepared the site inspection plan Ex.P3 on 6.8.2003 at the instance of Ram Ratan the Seizure Officer and the Patwari and thus, the spot verification proceedings conducted vide document Ex.P7 are of no worth at all. 30. The accused Gopal was arrested by SHO Bharat Kumar PW.28. As noted above, the SHO Bharat Kumar in his testimony did not give any details of the information given by Gopal under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He simply exhibited the information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act as Ex.P37 and thereafter, prepared the spot memo Ex.P38 dated 27.7.2004. The failure of the Investigating Officer to state the details of the information given by the accused makes the information inadmissible. Otherwise also, the information did not lead to the discovery of any incriminating fact because the place of recovery was already known from before. Even a lay man can understand that a fact already known cannot be rediscovered. 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a similar situation in the case of Thimma v. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1871 and held as below:- “10. Even a lay man can understand that a fact already known cannot be rediscovered. 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a similar situation in the case of Thimma v. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1871 and held as below:- “10. Reliance on behalf of the prosecution was also placed on the information given by the appellant which led to the discovery of the dead body and other articles found at the spot. It was contended that the information received from him related distinctly to the facts discovered and, therefore, the statement conveying the information was admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. This information it was argued also lends support to the appellant's guilt. It appears to us that when P. W. 4 was suspected of complicity in this offence he would in all probability have disclosed to the police the existence of the dead body and the other articles at the place where they were actually found. Once a fact is discovered from other sources there can be no fresh discovery even if relevant information is extracted from the accused and Courts have to be watchful against the ingenuity of the investigating officer in this respect so that the protection afforded by the wholesome provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act is not whittled down by the mere manipulation of the record of case diary.It would, in the circumstances be somewhat unsafe to rely on this information for proving the appellant's guilt. We are accordingly disinclined to take into consideration this statement.” 32. In the case of "Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra" reported in AIR 1976 SC 483 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the object and scope of Section 27 of Evidence Act and held as below:- “Sub-Inspector Thorat PW 7, conducted the investigation. After making inquiries from the Regional Transport Office, he traced the owner of the car, BML 6649, and requested him to send his car-driver to the Police station. Accordingly, the driver, Babu Vithal (PW 5), accompanied by the accused (appellant) appeared before the Sub-Inspector in the Police Station on September 26, 1968. The Sub-Inspector took the accused into custody. He then called the Panchas (including PW 6) and, in their presence, interrogated the accused who made a statement which was recorded by the Sub-Inspector. Accordingly, the driver, Babu Vithal (PW 5), accompanied by the accused (appellant) appeared before the Sub-Inspector in the Police Station on September 26, 1968. The Sub-Inspector took the accused into custody. He then called the Panchas (including PW 6) and, in their presence, interrogated the accused who made a statement which was recorded by the Sub-Inspector. Rendered into English, this statement (incorporated in the Pnachnama Ex. C) reads: "I will tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical drums which I took out from the Haji Bunder on 1st August." . 4. The accused then led the Police Officer and the Panchas to a Musafirkhana in Crowford Market and pointed out the three drums lying there, bearing the markings, ACC I Phosphorous Pentaoxide'. Thereafter, the drums were identified by PW 1 as the same which had been stolen. 5. Among others, the prosecution examined M. Bhikaji (PW 1), the informant, Vishnu Sakharam (PW 2), the Gatekeeper, Govindji (PW 3) the Clearing Agent and Rasal Mohd. (PW 6), a panch witness of the discovery. The driver of the car BML 6649 was also put in the witness-box as PW 5. He turned hostile and the prosecution cross-examined him to impeach his credit. 6. The plea of the appellant was one of plain denial of the prosecution case. 10. Although the interpretation and scope of Section 27 has been the subject of several authoritative pronouncements, its application to concrete cases is not always free from difficulty. It will therefore be worthwhile at the outset, to have a short and swift glance at the section and be reminded of its requirements. The Section says: "Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved." 11. The expression "Provided that" together with the phrase "whether it amounts to a confession or not" shows that the section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to any extent, Sec. 24, also. The expression "Provided that" together with the phrase "whether it amounts to a confession or not" shows that the section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to any extent, Sec. 24, also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary for bringing this section into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only "so much of the information" as relates distinctly to that fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word "distinctly" means "directly", "indubitably" "strictly", "unmistakably". The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase "distinctly" relates "to the fact thereby discovered" (sic) (and?) is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered. 12. At one time it was held that the expression "fact discovered" in the section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact (see Sukhan v. Crown, ILR 10 Lah 283 = (AIR 1929 Lah 344) (FB); Gangu Chandra v. Emperor, ILR 56 Bom 172 = (AIR 1932 Bom 286). Now it is fairly settled that the expression "fact discovered" includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this (see Palukuri Kotayya v. Emperor, 74 Ind App 65 = ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ): (Udai Bhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 830 = ( AIR 1962 SC 1116 )). 13. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to be clear about the precise statement which had been made by the appellant to the Police Officer. This statement finds incorporation in the panchanama, Ex. C, and we have reproduced an English rendering of the same earlier in this judgment. While considering this statement, the High Court observed that the accused had stated that "he had kept them (drums) there". We have perused the original record of the statement which is in Hihdi, and we are of opinion that by no stretching of the words this statement can be so read or construed as has been done by the High Court. The copy Ex. C. of the Panchanama, in the Paper-book contains a correct English rendering of the same. What the accused had stated was: "I will tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical drums which I took out from the Haji Bunder on first August". It will be seen that he never said that it was he who had deposited the drums at the place from which they were produced. It seems the latter part of the statement which was an outright confession of the theft, was not completely ruled out of evidence and something of it was imported into and superimposed on the first part of the statement so as to fix the responsibility for deposit and possession of the stolen drums there, on the accused. 