JUDGMENT 1. Managing Director of Syndicate Bank, Head Office Manipal is before this Court along with Assistant General Manager of the Bank concerned assailing the validity of the judgement and order dated 25.4.2007 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court wherein he has proceeded to allow Writ Petition No.46210 of 1999 (Ashok Kumar vs. Assistant General Manager, Syndicate Bank, Industrial Relation Cell, Zonal Office, Lucknow & ors). 2. Brief background of the case is that while working as Clerk at Varanasi Main Branch of Syndicate Bank (hereinafter referred as Bank), the petitioner-respondent had manipulated the bank's record and after altering the entries fraudulently diverted Rs.4978/- of the account holder Shiv Kumar Kothari to his SB account. For the said fraudulent act, the petitioner was served with a charge sheet dated 6.4.1995 by Dy. General Manager of the Bank. On receipt of the said charge sheet, the petitioner submitted his reply dated 2.5.1995, denying all the charges levelled against him. A departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner in which the bank had produced the original documents including the voucher dated 28.6.1994, occ register and copy of the SB account of petitioner apart from other documents. The Inquiry Officer concluded the inquiry and submitted his report dated 6.1.1999. In pursuance thereof, the Assistant General Manager of the bank vide his letter dated 29.1.1999 directed the petitioner to submit his reply/objection, if any, to the said enquiry report within 15 days. In response to it, the petitioner submitted his reply/objection on 4.3.1999. Thereupon the Assistant General Manager of the bank vide his letter dated 8.3.1999 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner indicating therein as to why he should not be dismissed from service with immediate effect. Thereafter the Assistant General Manager of the bank had proceeded to pass the final order on 31.3.1999 by which the petitioner was dismissed from service of the bank with immediate effect. The said order was communicated to the petitioner vide covering letter dated 31.3.1999. Against the aforesaid order the petitioner had filed an appeal on 14.5.1999 before the General Manager (P) of the bank, who vide his order dated 26.7.1999 had dismissed the appeal of petitioner and the said order was communicated to the petitioner vide his covering letter dated 29.7.1999. 3. Against the aforesaid order the petitioner had filed an appeal on 14.5.1999 before the General Manager (P) of the bank, who vide his order dated 26.7.1999 had dismissed the appeal of petitioner and the said order was communicated to the petitioner vide his covering letter dated 29.7.1999. 3. In this background, the petitioner had proceeded to file the writ petition in question with request to quash the orders dated 26.7.1999 and 31.3.1999 and to reinstate him in service with full arrears of salary, continuity of service alongwith all consequential benefits thereof. Finally the said writ petition was allowed by learned Single Judge on 25.4.2007, with following observations: - "34. In this connection only this much is to be observed that since I have held that the disciplinary inquiry has been found faulty from the stage of reply of charge sheet submitted by the petitioner, therefore, it is not necessary to decide the question of quantum of punishment while dealing with the aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage. However, I am of the considered opinion that the objections raised by the petitioner in connection of quantum of punishment have not been considered by disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, therefore, while concluding the disciplinary inquiry afresh, it shall be open for the disciplinary authority to deal with the question of quantum of punishment also having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 35. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion the writ petition is allowed and the petitioner is reinstated in service only for limited purpose of holding disciplinary inquiry afresh within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of the order passed by this Court. During this period the petitioner shall be treated to be under suspension and he shall also be paid subsistence allowance for the period during which a fresh disciplinary inquiry shall remain pending against him. In case the petitioner succeeds in disciplinary inquiry, the disciplinary authority shall also pass an order in respect of continuity of his service inasmuch as other consequential benefits of service including arrears of salary admissible and payable to him during the period he was out of employment on account of aforesaid impugned order of dismissal passed against him." 4. In case the petitioner succeeds in disciplinary inquiry, the disciplinary authority shall also pass an order in respect of continuity of his service inasmuch as other consequential benefits of service including arrears of salary admissible and payable to him during the period he was out of employment on account of aforesaid impugned order of dismissal passed against him." 4. Aggrieved by the said decision of the learned Single Judge, the present Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules has been preferred by the bank. 5. On the matter being taken up today, a preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent by contending that as the order in question is emerging from the exercise of competent and appellate jurisdiction by the higher authorities of the bank, the present special appeal arising out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, is not at all maintainable. 6. Shri P.K. Singhal, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the appeal in question is competent and is maintainable as the learned Single Judge has not at all considered and dealt with the case in its correct perspective. He has submitted that learned Single Judge has wrongly recorded the findings that the documents relied upon by the enquiry officer were photocopies and the same have not been proved. He has misinterpreted the statement of Management Witness-1 (MW-1). Question no.2 in cross-examination was in respect of occ register only. However, the original of MEX-2 was also produced before the start of cross-examination of MW-1 as is clear from the enquiry proceedings dated 8.12.1998. Learned Single Judge has not at all looked into the entire enquiry proceedings filed as Annexure CA-2 to the counter affidavit. The original documents were produced in the enquiry proceedings and thus, the entire exercise of learned Single Judge referring Sections 62, 63 and 65 of Evidence Act and recording findings on that basis are illegal and in ignorance of the material available on the record. Learned Single Judge was not correct in holding that the sole testimony of B. Taranath Pai could not be relied upon. The charge against B. Taranath Pai was of negligence only. He was the best witness to tell about the correctness of the mischief done by the petitioner. Learned Single Judge was not correct in holding that the sole testimony of B. Taranath Pai could not be relied upon. The charge against B. Taranath Pai was of negligence only. He was the best witness to tell about the correctness of the mischief done by the petitioner. Learned Single Judge was also wrong in holding that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority appears to be mechanical and without discussing the points raised by the petitioner. 7. Shri P.K. Singhal has also submitted that the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority clearly indicate that the points raised by the petitioner before both the authorities were duly considered. The punishing authority has considered the gravity of the misconduct of the petitioner and had clearly observed that the act committed by the petitioner was serious and grave in nature. The petitioner has adopted fraudulent and dubious means in order to achieve financial gains at the cost of the bank. In the public financial institution the employees of fraudulent nature are detrimental to the interest of the bank and such employee should not be allowed to continue in the service. The bank has lost the trust reposed on the employee and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are contrary to the record. The Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority had duly considered the objections raised by the petitioner in connection of quantum of punishment and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are contrary to the record. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on judgements of Supreme Court in Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC, Etawah and ors vs. Hoti Lal and another (2003) 3 SCC 605 ; State Bank of India and another vs. Bela Bagchi and ors (2005) 7 SCC 435 ; Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and another vs. Munna Lal Jain (2005) 10 SCC 84 ; Union of India and ors vs. P.Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 and a judgement of coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ A No.1088 of 2011 (J.K. Chandna vs. the Prathama Bank and ors) decided on 3.3.2016. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-respondent has vehemently opposed the special appeal by submitting that there is no infirmity in the order passed by learned Single Judge. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-respondent has vehemently opposed the special appeal by submitting that there is no infirmity in the order passed by learned Single Judge. He submits that in support of the charges levelled against the petitioner, one Sri B. Taranath Pai, Assistant Manager of Varanasi Main Branch of the Bank in question was examined as only management witness who himself was chargesheeted in respect of the same incident while working as Supervisor, hence he was highly interested witness and his testimony cannot be relied upon. More so, it was not corroborated and supported by any other independent witness and evidence in support of the said charge. He was also biased and impartial witness who had deposed under pressure. The documents relied upon by the bank were photostat copies and same have not been proved and therefore, the same could not be relied upon by the Inquiry Officer. The original papers were neither produced before the Inquiry Officer nor the Inquiry Officer had examined the same during the disciplinary inquiry nor the petitioner was permitted to inspect the original record. 9. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 10. Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules, as it stands at present, reads as follows: - "5. 9. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 10. Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules, as it stands at present, reads as follows: - "5. Special appeal.- An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award-(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge." 11. In Special Appeal No.1942 of 2008 (Sheet Gupta v. State of U.P. & others) decided on 11/12/2009, a Full Bench of this Court resolved the controversy regarding maintainability of Special Appeal (Letters Patent Appeal or Intra-Court Appeal) against a judgment of learned Single Judge of the High Court. The question was referred to Full Bench as there were two contradictory decisions of coordinate two Judge benches. The Full Bench held that the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 is a Central Act referable to Entry 33 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. In the present case, we find that as per Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the Court, the bar is only where the matter falls under the State and Concurrent List, whereas the bank is in List-I and as such, as per the provisions the objection so taken is unsustainable and, thus, the Special Appeal would lie. 12. In the present case, we find that as per Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the Court, the bar is only where the matter falls under the State and Concurrent List, whereas the bank is in List-I and as such, as per the provisions the objection so taken is unsustainable and, thus, the Special Appeal would lie. 12. What we find from the record in question is that the petitioner-respondent himself changed the name of beneficiary in the outstation collection, which was so deposited by the customer and the petitioner himself had reimbursed the amount in question. Shri B. Taranath Pai, Officer-in-Charge of the department had worked in good faith and was negligent only upto the extent of passing the slips, which were altered by the petitioner. It is also clear from the record that as a matter of fact the petitioner alongwith his defence representative was present throughout the enquiry proceedings, verified the documents sought for his defence, cross-examined the MW-1 and made submissions over the enquiry report, which goes to prove that the petitioner at every point of time had read and understood the contents of the chargesheet. It is also reflected that all relevant documents connected to the case in original as well as certified copies were also produced before the enquiry officer. He himself had verified the original documents on 21.12.1995, and originals of MX-2 had been summoned from Varanasi Main Branch and were produced before the enquiry officer. The same is very much reflected in the minutes of the enquiry, which has been brought on record alongwith the counter affidavit. 