14. Having cleared the ground, we will now consider, in the light of the principles clarified above, the application of Section 27 to this statement of the accused. The first step in the process was to pinpoint the fact discovered in consequence of this statement. Obviously, in the present case, the threefold fact discovered was: (a) the chemical drums in question, (b) the place i. e. the Musafirkhana, Crawford Market, wherein they lay deposited and (c) the accused's knowledge of such deposit. The first step in the process was to pinpoint the fact discovered in consequence of this statement. Obviously, in the present case, the threefold fact discovered was: (a) the chemical drums in question, (b) the place i. e. the Musafirkhana, Crawford Market, wherein they lay deposited and (c) the accused's knowledge of such deposit. The next step would be to split up the statement into its components and to separate the admissible from the inadmissible portion or portions. Only those components or portions which were the immediate cause of the discovery would be legal evidence and not the rest which must be excised and rejected. Thus processed, in the instant case, only the first part of the statement, viz., "I will tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical drums" was the immediate and direct cause of the fact discovered. Therefore, this portion only was admissible under Section 27. The rest of the statement , namely, "which I took out from the Haji Bunder on first August", constituted only the past history of the drums or their theft by the accused; it was not the distinct and proximate cause of the discovery and had to be ruled out of evidence altogether. 15. After culling out and rejecting the inadmissible portion, it was to be considered further whether the admissible portion of the information taken in conjunction with the facts discovered was sufficient to draw the presumption that the accused was the thief or receiver of stolen property knowing it to be stolen. The answer to this question, in the circumstances of the case, had to be in the negative. The drums in question were found in the compound or yard of a Musafirkhana which was a place of rest and waiting for Musafirs (travellers). It was not alleged by the prosecution much less proved -that the drums were lying concealed, or that the compound was under the lock and key of the accused. There is not even an oblique hint that the place of the deposit of the drums was in any way under the control or occupation of the accused. The place being a Musafirkhana, was from its very nature accessible to all and sundry. 16. There is not even an oblique hint that the place of the deposit of the drums was in any way under the control or occupation of the accused. The place being a Musafirkhana, was from its very nature accessible to all and sundry. 16. It must be remembered that an inference under Section 114, Illustration (a) should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference from the circumstances of the given case, which cannot be explained on any other hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. Such is not the case here. 17. The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the admissible portion of the statement made by the accused, could give rise to two alternative hypotheses, equally possible, namely: (i) that it was the accused who had himself deposited the stolen drums in the Musafirkhana, or (ii) the accused only knew that the drums were lying at that place. The second hypothesis was wholly compatible with his innocence. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.” 33. Thus an information given by the accused to a Police Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act would be only admissible to the extent, it distinctly leads to the discovery of an incriminating fact. The remaining portion which is confessional in nature has to be discarded as it would be hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. In the case at hand, even if the testimony of PW27 Suresh Kumar is accepted, then also, so far as the accused appellant Aladdin is concerned, in pursuance of the informations given by him, the Investigating Officer Suresh Kumar simply went to the house of Aladdin, from where nothing incriminating was recovered. He also prepared the spot identification memo of the place of recovery at the instance of the appellant of which he was already having knowledge. Thus, these two informations are inadmissible in evidence and are inconsequential. The Investigating Officer Bharat Kumar, prepared the spot identification memo of the place of seizure in furtherance of the information given by the accused Gopal. Again, the place of seizure was already known to the Investigating Officer because the original site inspection plan was available on the investigation file prepared way-back on 6.8.2003. The Investigating Officer Bharat Kumar, prepared the spot identification memo of the place of seizure in furtherance of the information given by the accused Gopal. Again, the place of seizure was already known to the Investigating Officer because the original site inspection plan was available on the investigation file prepared way-back on 6.8.2003. The confessional part of the statement given by the accused to the Investigating Officers that they had collected and concealed poppy straw at a particular place, which they wanted to point out, would become admissible only if it had led recovery of the contraband or some other piece of incriminating evidence and not otherwise. 34. The independent witnesses associated with the preparation of these spot verification memos did not support the prosecution story and turned hostile at the trial. The learned trial Judge, while using these circumstances for convicting the accused showed total ignorance to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The informations given by the accused to the Investigating Officers under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the site plans prepared in pursuance thereof were totally inconsequential and could not have been used as admissible pieces of evidence so as to connect the accused with the alleged seizure. Even the Motbirs associated with the recovery conducted by Sh.Ram Ratan did not support the prosecution case and turned hostile. Another fact which goes to the root of the matter in the peculiar facts of the case is that the Seizure Officer PW24 Ram Ratan did not prepare the site inspection memo at the time of the recovery. This omission also makes the entire recovery doubtful. 35. As an upshot of the above discussion, this Court is of the firm opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Special Judge convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act is grossly illegal, perverse and consequently, unsustainable in facts as well as law. 36. The appeal thus deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment dated 19.10.2015 is hereby set aside. The accused are acquitted of the charges. They are in custody. They shall be released from custody forthwith if not wanted in any other case. SBCRLA No.1050/2015 Aladdin & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan 37. Record be sent back forthwith.