13. He himself had verified the original documents on 21.12.1995, and originals of MX-2 had been summoned from Varanasi Main Branch and were produced before the enquiry officer. The same is very much reflected in the minutes of the enquiry, which has been brought on record alongwith the counter affidavit. 13. We have also occasion to peruse the records in question and find that the role of MW-1 was restricted only upto the extent of releasing the slipsmount to the account holder as mentioned in the outward cheque of collection ledger whereas the petitioner had altered the name of the beneficiary, derived pecuniary benefits and later on reimbursed the amount and as such, we are of the considered opinion that the responsibility and nature of duty of MW-1 are entirely different than the petitioner and hence we cannot hold that MW-1, who had adduced his evidence as management witnesses, was in no way biased in the matter and the role and responsibility of MW-1 was only of supervisory in nature, which is entirely different from the role of petitioner and he was also adequately punished by the bank for dereliction of duty and as such, the view of learned Single Judge that he was highly interested witness and his testimony cannot be relied upon, more so when it was not corroborated and supported by any other independent witness and evidence in support of the said charge, is absolutely perverse and cannot sustain. The conduct of the petitioner-respondent was grave/serious in nature and admittedly he derived pecuniary benefit at the cost of the bank/customer and admittedly reimbursed the said amount at a later date. 14. We have also occasion to consider the second aspect wherein learned Single Judge has heavily relied upon that the original documents were not produced in the enquiry proceeding and as such, the entire enquiry is vitiated. It is relevant to indicate that at the relevant point of time the petitioner was working in the Outward Cheque for Collection Section. He unauthorisedly writtenltered the entries pertaining to the name of the account holder and S.B. Account No.13596 in respect of Outward Cheque for Collection 527/94 tendered by Shri Shiv Kumar Kothari in Outward Cheque for Collection ledger and thereafter fraudulently diverted the proceeds of the said Outward Cheque for Collection for Rs.4978/- to his SB Account and derived pecuniary benefits temporarily at the cost of the customer/bank. Admittedly the petitioner had participated in the enquiry. He had got an ample opportunity to protect his right and claim in the enquiry. The personal hearing was also accorded and the order passed by the competent authority has also been assailed in the appeal and the Appellate Authority had also held that at no point of time there was any violation of principle of natural justice. The orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority clearly indicate that the points raised by the petitioner before both the authorities were considered. The punishing authority has considered the gravity of the misconduct of the petitioner and had observed that the act committed by the petitioner was serious and grave in nature. The petitioner had adopted fraudulent and dubious means in order to achieve financial gains at the cost of the bank. In the public financial institution the employees of fraudulent nature are detrimental to the interest of the bank and such employee should not be allowed to continue in the service. The bank has lost the trust reposed on the employee. The Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority had duly considered the objections raised by the petitioner in connection of quantum of punishment and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are contrary to the record. 15. In State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra AIR 1963 SC 779 , the Supreme Court considered whether the High Court can interfere with the order of punishment simply because finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer in respect of some charges is found to be vitiated by an error of law and whether it can go into the sufficiency and adequacy of punishment. While reversing the order of Orissa High Court, which had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent, the Supreme Court observed: - “But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were 'unassailable', the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a Competent Authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the Inquiry Officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice.” 16. In State of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723 , the Supreme Court indirectly reiterated the proposition laid down in Bidyabhushan Mohapatra's case (supra) and held: - “The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the inquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding ... under Article of the Constitution.” 17. In Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh AIR 1969 SC 966 , the principle laid down in Bidyabhushan Mohapatra's case (supra), was reiterated. In State of Madras vs. G. Sundaram AIR 1965 SC 1103 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the following proposition: - “High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in a properly conducted departmental enquiry except when it be shown that the impugned findings were not supported by any evidence. It cannot consider adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge.” 18. In State of A.P. Vs. C. Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557 , a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court referred to the judgments of Syed Yakoob Vs. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , Bidyabhushan Mohapatra's case (supra), Niranjan Singh's case (supra) and observed: - “In considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court need not be applied. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , Bidyabhushan Mohapatra's case (supra), Niranjan Singh's case (supra) and observed: - “In considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court need not be applied. Even if that rule is not applied by a domestic tribunal in any inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a Court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.” 19. In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India (1995 ) 6 SCC 749, the Supreme Court, while considering the appellant's challenge to the order of punishment passed as a sequel to the departmental enquiry held against him, highlighted the limited scope of judicial review by making the following observations: - “Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of that case.” 20. In Tara Chand Byas vs. Chairman JT 1997 (3) SC 500 a bank employee was punished for giving loans without adequate security. The Supreme Court upheld the punishment. 21. In Tara Chand Byas vs. Chairman JT 1997 (3) SC 500 a bank employee was punished for giving loans without adequate security. The Supreme Court upheld the punishment. 21. In Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra AIR 1999 SC 625 , the Supreme Court again considered the High Court's power to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings and held: - “It is a settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the powernd jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Further, it is a well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority.” 22. In Regional Manager and Disciplinary Authority SBI Hyderabad vs. S. Mohad. Gaffar AIR 2002 (SC) 3037 the Supreme Court interpreted the words 'gross misconduct' as against the 'minor misconduct' under the 'Shashtriya Award' and 'Desai Award' applicable to the employees of the bank and held that the expression 'gross misconduct' is not to be viewed or considered as it may appear or appeal to the perception of the court. It has to be construed in the context of the definition. If any act is done prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence involves, or is likely to involve the bank in serious loss and where the employee of the bank knowingly makes a false statement in any document pertaining to or in connection with the employment with the bank, the findings on such issue would amount to gross misconduct. The penalty or punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority will not be treated to be excessive, shocking conscious of the court, if it is permissible. The High Court does not normally interfere or substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty than the punishment imposed by the bank. 23. Similar view was also taken in Union of India and ors vs. K.G. Singh (2006) 3 ESC 373 (SC) limiting judicial review to the deficiency in the decision making process and not the decision itself. In State Bank of India vs. T.J. Pal (1999) 4 SCC 759 the Supreme Court observed that proof of actual loss was not necessary for punishing a bank employee. In State Bank of India vs. T.J. Pal (1999) 4 SCC 759 the Supreme Court observed that proof of actual loss was not necessary for punishing a bank employee. In Union of India vs. Vishwa Mohan 1998 (4) SCC 310 it was held by the apex court that absolute devotion, diligence and integrity is required from the employees in the banking business, otherwise the confidence of the public will be impaired. 24. This Court has consistently held in D.S. Bisnoi vs. State Bank of India 2004 (1) ESC 381; Sudhir Singh vs. District Cooperative Bank 2003 (1) ESC 465; Ram Pratap Sonekar vs. Allahabad Bank 2000 (2) ESC 814; K.K. Singh vs. Gomti Gramin Bank 2002 (1) ESC 257, delivered by Division Benches, relying upon Disciplinary Authority vs. N.B. Patnaik 1996 (4) SCC 457 ; State Bank of India vs. T.J. Pant 1999 (4) SCC 759 , that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority of the bank based upon the enquiry report. Where full opportunity is given to the employee of the bank to defend himself, the High Court would not interfere in the findings on technical and flimsy grounds. In Disciplinary Authority vs. N.B. Patnaik (supra) the Supreme Court observed that even if no loss has been caused to the bank, an act beyond the authority of the officer of the bank amounts to misconduct. 25. In Dr. Ram Pal Singh vs. State of UP and ors (2006) 2 ESC 1182 Allahabad (DB) a Division Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction of court in the matters of challenge to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority is very limited. The Court cannot sit in appeal over such findings. It only reviews the manner in which the decision was taken. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters is confined to correct errors of law or procedural matters and violations of principles of natural justice resulting in miscarriage of justice. The judicial review is permissible against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. A similar view was taken by Division Bench in Sarvesh Kumar Sharma vs. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd and another 2006 (2) ESC 1153 . 26. The judicial review is permissible against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. A similar view was taken by Division Bench in Sarvesh Kumar Sharma vs. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd and another 2006 (2) ESC 1153 . 26. Apex Court in the case of Union of India and ors vs. P. Gunasekran, 2015 (2) SCC 610 has taken the view that High Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot venture into reappreciation of evidence or interfere with conclusions of enquiry proceedings conducted in accordance with law, or go into reliabilitydequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on which finding is based. In disciplinary proceeding High Court is not and cannot act as second court of first appeal. 27. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order passed by learned Single Judge cannot sustain on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Court in matters of challenge to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority is very limited. The Court cannot sit in appeal over such findings. It only reviews the manner in which the decision was taken. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India in such matters is confined to correct the error of law or procedural matters and the violation of principle of natural justice resulting in miscarriage of justice. The judicial review is permissible against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Special Appeal is allowed and the judgement and order of learned Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition stands dismissed.